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Foreword
IN I99I THE World Bank, with International Labour Of-
fice (ILO) contributions, published its policy paper on Vocational Educa-
tion and Training (VET). Since that time, the experience of reform of VET
in both poor and rapidly growing countries has pointed to new directions
in making skills more relevant for economies in which private sector em-
ployment has grown increasingly dominant. In addition, the problems of
VET in transition countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have come
to occupy the attention of the World Bank. Both the ILO and World Bank
have been monitoring VET reform in recent years, including in transition
economies, where the World Bank is a relative newcomer while the ILO
has longstanding expertise.
This book builds on the fruitful cooperation between the two institu-
tions at the policy as well as the operations level. VET policy experts at
both the World Bank and ILO participated equally in every aspect of this
study. Vocational Education and TrainingReform: Matching Skills to Markets
and Budgets perhaps has the distinction of being the first joint study of the
two institutions at the global level.
For years vocational education and training policy has been hotly de-
bated, and it continues to stimulate impassioned discussions in all parts of
the world. The debate concerns both costs and relevance and this book,
aptly subtitled Matching Skills to Markets and Budgets, gets to the heart of
these issues. It does so in an analytic rather than prescriptive manner, it
xix
XX FOREWORD
eschews broad generalizations in favor of insightful country-specific analy-
sis, but it still draws lessons that most countries would do well to heed. We
hope that the information presented here stimulates further research and
that the policy lessons engender useful change.
Robert Holzmann Maria Angelica Ducci
Director, Social Protection Director, Bureau for
Human Development Network External Relations and Partnerships
The World Bank The International Labour Office
Washington, DC Geneva
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Introduction
INDERMIT S. GILL, AMIT DAR,
AND FRED FLUITMAN
GOVERNMENTS OFTEN EXPECT their vocational education
and training (VET) systems to perform feats that they would not expect
from other systems such as general education. Governments have perceived
an increased demand for training if the labor supply shows rapid growth, if
employment grows quickly, or if unemployment increases significantly. They
have called upon VET systems to help unemployed young people and older
workers get jobs, to reduce the burden on higher education, to attract for-
eign investment, to ensure rapid growth of earnings and employment, to
reduce the inequality of earnings between the rich and the poor, and so on.
The list is disconcertingly long. These high expectations have resulted in
heavy government involvement in VET, but the record has been disap-
pointing. Both factors-exaggerated expectations and overly involved gov-
ernments-are probably responsible for the disappointments that have
plagued VET in many countries. Some countries now recognize that the
government's role as a VET provider has been overemphasized. Others are
slowly realizing that expectations of VET, even when the private sector and
nongovernmental organizations have fully participated in provision, have
been unreasonably high. This chapter traces the experience of countries in
reforming their VET policies and summarizes the lessons learned.
Previous Research by the World Bank
A research effort led by the World Bank that culminated in a policy paper
(Middleton, Ziderman, and Adams 1993; World Bank 1991) emphasized
I
2 INTRODUCTION
that the dual goals of VET policies should be to encourage private provi-
sion and financing and to improve the efficiency of publicly provided VET.
The basic approach the policy paper proposed was a two-step strategy. The
first step involves addressing important non-VET problems-in particu-
lar, improving access to and the quality of general, especially basic, educa-
tion; creating a regulatory framework that encourages investment in physical
and human capital; and instituting macroeconomic policies that foster sus-
tained output and employment growth. The second step entails the reform
of VET by assessing VET policies and evaluating the supply of VET in
relation to changing labor market demands, tailoring actions to country-
specific situations, and building commitment and maintaining support for
the implementation of policy reform.
In operationalizing this approach, countries face a number of constraints.
Middleton, Ziderman, andAdams (1993) list the most important obstacles
as inadequate financing of public VET systems, incomplete information
on private training supply, fragmentation of VET systems, weak informa-
tion links between training providers and employers, and weak institu-
tional capacity. While spelling out the constraints to improving the efficiency
and relevance of VET systems, they stop short of proposing strategies to
overcome these obstacles. The timing of their research effort also precluded
systematic analysis of the problems of formerly communist countries, whose
transition gathered momentum during the 1990s.
Scope and Sample
Based on the experiences of countries worldwide, this study examines the
constraints they face in implementing VET and related policies; analyzes
how some countries have successfully implemented reforms; and evaluates
VET reforms in central and eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and
other countries in transition to a market economy, such as China.
This chapter focuses on the obstacles to implementing change in re-
sponse to changing labor markets as well as innovative approaches to over-
coming these constraints. It introduces in summary fashion the results of
studies of 16 countries and 2 territories: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Re-
public, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Republic of Korea, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia,
Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza. They were selected to obtain
a regional balance and to present a broad range of economic and labor
market conditions (table 1). Moreover, these are places where the World
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TABLE 1
General Characteristics of Sample Countries
Population Per capita income GDPgrowth rate
Country (1995, millions) (1995, US$) (1990-95, percent)
Hungary 10 4,120 (1.0)
Poland 39 2,790 2.4
Czech Republic 10 3,870 (2.6)
Russian Federation 148 2,240 (9.8)
Kazakhstan 17 1,330 (11.9)
China 1,200 620 12.8
Indonesia 193 980 7.6
Malaysia 20 3,890 8.7
Korea, Rep. of 45 9,700 7.2
Chile 14 4,160 7.3
Mexico 92 3,320 1.1
South Africa 41 3,160 0.6
Tanzania 30 120 3.2
Zambia 9 400 (0.2)
Jordan 4 1,510 8.2
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 58 790 1.3
West Bank and Gaza 2 1,750 0.0
Note: Numbers in parentheses are negative.
Source: World Bank (1997); for West Bank and Gaza: World Bank data.
Bank and the International Labour Office (ILO) have recently completed
economic and sector studies. The results of two special papers-on the
lessons of Australia's comprehensive VET reforms for and the applicability
of Germany's dual system to low- and middle-income countries-are also
discussed. Australia and Germany were chosen because their reforms have
not been adequately analyzed, these countries are relatively new entrants to
the role of international advocacy, and there are unresolved issues regard-
ing the applicability of their training systems to developing countries.
Each of the 17 studies examined the labor market developments that
determine the demand for VET, the supply response of the VET system,
the problems that arise in matching demand and supply, and the major
innovations in resolving these problems. Labor market analysis was restricted
to labor regulations and indicators (labor supply, employment, unemploy-
ment, and wages) that are relevant to the demand for skilled and technical
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workers. VET supply responses were categorized into secondary and
postsecondary vocational and technical education, pre-employment voca-
tional training, and in-service or on-the-job training. The treatment of VET
issues emphasizes the distinction between public and private management,
financing, and provision. Innovations, defined as policies that efficiently
or equitably match the supply of VET with labor market demands, are
country specific, although some general lessons are drawn.
This chapter investigates both the demand-side pressures on VET sys-
tems, which can be viewed as the roots of reform, and the supply responses
or the nature of reform. It also examines special issues that arise in the
course of VET reform and draws some general conclusions based on the
experience of the countries included in the World Bank-ILO study. Boxes
provide country-specific examples. Note that while this chapter seeks to
draw general conclusions, it does so only on the basis of the experience of
the countries included in the World Bank-ILO study.
Given the complexity of this subject, the experience of particular coun-
tries may qualify, or even contradict, some of the general conclusions. There-
fore, this chapter may be best viewed as an introduction to the country
studies, which illustrate the uniqueness of experience in each country. We
are confident, however, that careful interpretation of the experience of our
sample countries will provide lessons that are applicable to most low- and
middle-income countries.
Demand-Side Pressures: The Roots of Reform
The sample countries can be classified into three groups according to their
labor market characteristics. The first group has high labor-force growth,
low employment growth, and consequently high unemployment and un-
deremployment rates. These are relatively low-growth developing coun-
tries in Africa and the Middle East, represented here by South Africa,
Tanzania, Zambia, Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza. The sec-
ond group has high labor-force and employment growth and low unem-
ployment rates. These are the emerging market countries of East Asia and
Latin America, represented here by China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea,
Chile, and Mexico.' The third group consists of those countries with low
labor-force growth, low employment growth, and high unemployment rates.
These are countries that are in transition to a market economy, represented
here by Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, and
Kazakhstan (table 2 and figure 1).2
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FIGURE 1
Labor Market Characteristics of Sample Countries
Hungary l_ _
Poland _
Czech Rep.
Russian Federation
Kazakstan
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Labor force growth
Republic of Korea _ Employment growth
Chile Unemployment
Mexico
South Africa
Tanzania
Zambia
Jordan
Arab Rep. of Egypt _
West Bank & Gaza
l__________ l l
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Percent
Source: Table 2 in this chapter.
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TABLE 2
Growth in the Labor Supply, Employment,
and Unemployment, Selected Years
(percent)
Laborforce Employment Unemployment
Country (1980-95) (1986-95) (1995)
Hungary (0.5) (3.4) 10.3
Poland 0.3 0.0 13.1
Czech Republic 0.3 0.9 3.4
Russian Federation 0.1 (2.4) 8.3
Kazakhstan 0.9 0.3 1.0
China 1.8 2.3 2.8
Indonesia 2.8 2.3 3.5
Malaysia 2.8 3.2 2.8
Korea, Rep. of 2.2 3.1 2.0
Chile 2.5 2.9 4.7
Mexico 3.2 2.7 4.7
South Africa 2.6 0.0 4.5
Tanzania 3.1 2.0a 4.0
Zambia 3.0 (0.1) 18.0
Jordan 5.0 2.9 16.0
Egypt 2.5 0.4 11.0
West Bank and Gaza 5.0 2.5a 20.0
a. Estimate.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are negative.
Source: ILO (1996).
An examination of the main labor market indicators-especially labor
force growth, employment and wage growth, and unemployment rates-
reveals the demand-side pressures on VET systems to change. The studies
show that there are common patterns in the manner in which countries
react to these pressures, but some countries have resorted to more innova-
tive measures.
Pressures Caused by High Labor-Force Growth
Large numbers of labor force entrants pose a problem for policymakers
when public employment growth is no longer feasible and private employ-
ment growth is sluggish. Countries such as Egypt, Tanzania, and Zambia
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have responded to labor supply pressures by expanding formal public edu-
cation and training systems and absorbing their graduates into government
employment. With the reduction in government employment and the
growth of the informal sector, the demand for and supply of skills are mis-
matched.3 This results in the VET system, which is largely formal, and
irrelevant in the increasingly informal world of work. For example, for-
mally trained workers constituted between 50 and 80 percent of entrants
into Egypt's construction sector in the 1970s and 1980s, but they accounted
for only 5 percent of employment in the 1990s. In Tanzania, where less
than 10 percent of employment is in the formal sector, graduates of public
training institutions have found only informal employment since govern-
ment employment began to decline in the late 1980s.
Because secondary school graduates face poor employment prospects in
countries where education systems are government run and financed, de-
mand for higher education can become bloated. Some countries have re-
sponded by rationing places in colleges and universities. The secondary
vocational track is usually the main instrument for this rationing. In Egypt,
for example, only general secondary school graduates are eligible for ad-
mission to fully subsidized universities, and the vocational track has swelled
to include almost 70 percent of secondary enrollment. Of course, this has
done nothing to rectify labor market imbalances: the Egyptian VET sys-
tem supplies five to seven times the required number of skilled workers.
However, the unsustainable financial burden of maintaining a large public
VET system has resulted in a deterioration of quality to the point where it
supplies at best semiskilled workers.
More effective responses to these pressures involve non-VET measures.
Countries that introduced cost sharing in higher education have kept en-
rollments down, while not expanding vocational enrollments unnecessar-
ily. Jordan, for example, expects university students to pay about one-third
of the costs in the form of fees, a level closer to that in countries such as
Chile and Korea. By contrast, Egypt, Tanzania, and Zambia recover less
than 5 percent of costs from college students. Obviously, the pressures to
absorb a growing number of young job seekers are most effectively met by
improving their employment prospects. With a rapidly growing labor force
and poor employment growth, Malaysia faced a similar situation in the
early 1980s. It emphasized primary and general secondary education (only
11 percent of secondary school enrollment is in vocational education) and
growth-oriented economic policies. As a result, employment growth out-
stripped the growth of the labor supply in the late 1980s and 1990s.
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Pressures Caused by High Employment Growth
Rapid employment growth can create problems, too. In the export-ori-
ented East Asian and Latin American economies, the supply of skilled work-
ers and technicians has occasionally fallen short of demand despite increasing
wages. In Malaysia during 1986-94, only a small fraction of the rising
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers was attributable to differ-
ential demand elasticity; technical and skilled workers had smaller supply
elasticities than did semiskilled and unskilled workers. In Korea unfilled
vacancies for skilled workers as a share of employment grew from 2 to 7
percent between 1980 and 1991. In China shortages of skilled workers
emerged following rapid growth over the past decade as a result of the
pressures to improve competitiveness and adopt modern technologies. The
demand for professionals and technically and manually skilled workers is
growing faster than supply. This imbalance may be exacerbated because
some state enterprises continue to hoard such workers. Since trade liberal-
ization in the 1980s, Chile has becoming increasingly concerned about
increased inequality in labor earnings between skilled and unskilled work-
ers because of a relative scarcity of the former.
Improving the supply responses for these skill categories requires re-
forms in the VET system. Korea's VET system appears to have responded
well to high growth in demand. While all workers experienced increases in
real wages between 1975 and 1993, the ratio of wages of professionals and
technicians to those of semiskilled and unskilled workers fell from 2.5 to
1.5. The expansion of private pre-employment education and training in
Indonesia led to a significant narrowing of wage differentials between un-
skilled and skilled workers before the current crisis. Chile's success in ex-
panding access to secondary and postsecondary vocational education may
partially explain the dedine in earnings inequality between 1987 and 1996.
Upgrading workers' skills is an important concern in these countries.
With rapidly changing demands for ever more sophisticated skills, enter-
prises are increasingly expected to supply their own training. Although this
avenue is largely free of the problems of mismatch between the demand for
and the supply of training, governments feel pressured to intervene because
of longer-term growth and equity considerations. The most important
question here is whether firms should be coerced or encouraged to provide
even more in-service training to workers. Firm-level data from Indonesia,
Malaysia (box 1), and Mexico show that firms are more likely to train
workers when these firms are large, employ an educated work force, and
invest in technological change (Tan and Batra 1995).
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BOX I
Determinants of Enterprise Training in Malaysia
Malaysia's manufacturing sector has experienced rapid employment and produc-
tivity growth. A 1994 survey of 2,200 firms indicates that formal training is not
widespread: 33 percent of firms provide no training, 50 percent rely on informal
training, and only 17 percent provide formal training. The likelihood of formal
training rises with firm size but is not universal, even in large firms. Employers
are more likely to train more educated workers. The survey cites the following
reasons for not training: mature technology, high training costs, lack of informa-
tion about training sources, and the availability of skilled workers from schools
and other firms.
A scheme allowing a double deduction for investments in training has not suc-
ceeded in increasing training and has now been reduced in scope. The main benefi-
ciaries have been large multinationals, which would have provided training anyway,
and smaller firms were often unaware of the scheme. A new levy-rebate scheme
appears to be more successful in increasing training, but it is too recent to be evalu-
ated. Although the scheme is efficiently managed, small firms exhibit significant
noncompliance.
The most common external sources for employer-sponsored training are pri-
vate providers: 35 percent of firms that train use private training institutes, 25
percent use joint-venture skill development centers, and 20 percent use advanced
public institutes. The least popular sources are public youth training centers and
vocational and technical schools.
Source-. Malaysia chapter in this volume.
Pressures Caused by High Open Unemployment
As a legacy of their communist past, many transitional countries were handi-
capped by narrow wage differentials across skill levels. The move to a mar-
ket economy has resulted in increasing returns to schooling. In Hungary
the rate of return to general secondary education increased 12 to 19 percent.
In Poland and the Czech Republic wage differentials across skill levels have
also widened, which is a welcome development in these countries, because
it improves private incentives to acquire and pay for education and training.
Rising unemployment and falling real wages are the most visible and
costly aspects of transition. Long-term unemployment is particularly per-
nicious, and governments are using active labor programs, especially re-
10 INTRODUCTION
training, to address this problem. Little reliable information about the ef-
fectiveness of these programs is available, since they have not been rigor-
ously evaluated, even in most countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) except the United States (Dar
and Gill 1998). In large part the problem is a fall in labor demand in the
formal sector. In Poland, for example, the number of unemployed for each
vacancy increased from 13 in 1990 to 87 in 1993. However, as the skill mix
required has changed, mismatches between workers and jobs arise. For in-
stance, Russian industry has shed clerical and professional staff, but job
growth has been mainly for manual and production work. Evaluations of
retraining programs in Hungary reveal that some workers do benefit from
training, and curriculum reform in schools has resulted in better worker-
firm matches, but not all mismatches can be rectified through VET. In
Russia, for example, most vacancies have been for manual and physically
demanding jobs, but unemployment is worse for women than for men.
Training may not result in reduced unemployment of women until indus-
try has restructured sufficiently, which may take many years.
The Czech Republic has dealt with the problem of a fall in formal sector
activity during the transition to a market economy in a relatively innova-
tive manner. A large component of the reduction in employment between
1990 and 1995 was countered by pushing or keeping people out of the
labor force, and reducing the incentives to stay unemployed. The Czech
Republic relied more on early retirement schemes and reduced levels and
stricter eligibility rules for unemployment benefits. Training programs have
been kept small. The number of new job seekers was kept temporarily low
by increasing enrollments in and the length of vocational education pro-
grams. Poland and Russia have also expanded vocational education in
schools. However, the success of this approach depends critically on the
success of policies to encourage mployment growth: the Czech Republic
appears to be alone in both encouraging private sector job creation and
increasing the incentives for job seekers to accept employment at relatively
modest wage levels (box 2).
All the transitional countries have experienced large increases in the share
of private employment despite labor hoarding in public enterprises. In
Poland, while total employment fell by 2.6 million between 1989 and 1995,
private employment grew by 2 million. During the same period in the
Czech Republic, private employment as a share of the total rose from 1
percent to 64 percent. By 1994 more than 60 percent of Russia's industrial
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BOX2
Reform of Unemployment Benefit Legislation
and Outflows to Jobs in Transition Economies
Reform of labor laws can have immediate effects on employment and unemploy-
ment rates. Shown below are outflows from registered unemployment in four tran-
sitional countries following the tightening of eligibility for unemployment benefits
and reductions in their size and duration. In all countries this resulted in increased
outflows from unemployment and (except in Poland) increases in wage employ-
ment in registered jobs. Although some of the outflows reflect exit from the labor
force, many workers are going into informal unregistered employment.
Outflowfrom
unemployment Filled vacancies
Country Reform period Before After Before After
Czech Republic 1/91-5/93 7.0 23.4 11.0 16.5
Slovak Republic 12/90-6/93 5.1 9.4 3.5 4.7
Hungary 4/91-4/92 6.2 8.0 3.4 3.8
Poland 1/92-3/93 - 4.3 2.5 2.2
- Not available.
Note: In all four countries, the main changes in regulations were announced in January 1992.
Outflows from unemployment and vacancies are monthly flows as a ratio of unemployed stock.
Source: Gill and Dar (1995).
The Czech Republic had the sharpest change in legislation and experienced the
most favorable changes in unemployment and employment. After February 1991
unemployed workers were ineligible for benefits and severance pay if they became
redundant because of organizational change, double payments of severance pay
and unemployment benefits were stopped in 1992, and the amount of income
allowed while receiving unemployment benefits was reduced. Low open unem-
ployment (that is, registered unemployment) has allowed the Czech Republic to
keep the size of public training programs, which are expensive and at best modestly
effective, small.
Source Country studies in this volume.
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work force was employed in privatized enterprises, and in Kazakhstan the
private sector had grown to more than one-third of employment. Even in
China the share of urban private employment has doubled since 1990 to
14 percent.
This change in the clientele of the VET system has spelled trouble for
vocational schools, many of which were traditionally attached to enter-
prises. In Russia, faced with declining overall employment, these institu-
tions have become less specialized. They now offer training in 10 to 15
occupations instead of 3 to 5 as in the past and have shifted from technical
disciplines such as instrument making and machining to service sector-
oriented training such as law and economics. In areas of high employment
growth, similar institutions in China have diversified their clientele to in-
dude programs catering to the specific skill demands of private enterprises.
Supply-Side Responses: The Nature of Reform
Drawing the sectoral boundaries of VET is difficult. Within each country,
VET is managed by a number of public agencies. It is financed both by the
government and by the private sector and provided by schools, training
institutions, and on the job. While this multiplicity of financiers and pro-
viders can be beneficial, the government has traditionally dominated the
sector. Therefore, VET supply in many countries is not characterized by
competition but by fragmentation. Several ministries often manage similar
training programs, leading to duplication of public provision and to the
crowding out of private supply that would be forthcoming.
Because skills can be provided in a wide range of settings, and because of
the multiplicity of providers, dividing VET supply into subsectors is not
easy.4 Nevertheless, it is useful to think of it as consisting of three parts:
vocational and technical education that is part of the formal schooling
cycle; pre-employment vocational training, which is usually outside the
schooling cycle; and in-service training for workers provided in or outside
the workplace. This distinction is used throughout this chapter and in all
the country studies.
Organization and Management of the VET Sector
The main government agencies involved in the management of VET are
the ministries of education and labor, although other ministries usually
play an important role. In our sample countries, ministries of education
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invariably managed vocational and technical education with the exception
of Zambia (table 3). In general, multiplicity of management is not a prob-
lem for this subsector, but in a few cases-generally countries where large
public enterprises managed the vocational schools that supplied them with
workers-ministries of labor and industry were also involved. Egypt, where
more than eight ministries manage their own vocational and technical schools,
is the extreme case in this regard. In some countries the nongovernmental
organization (NGO) sector is also becoming a significant player in the
management and delivery of vocational education. In Hungary, for example,
about 90 foundations deliver secondary vocational school education.
Ministries of labor usually oversee vocational training outside the for-
mal school cycle. The exceptions are Jordan, where it is under the purview
of the ministry of education, and Kazakhstan and Zambia, where the re-
sponsibility lies with other ministries. Responsibility for pre-employment
training, compared with school-based vocational education, is somewhat
more dispersed. An increasing recent trend is the involvement of tripartite
bodies of employers, government representatives, and individuals in the
management and provision of vocational training.
The responsibility for in-service training is considerably more dispersed
across ministries. In about half of the sample countries, this responsibility
lies with the ministry of labor, and in about half other ministries are re-
sponsible. The ministry of education rarely plays a role in managing in-
service training: only in the Czech Republic is the ministry of education
responsible for accrediting training providers if they wish to award recog-
nized certificates. The management of these subsystems determines how
they are used. Ministries of education may use vocational education in
schools to keep students out of higher education, for which they are also
responsible. Ministries of labor often provide training courses to unem-
ployed workers who are eligible for unemployment benefits. Ministries of
planning or finance sometimes view in-service training as a way to increase
investment and growth.
Vocational and Technical Education
Vocational education is distinguished from general education by its higher
cost of delivery, especially at the secondary level, and by the options it
opens or closes at the secondary and postsecondary levels. In Tanzania, for
example, the unit costs of vocational education are twice those of general
secondary education. To meet these higher costs, Chile's per student subsi-
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TABLE 3
Management of VET Systems
Subsector Ministry ofEducationa Ministry of Labor Other agenciesb
Vocational and Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico Czech Republic,
technical Hungary, Poland, Kazakhstan,
education Russian Federation, Zambia, Egypt
Kazakhstan, China,
Rep. of Korea,
Indonesia, Malaysia,
Chile, Mexico, South
Africa, Tanzania,
Egypt, Jordan, West
Bank and Gaza
Pre-employ- Indonesia, Mexico, Czech Republic, Hungary,'
ment training Jordan Hungary, Poland,' Kazakhstan,
and retraining Russian Federation, Malaysia,'
China, Rep. of Zambia,' Egypt
Korea, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Chile,
Mexico, South
Africa, Tanzania,
Egypt, West Bank
and Gaza
In-plant Czech Republic Czech Republic, Hungary,'
training Poland,' Russian Kazakhstan,
Federation, China,
Kazakhstan, Indonesia,
Rep. of Korea, Malaysia,c
Indonesia, Chile, South Africa,
Mexico, Tanzania, Tanzania,
Jordan, West Bank Zambia,' Egypt
and Gaza
a. Includes ministries of education and of higher education.
b. Includes individual ministries, other government bodies, and multiagency organiza-
tions such as training boards.
c. Training overned by tripartite training boards of employers, individuals, and the
government.
Source: Country studies.
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dies for secondary industrial and commercial schools are 25 to 100 percent
greater than those for general education. In Egypt secondary technical educa-
tion costs two-and-a-half times more than general education at the same
level. In these and many other countries, students who enter the vocational
stream cannot go on to a university education. In some places, such as the
West Bank and Gaza, the only avenue for further study for vocational stu-
dents is enrollment in community colleges or polytechnics. In other coun-
tries, such as Korea, the barrier is curriculum-related: entrance examinations
for universities are based more on the curriculum of general secondary
schools, so vocational school students face an uphill task competing with
their general secondary counterparts. As a result, parents have pressured
vocational schools to make their curriculum more general.
The effectiveness of school-based vocational education programs ap-
pears to depend on their objectives. The most common objectives are, first,
to keep less gifted students out of higher education and off the streets;
second, to keep people temporarily out of the labor market; and third, to
provide employers with skilled workers and technicians. Other objectives
include providing students with general vocational skills to prepare them
for lifelong learning or for postsecondary specialized training.
Experience shows that vocational education does not seem to be a cost-
effective way to keep less able students out of subsidized higher education.
For example, even a well-organized and powerful government has not had
much success in using vocational secondary education to curb the vora-
cious appetite of Koreans for higher education. Despite several measures to
increase vocational school enrollment-secondary school entrance exami-
nations for Korean primary school leavers are sequenced so that vocational
schools are favored, these schools receive an increasing share of the budget,
and parents are exhorted to send their children to vocational programs-
the government has not been able to attain its target of a 50-50 distribution
of secondary school students in vocational and general streams. In Egypt
attempts to maintain a heavily subsidized higher education system have
resulted in more secondary students being channeled into the vocational-
technical track (table 4). Because of budgetary pressures and because good
technical education is more expensive than general education, the quality
of instruction has fallen to abysmal levels. Since Tanzania's secondary en-
rollment rate is low, the high proportion in vocational-technical streams
does not pose a major budgetary problem. However, the high costs of voca-
tional education may thwart future attempts to raise secondary enrollment
ratios.
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TABLE 4
Size of Vocational-Technical Secondary Education Track
Secondary Number of students Vocational
Country enrollment ratio (thousands)' technical sharea
Hungary 81 135 73
Poland 84 2,206 67
Czech Republic 86 - 84
Russian Federation 88 6,277 60
Kazakhstan 90 1,750 33
China 52 15,300 55
Indonesia 43 4,109 33
Malaysia 59 533 11
Korea, Republic of 93 2,060 39
Chile 70 652 40
Mexico 58 - 12
South Africa 77 - 1
Tanzania 5 23 65
Zambia 20 - 2
Jordan 53 - -
Egypt 76 2,788 68
West Bank and Gaza - 53 4
- Not available.
a. For levels of secondary education at which students are streamed into general and
vocational-technical programs.
Source: Enrollment ratios: World Bank (1997); other data: individual country studies in
this volume.
Formerly communist countries traditionally had a high proportion of
secondary students (between 60 and 85 percent in many cases) in voca-
tional-technical streams. These countries now face both severe budgetary
pressures and a rapidly changing skill mix. The experience of the Czech
Republic during its transition to a market economy shows that vocational
education can be a cost-effective instrument for keeping people tempo-
rarily out of a labor market that is undergoing large-scale restructuring.
The Czech Republic's experience also reveals that several conditions are
critical for the success of this strategy. First, the government tackled non-
VET measures, such as macroeconomic and labor market reforms, simul-
taneously. This encouraged rapid private employment growth. Second, it
made vocational programs more general, so that graduates entered the un-
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certain labor market with appropriately general skills. Third, the govern-
ment financed expansion of vocational-technical education not by bor-
rowing, but by limiting public funding of universities. Finally, it made
vocational programs less terminal so that they remained attractive. While
in 1989 only 45 percent of Czech secondary students were eligible to apply
for higher studies, by 1995 this figure had increased to 60 percent.
The experience of rapidly growing countries suggests that vocational
education is most effective when used to meet current demand for skilled
workers and technicians. Making schools responsive to the changing de-
mands of employers is difficult, but in Chile a mix of financial incentives
and decentralization appears to have helped some of the agricultural and
industrial schools do just that. Per student subsidies for agricultural schools
in Chile are twice as large as those for humanistic-scientific schools, and
for industrial schools they are 50 percent higher. Assisted by these subsi-
dies, a private corporation for rural development has successfully responded
to employers' demands. Although rigorous evaluations are not available,
placement rates that range between 60 and 75 percent indicate that Chile's
model is quite successful. Left to their own devices, China's secondary vo-
cational and technical schools, which were each traditionally attached to a
single public enterprise, have diversified programs to better suit local in-
dustries' demands. The State Education Commission's schools and other
institutions provide tailored technical programs to 50 million adults, many
of whom are already employed. This has sometimes blurred the distinction
between vocational education in China's schools and vocational training
programs, which are shorter and more specific.
Vocational Training Programs
Unlike vocational education, vocational training usually falls outside the
formal schooling cycle. Thus, it varies more in terms of training duration
and entry requirements. Unlike in-service training, vocational training is
outside the workplace and is generally not intended for currently em-
ployed workers, but for those outside the schooling cycle who are seeking
work. The proportion of practical to theoretical instruction in vocational
training programs is higher than in vocational education, but lower than
in in-service training. Although secondary vocational education lasts two
to three years in Korea, vocational training programs take from one month
to three years. The curriculum for school-based vocational education in
Korea is 70 percent theoretical and 30 percent practical, but the ratios
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are reversed in training institutes. As in many countries, Indonesia's pub-
lic vocational training institutions target school dropouts, school and
university graduates, and homemakers; vocational schools only admit re-
cent primary school leavers.
Again, the success of these programs appears to depend more on their
objectives than on how they are designed and delivered. The main objec-
tives of the vocational training programs in our sample countries have been
to help unemployed workers find jobs, to prepare school leavers to enter
the labor market, and to upgrade the skills of employed workers.
Public training programs are usually not a cost-effective way to help the
unemployed find jobs. The experience of our sample countries is similar to
that of OECD countries (Dar and Gill 1998). However, these programs
have rarely been rigorously evaluated in developing countries, and their
costs have not been monitored. In Eastern Europe, where scientific evalu-
ations do exist, the findings suggest that while the impact of untargeted
public training programs is low, they have been somewhat more effective
for selected subgroups among the unemployed, for instance, for older, less
educated, unemployed workers in remote areas (box 3). Evaluations in in-
dustrial, transitional, and developing countries suggest that if public train-
ing programs are even moderately effective for job seekers who can be
classified as the poorest members of society, tightly targeted programs for
these groups can be justified on equity grounds. The training scholarship
program of the Chilean Ministry of Labor's National Training and Em-
ployment Service has not been carefully evaluated, but it appears to have
helped relatively disadvantaged workers such as women and former con-
victs. However, whether the participants are the worst-off among those
seeking employment is not clear.
Vocational training can be effective in preparing school leavers for jobs
if the delivery is competitive and the economy is buoyant. The experience
of Chile and Indonesia shows that when these conditions are met, effective
training programs can be delivered in different ways. Through the Minis-
try of Labor's National Training and Employment Service program, Chile
has used public subsidies to encourage relevant training for young people.
The program invited bids from private and public providers to deliver train-
ing programs for narrowly specified groups in specific locations; for full
payment to the provider, the program required a minimum fraction of
trainees to be placed in jobs on completion of training. Indonesia has cho-
sen a different route by encouraging unsubsidized, competitive, private
provision of training. Although public training centers enroll fewer than
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BOX3
Retraining Programs in Eastern Europe:
Efficiency and Equity Considerations
In response to rising unemployment and falling real wages, governments in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey instituted retraining programs in
the early 1990s. A recently completed study carried out jointly by the governments
of these four countries and the World Bank examined the effectiveness of retrain-
ing and other active labor market programs in these countries. The findings pro-
vide valuable lessons for other developing economies in designing, administering,
and monitoring their training programs. The following are the main VET-related
findings of this study:
* Shorter training courses are more effective than longer courses in raising
employment probabilities and earnings.
* Training by private providers is more effective than training by public
providers.
• Training does not benefit all groups. Retraining is a substitute for attributes
that lead to higher re-employment probabilities in the absence of any inter-
vention (for example, being younger, more educated, and from more dy-
namic regions). In other words, the program's value added in improving
labor market outcomes is greater for relatively disadvantaged job seekers.
Before the results of these evaluations were incorporated into the design of labor
market programs, public training schemes in these countries were more likely to
have young, educated job seekers from relatively dynamic regions. The results of
rigorous evaluations show that targeting job seekers who are disadvantaged in terms
of age or education or come from backward regions appears to better serve both
equity and efficiency objectives.
Source: Frerwell, Benus, and O'Leary (1998).
100,000 trainees, more than 1.5 million people are enrolled in private cen-
ters. Note that both Chile and Indonesia have had sustained output and
employment growth during the past decade.
Vocational training programs appear to be most effective when aimed at
helping employed workers upgrade their skills. Firms can send workers to
TABLE 5
Government In-Service Training Initiatives
Levy-grant system Other incentives
Country Rate' Used to finance Tax credit Subsidy
Hungary 1.5 Employment fund n.a. n.a.
Poland 2.0 Employment fund n.a. Trainee wages
Czech Republic
Russian Federation 1.5 Employment fund 1.5% of profits n.a.
Kazakhstan 2.0 Employment fund n.a. n.a.
China n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Indonesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Malaysia 1.0 Training fund Double deduction n.a.
Korea, Rep. of 0.5 Public centers n.a. n.a.
Chile n.a. n.a. 1% of payroll Trainee wages
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. Trainee wages
South Africa 0.5-2.0b Industry funds n.a. n.a.
Tanzania 2.0 Public centers n.a. n.a.
Zambia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Jordan n.a. n.a. n.a. Trainee wages
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
West Bank & Gaza n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. Not applicable.
a. Percentage of payroll.
b. Taxes levied by industrial training boards are either ashare of payroll costs or per employee.
Source: ILO (1996).
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training institutions for skill upgrading, rely on formal in-house programs,
or simply encourage on-the-job learning. Malaysia's enterprise survey (box 1)
shows that of the firms that train their workers formally, more than half
rely on external training providers, most commonly private training insti-
tutes and joint-venture skill development centers. Training provided in
public institutes, such as youth training centers and vocational schools,
which focus on training for first-time job seekers, is not popular with em-
ployers. Malaysia's experience suggests that for public expenditures on train-
ing programs to yield the highest payoff, targeting the "correct" clientele
may be at least as important as ensuring competition in delivery.
In-Service Training Initiatives
In-service training differs from vocational education and pre-employment
training by taking place in the workplace, that is, on the job; by being job
specific; and often by being relatively informal, even in the formal sector.
However, as noted earlier, the distinction between vocational training and
in-service training is sometimes blurred. All the sample countries had gov-
ernment initiatives to increase in-service training, which generally take the
form of levy-grant schemes, tax credits, and training subsidies (table 5).
The objectives of these initiatives are to encourage firms to pay for invest-
ments in their workers' general skills; to help school-to-work transitions
(for instance, through apprenticeships); and to help workers acquire job-
specific skills that are currently needed. Governments have used various
forms of coercion and financial incentives, with varying degrees of success,
to attain these objectives.
Few rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of these initiatives exist.
The scattered evidence suggests that mandatory requirements, levy-rebate
schemes, and tax incentives have at best a mixed record in increasing in-
service training. Despite simplifying the application process, Malaysia's
double deduction incentive for training has had little success in encourag-
ing training by firms (namely, small domestic enterprises) that otherwise
would not have trained their workers. The case of Korea, which has used all
these measures at one stage or another since the late 1960s, best illustrates
their effectiveness. In 1974 the government made in-plant training com-
pulsory for firms with more than 500 employees, and the number of train-
ees rose. In 1976 the government expanded this to include firms with 300
to 500 employees, but it gave firms the option to pay a levy instead of
providing the training. The number of trainees declined, and despite an
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eightfold increase in the levy between 1977 and 1985, about one-third of
the covered firms opted not to provide training. Recent evaluations have
indicated that the levy-rebate system has been ineffective in increasing in-
service training, and the levy-rebate scheme is being phased out. Chile dis-
continued its program in 1980, opting to subsidize training instead through
a tax credit scheme.
Extremely efficiently run levy-rebate schemes (for instance, with quick
processing of daims and simple administrative procedures) may lead to
increased in-service training by some firms. Malaysia's Human Resource
Development Fund, a levy-rebate scheme initiated in 1992, appears to have
increased the incidence of training modestly. Surveys find that about 50
percent of covered firms have increased their training since the scheme
began compared with about 30 percent of firms that are eligible but have
not registered. Despite being efficiently and transparently run, the scheme
still faces considerable noncompliance problems and uneven implementa-
tion across sectors. South Africa is the only sample country with a levy-
rebate scheme administered by industrial training boards. The evidence
does not appear encouraging: compliance is low despite the decentraliza-
tion of control, and the effectiveness in increasing training is doubtful.
Schemes that provide earmarked subsidies appear to have been more
successful in encouraging in-service training. In Chile the Ministry of Labor's
National Training and Employment Service uses a tax credit scheme to
encourage firms to send workers for training programs, and in Korea the
number of trainees rose sharply when the government subsidized in-plant
training between 1968 and 1971. However, these schemes have not been
evaluated carefully. Even if found to be effective, straight subsidies pose
obvious budgetary questions. Levy-rebate schemes have the advantage that
they are self-financing, but they may discourage employment because the
tax is levied on payrolls.
Critical Issues, Constraints, and Innovations
This section summarizes three important reform issues relating, respec-
tively, to the organization, provision, and financing and content of VET. It
is not intended as a comprehensive treatment of these aspects of VET. In-
stead, it focuses on aspects that are of interest worldwide, have received in-
depth treatment in the case studies, and have not been satisfactorily covered
in the last two sections. In particular, we discuss the main messages gleaned
INTRODUCTION 23
from studies on Australia's reforms since 1985 and the applicability of the
German dual system to low- and middle-income countries.
Reorganizing to Facilitate Continual Reform
Fragmentation because of the involvement of multiple government agen-
cies and the difficulty of obtaining timely inputs from employers and trainees
make it hard to ensure efficient and accurate feedback to VET suppliers
and quick reforms in response to this feedback. Sometimes the sluggish
responses prompt interventions by officials in higher levels of government.
Korea's Presidential Commission on Education Reform has helped to re-
solve contradictions between general and vocational secondary education
and higher education. Malaysia's Economic Planning Unit helps to moni-
tor whether labor market demands are being efficiently met and the changes
required to ensure that VET supply keeps pace with other efforts to reach
industrial country status by 2020. Chile's Planning Office played a crucial
role in the 1980s in designing VET policies and in determining the pattern
of government subsidies for general and vocational education. However,
the case of Australia, which launched reforms to ensure that its VET sys-
tem would be sustainable and self-adjusting as circumstances change, is
perhaps the most innovative.
Despite the expansion of Australia's VET system up to the mid-1980s, it
remained subject to criticism. Critics charged that the system was too in-
flexible to respond quickly to skill shortages or new labor market demands
and that it operated with procedures and standards that were out of date
and no longer cost effective. Australia's efforts to facilitate smooth and cost-
effective VET system responses to changing labor market conditions can
be classified into four sets of measures as follows:
* Combining the relevantgovernment agencies into one body at the federal
levelfor more coherent policymaking and allocation ofpublicfunds. Between
1975 and 1985 the federal government's actions had distinctly changed the
relationship between the ministries of employment and education. The
government had increased the Ministry of Employment's responsibilities
for developing traineeships, interacting with employers to determine the
types of training required, and implementing programs for the unemployed.
However, VET, which fell under the purview of state education ministries,
remained the country's major vehicle for the system's formal training com-
ponent. The federal government became unwilling to tolerate the division
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and combined the employment and education ministries into the Depart-
ment of Education, Employment, and Training. Bearing in mind that its
role in education was mainly as financier rather than administrator, the
federal government was able to take major initiatives in setting policy. Its
actions eventually led some states to combine their education and labor
ministries.
- Ensuring employers' and workers' participation in policy setting at the
federal and state levels. The second major reform was the establishment of
the Australian National Training Authority by the federal and state govern-
ments. The authority was established as a company, with the federal and
state governments being equal shareholders. These governments recognized
that their role in managing VET reform could not supersede the role of
employers and workers, so they were included, making the authority a tri-
partite body. The Australian National Training Authority embarked on an
ambitious plan to develop a nationwide assessment and certification sys-
tem and to encourage private training providers. The task was approached
on the understanding that the major responsibilities should not simply be
vested in government bureaucracies. The intent was to pass control of train-
ing from the supply side to the demand side.
* Shiftingsome of thefinancial burden ofVETinvestments onto the benefi-
ciaries. The financing of VET is as big an issue in Australia as in developing
countries. As in other countries, employers look critically at the costs and
benefits of training. State and federal governments are increasingly inter-
ested in having a more cost-effective system. Trainees and students, how-
ever, have probably been less concerned; when the reforms began, they
bore few direct costs for training. By the mid-1980s the federal govern-
ment, with its sole management responsibilities for higher education, was
finding it difficult to sustain its decision, made a decade earlier, to abolish
higher education fees. Consequently, it introduced a higher education con-
tribution, which initially covered 20 percent of the cost of higher educa-
tion. However, the federal government left it to the states to consider
introducing student fees for VET, which many of them did. To relieve the
burden on employers, the government in 1996 instituted a training wage,
which is below union wage levels. Trainees are thus being asked to bear a
greater share of the cost of training. Recognizing that the training wage
could fall below acceptable standards, the government proposed in 1996 to
top up the wage.
* Ensuring competition in provision so that the supply is cost effective and
relevant. The Department of Education, Employment, and Training intro-
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duced competitive bidding among training providers. Training courses were
put out for bids, and although the government system maintained its posi-
tion as the major supplier, others, including private providers, were al-
lowed to bid to become suppliers. The federal and state governments
concluded that employers should be allowed to use nongovernmental train-
ing providers (for apprenticeship training as well), even though in many
cases such providers did not yet exist. Through a system of financing, em-
ployers could buy training from any supplier rather than direct funds auto-
matically to the government system or to other government-funded
providers.
Australia's reforms contain these important lessons for developing and
transitional countries:
Expansion of VET without institutional change is rarely an answer in
itself The Australian experience shows the importance of basing reform on
sound institutions, without which investments run the risk of turning bad
systems into expensive bad systems. One particular problem concerns the
relations among the industrial partners, employers, and unions, and between
each of them and the VET system. In this respect, a great deal depends on
the broader relationship between the industrial partners and the govern-
ment. Such an approach is difficult to adopt in countries that have depended
on the public sector for their development. In the end, however, this is the
only way for these countries to get full value for their investments.
* Links with the labor market must be predominant. To keep links be-
tween the VET system and the labor market strong, the government must
examine its own internal structures and operations. Many countries have
experienced tensions between achieving educational and labor market ob-
jectives. Resolving these is not easy in industrial countries and may be even
more difficult in countries with well-entrenched public sectors where in-
teragency discussions are weak. Australia's solution was to amalgamate the
players into one portfolio. With the establishment of a single national min-
istry encompassing employment, education, and training, competing pri-
orities could be resolved closer to the operating level.
* Financing of VETshould reinforce, not contradict, marketforces. Allow-
ing market forces to work does not only depend on setting up institutions
that encourage industry to determine its own training needs. This can be
achieved by ensuring that costs are shared, but this is not the entire answer:
costs are best apportioned in a way that enables buyers to exercise judg-
ment. Again, this implies a shift in control away from the public sector and
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toward employers and trainees. Industry should become the main force
behind the development of VET training standards, assessment procedures,
and accreditation.
Encouraging Private Providers
The domination of VET by developing-country governments since the
1950s has often shut out private providers (private suppliers of training,
NGOs, and public-private partnerships) from the market for formal train-
ing. Private sector firms that sought external training for their workers were
generally steered toward public providers. Recognizing that a healthy pri-
vate supply of vocational training is good both for labor market efficiency
and for budgetary reasons, many governments are trying to encourage pri-
vate provision while at the same time "protecting" consumers from high
prices and malpractice. The requirements for success, as demonstrated by
some of our sample countries, appear to be as follows:
* Clear and lenient laws are necessary. Removing ambiguity about the
setting up of training firms results in a vigorous response, especially for
postsecondary training programs. The most striking case is that of Chile,
where streamlining the legal requirements for starting training firms in
1989 was accompanied by a rapid growth of unsubsidized private training
(box 4). With clear and balanced legislation, government financing may
not be necessary to bolster the demand for short training programs that are
expected to be followed by employment (and not further study). Legisla-
tion in Hungary that has permitted NGOs and public-private partnerships
to participate in the delivery of VET at all levels has also had a positive
impact. In many cases these partnerships are formed on a tripartite basis-
that is, they consist of government, employer, and union representatives.
For example, all Regional Human Resource Development Training Cen-
ters in Hungary are governed by tripartite boards and obtain equal por-
tions of funding from employers, individuals, and the government.
Malaysian training centers and many postcompulsory training centers in
Poland are now allowed to operate on a similar basis. NGOs are also enter-
ing the postcompulsory vocational training field, as they already have in
secondary-level schooling. In Hungary about 90 foundations deliver sec-
ondary school vocational education.
* Balancedfundingformulas are essential. Public funding can be used to
encourage private provision of longer, for instance, secondary, technical-
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BOX4
Private Provision of Postsecondary Education in Chile:
The Importance of Transparent Legislation
Since the early 1980s, Chile has reformed the financing and regulatory mecha-
nisms for its postsecondary education and training institutions. Before the reforms,
all postsecondary education was provided by eight universities that were allocated
one-third of the government education budget. Private training institutes were pro-
hibited from offering postsecondary technical programs. A 1980 law established
minimum requirements for setting up postsecondary institutions, but proposals
were dealt with on a case-by-case basis until 1988. In the first nine years after the
reforms, the number of universities grew from 8 to 34, the number of professional
institutes from 0 to 41, and the number of technical training centers from 0 to 133.
In 1989 the government clarified the requirements for establishing postsecondary
institutions and began treating proposals quickly and uniformly. Within a year the
number of universities and professional institutes had doubled, and the number of
technical training centers had increased by 25 percent. The table shows the per-
centage of these that relied on public subsidies. Note that much of the expansion in
supply since 1989 is in the private unsubsidized sector, which indicates that gov-
ernment support for these institutions through clear and balanced legislation is
more important than public subsidies.
Number of Postsecondary Institutions, Selected Years, 1980-90
Institutions 1980 1986 1989 1990
Universities 8 20 34 60
Percentage without
public funds 0 15 41 66
Professional institutes 0 24 41 82
Percentage without
public funds 0 70 93 97
Training centers 0 86 133 168
Percentage without
public funds 0 100 100 100
Source: Chile chapter in this volume.
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vocational programs. In Chile only 28 percent of secondary vocational
school enrollment was private in 1980. By 1993 this ratio had more than
doubled, thanks to a new funding formula that did not discriminate be-
tween public and private providers. In Hungary, by contrast, special fund-
ing for public training institutions has discouraged private providers.
* Growth of relevant employment is a critical prerequisite. People often
assert that supplying technical training requires large set-up costs and that
private entrepreneurs would shy away from these investments. They argue
that training for commercial fields, such as in languages and secretarial
skills, is cheaper to provide and hence private providers would be more
willing to supply it. They cite this as the rationale for government provi-
sion of technical training, even where it is accepted that the government's
role in provision should be curtailed or reduced. The experience of our
sample countries shows that when private providers are not discouraged by
stringent laws, rapid industrial growth can lead to a strong private supply
of technical training. In the Czech Republic, where manufacturing em-
ployment has grown rapidly since 1993, all new technical training pro-
grams are privately provided.
- Universal accreditation schemes are not necessary for a healthy private
supply. Little empirical support is available for the popular belief that low
quality training at exorbitant prices will result unless private providers are
tighdy regulated (for instance, by requiring that all providers meet standards
set by the government). In Indonesia, which does not have an accreditation
scheme, two-thirds of secondary and postsecondary technical-vocational
enrollment is in private institutes. Regulations in Chile and the Czech Re-
public stipulate that private providers must be accredited if they intend to
apply for public subsidies but not otherwise. In Russia accreditation is
necessary only if providers wish to award certificates recognized by the
government. The experience of these countries-which span a broad eco-
nomic and institutional spectrum-shows that a government-organized
system of accreditation is neither necessary nor sufficient for a balanced
private system of training. The experience of other countries shows that
government-run accreditation systems, which are intended to inform people
of quality levels, can easily degenerate into licensing regimes that rule out
the existence of nonconforming firms. This discourages the development
of a vigorous private sector.
* Unplannedpublic provision crowds outprivate supply. Many countries
make VET policy decisions based on a poor or incomplete picture of pri-
vate supply. Indeed, relying on government sources of information, we found
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it difficult to compile a table on the share of the private sector in providing
VET. The case of Indonesia, which has experienced rapid growth of private
VET supply, best illustrates the dangers of an unplanned expansion of public
training. Originally, the government was to provide only high-cost train-
ing programs (for example, for technicians and mechanical operators), but
erratic and declining external funding forced public centers into lower-cost
areas, such as commercial programs, for which trainees were willing and
able to pay. However, this area was already well catered to by fee-charging
private centers. Rather than helping private suppliers, subsidized govern-
ment centers ended up crowding out some private providers.
When VET policies are well designed, a vigorous private supply response
can be forthcoming. In Chile funding mechanisms require public provid-
ers to compete on equal terms with private firms. As a result, private firms
now supply a healthy portion of commercial, industrial, and agricultural
secondary education. For shorter courses that lead trainees directly to jobs,
Chile's experience shows that clear and balanced legislation may be even
more important than government subsidies. Although these conditions are
necessary, they are not sufficient. For a vigorous private supply of training,
the demand for the skills that these programs provide must also exhibit
growth. Generally, the willingness to pay for skills that are relatively gen-
eral, such as English language proficiency and computer-related and secre-
tarial skills, arises sooner than for comparatively specific skills, such as those
required to obtain work as a technician or machinery operator. As a result,
when regulations are favorable, the private supply of commercial training
emerges first. The Czech Republic's experience shows that with the growth
of demand for technical skills, brought about by growth in the modern
manufacturing sector, the private supply response for technical training
can be equally vigorous. In light of these findings, two popular beliefs should
be reconsidered: government provision of technical training is necessary
because the private sector is "reluctant" to enter this field because of risks or
costs, and universal (government) accreditation schemes are necessary to
ensure that the "poor are not taken advantage of" by profit-seeking train-
ing firms.
Implementing the Dual VET System
The problem of strengthening the links between education and employ-
ment preoccupies policymakers in all countries. In countries that are grow-
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ing rapidly, this preoccupation stems from the concern that the economy's
demand for skilled workers will outstrip its supply. In countries where eco-
nomic growth is slow, the concern may arise as a result of growing unem-
ployment among young people. In both cases this attention often turns
into efforts to make curricula more vocational, to involve employers in
schooling decisions, to increase pre-employment training, or to create in-
centives for employers to participate in apprenticeship training. These at-
tributes are all associated with the current German approach to VET,
commonly referred to as the dual system. The dual system is attractive for
countries at all stages of development. In our sample countries, the Czech
Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, and Poland all have some form
of this system, and other countries, such as Kazakhstan, Tanzania, and Zam-
bia, are considering adopting this approach.
The system is referred to as dual, because schools and employers respec-
tively provide vocational education and occupational training simulta-
neously, that is, during a single program of work and study. Theoretical
aspects of training are provided in publicly run and publicly financed vo-
cational secondary schools, and practical aspects in firms that provide and
finance apprenticeships. Apprentices spend one or two days each week in
vocational schools, and the remainder in firms. In small firms apprentices
usually acquire skills through learning by doing; in larger firms training is
often in specialized centers. In Germany the formal vocational education
component was introduced many years after the vocational training part
had been refined, but this sequence is ordinarily reversed in developing
countries trying to adopt the dual system. In these countries a public voca-
tional education system usually exists, and governments attempt to tack on
an apprenticeship program to make the system a dual one.
A pertinent question to ask is whether the following employment struc-
tures and institutions of countries that are trying to import the system are
similar to Germany's:
i Sectoraland size distribution offirms. Almost 90 percent of employment
in Germany is in manufacturing and services, sectors where most appren-
ticeships are provided. This ratio is considerably lower in low-income coun-
tries; for instance, it is about 45 percent in Egypt and Indonesia. Even in
the relatively modern manufacturing and services sectors in developing
countries, employment is concentrated in microenterprises and small-scale
enterprises. Germany's experience with the dual system shows that extremely
small firms generally do not provide apprenticeships; when they do, they
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often do not retain trainees who complete their apprenticeships. In devel-
oping countries where small firms dominate even the regulated formal pri-
vate sector, this would imply low participation in such a system.
* Regulation and union coverage. Firms in developing countries are more
likely than German firms to be unregulated and to have weak union repre-
sentation. Therefore, it may be difficult for the government or unions to
ensure that employers conduct apprenticeships in conformity with estab-
lished standards and regulations. In the German handwerk sector, which
most resembles manufacturing and services sectors in developing coun-
tries, many German firms use trainees as cheap, flexible labor. In most
developing countries the absence or nonenforcement of minimum wage
legislation reduces the need for firms to use apprenticeship wage laws to
avoid hiring untested workers at high entry wages.
* Capacity to bear high costs. Because of both tradition and pragmatism,
firms in Germany bear the high costs of the vocational training component
of the dual system, but in our sample countries firms tend to be reluctant
to bear the costs of apprenticeships. Faced with private firms' reluctance to
finance the vocational training component of the dual system, developing-
country governments may be tempted to bear the entire burden, but they
should weigh this decision carefully. It appears that the poorer the country,
the greater the real burden of implementing a German-style dual system.
Although the annual unit cost of the dual system in Germany is about the
same as its per capita gross national product, simulations show that this
ratio is greater than two in Korea, more than three in Indonesia, and more
than four in Egypt (box 5).
Although the German system is not directly importable, the following
principles underlying it provide valuable lessons that are relevant across a
broad socioeconomic spectrum:
* Participation in the dual system is voluntary. Even some firms that are
qualified to offer apprenticeships do not do so. In addition, employers are
under no obligation to retain trainees upon their completion of the dual
program, and less than half do. Developing-country governments trying to
adopt the dual system while using coercive measures, such as mandated
training requirements or forcible retention of apprentices, should be in-
formed that this is inconsistent with the German system.
* The organization and control of vocational education and training are
left to the body that pays for the instruction. State and local governments pay
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BOX 5
Costs of the Dual System in Low- and Middle-Income Countries
In Germany the government pays for and controls vocational education in schools,
and employers finance and manage apprenticeship training. Using a simple meth-
odology, we impute the annual unit costs of a dual system participant to equal
US$17,200 in Korea, US$2,750 in Egypt, and $2,250 in Indonesia. For example,
the imputed cost of putting an Indonesian trainee through the dual system is about
US$7,000. This imputed measure is almost identical to the actual cost of a dual
system pilot program in Indonesia reported in independent surveys.
Unit Cost of Dual System Components, 1991
(1991 U.S. dollars)
Actual or imputed cost
Vocational Ratio of total
Country Training education Total to GNP/capita
Germany 17,700 3,300 21,000 0.9
Korea, Rep. of 14,500 2,700 17,200 2.3
Indonesia 1,900 350 2,250 3.1
Egypt 2,350 400 2,750 4.2
Source: Country studies in this volume.
for and control the relatively general skills that are acquired in school, and
employers pay for and determine the job-specific training acquired in the
workplace. Efforts by developing countries to adopt the German dual sys-
tem often violate this principle and allow governments, not employers, to
take the lead in organizing and financing vocational training.
* Education and the dual system appear to be complements. Germany does
not use the dual system to keep high school graduates from pursuing higher
education. In fact, the education level of Germany's dual system entrants
has risen significantly over time, as the pace of technological change has
increased the importance of general education relative to specific skills.
Poorer countries may be better served by government efforts to improve
general education levels rather than allocate scarce resources to public vo-
cational education programs or government-led apprenticeship schemes.
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Summary and Lessons Learned
As stated earlier, given the complexity of this subject and the large varia-
tions in the characteristics of the countries studied, the following summary
may not adequately represent he experience of some of the sample coun-
tries. A full appreciation of VET reforms can perhaps only be obtained by
r eading the individual country studies. However, some general essons can
be drawn from these disparate experiences.
At the risk of oversimplifying the complex changes in the countries stud-
ied, we can summarize the ingredients of success in VET reforms as follows:
* Successful reforms make school-based vocational education more like
general education in two ways: the content is made more general, and the
vocational-technical track is made less of a dead-end.
* Successful reforms combine public financing of pre-employment train-
ing with rigorous evaluation of program impact and ensure competition
between providers in delivery.
* Successful initiatives to encourage in-service training recognize that
fiormal training is not widespread, even in formal sector enterprises; that
mandatory training targets and levy-rebate schemes do not increase train-
ing significantly; that tax incentives work only where tax coverage is com-
prehensive; and that while subsidies may increase training, they will also
increase expenditures.
The main messages gleaned are as follows:
* Matching instrument o target group is as important as picking the best
delivery mode. Regardless of the mechanisms through which VET is sup-
plied (public or private, subsidized or unsubsidized private), it is critical
that these programs target groups that will most benefit from them. This is
because VET is more effective when used for some purposes (for instance,
Ito meet clearly observed, current labor market demands), than for others
(such as keeping less gifted students out of higher education or helping the
unemployed find jobs). In most cases VET programs are more expensive
ithan alternatives, such as general education and job search assistance. In
imatching instruments to objectives, most developing countries are only
now appreciating the importance of scientific evaluations.
* Preoccupied with providing or financing VET many governments have
neglected their roles as providers of information about the availability and
effectiveness ofvocationalprograms. An expansion of this role may be one of
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the most effective ways for governments to foster a relevant and cost-effec-
tive VET system. Better information about VET programs helps
policymakers redesign their VET policies and interventions so that private
providers are not crowded out of the market. Wider access to information
on the availability and quality of training supply can protect prospective
trainees from unfair trade practices better than can government-run ac-
creditation schemes and stringent licensing practices in countries where
institutional factors circumscribe the regulatory powers of government. In
general, this role has been overlooked or underemphasized. The lack of
reliable information about public training programs and privately provided
VET programs in most of our sample countries is striking evidence of this
neglect.
- A vigorous private response has refuted claims of the reluctance ofprivate
providers to enter thefield. The experience of our sample countries indicates
that when VET policies are designed to encourage rather than replace the
private sector (either private training providers, NGOs, or public-private
partnerships), a vigorous private supply response can be forthcoming. Thus,
for example, public funding mechanisms that require public providers to
compete on approximately equal terms with private trainers can result in
the latter acquiring a healthy portion of the market for longer vocational
education programs. Experience also shows that for shorter courses that
lead trainees directly to jobs, clear and balanced legislation seems to be
even more important than government subsidies. However, while these
conditions are necessary, they are not by themselves sufficient. For a vigor-
ous private supply of training, there must also be growth in the demand for
skills that these programs help workers acquire. Generally, people's willing-
ness to pay for skills that are relatively general (for instance, language pro-
ficiency and computer skills) arises sooner than that for occupation-specific
skills (for example, as technicians or operators). As a result, with balanced
regulations, the private market for commercial training emerges before that
for technical programs. 'Where the demand for technical skills has grown
because of the growth of modern manufacturing, and the regulatory con-
ditions are favorable, private supply responses for technical training have
been equally vigorous. In light of these findings, the private sector should
not be viewed as reluctant to enter this field.
* Political will, not institutional capacity, is the main obstacle to compre-
hensive reform of VET systems. This message is based on the experience of
countries worldwide (for example, Australia in the OECD, Chile in Latin
America, the Czech Republic in Eastern Europe, and Korea in East Asia).
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Resistance to the reallocation of responsibilities and government funds in
response to changing labor market conditions may be overcome (as in Aus-
tralia) by comprehensive reforms that consolidate responsibility for
policymaking and oversee public spending on education, training, and
employment under one umbrella; implement institutional measures to in-
volve employers and workers in determining VET policy; and reduce sig-
nificantly the role of government in supplying VET by restructuring
financing rules to encourage rather than crowd out private provision. This
is a tall order for any country, but the most important prerequisite is the
political will to reform, which is perhaps neither dependent on a country's
wealth, nor on its level of institutional advancement.
Notes
1. The financial crisis in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea has dampened em-
ployment growth and led to an increase in unemployment since late 1997.
2. Countries may fit into more than one group. For example, China is in tran-
sition and has high employment growth, and Mexico has experienced both high
growth and high unemployment episodes.
3. In South Asia the share of the urban informal sector in nonagricultural em-
ployment is about 60 percent. In Africa the share of wage employment in the labor
force declined from 12 percent in the 1980s to 9 percent in the 1990s. In Latin
America, by contrast, urban formal employment grew faster than the informal
sector during the 1980s and 1990s.
4. One of the emerging trends in education and training is lifelong learning,
which incorporates three interrelated topics: civics and consumer education, lit-
eracy and foundation skills, and occupational skills. A few of the countries in the
sample have recently been attempting to develop a lifelong credit system for skills
training that will allow individuals to accumulate skills and qualifications through-
out their working lives. However, this study does not examine the issue of lifelong
learning in detail.
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PARTJ Transition Economies
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION and training systems in coun-
tries in transition to a market economy face a double challenge. First, they
must transform themselves: developed to serve a centrally planned economy
and geared toward technologically backward industrial production, they
must become compatible with an economy based on market principles
that incorporates a greater variety of industrial production and services.
Second, they must contribute to the health of that market-based economy.
Part I analyzes how the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
and the former Soviet Union (FSU) are coping with these two challenges.
In Hungary, the first of the reformers, the duration of primary educa-
tion has increased, and the age of entry to vocational education has been
postponed. Moreover, the relative roles of the state and the private sector in
providing training outside the school system have changed. Many state
training centers, which once were important, have been closed or priva-
tized, and many must compete with private training institutions for pub-
licly financed contracts to retrain the unemployed.
In Poland, however, the amount of public funds spent for training has
remained low, and the people involved in labor market training are still few
in number. The main reason is that few vacancies can be filled on the basis
of retraining. Vocational education has traditionally been organized along
sectoral lines, with schools focusing on a single sector and switching from
one vocation to another only with difficulty. The industrial and vocational
education structures have proven to be a major barrier to industrial and
regional development during the transition. But Poland is the only for-
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merly socialist country that has maintained a successful traditional appren-
ticeship system in the handicraft sector.
Vocational and technical education in the Czech Republic has been made
more general. No longer is it a dead-end. Financing rules and regulations
have been changed so that private and public schools benefit from the same
financial arrangements and face the same incentives for cost sharing with
students and firms. Most private schools are in the secondary technical
sector, a development unique to the Czech Republic. (Private schools in
other CEE countries are mostly primary or general secondary.) A lenient
law for setting up training centers has encouraged the private provision of
education in the Czech Republic; accreditation requirements are more strin-
gent, but accreditation is needed only if certificates are to be issued or
public funds are sought. Unlike other CEE countries, the Czech Republic
has relied more on restricting labor supply (by delaying the entry of youth
into the labor market and by expanding the secondary education system)
and less on propping up labor demand through interventions.
The countries of the former Soviet Union face these challenges under
more uncertain political and economic conditions, and under more acute
financial constraints. Most educational institutions in the Russian Federa-
tion continue to cling to the old ways. One major change has been to allow
private institutions. But private training provision has been slow to grow,
in part because of the attitude of accrediting authorities toward private
schools, which they view as a threat to the public system. Many vocational
schools continue to be aligned with specific enterprises, but apart from this
there is little involvement by employers. The curriculum is developed at
the center, either in ministries or methodological institutes. The main issue
facing policymakers is how to make the system more responsive to changes
in the labor market. Financial constraints mean that new alternatives must
be found to finance the needed improvements. However, efforts to share
the costs of vocational training with the beneficiaries, particularly the trainees
themselves, are limited by legislation: initial vocational training is by law
free to the participants. Russia has not yet begun to address the fundamen-
tal question of how to reform its VET system.
In other FSU countries, such as Kazakhstan, the VET system continues
to operate in ways suited to a command economy. For example, it churns
out trainees for manufacturing and agriculture even though these sectors
are declining relative to trade and services. The VET system is in dire fi-
nancial straits, but it is not alone in that. Kazakhstan presents the classic
dilemma in vocational education and training, best summarized in the phrase
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"training for what?" The government appears to have been unable to an-
swer this question and has given VET a low priority. Despite the problems
that VET is facing, the government of Kazakhstan has been correct in its
decision not to accord vocational education and training a high priority.
Economic development has been slow and uncertain, giving rise to a poor
labor market and slowing any investments in VET by employers. The rel-
evant government agencies have been unable to define a role for them-
selves. But the low priority accorded to vocational education and training
while the economy takes the path of transition to market should not lead
to its desertion by government: even decisions not to reform should be
taken deliberately.

Hungary
MARTIN GODFREY
HUNGARY BEGAN its transition to a market economy ear-
lier than its neighbors, taking significant steps during the 1980s toward
enterprise reform and decontrol of prices and wages. The process gathered
speed after 1989 with the change in the political system and the demo-
cratic election of a government committed to full liberalization of the
economy.
At the outset of the transition Hungary had many advantages in addi-
tion to its early start. In particular, its population, though small, is well
educated. With an adult literacy rate estimated at 99 percent, the country
is placed in the top category for human development by the Human De-
velopment Report (UNDP 1995). The 1990 census showed that 78 per-
cent of the adult population (ages 15 or older) had at least eight years of
primary education. The 1992 round of the Household Panel Survey found
that 33 percent of unskilled workers and 81 percent of skilled workers had
a postprimary qualification, and that 64 percent of managers had a tertiary
qualification. Moreover, education is of high quality: in 1991 tests placed
Hungary second only to Japan in achievement in science among 13-year-
olds (OECD/CCET 1995).
As table 1-1 shows, Hungary's population continued to fall during the
1990s. By 1994 it was 4 percent below its level of 14 years earlier. The
economy collapsed in the early 1990s, partly because of the process of
itransformation, partly because of the disintegration of the Council for
NMutual Economic Assistance trading system and of the Soviet Union, and
partly because of difficulties in gaining access to new markets. Industries
4'
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TABLE 1-1
Trends in Population, Output, and Income, 1989-94
(percent)
Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Population (thousands) 10,578 10,365 10,346 10,324 10,294 10,261
Rate of change in real GDP 0.4 -3.3 -11.9 -3.0 -0.8 2.0
Share of industry in GDP 30.0 27.0 27.0 24.0 24.0 -
Share of services in GDP 37.0 41.0 53.0 53.0 55.0 -
Rate of change in real GDP
per head 0.4 -2.1 -11.7 -0.2 -0.3 2.3
Rate of change in real wages 0.9 -3.7 -4.0 1.4 -0.8 3.1
-Not available.
Source: UNICEF (1995); World Bank (1995a).
linked to old structures and trading systems, such as metallurgy and engi-
neering, were hit particularly badly. Structural change has consisted mainly
of fast growth in the services sector, and the shrinking of agriculture from
about a third of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1989 to about a fifth in
1993. Real GDP per head and real wages have fallen substantially and, as
unemployment and inequality in income distribution have increased, so
has the incidence of poverty (World Bank 1995b). Hungary's GDP per
head, equivalent to US$3,981 in 1994, remains the highest among Central
and Eastern European countries. While the upturn in economic activity
during the past few years is welcome, some doubt its sustainability.
Hungary failed to achieve as smooth a transition as many had expected.
One of the most important reasons was the fall in export earnings by al-
most 30 percent since 1989 because of a combination of labor cost and
exchange rate factors (Godfrey 1994). As a result, the current account has
gone into substantial deficit, and the debt-service ratio, which had begun
to fall during the early 1990s, has risen again to an alarming extent. Since
the government budget deficit in 1994 was equivalent to 7.5 percent of
GDP-one of the highest such ratios in Central and Eastern Europe-
fiscal and monetary policy has had limited room for maneuver. The need
to restore external and internal balance has forced the government to con-
centrate on stabilization rather than on transformation and revival.
Nevertheless, the economy is being transformed in many respects (table
1-2). The private sector's share of GDP has grown dramatically. As far as
employment is concerned, the public administration resisted attempts to
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TABLE 1-2
Estimated Private and Public Sector Share in GDP
and Employment, 1990-94
(percent)
Enterprise share 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Private sector share in GDP 16 18 25 65 70
Share in total employment of
Public administration - - 16 17 21
State-owned firms - - 39 34 24
Local-government-owned enterprises - - 5 5 4
Cooperatives - - 7 6 5
Joint ventures - - 9 11 13
Private enterprises - - 14 17 21
Sole proprietors - - 10 10 12
Total - - 100 100 100
-Not available.
Source: Labor Research Institute (1995).
reduce its size (at least until 1995-96). Yet the fall in employment in state
enterprises in particular has been reflected in an increase in private sector
employment from 33 percent of total employment in 1991 to 46 percent
in 1994.
Although employment in the private sector has been rising, this has not
prevented total employment from falling from around 5.0 million in 1991
to 3.5 million in 1995. This reflects partly an exodus from the labor force
and partly the painful emergence of mass unemployment. The level and
rate of unemployment reached their peaks in 1993, but the rate is still
above 10 percent, and as the number of unemployed has fallen, the pro-
portion out of work for more than a year has risen disturbingly from 21
percent in 1992 to 46 percent in 1995.
The Labor Market
Almost as worrying as the growth of unemployment has been the exodus
from the labor force. Participation rates fell sharply from 84 percent in
1991 to less than 70 percent by 1995. Some of the newly inactive of work-
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ing age are students prolonging their studies, but a much greater propor-
tion are home workers and the prematurely retired. In February 1994, 27
percent of those receiving pensions were below the age of 60, and 58 per-
cent of these younger pensioners received disability pensions. This reflects
not increased morbidity, but "'soft layoffs' and collusion between employ-
ers and employees" (World Bank 1995a, p. 34). The consequences for gov-
ernment expenditure and for payroll taxes have been disastrous. Public
expenditure on pensions accounted for more than 10 percent of GDP in
1993, and employers' contributions to pensions, health insurance, and
unemployment compensation represented nearly 50 percent of their pay-
roll costs in 1994 (compared with 32 percent in Poland, about 31 percent
in Western Europe, and 26 percent in the Czech Republic).
Employment has also fallen sharply. As table 1-3 shows, total employ-
ment fell by 18 percent between 1989 and 1994. Since GDP fell by 16
percent during the same period, this implies a slight reduction in labor
hoarding by employers and a consequent increase in productivity. With
the growth of employment in the services sector, the relative importance of
self-employment has grown, but, as can be seen, the vast majority of work-
ers are still wage employees. The share of women in total employment has
also increased slightly.
An increasing proportion of the labor force works in the so-called hid-
den or unregistered economy, which includes those working for employers
attempting to evade taxes and the self-employed. Sik (1995) reports that
Hungary's hidden economy (excluding domestic production) accounts for
a 27 percent larger share of the GDP than in the United States, implying a
share of around 13 percent. His study supports the view that the unregis-
tered economy is becoming increasingly important. He finds that only 61
percent of the total working hours of the adult population (excluding do-
mestic work) in 1994 was spent on a first job, with the remainder being
devoted to informal wage labor (5 percent), subsistence agriculture (36
percent), and interhousehold barter (2 percent). Arvay and Vrtes (1994)
arrive at an even higher estimate of the size of the hidden sector in 1992:
26.5 percent of GDP.
The growth of the hidden economy may have moderated the growth of
unemployment to some extent, but in 1994 the unemployment rate still
exceeded 10 percent. A striking aspect is the significantly lower unemploy-
ment rate among women: 8.4 percent compared with 11.8 percent for
men. Those under 25 are the most severely affected, with a rate of around
20 percent. Rates for older groups are also high and have been rising. In
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TABLE 1-3
Employment by Sector, 1989-94
(percent)
Sector 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Agriculture share 19 18 16 14 9 9
Industry share 37 37 37 35 34 33
Services hare 44 45 47 51 57 58
Annual rate of change in
employment -0.5 -0.6 -3.2 -10.6 -1.2 -3.6
Wage employees as percentage
of total employment - - - 92 91 90
- Not available.
Source: CSO (various years); World Bank (1995a).
general, unemployment rates decline with education level. They are close
to 30 percent for those with less than primary education, 20 percent for
those with primary education, and just 2 percent for university graduates.
Long-term unemployment is a growing problem. This category included
only 6 percent of the unemployed in 1991, but by the middle of the decade
more than 40 percent of the unemployed were long-term unemployed. A
significant proportion of these have low skill and education levels: 43 per-
cent were classified as unskilled and semiskilled, and 79 percent of the
long-term unemployed had at most primary schooling (Labor Research
Institute 1995). Long-term unemployment is also disproportionately con-
centrated in those regions that depend on heavy industry and agriculture,
with little potential for trade and tourism and less developed entrepreneur-
ial capacity than elsewhere in the country (Galasi and Kertesi 1996).
As the labor market has developed in the past few years, wage differen-
tials have tended to increase. Kertesi and Koll (1995) analyzed Hungarian
labor market data between 1986 and 1994. Their analysis shows that edu-
cation is an increasingly important determinant of differences in earnings.
The impact, all other things being equal, on wage earnings of higher edu-
cation (compared with completed primary schooling) increased from 34
percent in 1986 to 46 percent by 1994. The impact of secondary education
(both vocational and general) increased by even more, from 12 to 19 per-
cent. By contrast, the impact of apprentice schooling remained unchanged
during this period. In line with the increasing influence of market forces
are other interesting developments: a reduction in the impact of gender on
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wages; an increase in the impact of age and experience on wages; and a
widening of differentials between managers and nonmanual workers on
the one hand, and manual workers on the other.
The Vocational Education and Training System
In the current education system, eight years of primary schooling open the
way for access to various alternatives: four years of grammar school (al-
though some grammar schools have presecondary classes that enable them
to take pupils from primary school at an earlier stage); four years of voca-
tional secondary school; three years of vocational training, for the most
part in an apprentice school; or two years in another vocational training
school, for example, for typist training. Graduates of secondary grammar
and vocational schools can gain access to postsecondary education in univer-
sities, colleges, vocational training institutions, or in the additional class of
a vocational secondary school. The main reforms, presaged by the 1993
Public Education and Vocational Education Acts now being implemented,
are an increase in the duration of primary education from 8 to 10 years and
postponement of the age of entry to vocational education from 14 to 16.
However, the whole system is in a state of flux as schools respond in differ-
ent ways to the pressing problems they face.
The trauma of transition has not caused any reduction in educational
enrollment ratios. Indeed, for all except apprentice schools, such ratios in-
creased substantially during the 1990s. Table 1-4 shows the continuation
rates in the educational system in 1990 and 1994. As can be seen, almost
all primary school graduates now go on to postprimary education, most of
them into some form of vocational education or training (VET). The pro-
portion of vocational secondary school graduates going on to higher edu-
cation is much lower than in the case of grammar school graduates. The
proportion of primary school leavers who eventually enter higher educa-
tion is more than 11 percent and rising.
Those who do not continue their studies join the labor market from the
various levels of the education system. Few new entrants to the labor force
are primary school dropouts-less than 4 percent in 1994-but they are
overrepresented among the unemployed. Even though their importance is
diminishing, graduates from apprentice schools still account for a third of
new entrants. Only 15 percent of those who had just graduated from sec-
ondary school who joined the labor market in 1994 were from grammar
schools, which illustrates the dominance of VET.
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TABLE 1-4
Continuation Rates from Primary to Secondary Schools and from
Secondary Schools to Higher Education, 1990 and 1994
(percent unless otherwise indicated)
School continuation rate 1990 1994
Completed primary school (number) 164,616 136,864
Entering secondary schools 93.8 98.8
Entering grammar schools 21.1 25.7
Entering vocational secondary schools 27.5 32.6
Entering apprentice schools 42.0 35.2
Entering other vocational training schemes 3.2 5.3
Completed grammar school (number) 24,053 30,829
Entering higher education 30.1 40.9
Completed vocational secondary school (number) 28,382 36,580
Entering higher education 11.9 16.9
Source: Benedek (1995); CSO (various years).
Vocational Education
Vocational education has expanded at a slower rate than has general educa-
tion. Growth between 1985-86 and 1994-95, however, was fast (table 1-
5). Enrollment in vocational secondary schools overtook that in the declining
apprentice schools in 1993-94, and enrollment in other vocational schools
(including health and typing) stabilized at around 30,000.
As table 1-6 shows, by far the largest category of vocational secondary
schools is the industrial/technical. The fastest expansion has been in the
small "other" category, followed by commercial, art, agricultural, and eco-
nomic vocational secondary schools. Some gender stereotyping is evident,
with women overrepresented in kindergarten teaching, health, postal, eco-
nomic, commercial, and art schools and underrepresented in industrial/
technical and agricultural schools.
In apprentice schools the largest categories are machine production,
maintenance and repair, construction, clothing, and trade, although en-
rollment in all these fields contracted during the 1990s (table 1-7). Miscel-
laneous services and the wood industry are the only major categories that
expanded. Evidence of some lumpiness in the system is the increase in
third-year enrollment in some categories for which total enrollment has
fallen, such as metallurgy, clothing, construction, and transportation.
48 TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TABLE 1-5
Full-time Enrollment in Secondary Vocational Education,
1990-91 to 1994-95
(thousands of students)
Vocational Apprentice Other vocational
Year secondary schools schools training schools Total
1990-91 168 209 16 393
1991-92 179 205 21 405
1992-93 186 189 28 403
1993-94 192 174 30 396
1994-95 196 163 28 387
Percentage change,
1985-86 to 1994-95 85 -7 115 21
Source: Benedek (1995).
TABLE 1-6
Enrollment in Vocational Secondary Schools,
by Type of School and Gender, 1990-91 and 1994-95
Percentage Percentage
Total change Full-time of women
enrollment from enrollment enrolled
Type of school 1994-95 1990-91 1994-95 full time
Industrial/technical 120,803 17 84,626 23
Agricultural 20,472 22 19,792 38
Economic 51,138 21 39,546 75
Commercial 20,126 30 15,402 74
Catering 10,799 17 7,255 53
Transport 792 -17 631 45
Postal 4,265 -5 3,675 83
Health 16,166 -6 16,002 94
Kindergarten teachers 1,306 -71 1,306 98
Art 3,345 26 3,345 62
Other 5,466 500 5,385 81
Total 254,678 17 196,965 50
Source: CSO (various years).
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TABLE 1-7
Apprentice School Trainees, by Field, 1990-91 and 1993-94
Total Percentage Third-year Percentage
trainees, change from trainees, changefrom
Field 1993-94 1990-91 1993-94 1990-91
Machine production,
maintenance 50,911 -11 14,943 -3
Clothing 18,544 -2 5,943 13
C7onstruction 19,737 -17 6,318 4
Trade 16,109 -37 6,738 -13
Catering 9,694 -6 2,985 -5
'rransportation 928 -29 361 52
'Wood industry 10,360 10 3,164 20
Miscellaneous services 12,023 34 2,515 33
Others 39,500 -15 15,500 -5
Total 174,418 -17 54,867 -2
Source: Fejes (1994).
Total enrollment in higher education is more than 150,000, with engi-
neering being the largest single specialization (close to 35,000 students),
while the various kinds of teacher training account for almost a quarter of
total enrollment. Universities account for 43 percent of total enrollment in
higher education, and foreign students for 4 percent of university students.
As table 1-8 shows, the differences between current expenditure per stu-
dent in various levels of education are relatively small, with the exception
of tertiary education, which is three to four times as expensive as other
levels. In real terms, unit costs at all levels except primary and apprentice
schools fell during the 1990s.
Most of the recurrent expenditure incurred by schools consists of sala-
ries. Different types of schools vary little in this respect (65 percent for
grammar schools, 63 percent for vocational secondary schools, and 61 per-
cent for apprentice schools), which is perhaps a sign of inadequate expen-
(liture on materials by vocational schools.
Most funding for education comes in the form of a subsidy from the
central government (the so-called "normative" contribution per pupil). It
is channeled through local governments. This subsidy is estimated to ac-
count for 59 percent of total current costs in the case of grammar schools,
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TABLE 1-8
Recurrent Expenditure Per Full-Time Student,
by Level and Type of School, 1990-91 and 1994-95
(Hungarian forints)
Nominal Real
percentage percentage
change from change from
School 1994-95 1990-91 1990-91
Kindergartens 93,417 136 -2
Primary schools 99,332 167 10
Apprentice schools 121,503 155 6
Secondary grammar schools 106,034 116 -11
Vocational secondary schools 113,469 92 -21
Third-level education 377,474 89 -22
Source: CSO (various years); National Bank of Hungary data.
61 percent for vocational secondary schools, and 85 percent for apprentice
schools (Lannert 1994). There is some dispute about the figures for ap-
prentice schools. In 1992 an official survey found that 70 to 80 percent of
their costs were financed by the central government grant, 7 to 8 percent
by local governments, 2 to 13 percent by direct contributions from compa-
nies, up to 2 percent by the Vocational Training Fund (VTF) and other
foundations, and 4 to 13 percent by the schools' own income and other
sources. However, representatives of the Budapest and Debrecen local gov-
ernments have stated that they had to find 30 to 40 percent of funding
from noncentral government sources.
The VTF, a central budgetary subfund estimated to be worth about
10,000 million Hungarian forints (HUF) in 1995, is financed by contri-
butions from employers (1.5 percent of the wage bill, or 1 percent in the case
of agriculture). It operates as a levy-grant fund and is of significant impor-
tance to vocational education. If an enterprise engages in training, its con-
tribution to the VTF is commensurately reduced, to the extent that it can
claim back a surplus of expenditures over contributions. Training for this
purpose can consist of providing training within the enterprise, including
the purchase of equipment for group training. Supporting workshop-based
practical training in a vocational secondary school or apprentice school or
making direct, voluntary payments to schools also count as training.
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Few nongovernment schools exist: 91.6 percent of secondary schools
are funded by local governments, 2.6 percent directly from the central gov-
ernment budget, 2.1 percent by foundations or private owners, 3.1 percent
by churches, and fewer than 0.7 percent by other organizations. How-
ever, the number of private foundations is growing. There are 3,000 of
them concerned with education, of which 600 are concerned with VET
(Benedek 1995).
The framework for managing and regulating Hungary's vocational edu-
cation system is complex, since many actors are involved. The Ministry of
Labor is responsible for vocational education, though other ministries have
a say in the content of training relevant to them. The Ministry of Educa-
tion is responsible for general education, including the teaching provided
in the vocational schools, and for the transfer of the funds from the central
government to local governments. Local governments are responsible for
almost all schools and make decisions about establishing schools or closing
them down and on appointments of principals. The National Training
Council, a subcommittee of the National Council for Reconciliation of
Interests, which includes representatives of employers' and employees' or-
ganizations, has authority over the distribution of the VTF.
The Vocational Training Act, which became law in 1993, defines a new
division of labor between schools (which are responsible for teaching theory)
and enterprises (which are responsible for practical training of formally
contracted apprentices). The act sets out the conditions for the provision
of vocational training by institutions outside the school system.
Vocational Training Institutes and Retraining Programs
The relative roles of the state and the private sector in providing training
outside the school system changed a great deal during the 1990s. State
training centers used to be extremely important. (More than 306,000 people
completed some training in them in 1989.) No reliable data on current
enrollment are available, however. Many state training centers have been
closed or privatized. Of those currently operating, the most important are
the new regional training centers (RTCs), partially financed from a World
Bank loan. Eight are now up and running. They compete with the growing
number of private training institutions for contracts for retraining the un-
employed; the contracts are financed from the VTF and from a second
central budgetary subfund known as the Employment Fund (EF).
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TABLE 1-9
Participants in State-Subsidized Retraining Courses, 1992-94
(thousands)
Participants 1992 1993 1994
Total number of participants 58 90 94
Number in courses offering a training certificate 57 78 81
Number in semiskilled courses 7 12 13
Source: Benedek (1995).
The EF finances all types of active labor market programs. The tripartite
National Labor Market Committee has determined the principles on which
the EF is to be used. The committee distributes approximately 60 percent
of the EF, based on set criteria, to county labor councils that can spend the
funds as they deem fit. The remainder of the EF that is earmarked for
training is then distributed by the National Training Council on the basis
of competitive bidding. Table 1-9 shows the growth in the number of par-
ticipants in training courses funded by the EF. Of the 1994 participants,
only 4 percent were currently employed; 36 percent were unemployed school
leavers, and 60 percent were other unemployed. Half of the participants
were below the age of 25; two-thirds, below the age of 35. Eighty-five per-
cent had secondary school or higher qualifications and/or a vocational cer-
tificate. Seventy-four percent were trained in groups; the remainder, as
individuals.
Established in October 1991, the first RTC serves three counties in north-
ern Hungary with high unemployment rates. During its first two years
more than 5,000 students completed courses in a wide range of trades. By
1994 three centers were operating; they launched a total of 810 courses
involving 14,000 students. The dropout rate was estimated at 12 percent.
Most of those who dropped out left to take up employment. The centers
are owned by local governments and the Ministry of Labor, but only 30 to
40 percent of their income comes from a state subsidy (Benedek 1995); the
rest comes from income from training contracts.
For those contracts the RTCs compete on equal terms with nongovern-
ment training institutions of various types. Some are the privatized train-
ing departments of state enterprises such as the Csepel power station
(Lannert 1994). Some in urban areas belong to foundations and have spe-
cializations similar to the RTCs. Some are new private companies aimed at
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TABLE 1-10
Training Providers for Labor Market Courses, 1995
(number)
Ownership Institutions Courses Participants
Limited company 43 230 4,857
Sole proprietor 66 409 13,563
Cooperative 31 165 3,148
Other enterprise 4 42 851
Self-employed 3 22 333
Central budget organization 29 613 10,725
Local government organization 79 284 5,936
Social insurance organization 1 1 31
Nonprofit organization 8 26 447
State enterprise 1 2 53
State enterprise to be privarized 1 4 5 1
State enterprise under liquidation 2 10 212
Other nonmarket 1 2 47
Unknown 86 430 12,015
Total 355 2,240 52,269
Source: Ministry of Labor (1995).
the obvious markets in computer science, languages, and secretarial skills
(OECD/CCET 1995). Many are very small, set up to profit from EF con-
tracts. They are required to register with the Ministry of Labor, but effec-
tive accreditation or a quality control system has not been put in place to
date. Table 1-10 shows the wide range of ownership of training providers
for labor market courses in 1995.
As the table shows, small, private organizations run by sole proprietors
provided the largest amount of training (by number of participants). State
organizations were responsible for less than a third of this type of training.
Data on the sectors to which these 355 training providers belong show that
more than 65 percent are classified as being in the education sector. In
other words, they are training centers rather than factories. Only small
amounts of training are done in-plant-mainly in the real estate, manufac-
turing, trade and transport, and hotel and restaurant sectors.
Total expenditure on labor market training is substantial. In 1993 it
amounted to HUF 3,679 million (approximately US$37 million), the largest
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single item of expenditure on active labor market programs (Frey 1994).
The average cost of such courses outside Budapest was HUF 68,000 for a
vocational certificate and HUF 47,000 for semiskilled courses.
Pulay (1995) calculated the cost per completer and per placement for
retraining courses in 1994 at the regional level. The average retraining cost
per completer was HUF 90,000 and per placement was HUF 192,000.
(Less than 50 percent of the completers were placed in jobs within six
months of completing training.) Completion rates are high in almost all
regions, but placement rates vary from 34 to 71 percent. The retraining
cost per completer also varies widely, from HUF 31,000 to HUF 128,000,
with Budapest having the highest costs. The cost per placement ranges
from HUF 73,000 to as high as HUF 262,000.
These figures are interesting, but on their own they are an insufficient
indicator of external efficiency. Placement rates show how successful train-
ing is in terms of gross outcome. Some of these counties are extremely
successful in these terms, others less so. The RTCs appear to have been
even more successful: 40 percent of their graduates in 1994 reportedly found
jobs after three months and 60 percent after six months (Benedek 1995).
However, gross outcome is not the same as net impact. The question is:
how much better did these individuals fare in the labor market than they
would have done if they had not had this training? To measure the net
impact of training in this sense a control or comparison group is needed.
Table 1-11 shows the results of a two-stage survey carried out in three
counties in November 1992 and 1993. It included a comparison group to
measure the difference made by training.
In 1992 a total of 1,574 people were interviewed in three categories:
people who first registered as unemployed in June 1991, people who en-
tered retraining in the second half of 1991, and people who participated in
public service employment in September 1991. The investigators attempted
to interview the same individuals a year later and traced 1,478 of them.
The analysis in table 1-11 is based on a sample of 368 graduates of the
training and a comparison group of 571 registered unemployed who had
not participated in an active labor market program in November 1992,
and 445 graduates of the training and a comparison group of 589 in No-
vember 1993. Two measures of the impact of the training were used: im-
pact on the probability of obtaining a normal (unsubsidized) job and impact
on monthly earnings. As the first row in each part of the table shows, train-
ing had a statistically significant, positive impact on employment and a
statistically insignificant impact on earnings if the unadjusted mean out-
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TABLE 1-11
Retraining and Labor Market Outcomes,
November 1992 and November 1993
Impact on probability Impact on
of obtaining normaljob earnings gain
Estimation methodology (percentage) (HUFper month)
NVovember 1992 survey
Unadjusted for characteristics 6.6a 649
Aidjustedfor observable characteristics
By regression -4.4 -3,580a
By matched pairs -8.0' -513
NVovember 1993 survey
UJnadjusted for characteristics 19.2a 1,487
Aldjustedfor observable characteristics
By regression 6.3b 493
By matched pairs 1.2 2,052
a. Significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
b. Significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
Sources: Godfrey, Lazar, and O'Leary (1993); O'Leary (1994).
comes of the two groups are compared. This is true particularly by the time
of the second survey. However, the results are much less impressive if re-
sults are adjusted for differences in observable characteristics between the
two groups, either by regression analysis or by use of the matched-pairs
technique. The first survey shows training to have had a statistically signifi-
cant, negative impact on earnings, according to the regression analysis, and
a negative impact on employment probability, according to the matched-
pairs analysis. The second survey shows a positive but small impact on
employment probability according to the regression analysis, but all the
other results are statistically insignificant.
Even more interesting than the aggregate results are the results of sub-
group analysis shown in table 1-12. The statistically significant estimates
of the impact on employment probability suggest that the impact increases
with age. It is highest for those over 40, about the same for men as for
women, higher for those with less schooling and for those in nonmanual
specializations, and higher than average in Borsod County, which has the
highest unemployment rate of the three.
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TABLE 1-12
Impacts of Completing Retraining on Probability of Obtaining
a Normal Job, by Subgroup, November 1993
Subgroup Impact estimate Standard error
Age 25 or less 0.072 0.051
Age 26 to 40 0.136a 0.074
Age over 40 0.264' 0.103
Female 0.112b 0.049
Male 0.130b 0.048
Education 8 years or less 0.219b 0.077
Education more than 8 years 0.071 0.043
Nonmanual specialization 0.079' 0.046
Manual specialization 0.201b 0.064
Not received unemployment
benefits since 6/1991 0.049 0.066
Received unemployment benefits
since 6/1991 0.144b 0.043
Worked before 6/1991 0. 137b 0.045
Never worked before 6/1991 0.080 0.074
Borsod County 0 l 59b 0.051
Hajdu-B County 0.079 0.060
Somogy County 0.064 0.068
a. Significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
b. Significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
Source: O'Leary (1994).
It appears from this that labor market training may be concentrating on
categories of students who can achieve the highest outcomes, but on whom
it has the least impact, because, as noted earlier, half of the participants are
below the age of 25 and 85 percent have secondary or higher qualifications
or a vocational certificate. On the basis of their analysis of flows into and
out of unemployment insurance, Micklewright and Nagy (1994) note that
those with low levels of education have far lower chances of leaving unem-
ployment insurance for training. They define the situation as follows:
Among men, someone with general or vocational secondary education is
over four times more likely to leave UI [unemployment insurance] for a
training scheme than is a person who has only completed primary educa-
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tion. Among women, the probability is over five times higher.... This may
reflect a variety of factors. The more educated may be more willing to retrain
or may react more to the incentives offered (a 10 percent addition to unem-
ployment benefit). They may be more able to find private training courses
that the employment office will approve. The employment offices may offer
training courses only to the more educated. The part played by selection
policy of employment offices (or by national policy in the design of training
schemes) seems misplaced given that the more educated have a notably higher
probability of finding a job in any case.
Gill and Dar (1995) creatively combine the November 1993 results on
impact with estimates of cost to simulate a cost-benefit analysis of training
compared with unemployment benefits (table 1-13). If the matched-pairs
technique is used, as increases in reemployment probability and earning
gains from training are insignificant, it appears that training never pays off
regardless of the duration of unemployment benefits. If it is assumed that
the gains from training persist over the entire working life of individuals (a
rather generous assumption), regression-adjusted estimates yield a benefit-
to-cost ratio of 0.97 for an average unemployment benefits duration of six
months. That is, it takes more than 30 years for training to pay off. If the
average duration for which unemployment benefits are paid is a year, re-
training pays off in about 10 years. If, however, the reemployment prob-
ability gain from training is transient, training will never pay off, regardless
of the duration of unemployment benefits. On the basis of these findings,
Gill and Dar (1995, p. 12) conclude that "it seems difficult to justify large
scale retraining programs on economic considerations alone."
Enterprise-Based Training
Little systematic information is available about enterprise-based training,
but observers generally agree that it has collapsed, along with many of the
large enterprises, and that this is one of the greatest problems the training
system faces. An indication of the extent of the collapse is given by the fall
in the number of factory workshops available for practical training by ap-
prentice school pupils (table 1-14).
As a result of the virtual halving of the number of factory workshops,
schools have been forced to expand their own workshops, thereby consid-
erably reducing their connection with industry. As the large state enterprise
workshops have closed, the role of small private enterprises in providing
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TABLE 1-13
Simulated Cost-Benefit Analysis of Retraining in Relation
to Unemployment Benefits
Average duration of unemployment benefits
Evaluation technique 6 months 12 months
Differences in economic costs (US$) 1,964 900
Differences in financial costs 1,525 900
Differences in forgone earnings 439 0
Matched-pairs analysis
Benefit-to-cost ratio 0 0
Time taken to recover costs (years) Never Never
Regression-adjusted analysis
Benefit-to-cost ratio 0.97 2.11
Time taken to recover costs (years) 33 10
Notes: Unemployment benefits are assumed to be US$1,250 annually, based on mini-
mum unemployment benefits of US$1,030 in 1993 (Burda 1995). Retraining program
costs are assumed to be US$900 per participant, and the duration is assumed to be one year
(Pulay 1995). Differences are based on monthly earnings and reemployment rates of re-
training participants relative to those who only received unemployment benefits. Economic
costs include financial costs (fixed at US$900 for retraining and at US$104 per month for
unemployment benefit) and forgone earnings (US$0 if the program length is the same as
unemployment benefits, negative if unemployment benefits last longer than the retraining
program). Forgone earnings for retrainees are computed as follows: the average earnings of
unemployment benefit recipients (US$148 per month) are multiplied by the number of
months that retraining duration exceeds unemployment benefits duration and the prob-
ability of being employed during these months.
Source: Gill and Dar (1995).
practical training for school pupils has increased. They now predominate
in this role in all sectors except transport and telecommunications. Much
of this training is organized by the National Association of Craftsmen,
which has also contributed to curriculum development in the schools
(Lannert 1994).
The reduced role of enterprises in factory-based training of appren-
tices is matched by a reduction in the training of their own employees.
The state enterprise workshops that have disappeared or have been sold
off or privatized as profit-oriented training centers had been used for this
function also. The new joint ventures bring their own in-plant training
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TABLE 1-14
Factory-Based Workshops and Training Posts Available
to Apprentice School Pupils, 1990-91 to 1994-95
Number Percentage Number Percentage
offactory of total offactory of total
Year workshops workshops training posts training posts
1990-91 3,039 76 52,338 75
1991-92 2,718 70 46,710 67
1992-93 2,304 61 40,607 59
1993-94 1,829 52 35,237 52
1994-95 1,617 47 32,349 48
Source: Benedek (1995, table 3.1.1).
systems, but little is known about them. The new small enterprises offer
practical training to some apprentice school pupils-seen as a source of
cheap labor according to Lannert (1994)-but like small enterprises ev-
erywhere, they prefer to poach the skilled workers they need rather than
to train new workers.
Training for the civil service (currently undergoing a 15 percent cut in
staff in two stages) is taken seriously in Hungary. The Public Administra-
tion College organizes preservice and off-the-job training and sets two ex-
aminations, basic and professional, which all must pass within a set time
limit in order to remain in the service. Ministries have a small budget for
training of individuals. A number of aid agencies have projects to strengthen
the public administration. Britain, Germany, and the European Union's
Phare program (1995) have participated in these projects.
Enterprise-based training is regulated by the 1991 Employment Act and
the 1993 Vocational Training Act, which defined the responsibilities of the
National Training Council, including the allocation of grants from the
levy-funded VTF and the award of contracts from the EF. An amendment
to the Vocational Training Act, passed in October 1995, has led to some
confusion about tripartite arrangements. It sets up a new National Council
for Vocational Training, without decisionmaking powers, and merges the
VTF, the EF, and various other funds into a single Labor Market Fund
under the control of the Ministry of Labor. It also assigns a major role to
the emerging chambers of commerce and industry (or employers' associa-
tions), particularly in accreditation and examinations-a role assumed tem-
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porarily by the Ministry of Labor until the chambers are strong enough to
take over. All this leaves the old National Training Council with an uncer-
tain future (Bessenyei 1995).
Major VET Issues
The major issues for vocational education and training concern organiza-
tion, costs, and efficiency.
Organization and Management
Organization and management are perhaps the most striking issues in the
field of VET in Hungary. As already discussed, the division of responsibil-
ity for the system is complex, involving the ministries of Labor and Educa-
tion; other ministries; local governments; and, through their membership
in the Vocational Training Council, employers and employees. Schools in a
decentralized system are supposed to have a high degree of autonomy. In-
evitably, differences arise in the points of view of the various parties in-
volved. Broadly, the Ministry of Labor favors vocational education, the
Ministry of Education and many local governments favor general educa-
tion, and employers favor a dual training system. Meanwhile, employers,
particularly those running private training institutions, tend to dislike the
RTCs and want practical training to be located in enterprises. The Minis-
try of Labor and the trade unions, which tend to represent the teachers,
think schools should run their own workshops. More important than these
and other disagreements is a lack of clarity about exactly who is respon-
sible, particularly at the local level. As Halasz (1994, p. 58) comments,
instruments appropriate for a decentralized system and the sharing of re-
sponsibilities have not yet been found. Since 1990, when the 20 counties
(including Budapest) lost their jurisdiction over lower level authorities, the
middle level of the educational administration has disappeared. This mana-
gerial muddle, in which conflicts are not resolved but avoided, is a context
for inertia rather than reform.
Costs and Financing
The costs of vocational schools appear to be low, but a high proportion of
current expenditure goes to salaries, raising the question of whether the
schools spend enough on materials. As for sources of revenue, schools are
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allowed to earn income and to use it for their own purposes. Lannert (1994)
gives examples of schools that use their workshops as enterprises, employ-
ing skilled workers and plowing profits back into the schools, and of others
that obtain funds from employers under the auspices of the VTF. Sixty to
80 percent of expenditure is still funded by the government, however. The
challenge for vocational schools of all types is to expand their nongovern-
ment funding to the point where it covers the entire cost of the vocational
part of their curricula.
VOCATIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES. Cost and financing issues are equally
pressing for vocational training institutes. Ideally, the RTCs, which are 30
to 40 percent state subsidized, would be entirely self-supporting. The rev-
enue needed would be even greater if the practical content of their training
was increased to the extent that many observers think would be desirable.
With skill training for the unemployed probably on the decline, the centers
need to attract more sponsorship from enterprises for pre-employment or
off-plant employee training, and they should also offer more courses for
which individual students are willing to pay full fees. At present the centers
recover some 15 to 20 percent of their costs from employer-sponsored and
self-funding sources.
LEVY-GRANT SYSTEM. Hungary is fortunate in already having a levy-grant
system, which can help to solve some of these financing problems. Al-
though the system has been properly placed within a tripartite structure,
the government has tended to exercise control over it because of the weak-
ness of the organizations involved. Martonfi (1995) asked 340 top manag-
ers to assess on a scale of 0 to 100 the influence of various actors on the
allocation of the VTF. They judged that government and ministries have
the strongest influence (score of 87), followed by local governments (41),
schools and training institutions (37), employers' associations (32), and
trade unions (21). In the managers' opinion the order of precedence should
be more or less reversed, with employers followed by schools exerting the
strongest influence and government, central and local, playing a less domi-
nant role. As an example of undue government influence, employers cite
the use of the VTF to finance the National Vocational Training Institute.
They believe this research and development organization should be financed
from the government budget (Lannert 1994). Regardless of how it is allo-
cated, the VTF needs to retain a separate identity if it is to operate as a levy-
grant fund increasingly oriented toward enterprise training. The move to
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combine it with the EF and other funds in a single Labor Market Fund
does not seem to be helpful.
Efficiency
On the related issue of efficiency, Halasz (1994) suggests that the whole
vocational training system is facing a three-fold crisis of legitimacy, institu-
tions, and structures. The crisis of legitimacy arises from the place in the
previous regime of vocational training, narrowly specialist, preferred to
broad, general education, and tightly linked to unproductive and ineffi-
cient state enterprises. The institutional crisis is caused by the decline of
industry and the disappearance of workshops and training places. The struc-
tural crisis reflects the slow adjustment of schools to changes in the labor
market. Many "continue training pupils in fields that are certainly not
needed and will probably never more be needed in such a high proportion"
(Halasz 1994).
APPRENTICE SCHOOLS. The threefold crisis that affects the system is no-
where more evident than in the apprentice schools. Their institutional cri-
sis is acute, as practical training becomes increasingly difficult to arrange
and the growing involvement of small, private enterprises raises quality
control problems. Even more acute is their structural crisis in the face of
transformed labor markets. With an unemployment rate among appren-
tice school leavers of 15 percent (only slightly lower than the primary school
rate of 19.5 percent), the schools continue to churn out people in unem-
ployable trades. The rate of inflow of apprentice school graduates into the
unemployment insurance benefit register is also similar to that of primary
school graduates. The impact of apprentice schooling on wages has re-
mained unchanged since 1986-around 10 percent above the rate for
completion of primary school. The estimated social rate of return is low, at
2.6 percent, less than half of that for secondary grammar and vocational
schools. There are methodological problems with calculating the rate of
return to a type of schooling that, as Timar (1994) points out, gets "only
poor students, rejected by either of the two other school types." Unless the
comparison group is deliberately chosen to reflect the low quality of the
intake (for example, confined to graduates of primary school with the low-
est grades), the incremental income attributable to this type of schooling is
understated, just as it is overstated for schools that have an intake of above
average quality. Nevertheless, the external efficiency of the apprentice schools
is clearly in doubt.
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VOCATIONAL SECONDARY SCHOOLS. The efficiency of the vocational sec-
ondary schools is less easy to judge because of the shortage of data. The
unemployment rate among their graduates, at 6 percent, is relatively low.
The inflow rate into the unemployment insurance register is higher than
for grammar school graduates, and the probability of exit to a job is lower
for men, but not for women. There are no separate rate of return estimates.
The schools are, in any case, in the process of transformation. The new
vocational secondary schools based on the World Bank model are popular
with parents (Lannert 1994, p. 60), and their ratio of applications to places
is near the top of the league table. This suggests that at least the private rate
of return to such schooling is high and augurs well for the chances of greater
cost recovery.
LABOR MARKET TRAINING. The two-stage survey of those who entered
retraining in the second half of 1991 suggested that the impact of labor
market training on employment probability and earnings gain in 1992 and
1993 was small or negative. These results combined with cost estimates in
a cost-benefit simulation led to the conclusion that large-scale retraining
programs are difficult to justify on economic considerations alone.
Training specialists have criticized this conclusion on the following
grounds:
- Trainingprograms under review were still ofrelatively low quality. Much
has changed since the training under review and the two surveys were car-
ried out. If the training had been of higher quality, its internal efficiency
would certainly have been improved. Its external efficiency, however, would
depend on whether the low returns to training reflected primarily poor
internal efficiency or weakness of demand in the labor market. The im-
provement in the impact of the same training between the first and second
surveys suggests the importance of labor market factors. It reflects the pas-
sage of time but also an improvement in the labor market between the two
surveys. Although the quality of the best retraining has undoubtedly been
increasing, whether this applies to average training is not at all certain given
the problems of accreditation and quality control for the burgeoning pri-
vate training sector.
* Incentives for placement had not yet been developed. Incentives tend to
increase placement in a given situation. This may or may not have a posi-
tive effect on the net impact of training. Such incentives reinforce the ten-
dency of trainers to "cream," that is, admit to courses those who would be
able to find a job even without the training.
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* The costs of social assistance after exhaustion of unemployment benefits
were not included in the costs ofthe passive alternative. Social assistance rather
than the provision of insured unemployment benefits is becoming the domi-
nant mode of support for the unemployed. However, this does not neces-
sarily have much effect on the substance (as opposed to the wording) of the
assumptions made in the cost-benefit simulation. Those who participate in
training courses are in categories of workers (younger and more educated)
who do not stay unemployed for long, however financed. The assumptions
for the comparison with the passive alternative reflect this.
New evaluations are needed of all types of VET, not just labor market
training, that link internal and external efficiency. Such evaluations, with
properly chosen comparison or control groups, must focus on net impacts
rather than merely on gross outcomes or placements. Types of training that
have favorable outcomes (as measured by placement rates) cannot be as-
sumed to have favorable impacts.
One of the most striking issues to arise from the surveys, and from analyses
of flows into and out of insured unemployment, is that labor market train-
ing may be concentrating on those who need it least in order to get a job:
the relatively young and well educated. The Ministry of Labor has recog-
nized this, and the World Bank has welcomed a shift in training emphasis
toward the long-term unemployed, who are often men, old and poorly
educated, with learning disabilities or marginal disabilities. Criteria for al-
locating funds will need to reflect this new emphasis.
Special attention has to be paid to the regional training centers, perhaps
the most controversial vocational training institutes in Hungary. Econo-
mists and trainers disagree about whether it made sense for an extremely
indebted economy to borrow US$25 million to help set up these centers.
Most economists question the need for such an investment because of the
weakness of demand for labor and the existence of other usable facilities
that could have been converted more cheaply. By contrast, trainers point to
RTCs' symbolic importance, to their effect on teachers' attitudes, and to
their role in setting standards of quality and value in competition with
private trainers. Realists point to what might be called the political economy
of World Bank projects: the centers represented the only chance for the
Ministry of Labor to become eligible not only for loan money, but also for
counterpart funds that would not otherwise have been made available to it
for training purposes by the Ministry of Finance. The RTCs' placement
rates are reported to be high, but given the high quality of their intake, this
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cannot be taken as an incontrovertible indicator of favorable impact. What-
ever the verdict on the external efficiency of RTCs, some issues of internal
efficiency also need attention. The supervision report at the end of 1994
found evidence of underutilization of expensive equipment. (The norm
was a single training session from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m.) Criticisms have also
been leveled at the centers' excessively theoretical approach to teaching.
]Both criticisms may represent national tendencies that go beyond the cen-
ters. As the supervision report points out, the role and constitution of the
centers within the VET system need to be clarified: are they to be strategic,
national institutions in a favored position or autonomous, unsubsidized
profit centers competing with other training providers on a "level playing
field"?
Because the transition to labor markets has been accompanied by an
increase in poverty and inequality, equity has become a more important
issue in Hungary. Training can play a role in combating poverty and in-
equality, but only a small role. Since a person's prior general education
determines his or her access to training, an approach to equalization that is
confined to training will produce only marginal improvements in the situ-
ation of disadvantaged groups. They will still be overrepresented in low
education, low-income occupations, and among the unemployed. This is
particularly true of Hungary's largest and most disadvantaged minority,
the Gypsies. Regression analysis shows that the huge differences in unem-
ployment rates and wages between Gypsies and non-Gypsies are due to
three factors: discrimination, location, and education (Kertesi 1994). A
national sample survey in 1993 found that 43 percent of Gypsies had less
than eight years of primary schooling, and that even for 20- to 24-year-
olds, the figure was 25 percent (Kemeny, Havas, and Kertesi 1994). Kertesi
found that a typical Gypsy child age six in 1981 had 15 times less chance to
continue his or her studies in a secondary school and 50 times less chance
to study at a university than a non-Gypsy six-year-old.
In these circumstances, the only training programs for which most Gyp-
sies qualify are those that will lock them into relatively low-paid occupa-
tions or continued unemployment. Indeed, they are well represented among
apprentice school pupils (Kemeny, Havas, and Kertesi 1994, p. 11). The
Ministry of Labor has been grappling with labor market programs for the
Gypsy community, and an excellent nongovernment organization-the
Autonomia Foundation-has much experience in this field. However, edu-
cation rather than training is the key. Kertesi (1994, p. 33) recommends
increasing the mandatory school-leaving age for all. This may or may not
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be necessary, but there is certainly a need for equity-conscious education
planners to ensure that all children, whatever their background, complete
high-quality primary and lower secondary schooling (Carnoy 1993). Sub-
sidized preschool kindergarten programs for disadvantaged children are
the starting point for this (Costarelli 1993). Remedial general education
for adults who have not completed basic education may make sense as a
precondition for training. The problems of inequality cannot be solved by
the training system alone.
Notable Reforms
Despite the problems identified so far, Hungary has made remarkable
progress in reshaping its VET system to meet the challenges of markets. In
particular, it has established a framework of laws and institutions within
which the system can develop. The National Vocational Training Institute
has been set up as the research and development organization for the sys-
tem, the first institution of its kind in the region. The elements of a levy-
grant system are in place, with the potential to eliminate subsidies and to
offset disincentives to training that arise from the inability of employers
who do train to capture its benefits.
The school system is in the process of restructuring. The age of voca-
tional specialization is due to be postponed, apprentice schools are shrink-
ing and gradually moving closer to the market, vocational secondary schools
are increasing the general content of their curricula, the baccalaureate ex-
amination is being extended to technical subjects, and all examinations
and curricula are undergoing modernization. The system has become in-
creasingly complex. As Lannert (1994) points out, the simple apprentice
school "has almost vanished and now in the same institution we find a
special vocational school, a vocational training [apprentice] school, a sec-
ondary vocational school, and even a grammar school or a primary school."
At the same time marketization and decentralization are beginning to
differentiate the more from the less innovative schools. The innovative ap-
prentice/vocational school, as characterized by Lannert (1994), will have
the following features: growing or stable enrollment; a fundamentally
changed curriculum, including such offerings as craft classes or those asso-
ciated with the World Bank project; a cooperative attitude toward the RTCs;
well-equipped workshops for new forms of practical training and flourish-
ing connections with enterprises; a school enterprise employing skilled
workers rather than school pupils; a manager/director rather than a princi-
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pal; and a staff member responsible for fundraising and keeping in touch
with enterprises. An example of an innovative school is one in Csepel. It
changed its specialization from textiles to catering and has secured a long-
term contract with a luxury hotel in Budapest (Lannert 1994, p. 65). The
less innovative school, on the other hand, will have decreasing enrollment,
few structural changes other than starting secondary vocational classes, a
hostile attitude toward the RTCs, traditional forms of practical training,
no school enterprise apart from a shop or rented school buildings, and a
pedagogic style of principal.
A striking change in the past few years is the huge increase in the role of
private training institutions and in the use of tenders and competition for
training contracts. The RTCs compete on equal terms in these tenders,
though with the advantage of a substantial government subsidy. An impor-
tant weakness in the new system is the absence of an accreditation or qual-
ity control system. It is gradually being developed, but in its absence, many
of the new private training institutions exploit the system (Lannert 1994).
I-Hungary's experience may demonstrate that privatization of training re-
quires a bigger role of government in accreditation (working wherever pos-
sible through professional associations) to avoid the risk of wastage.
Criteria are needed for allocating funds from the center to the regions
for training and other labor market programs. Hungary (along with Po-
land) leads the way here with the development of a management system
based on performance indicators (O'Leary 1995). For example, an indica-
tor of training program performance is average cost per course completer
who is employed at follow-up. It is proposed that this and a few similar
indicators should be added to the algorithm for allocation of the decentral-
ized portion of the EF across counties. Demographic data and indicators
of regional unemployment are used to adjust national standards for local
conditions. Data are already being collected, and the system has been tested
in several counties. Progress is impressive, but a few dangers arise from the
focus on the gross outcome rather than net impact. Adjusting targets ac-
cording to local conditions may reduce "creaming," but to know whether
training courses are worth supporting at all, data on average cost per unit
of impact, rather than on average cost per completer employed, are needed.
This, in turn, requires data on a comparison group, which could be drawn
from the quarterly labor force survey. The deletion of performance indica-
tors based on earnings from the system is regrettable (O'Leary 1994).
One of the most serious obstacles to the implementation of reforms is
the state of the economy and the labor market. The weakness of demand
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for labor (trained or untrained) means that the government has to take the
lead in developing new systems. The inexperience in these areas of the new
employers' associations and chambers of commerce and the reformed labor
unions reinforces the tendency toward government dominance. The col-
lapse of state enterprises has damaged the institutional basis for apprentice
training. Their replacement by a multitude of small firms and the growth
of the hidden economy make reviving enterprise-based training and col-
lecting the funds needed for VET difficult.
Attitudes in the education and training sector are changing fast, but
teachers still are widely accused of preferring theory to practice. Moreover,
trainers understandably prefer to train the easily trainable rather than the
difficult cases who will benefit more from training. The academic qualifi-
cations of apprentice and vocational secondary school teachers reportedly
have fallen. In 1994-95, 21 percent of teachers in the former and 10 per-
cent in the latter were qualified only as primary school teachers. Teachers'
lack of industrial experience, however, may be more of a problem. In addi-
tion, instructor training for vocational training institutes is not systemati-
cally organized, and low salaries make it difficult for public sector institutions
to compete with industry for the best talent (Lannert 1994).
Higher education is the most subsidized level of the education system,
with a difference of more than 10 percentage points between the social and
private rates of return to it. This implies that higher education has prob-
ably been expanding at a slower rate than would otherwise have been pos-
sible, and that vocational education has been performing the function of
rationing the flow of entrants to it from lower levels. Even in 1994 more
than 40 percent of primary school completers entered apprentice and other
vocational training schools, which did not allow access to higher levels,
and the progression rate of vocational secondary graduates to higher edu-
cation is still much lower than that from grammar schools, which take only
26 percent of primary school completers. However, ongoing reforms are
increasing the number of postprimary students who will qualify for higher
education.
Finally, the VET system has been reformed despite rather than because
of the structures that have been created to manage it. The problem is not
the involvement of many parties with divergent interests-a positive rather
than a negative factor-but the lack of clarity about the division of respon-
sibilities. Until instruments appropriate for a decentralized system and for
the sharing of responsibilities are developed, the reform of VET in Hun-
gary, although impressive, will not reach its full potential.
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2 Poland
PETER GROOTINGS
POLAND EXPERIENCED SEVERAL years of economic crisis
during the 1980s, when salaries were low and basic consumer goods and
services were in short supply. However, foodstuffs and raw materials were
subsidized and therefore accessible. This situation changed dramatically
after 1990, when the government gradually removed the subsidies. Savings
in Polish zlotys were depreciated, savings in hard currencies lost real value
because of exchange rate stabilization, and interest rates rose dramatically.
Because most enterprises reacted to the liberalization of markets with sharp
price rises, real income levels went down even farther.
By the end of 1993, Poland had become the fastest growing economy in
Europe, with a strong private sector and a gradually developing market-
based infrastructure. At the same time, however, unemployment rates re-
mained high; the budget deficit was slowly growing; real wages had not
recovered; and social conflicts had increased, though no longer in the form
of strikes.
The Labor Market
Within a few years of the start of economic reforms, Poland's labor market
changed from one characterized by a persistent shortage of labor into one
with some of the highest unemployment rates in Europe, the result of a
shortage of jobs rather than a mismatch between education and the labor
market's needs. In addition, the system for determining wages and salaries
changed radically following the demise of the communist regime.
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,Employment Patterns
]Between 1990 and 1993 the number of economically active people fell, the
number of people employed decreased, the structure of employment fun-
damentally changed, employment in the informal sector became widespread,
and unemployment became massive (table 2-1).
Poland lost more than 2.6 million jobs between 1989 and 1994. Mainly
because of the collapse of the state sector in 1994, public sector employ-
ment was only 64 percent of what it had been at the end of 1989. In con-
trast, after an initial loss of almost 200,000 jobs in 1990, employment in
the private sector increased by almost 600,000 during this period. How-
ever, cooperative organizations, classified as private in the current classifi-
cation system, almost completely collapsed; an estimated 1.5 million jobs
were lost. Although employment in the private sector increased by more
than 2 million jobs, this was not sufficient to make up for the loss in public
and cooperative employment. Only in 1994 was the increase in private
sector employment greater than the loss in public sector employment.
Thus, the structure of employment has changed considerably. Unlike
mnost other Central and Eastern European countries, Poland has always
had a private sector-mainly in agriculture, but also in services and handi-
crafts. However, the majority of people (54.3 percent in 1989) were em-
ployed in the public sector, a figure that had dropped to 40 percent by the
end of 1994. Since privatization has not been completed and most large
TABLE 2-1
Population Groups, by Employment Status, Annual Averages 1990-93
(thousands)
Group 1990 1991 1992 1993
Working-age population 21,925.7 22,008.7 22,118.4 22,256.9
Labor force - 18,692.2 18,405.0 18,223.0
Employed - 17,064.6 16,065.4 15,500.2
Unemployed 577.2 1,627.6 2,339.6 2,722.8
Not in the labor force - 3,316.5 3,713.4 4,033.9
Not employed in working-
age and nonworking-age
populations - 4,944.1 6,053.0 6,756.7
- Not available.
Source: Author's calculations.
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industrial enterprises and banks are still state owned, many of the jobs in
the private sector are in new firms, most of which are very small. In 1992-
93, the typical private enterprise employed two persons.
The pattern of employment in the various sectors of the economy has
also changed. While employment in agriculture remained relatively stable
between 1989 and 1994, dropping slightly from 28 to 26 percent, employ-
ment in industry fell from 35 to 29 percent, and employment in services
rose from 38 to 45 percent. The decrease in agricultural employment has
been largely attributable to the collapse of cooperative farms, with the re-
sultant loss of almost 1 million jobs. However, the figures indicate that
many of those affected found work in private agriculture. The decrease in
industrial employment is the result of almost 1.4 million job losses in manu-
facturing and of some 400,000 job losses in industrial construction. The
increased employment in services between 1989 and 1994 was the result of
growth in the retail trade of around 600,000 jobs, in financial services of
80,000 jobs, and in state administration of 90,000 jobs.
The figures for agricultural employment disguise considerable hidden
unemployment. Because most private farms are small and poorly mecha-
nized, many people unable to find a job elsewhere work on a farm.
Witkowski (1995) estimates that some 450,000 people are in this situa-
tion. In addition, an estimated 200,000 people are unemployed but are not
registered as such, and they have given up searching for a job.
Regional employment levels vary significantly. Although major cities
such as Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, and Katowice recorded unemployment
rates that ranged from 7.5 to 10.0 percent in 1994, rural areas in the North
had unemployment rates of 28 to 30 percent, and the region of Walbrzych
in the Southwest had an unemployment rate of 27 percent. The authorities
have now recognized almost a quarter of all districts as special problem
areas, which entitles them to preferential treatment, such as prolonged un-
employment benefits and early retirement schemes.
Some of the regions and cities with low unemployment rates (for ex-
ample, Katowice, Gdansk, and Kielce) have the highest absolute numbers
of unemployed. This is a result of the extreme centralization of the popula-
tion in large cities focused on a single industry.
Wages and Salaries
Under the previous system, the central authorities set wage differentials
and wage increases. They normally based their decisions on political crite-
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TABLE 2-2
Monthly Earnings by Occupational Category, 1987, 1991-93
Percentage of average annual
compensation for all workers
1987 1991 1992 1993
Professionals and managers 126 126 169 136
Mdid- and lower-level white-collar
employees 84 100 109 88
Service and trade employees 79 80 60 88
Private entrepreneurs 204 190 195 188
Skilled workers 99 92 69 88
Unskilled workers 65 60 69 60
Farm workers 88 68 52 80
Source: Authors calculations.
ria: workers were privileged compared with other occupational groups, and
those working in sectors strategically important for the national economy
(mining, heavy industry) received better wages than did those working in
other sectors. Wage increases depended on the bargaining power of repre-
sentatives in the central administration and on strike threats by individual
occupational groups. As a result, workers in large industrial enterprises
occupied a privileged position. There was hardly any relationship between
salary and level of education (table 2-2).
Differentiation both in actual remuneration and in wage and salary set-
ting is now much greater. Even though finding accurate statistical data for
the 1987-93 period was difficult, some trends became clear: wages in the
public sector still depend on political action such as strikes and social un-
rest, and state enterprise managers and workers (and their unions) still act
in partnership when approaching the government with wage demands. Wage
clifferentials and the relative positions of various occupational groups have
changed less in the public sector than in the private sector, with the excep-
tion of civil servants employed in government institutions, whose position
has improved somewhat. In the private sector market forces play a much
stronger role, and the influence of unions is less pervasive. The role of
education in shaping incomes has increased gradually, especially in the pri-
vate sector.
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Labor Market Signals for Skill Needs
The high level of unemployment appears to be the result of a shortage of
jobs more than of mismatches between education and employment. The
job shortage is the result of cutbacks in public employment and the slow
growth of demand for labor in the private sector. The large number of very
small private enterprises also indicates that many people have become self-
employed. The unemployment o vacancy ratio-that is, the number of
registered unemployed for each registered vacancy-increased from 13 in
1990 to 87 in 1993.
The employment prospects of secondary school graduates and univer-
sity and other postsecondary graduates have worsened steadily (table 2-3).
In 1989, 41 percent found employment immediately after graduation; in
1994 only 22 percent managed to do so. University and basic vocational
school leavers were the most successful, while postsecondary and general
TABLE 2-3
Labor Market Status of School Leavers after Completion
of School, 1989-94
(percent)
Year education completed
and education level Employed Unemployed Inactive Total
Year of completion
1989 40.5 27.1 32.4 100
1990 36.0 37.1 26.9 100
1991 28.4 46.2 25.4 100
1992 27.0 45.4 27.6 100
1993 22.5 54.8 22.7 100
1994 21.9 58.2 19.9 100
Level of education
University 34.4 41.3 24.3 100
Postsecondary 20.2 54.8 25.8 100
Vocational secondary 28.0 50.1 21.9 100
General secondary 19.2 47.4 33.4 100
Basic vocational 32.6 47.3 20.1 100
Primary 26.0 17.0 57.0 100
Source: Witkowski (1995).
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secondary graduates were the least likely to find employment. In general,
the lower the education level, the higher the unemployment rate.
In all age groups more women than men are unemployed, and many
women and girls have withdrawn from the labor market. Unemployment
is concentrated in the young age groups: almost one-third of the unem-
ployed are younger than 24. Among older workers, those with little educa-
tion were more likely to lose their jobs.
Signals that come from the labor market in terms of employment pat-
terns, unemployment figures, vacancy levels, and salary levels do not al-
ways have direct relevance for the vocational education and training (VET)
system, because some of them stem from inherited structures and institu-
tions. Obviously, sectors currently in decline do not offer employment pros-
pects, and the volume of training for these sectors should be adapted
accordingly. Similar adaptations are needed with respect to the changing
structure of employment. Given the reduced importance of large industrial
and bureaucratic organizations, education needs to be less specialized, per-
haps even less occupation specific. There is also a need for a stronger train-
ing infrastructure that can handle the many long-term unemployed. The
fundamental problem of insufficient market demand for labor persists,
however. Recruitment levels are such that enterprises can find the skills
they need from the pool of unemployed relatively easily.
The Vocational Education and Training System
A VET system meant to serve a relatively backward centrally planned
economy now has to be transformed into one that will meet the require-
ments of a modern market-ledc economy.
Overview of the Polish Education System
The Polish education system is still in transition. Modernization of both
its structure and content, planned since the early 1960s, is finally being
undertaken.
STRUCTURE Primary school starts at the age of seven and lasts for eight
years. Most children attend preschool before entering primary school. Com-
pulsory schooling lasts until the completion of primary school or until the
child reaches the age of 17, whichever comes first. Secondary education is
not obligatory. After leaving primary school, children can continue their
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TABLE 2-4
School Enrollment at Different Education Levels, 1990-95
(number)
Type of school 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95
Primary 5,231,300 5,259,700 5,237,100 5,179,300 5,118,900
Secondary 1,896,100 1,977,700 2,057,800 2,136,500 2,206,400
General 445,000 499,800 555,800 602,400 648,600
Vocational and
technical 1,451,100 1,477,900 1,502,00 1,534,100 1,557,800
Basic vocational 814,500 806,200 792,800 769,500 745,800
Postsecondary 108,300 100,900 95,900 110,800 131,500
Higher 403,800 428,200 495,700 584,000 682,200
Adult education 224,900 210,600 212,400 223,900 245,800
Source: Witkowski (1995).
education in general secondary schools, in various vocational schools, or in
mixed general-vocational schools. General secondary school lasts for four
years and can lead to a certificate called the Matura. Students that pass the
Matura can sit for university entrance examinations and enter certain
postsecondary vocational schools. Table 2-4 shows enrollment at the vari-
ous levels.
Basic vocational schools last two or three years, depending on the par-
ticular course of study, and lead to a skilled worker certificate. Secondary
technical schools last for four or five years. To graduate students must pass
the Matura and are qualified as technicians. Secondary vocational schools
last four years. Students must pass the Matura to graduate and are qualified
as skilled workers. In the mid-1990s the authorities experimented with a
new type of secondary professional school that does not provide an occu-
pational qualification. In 1995 there were 135 such schools.
Students who have trouble completing primary school can enter special
schools that prepare them for simple jobs in industry during one- or two-
year courses. In addition, factories run so-called job adaptation courses
that last from six months to a year for young workers who are paid during
the training period.
Graduates of general secondary schools and basic vocational schools can
pursue further vocational and technical studies. Those completing a gen-
eral secondary school can attend a secondary technical school, while those
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completing a basic vocational school can attend a general secondary school
ol- a secondary technical school.
Poland is the only former socialist country that has maintained a tradi-
tional apprenticeship system in the handicraft sector. Such apprenticeships
usually last three years, and apprentices can receive either skilled worker or
master qualifications. The Chamber of Handicrafts manages this system.
The number of students who receive higher education has always been
limited. The apprenticeship system is open to adults (defined as those older
than 17) as well as to children. The handicraft apprenticeship system is also
open to adults. No distinctions in terms of courses offered and qualifica-
tions awarded are made between children and adults who follow the same
ecducational programs.
Institutions of higher education are available at the postsecondary level-
namely, higher vocational schools in a few areas that do not provide aca-
demic titles and universities and polytechnics (technical universities). Since
1989 a number of postsecondary colleges have been established, mainly to
train foreign language teachers. The system is now being expanded to offer
higher professional education.
FINANCING. In 1991 expenditure on education and training was about
5.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), down from 6.6 percent in
1990. In 1992 the share of GDP increased somewhat to 5.6 percent, but
the total amount was less than 75 percent of the 1990 level because GDP
had fallen dramatically. During 1991 and 1992 the Ministry of National
Education suffered from major budget cuts, resulting in problems paying
teachers' salaries. In 1993, 10.3 percent of public expenditures went to
eclucation, compared with 11.8 percent in 1989. In 1994 the share in-
creased again to 11.2 percent. Most of the ministry's budget goes to pay
teachers' salaries. In 1992, for example, teachers' salaries amounted to 84
percent of all costs for preschools and primary and secondary schools.
ivMaintenance and investment were neglected during the 1960s and 1970s
sco that by the end of the 1980s, the time when fundamental changes were
needed, the state of the educational system had become deplorable.
Students and their families have increasingly been forced to contribute
tco financing VET by paying for school materials and the upkeep of school
buildings. Scholarships for secondary school students have been cut drasti-
cally. In 1985-86, 9.5 percent of those in general secondary schools and
m,ore than 20 percent of those in vocational and technical schools received
scholarships; by 1991 these figures had fallen to 0.5 percent and 1.0 per-
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cent, respectively. As a result, households covered 17 percent of all educa-
tional costs in 1991-92 and about 25 to 30 percent in 1994-95. For years,
salaries in Poland, like in other socialist countries, were low because hous-
ing, vacations, education, and transport were heavily subsidized. With the
sudden withdrawal of subsidies, many households experienced severe fi-
nancial problems.
The burden of spending is shifting from the central government to local
authorities, which are now responsible for preschools and are gradually
taking over the costs of primary schools. Table 2-5 presents a breakdown of
expenditures by type of education for primary and secondary schools. Vo-
cational schools received 20.9 percent of the budget in 1980 and 17.4
percent in 1990, when most industrial enterprises closed down their schools.
This percentage increased gradually to 26.1 percent in 1993 at the cost of
a reduced share for primary schools.
Vocational Education
All secondary schools (except the basic vocational schools) require entrance
examinations. In the past this permitted effective control over the number
of students entering these schools. Because the authorities kept the number
of students allowed to enter general secondary and secondary technical
schools low, basic vocational schools began to be viewed as schools for
those who fail to get into other schools. A similar stigma was attached to
the secondary vocational and technical schools. Their standards have never
been as high as those of the general secondary schools. Nevertheless, the
secondary vocational and technical schools have always been popular, be-
cause they provided an avenue to higher education. Similarly, many stu-
dents treated the postsecondary vocational schools as a place to bide their
time until they were accepted into a university. This was reinforced by the
traditional pedagogical approach, which in both secondary schools and
primary schools focused on university preparation.
LINKS BETWEEN VET AND OTHER TYPES OF EDUCATION. The structure
of schooling has changed little in recent decades, although there has been a
move to reduce the number of students entering basic vocational schools
and to increase the number entering secondary technical schools. There
has also been a tendency to introduce more vocational education into gen-
eral education.
During the 1980s, about 97 percent of those completing primary school
continued their full-time education. In 1991-92 the proportion dropped
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TABLE 2-5
Public Expenditures on Primary and Secondary Education,
1980 and 1990-93
(percent)
School type 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993
Preschools 15.5 16.9 0.4 0.3 0.2
Primary schools 52.7 55.6 64.7 61.3 59.5
Secondary general schools 6.7 5.8 7.1 7.7 8.1
Special general schools 2.2 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.4
Vocational schools 20.9 17.4 22.4 24.7 26.1
Arts schools 1.6 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.1
Special vocational schools 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: OECD (1995, p. 46).
to 94 percent; of those students, about 26 percent entered general second-
ary schools, 25 percent attended secondary technical and vocational schools,
and 43 percent went to basic vocational schools. All in all, therefore, about
70 percent of primary school leavers enter the vocational education sys-
tem; half of them are eventually eligible to take examinations for entry into
higher education institutions. However, the proportion of students that go
on to higher education is low (only 12 percent compared with 30 percent
in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries
and 15 to 20 percent in other Central and Eastern European countries).
Graduates of vocational schools that do not have this opportunity can,
theoretically, continue their studies to achieve full secondary level certifi-
cates, but only some 23 percent actually do so.
Current policies aim to increase the number of students completing
secondary education and, as a result, to reduce the number entering basic
vocational schools. Policies also aim at providing higher education that is
geared more toward employment than toward traditional academic higher
education.
LINKS BETWEEN VET AND THE LABOR MARKET. Almost 50 percent of
school leavers entering the labor market in 1989-90 had at most a basic
vocational school diploma or incomplete secondary schooling, a figure that
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had dropped to 40 percent by 1993, while 13 percent could claim only an
elementary school certificate.
Vocational education has traditionally been organized along sectoral lines,
with the pertinent ministry or agency responsible for determining the vo-
cational curricula and the Ministry of National Education responsible for
overall administration, general subjects, and coordination. Schools nor-
mally focus on a single sector, and switching from one type of vocation to
another is difficult. These characteristics make the system excessively rigid.
In addition, skills not required in large enterprises tend to be neglected,
and the handicrafts and services sectors have suffered as a result.
The industrial sector and parallel vocational structure have proven to be
a major barrier to industrial and regional development during the transi-
tion to a market economy. For years educational researchers have pointed
to problems in rural areas, where nonagricultural education has been
largely absent. With the collapse of state agricultural enterprises, the lack
of secondary vocational education in rural areas has become even more
of a problem.
At the administrative level, the interaction between schools and enter-
prises was top-down and bureaucratic. The number of students pursuing
particular courses depended on the plans of individual ministries, course
content was jointly worked out by representatives of the ministries and
teachers, and budgets depended on the bargaining strength of each minis-
try. The result was a complex, heavily centralized system with uneven and
largely unintended outcomes that reflected the ever present gaps between
the targets of central administrative planning and realities at the local level
in a shortage economy.
All types of vocational schools, even schools with their own workshops,
organize part of their training inside enterprises. Most schools have devel-
oped relationships with local firms. These firms are keen on having good
contacts with schools, because they are a source of labor, which is always
needed. However, the training within enterprises is not well integrated into
either school work or the work of the enterprises.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT. The structure of school-based voca-
tional education and training dates back to 1961 legislation on the devel-
opment of the educational system. In 1991 Parliament adopted a new law
on secondary education, the Education Reform Act, to help cope with the
new financial and administrative conditions. The 1991 act maintained the
same types of schools that existed previously, and it returned overall re-
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sponsibility for education to the Ministry of National Education. At the
same time, however, it regulated the continued participation of other min-
istries or central agencies in decisionmaking on curricula and teaching
materials, such as textbooks. Details about how this is carried out in prac-
tice are settled by separate rulings of the Council of Ministers.
The act also established the rights and obligations of regional education
authorities, school directors (who now report directly to the Ministry of
National Education), and other staff. It introduced considerable decen-
tralization and gave schools significant discretion in management and in
making some decisions about their curricula based on the needs of local
labor markets.
The act also allowed for the establishment of any kind of nonstate school.
The hope was that this would introduce competition into the school sys-
tem that would speed up modernization.
COSTS AND FINANCING. All state schools, those under direct ministry
control and those governed by local authorities, are financed from the pub-
lic budget. Other schools that are not state schools but are officially recog-
nized receive subsidies for each student from the state budget that amount
to 50 percent of the average cost per student in state schools. The number
of private schools is increasing, but private vocational schools are rare.
Formerly, enterprises contributed to the financing of vocational educa-
tion by running their own schools and training centers. However, this money
came indirectly from the state budget, because it was provided by the re-
spective technical ministry, if not directly by the Ministry of National Edu-
cation. One of the first things enterprises did when they became responsible
for their own financial management and budgets at the end of the 1980s
was to close their training facilities. The Ministry of National Education
was unable to take over all the financial commitments of all the enterprise
schools and training workshops. Therefore, it has allowed the remaining
enterprise training schools to earn additional income by renting out part of
their buildings, by providing private training, or by other means.
ASSESSMENT AND CERTIFICATION. Polish education has been character-
ized by a high degree of centralized control of inputs, including finances,
staff, curricula, textbooks, and numbers of students. The number of gradu-
ates was supposed to equal the number of people enterprises planned to
hire, but schools were responsible for final examinations. Therefore, the
quality of training outcomes was extremely diverse.
84 TRANSITION ECONOMIES
Occupations are divided into two broad categories, skilled workers and
technicians, depending on the amount of theoretical knowledge required.
Unlike the German system, where traditionally a skilled worker can be-
come a technician by pursing further training, in Poland students follow
two different tracks after primary education to become either a skilled worker
or a technician. This is typical of many Central European countries that
had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Labor Market Retraining
In 1990 the Ministry of Labor established the Labor Fund, which is fi-
nanced from a 2 percent tax on wages. This fund is used, among other
things, to refund enterprises for wages paid to vocational education stu-
dents who do some of their training within the enterprise and to young
workers who undergo training within the framework of an employment
contract with the enterprise. The fund also finances training for the unem-
ployed. However, the amount the fund spends for training purposes has
remained low, and the number of people receiving labor market training
has remained few. Table 2-6 shows expenditure on labor market programs
from 1990 to 1993.
Several factors are responsible for the low level of retraining activities.
The most important one is that few vacancies can be filled on the basis of
retraining. Because of the large number of registered unemployed, employ-
ment office staff are unable to spend much time on individual cases. In
addition, the infrastructure for handling unemployment had to be devel-
oped from scratch and has concentrated mainly on benefit payments. Em-
ployment offices complain about the difficulties of finding appropriate
training organizations that could be contracted to provide retraining courses.
TABLE 2-6
Labor Market Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-93
Expenditure category 1990 1991 1992 1993
Labor Fund 0.63 1.65 2.00 2.01
Passive policies 0.32 1.35 1.72 1.68
Active policies 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.31
Source: Ministry of Labor and social policy data.
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For the moment, secondary schools, private training firms, and large semi-
public adult training organizations are involved in labor market training.
Most of the unemployed receiving such training are young school-leavers.
Continuous Training for Adults
For many years Poland has had a widespread system of nonformal training.
By the end of 1989, 448 institutions that did not belong to the formal
school system provided such training, half of them operated by the Asso-
ciiation of Vocational Upgrading Institutions. Some of the institutions
operated on a countrywide scale. Courses ranged from short ones-for
example, on health and safety (the association has the monopoly on these
courses, which are obligatory for all enterprises)-to full vocational educa-
tion leading to qualifications similar to those provided by the formal school
system. By 1993-94 there were more than 2,000 nonformal institutions;
35 percent of them offered foreign language courses.
The large private training organizations and the public school system
have suffered from similar problems: outdated curricula and teaching ma-
terials for traditionally narrow occupational profiles. Some of these organi-
zations were more or less self-financing through fees and the sale of goods
produced by students. Therefore, their problems were also similar to those
of school workshops after the liberalization of markets. Some private train-
ing organizations have concluded contracts with the Employment Offices
for the delivery of retraining courses. Private industries' interest in provid-
ing training courses for their employees through commercial organizations
has remained minimal.
Major VET Issues and Reforms
Like the other transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, Po-
land faces a dual challenge. Developed to serve a centrally planned economy,
VET systems were geared toward heavy industry and technologically back-
wrard industrial production. The first challenge is to make them compat-
ible with an economy based on market principles that incorporates a greater
variety of industrial production and services. At the same time, the VET
system is expected to contribute to the development of a market-based
economy-the second challenge.
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Structure and Organization
Until the mid-1980s, there were three types of secondary schools. About
15 percent of students finishing primary school attended general second-
ary schools, some 25 percent went to secondary vocational or technical
schools, and around 60 percent went on to basic vocational schools. In
other words, most students were expected to enter the labor market upon
acquiring what often amounted to rudimentary skills. Since the 1960s,
training specialists have been pointing out that this should be changed,
because technological change requires higher levels of skills, less specializa-
tion, and increased educational and occupational mobility for workers.
Several attempts to reform the system along these lines met with resistance
from enterprise management and manpower planners, who argued that
existing jobs were simple in nature and required more practical dexterity
than cognitive skills. With the higher levels of uncertainty inherent in a
market-based system, Polish authorities appear to have decided that a higher
level of general education is the way to handle this challenge.
In 1994, 607,500 pupils completed primary school. Almost 30 percent
of them went on to general secondary schools, 5 percent entered secondary
vocational schools, 23 percent attended secondary technical schools, and
about 40 percent entered basic vocational schools. Thus, less than 70 per-
cent of primary school-leavers entered the vocational education system,
down from more than 85 percent before the transition. However, as noted
earlier, the proportion of students continuing to higher education is only
about 12 percent. The intent of current policies is to increase the number
of students who complete their secondary education; to reduce the number
of students entering basic vocational schools; and to provide higher educa-
tion curricula that is different from the traditional academic curricula, in
particular, courses more geared to employment.
The changed employment environment and the greater participation of
the private sector in the delivery of education require new forms of coop-
eration between the actors now involved in education. This includes
policymakers from the different ministries traditionally responsible for
vocational education and training, public administrators at different levels,
social partners, and the various providers of education and training. Polish
institutions have always had problems when trying to coordinate their ac-
tivities, and a consensus about how to achieve such coordination on educa-
tion and training does not appear to exist.
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Management and Funding
Under the old system, vocational schools either were attached to an enter-
prise, which was responsible for all costs other than teachers' salaries, or
were managed by local education authorities, with the budget coming from
the Ministry of Education. Companies used to be interested in having con-
trol over vocational schools, because this ensured a supply of appropriately
trained workers. With the gradual integration of vocational schools into
the public education system, companies lost much of this control and be-
came less interested in funding them. At the same time that the Ministry of
Education found itself responsible for funding more schools, the govern-
ment reduced total education budgets as part of its structural adjustment
policies and because of falling government revenues. Nearly all firms closed
down their facilities for practice learning or canceled their contracts with
school workshops. As a result, much vocational education became almost
exclusively theoretical.
Because the central government was unable to provide sufficient resources,
a 1989 law allowed schools to set up workshops on a commercial basis
and to use the profits to buy equipment and to top up staff salaries. By
1990 about 650 schools had workshops, but since their production re-
quirements conflicted with learning objectives, the workshops were closed
again in 1992.
Another change has been the shift in spending from the central govern-
ment to local authorities. In the 1980s the central government's hare of
education expenditures was more than 90 percent, but by 1994 local au-
thorities' share had risen to more than 30 percent, and this share is ex-
pected to increase. There has also been a concentration of expenditure inside
the Ministry of National Education once other ministries topped financ-
ing vocational schools.
Since 1992 schools have had a certain degree of autonomy in adjusting
parts of their curricula to respond to the needs of the local labor market.
Decentralization has, indeed, been predicated on the assumption that re-
sponding to labor market needs is best done at the school level. For school
management and teachers, however, this has implied taking on new roles
in an attempt to bring some order into the labor market uncertainties that
surround them. The ministry has been unable to guide schools in their
experimental adaptation of courses yet still insists on approving the schools'
curricula. Gradually, regional educational authorities are becoming more
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active in promoting and assisting school-based curriculum change and in
providing a mechanism for generalizing and disseminating experience.
The developments to date indicate that policymakers have taken a num-
ber of steps to develop an alternative infrastructure for financing, manage-
ment, and curriculum development of vocational instruction after the
collapse of the old system. The new infrastructure is not yet in place, how-
ever, mainly because the Ministry of National Education lacks the neces-
sary resources and because of the lack of industry interest. The large
international assistance programs financed by the European Community
and the World Bank are supporting the development of the new infrastruc-
ture, but the three subsystems of vocational education and training (for
young people, for adults, and for the unemployed) should be dealt with
more consistendy within an integrated policy framework (Grootings 1 993a,
1993b).
Curricula and Delivery
The new education policymakers came essentially from the ranks of teach-
ers and educational researchers. Thus it should come as no surprise that
they have focused on what had been postponed for so long-namely, revis-
ing and modernizing existing curricula and developing new curricula for
subjects that had been neglected, such as modern languages, or that had
not been in demand, such as financial management, banking, and eco-
nomic subjects.
The new curricula were to be developed by so-called "author groups" of
teachers. These groups were confronted with a challenging task, because
the Ministry of National Education had closed down all supporting infra-
structure for curriculum research and development. Either private business
is not well enough organized yet to participate in such an undertaking, or
individual employers have little interest in becoming involved in vocational
education, because they have no trouble finding employees with sufficient
qualifications. Most curriculum innovation projects have been financed
from foreign assistance programs. In 1994 the authorities decided to estab-
lish a national curriculum center, and they have now created a special team
for curriculum development within the Research Institute for Education.
Early on in the reform process, educators realized that vocational teach-
ers' pedagogical skills as well as their technical knowledge would need a
certain amount of upgrading. However, the institutions that once took
care of the former had been closed down, and no institutions to provide
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teachers with further education and training in technical subjects had ex-
isted under the old system.
In the meantime the role of teachers has changed considerably. No longer
do they merely implement what has been decided by central authorities.
T'hey now have to be educational developers themselves and translate labor
nmarket signals into educational programs. Some teachers have managed to
do this better than others. The authorities have taken steps to reorganize
the system for educating vocational education teachers to increase their
overall level of qualifications while making them less academically oriented.
TIhey have also set up postsecondary colleges for teacher training. These are
intended for foreign language teachers but later will accommodate others.
The reorganization of teacher training in vocational education has only
just begun and remains one of the main challenges facing the Polish VET
system.
Because the geographical distribution of VET schools used to be de-
fined primarily by the presence of industrial enterprises, many of whom
are now in crisis or have been closed down, the relocation of schools has
also been put on the agenda. In addition, individual schools, in consulta-
tion with regional authorities, have started to change their course offerings,
sometimes with a view to contributing to regional development plans. As a
result, some areas of education that had been neglected, such as tourism
and commercial studies, are now being developed.
To change from a system that controlled inputs to one that controls
output, and to attain standards comparable to those in Western European
countries, Polish policymakers will have to agree about relevant occupa-
tional profiles. The Ministry of National Education has not yet succeeded
in mobilizing the social partners (employers and trade unions) needed for
this, so achieving consensus will probably take some time. The slow pace of
industrial restructuring is also a hindrance. Except in those sectors that are
growing rapidly, industry feels under no immediate pressure to invest re-
sources in such activities.
Policymakers have realized that the problem of developing a set of quali-
fication standards calls for radical improvement of educational provision
and the development of a national system of examination and certification.
However, perhaps because of the general shortage of funds, they have tended
to leave the responsibility for provision to individual schools. Recently,
experiments with developing national examinations for general secondary
schools have started at the regional level. Yet VET quality control remains
largely input oriented through central approval of curricula. In view of
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increasing mobility, both within the education system and in the labor
market, the challenge will be to develop assessment and certification proce-
dures that will lead to generally recognized qualifications.
New Roles for the Government
Poland's attempts to modernize an anachronistic VET system is compli-
cated by the absence of well-functioning labor market institutions, such as
employment offices, and an infrastructure for retraining the unemployed;
by the lack of industry involvement; and by the dramatic restructuring of
the employment system as a whole, the direction and final outcome of
which are still unclear. This problem is particularly acute in the case of
retraining programs for the unemployed, which were not required before
1989 and were barely operating even as late as 1992. Retraining policies are
crippled by a lack of awareness about future employment prospects, but
the number of people enrolled in retraining and training programs has
grown more than tenfold since 1990.
Obstacles to Reform
Few stakeholders are truly interested in the necessary reforms because the
supply of qualified labor at this stage of the transition is abundant, and
future requirements are unpredictable. Therefore, no clear national strat-
egy for VET reforms exists.
STAKEHOLDERS' LACK OF INTEREST IN VET. Changes in the VET system
are largely a by-product of changes in the overall educational system. Voca-
tional education has lost its dominant position in terms of financial and
personnel resources, even though it caters to the majority of secondary
school students. Policymakers have given priority to developing what was
missing in Polish education rather than to improving what was already
present.
Individual schools have been forced to bear the burden of adaptation,
and the changes taking place are restricted to such basics as curricula, teach-
ing materials, and staff qualifications. With no clear signals from the Polish
labor market and social partners reluctant to become involved in mid- or
long-term VET policymaking, points of reference are sought elsewhere or
are imported through such means as bilateral assistance programs.
Nevertheless, given the country's extremely limited financial resources,
Poland's accomplishments should not be underestimated. Its vocational
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education and training has changed from a closed and centralized system
to a system opened up to the outside world. While this has been an ad hoc
process based largely on pragmatic, short-term decisions by local actors, it
may well prepare the ground for future developments. The time may have
come to evaluate what is taking place in schools rather than develop central
policy initiatives that do not relate well to local developments. However,
educational policymakers may not be able to achieve this without more
involvement from industry.
The present economic situation, especially the employment situation, is
not conducive to mobilizing social partners for a transformation of the
VET system. The labor market has an abundant supply of well-qualified
labor for the few new, modern firms that need labor. Most of the immedi-
ate skill gaps have been covered, and existing enterprises are not in a posi-
tion to recruit new labor as they try to protect the workers they have.
If employers and trade unions were more involved in decisions on voca-
tional education, the schools would be more in touch with employers' ac-
tual needs. Since planning for skill requirements far ahead of time is virtually
impossible, vocational education systems need to have intrinsic flexibility
and responsiveness. This can be achieved only when they are able and will-
ing to communicate on a continuous basis with representatives of the em-
ployment system.
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT NEEDED SKILLS. The problem of predicting the
skills that will be needed is difficult in all transition countries, because of
the difficulty of reaching a national consensus on the economy. To a large
extent this can be attributed to a political reluctance to change existing
industrial employment structures radically, because this would result in
considerable social conflict and tension. Moreover, new employment is
emerging primarily in small private enterprises.
The experience of Western countries has demonstrated the difficulties
inherent in predicting medium- and long-term needs for particular occu-
pations and to structure educational policies accordingly. Moreover, mod-
ern technologies and enterprises' organizational structures are now more
flexible than before, which makes defining a precise fit between educa-
tional qualifications and jobs problematic. In addition, it has always been
the case that many jobs could be filled by people with quite different for-
mal qualifications. Finally, there are new "hybrid" occupations that com-
bine skills and competencies that once were the domain of separate
occupations (for example, operators of highly automated production lines
or auto mechanics, who must now also be familiar with computers).
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BOX 2-1
Poland's VET Reforms
The modernization of VET systems has several purposes: to reduce the number of
vocational profiles, develop broader occupational profiles, reduce enrollments in
basic vocational schools, expand secondary education leading to a Matura certifi-
cate, and develop postsecondary, nonuniversity vocational education. The reforms
involve
* Modernizing curricula. Particular efforts are being made to accommodate
modern languages and new technologies. New programs are being devel-
oped, especially in services and commercial administration, and obsolete tra-
ditional programs (such as in metals and heavy industries) are being phased
out. New curricula are being tested in about 600 vocational schools and will
gradually be expanded. The Ministry of National Education has set up 15
commissions charged with preparing educational programs.
a Updating teachers' qualifications and educational materials.
* Changing curricula and methods of teaching to provide students with not
only technical skills and knowledge, but also the social skills that will enable
them to be active in the labor market, and to prepare them for continuous
education and training during their working career.
* Helping students make appropriate vocational and occupational choices
by developing information systems and an occupational counseling infra-
structure.
To cope with the loss of practical training facilities, the Ministry of National
Education is developing alternative solutions. Schools that can show that their
practice workshops are financially sustainable receive subsidies from the ministry.
The ministry has also initiated the establishment of 10 regional training centers
that will be well equipped and open to all schools in the region.
Finally, a start has been made in developing a new type of vocational school, the
secondary professional school, which will last four years and offer students a gen-
eral secondary education plus a broad vocational education in 14 fields. Unlike the
existing secondary technical schools, the new schools will not qualify students as
technicians but will allow them to go on to higher education or to study for an
occupational qualification at a postsecondary school.
Source: Author's data.
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Such developments in the labor market have led Western economies to
review their own VET systems and to design new structures for
decisionmaking, provision, and control. Polish policymakers appear still
to be caught up in modernization rather than in designing a system for the
future (box 2-1).
LACK OF A CLEAR CHANGE STRATEGY. During the past few years there has
been some discussion about the appropriate method for implementing
changes in VET and whether such a method should take a top-down or a
bottom-up approach. This debate was related to whether changes should
be introduced in the structure of the educational system or in such aspects
of the system as curricula, textbooks, teacher qualifications, and so on. In
practice, there has long been a mixture of top-down and bottom-up inno-
vation. The problem is how to combine them so that national educational
policies support local experimentation, and local developments benefit sys-
tem development at large.
Sometimes with the help of local enterprises and sometimes with the
help of foreign partners, many schools have instigated changes on their
own initiative in an attempt to respond to immediate needs and improve
the quality of the education they provide. These changes include modern-
izing curricula, introducing new textbooks, obtaining new teaching equip-
ment, and retraining teachers. What has usually been missing in these
activities, however, is a recognition of the systemic change needed to pre-
pare students for functioning in a market economy.
The present policy of decentralization is necessary to cope with the new
requirements of the labor market. To this end, teachers require external
support and guidance. External support for bottom-up reforms would also
provide coherence to what has so far been uncoordinated development of
local initiatives. The country does not have the capacity to monitor what is
going on at the local level in individual schools. Thus lessons derived from
the experiences of innovative schools do not find their way into national
training policies.
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3] Czech Republic
PETER GROOTINGS
THE CZECH REPUBLIC, a nation of about 10 million
people, was established on January 1, 1993, after the Czech and Slovak
Federation split up. Before World War II, the former Czechoslovakia was a
parliamentary democracy with a gross national product (GNP) per capita
comparable to that of Austria and Belgium. Industry was well developed in
the western part of the country, and its products were sold on world mar-
kets. In 1948 the Communist Party introduced a centrally planned economy,
which (after a short interruption during the Prague Spring of 1968) was in
place until the Velvet Revolution of 1989. By 1990 GNP was about one-
fifth that of Austria and Belgium. By 1994 GNP per capita was about
US$3,600, half that in Greece and Portugal, countries with the lowest GNP
per capita in the European Union.
By the end of the 1980s, the industrial structure was characterized by a
predominance of large nationalized-and increasingly undercapitalized-
enterprises in heavy industry and engineering, with markets almost com-
pletely concentrated in former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
countries. One of the major challenges Czech industry faced after the col-
lapse of markets in the former socialist countries was to become competi-
tive in world markets.
Basic indicators for 1991-94 show a remarkable turnaround in eco-
nomic performance, an impressive growth in private employment, and sur-
prisingly low unemployment (table 3-1). As a result, by 1995 Czech
policymakers generally viewed their economy as one that was no longer in
transition, although external observers argued that the country had merely
95
96 TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TABLE 3-1
Basic Economic Indicators, 1991-94
Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994
GDP (current prices, billions of krona) 1,037.5 716.6 791.0 910.6
Annual changes of GDP
(constant prices, percent) -14.2 -7.1 -0.3 3.0
Industrial production (percentage of
total production) -24.4 -13.7 -5.3 2.5
Ratio of srate budget to GDP -2.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Inflation (percent) 56.6 11.0 20.8 10.0
Employed in the private sector (percent) 18.8 31.1 46.9 55.0
Gross debt per head of population
(millions of US$) 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8
Registered unemployment
(percentage of labor force) 4.4 2.6 3.5 3.2
GDP gross domestic product.
Source: Czech Statistical Office data.
postponed some of the problems that had caused social hardship in other
countries. These observers predicted that some of the features typical of
transition, such as higher rates of unemployment, were therefore likely still
to appear. They pointed to the comparatively favorable economic situation
in the Czech Republic at the end of the 1980s and to a number of specific
factors (such as low labor force participation, low wages, continued labor
hoarding in large public enterprises, and the effects of public employment
measures). The impact of these factors is likely to weaken in the near future.
A key element of recent economic reforms has been the privatization of
state-owned enterprises. As a result, the share of the nonstate sector in GNP
reached 56.3 percent in 1994, while its share in industrial production was
56.9 percent. Private sector employment rose from 19 percent in 1991 to
55 percent in 1994. However, the state sector is still relatively large, and
future privatization measures may well be accompanied by an increase in
unemployment.
Labor Market Developments
While the Czech population is slowly declining, the large generation born
in the 1970s has now reached child-bearing age. In 1994 about 2.0 million
CZECH REPUBLIC 97
TABLE 3-2
Working-Age Population, Labor Force, and Participation Rate,
Selected Years, 1980-94
Category 1980 1990 1991 1992 1994
Working-age population
(thousands) 5,806 6,018 6,082 6,150 6,212
Labor force (thousands) 4747 4,627 4,871 4,644 4,699
Participation rate (percent) 81.8 76.9 80.1 75.5 75.6
Men 87.9 81.7 86.4 81.6 81.4
Women 74.9 71.6 73.2 68.8 69.4
Source: Czech Statistical Office data.
people were too young to work, about 6.2 million (2.6 million of them
women) were of working age, and around 5.0 million (2.3 million of them
women) were of retirement age or older. Although the population of work-
ing age increased between 1980 and 1994, labor force participation rates,
which were relatively high in 1980, decreased both for men and women
(table 3-2).
In the early 1990s the Czech Republic saw a decrease in overall employ-
ment opportunities, a shift in employment patterns from agriculture and
industry toward the services sector, and an increase in employment in the
private sector. Table 3-3 provides an overview of employment from 1990
to 1994. The figures show a net decline in employment and a considerable
shift from the primary and secondary sectors toward the tertiary sector.
The number of people employed in the private sector increased from
1.3 percent of the work force in 1989 to 31 percent in 1992 and 64
TABLE 3-3
Employment by Sector, 1990-94
(thousands)
Sector 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total employed 5,435 5,387 4,889 4,766 4,759
Primary sector 826 801 651 491 451
Secondary sector 2,345 2,290 2,048 2,005 1,945
Tertiary sector 2,264 2,296 2,190 2,270 2,363
Source: Czech Statistical Office data.
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TABLE 3-4
Unemployment Rates, by Gender and Education, 1993 and 1994
(percent)
1993 1994
Education level Males Females Males Females
Primary and not stated 8.4 7.6 11.7 7.8
Lower secondary
Apprentice 2.7 4.6 2.7 4.6
Technical 2.5 5.0 2.6 5.8
Upper secondary
Apprentice (Maturita) 4.7 7.3 2.4 5.0
Technical 1.9 3.1 2.1 2.6
General 5.8 3.7 5.9 3.6
University 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.1
Average 3.0 4.5 3.3 4.3
Source: Czech Statistical Office data.
percent in 1995. This is a result both of privatization of former state
enterprises and of the growth of small and medium private businesses.
Between 1993 and 1994 the number of small and medium enterprises
increased from 3,109 to 3,997; half of them were enterprises with fewer
than 100 employees.
Although the overall unemployment rate is relatively low, large regional
differences resulted from the inherited employment structure. Not only
was employment concentrated in large, heavy industrial enterprises, but
these enterprises were unevenly distributed across the country, which made
some regions and communities dependent on one major enterprise. Un-
employment rates also differ significantly by education levels (table 3-4).
Czech state enterprises are known to prefer older workers with experience
over better educated younger workers, and since they have so far avoided
shedding labor, they have not provided many job openings for school leavers.
Accordingly, the number of vacancies is still relatively low.
Compared with other countries in transition-indeed, compared with
many industrial market economies-the Czech Republic has had remark-
ably low open unemployment. According to a 1995 report by the Organi-
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zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1995a), the
following factors may explain the Czech "unemployment miracle":
- Employment reduction accomplished by pushing people out of the
labor force. A much larger component of employment reduction in the
Czech Republic was accomplished by pushing people out of the labor force
than into unemployment through retirement schemes for working pen-
sioners and early retirement schemes. In addition, a larger number of school
graduates at different levels have been retained within the expanding edu-
cation system, thereby lowering labor force participation by new entrants.
* Workers' acceptance of strong wage moderation. This resulted in a
decline in real wages, which were already low compared with those in other
Central European countries.
* Favorable initial conditions in terms of employment structure (espe-
cially the small share of agricultural employment) and the qualifications of
the work force (enabling mobility and flexibility).
* A long industrial tradition.
* Persistent labor hoarding in large enterprises, even after privatization.
Because of the nature of the privatization process, in which former enter-
prise management has played a key role, privatization has taken place largely
without enterprise restructuring so far.
- The large absorbent capacity of the newly emerging private sector.
In 1990, 18.7 percent of the economically active population had only a
primary education; 43.1 percent had a lower secondary education (most
had gone through an apprenticeship system; the rest had acquired techni-
cal skills); 27.7 percent had higher secondary qualifications; and only 9.6
percent possessed a university degree. Since then the educational level has
improved slightly as a result of the withdrawal of older, less educated people
from the work force. The signals emanating from the labor market during
this transitional phase have affected the vocational education and training
(VET) system.
The Vocational Education and Training System
The Czech educational authorities since 1990 have increased the flexibility
and scope of the education system, including vocational education. After
preschool, which is optional, children enroll in so-called basic schools. Basic
schools are divided into two levels. The first five years are equivalent to
elementary school, and the sixth through ninth years are equivalent to lower
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secondary school. Basic education was increased gradually from eight to
nine years between 1990 and 1996. After leaving basic school, children can
apply to attend a secondary general school, a secondary technical school,
or a secondary vocational school. All upper secondary schools require chil-
dren to pass an entrance examination, and those who do not can go to
vocational schools that offer one or two years of training for simple manual
occupations. Prior to the transition to a market economy, secondary voca-
tional schools were closely attached to, or even part of, industrial enter-
prises, but this formal relationship has now ceased almost entirely.
Secondary technical schools and secondary general schools offer stu-
dents the opportunity to take the Maturita examination. Students who
pass it, can take university entrance examinations. Until recently both types
of schools also offered so-called post-Maturita courses that enabled stu-
dents to obtain a professional qualification, to get a second professional
qualification if they already had one, or to specialize within a particular
field. In 1996 these courses were abolished and replaced by a new system of
tertiary-level nonuniversity education.
Of those students who choose to continue their studies at the
postsecondary level, about 64 percent have a secondary general school cer-
tificate, some 30 percent come from secondary technical schools, and 4 or
5 percent come from secondary vocational schools. The vast majority of
those who leave secondary vocational school enter the labor market, al-
though since 1992 more have been staying in school to follow a two-year
course that leads to the Maturita.
Enrollment data at the secondary level demonstrate the increasing popu-
larity of technical and general education, and they also show the value at-
tached to professional qualifications (table 3-5). With greater flexibility in
the system, the share of technical and vocational graduates who can enroll for
further studies (that is, pass the Maturita) has increased significantly.
Organization and Management
Until 1989 education was governed through regional and national com-
mittees, with the administrative bodies centrally controlled by the Minis-
try of the Interior and the Communist Party. After the transition, most
secondary vocational schools, which had previously belonged to individual
enterprises and their respective technical ministries, were placed under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, while the Ministry of Education
took over responsibility for research institutions. The Ministry of Educa-
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TABLE 3-5
Enrollment Rates in Secondary Schools, 1989-95
(percent)
Secondary technical Secondary vocational
With Without With Without
Year General Maturita Maturita Maturita Maturita
1989-90 14.9 24.0 - 5.6 55.0
1990-91 15.3 24.4 - 5.1 49.8
1991-92 16.1 23.3 4.9 5.1 48.6
1992-93 15.5 24.4 3.3 5.6 46.4
1993-94 16.4 27.4 2.4 6.6 46.4
1994-95 18.0 34.1 1.3 6.5 40.1
- Not available.
Source: Ministry of Education (various years).
tion was also responsible for secondary technical schools and some voca-
tional schools. Following the 1996 elections, the government sought greater
coordination of VET and placed all vocational schools under the Ministry
of Education.
Direct involvement by enterprises in vocational and technical education
has largely ceased, although relationships-mostly informal-between indi-
vidual schools and enterprises persist. Although industry is still represented
at the national level in the expert groups that decide on curricula, this
participation is largely voluntary and is a continuation of former practice.
Many of the schools' day-to-day responsibilities have been decentral-
ized. School principals can now manage their own budgets-which the
state still provides-and they have a large amount of autonomy in matters
relating to staff and administration. All secondary schools administered by
the state have received the status of legal entities. Nevertheless, there is a
general feeling that ministry staff are still heavily involved in operational
tasks. To date, decentralization has been largely within the framework of
the administrative systems of individual ministries, and it has involved only
those people directly involved in education: administrators, teachers, and
parents. Horizontal communication and coordinating bodies have not been
developed. Nevertheless, those changes that have taken place have made
schools and teachers far more responsible for educational matters than in
the past.
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Financing
An important change has taken place in the way schools are financed. In
1992 the authorities introduced a system of formula financing referred to
as normative financing. Schools receive a lump sum based on the number
of pupils. The amount per pupil varies according to the type of school and
the field of study, and an index compensates for certain disadvantages (such
as students' disabilities, school location, and so on). Although the criteria
for calculating the lump sum remains debatable, this funding mechanism
has made schools more responsive to students' and parents' aspirations and
to the labor market's needs. The mechanism also allows school manage-
ment to develop its own policies.
Total expenditures on education increased from 21.1 billion krona in
1989 to 63.1 billion krona in 1994, and as a percentage of gross domestic
product, education expenditures increased from 4.0 to 5.7 percent during
the same period. Estimates indicate that the state budget covers about 98
percent of total education costs. The major portion of financing (more
than 80 percent) comes from the national budget. The municipal share has
decreased.
In the VET system about 75 percent of noninvestment expenditures are
for salaries and social insurance for teachers and other staff. Finding re-
sources for investments (renovating buildings and buying equipment and
teaching materials) has been a continuous problem, especially for the schools
now under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.
Retraining Programs
The labor policies implemented by the Public Employment Service, which
falls under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, include
labor market training. This service was established in 1990 and had to be
built from scratch. Training has not had to be implemented on a massive
scale given the relatively low unemployment figures. Only a small number
of people (less than 0.25 percent of the labor force) have entered retraining
programs, and so far only a small amount of money has been spent on
them (about 0.1 percent of gross domestic product).
The Public Employment Service does not have its own network of re-
training centers, but it enters into agreements with private and public train-
ing organizations. Several secondary VET schools have signed such contracts.
Increasingly, however, the Public Employment Service is becoming dissat-
isfied with the quality of retraining provided and the pedagogical approaches
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adopted both by educational institutions and by private organizations; it
feels that it often has to address the resulting problems. These issues are
now leading to doser cooperation between education and labor market
authorities.
I'ostschool Training
W5hile the former system of adult education, as an integrated part of the
state educational system, has gradually collapsed, private training initia-
tives have increased. An estimated 2,000 private training organizations are
now operating. The only condition for a private training center to operate
is to be registered as a company, but if it wishes to award educational cer-
t:ificates, accreditation by the Ministry of Education is required.
Enterprises have completely withdrawn from financing vocational and
technical education because they lost their apprentice and training centers
and their soft-budget financing. Recently, however, some enterprises have
indicated that they might be ready to invest in training again. These are
usually enterprises that have managed to establish themselves on the world
market and need skills not readily available in the schools (such as the
Skoda car factory), or enterprises confronting severe labor shortages (as in
the Ostrava mining region).
VJET Issues and Reforms
Since 1989 the Czech authorities have initiated changes in the structure of
v'ET in an attempt to overcome some of the rigidities of the inherited
system. The number and scope of innovations that these measures have
encouraged are impressive, but some developments have been less positive.
Free Choice of Education and the Development of Private Schools
T'he introduction of freedom of choice at the end of compulsory schooling
has dramatically lowered enrollments in vocational schools, which provide
courses leading to the apprenticeship certificate, and correspondingly in-
creased enrollments in technical schools, which offer courses leading to the
Maturita. Encouraged since 1989, private VET institutions have undoubt-
edly played a major role in changing VET structures in the initial transition
years, since most private schools are in the secondary technical school sector.
Private schools have benefited from the same financial arrangements as
state schools. In addition, they can elicit financial contributions from stu-
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dents and their parents. These contributions are necessary to cover invest-
ment, because state funding only covers teachers' salaries and operational
costs. Since public funding depends on the number of students, private
schools now seek to attract as many students as possible by offering attrac-
tive educational packages.
The inherited VET system catered to 85 percent of school leavers from
basic schools, but it channeled them into rigid, narrow educational streams
and specialties. The possibilities of transferring from one type of voca-
tional education to another were limited, not only because student quotas
were decided centrally, but also because schools were viewed as belonging
to the specialized technical ministries and, in the case of the secondary
vocational schools, were directly attached to industrial enterprises. In addi-
tion, access to schools was possible only after passing the entrance exami-
nation. Changing one's educational profile was difficult. Thus occupational
mobility among young workers was relatively high.
In response, the authorities have tried to increase the possibilities for
horizontal and vertical mobility for students by changing the curricula and
by creating new types of educational institutions. A number of secondary
vocational schools are being transformed, with European Union PHARE
support, into so-called integrated schools, which offer courses at the level
of both secondary vocational and secondary technical schools. In addition,
a limited number of economic and technical secondary schools have been
established that fall somewhere between secondary general and secondary
technical schools. (They offer a practical education with a higher level of
general theory than that provided by the technical schools, and they expect
their graduates to continue their studies at the university level, especially in
the technical streams.)
The authorities have diversified further by distinguishing between two-,
three-, four-, and five-year courses in both secondary technical schools and
secondary vocational schools. The length of the course depends on the
requirements for specific occupations. However, because of the extension
of basic schooling for one year, the five-year courses were abolished in 1996.
Those taking the four-year courses are eligible to take the Maturita.
Development of Higher Professional Schools
Vertical mobility for students has been increased, first by the provision of
follow-up courses for graduates of both secondary technical and secondary
vocational schools, and second, on an experimental basis, by the creation
of higher professional schools. As a result, postsecondary education has
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been diversified, and students' chances of gaining access to higher educa-
tion have improved.
Higher professional schools are developing rapidly. In addition to the
25 schools already in existence, about 300 secondary technical schools have
applied for status as higher professional schools, of which nearly 150 have
a good chance of being accepted. These schools' courses in computer sci-
ence, foreign languages, and commercial law are in high demand. Admis-
sion is selective. Applicants must have a technical Maturita and must also
pass an entrance examination. Courses last from one to three years, includ-
ing practical training of at least one day a week.
The status of higher professional schools is problematic, since they are
not considered to be higher education institutions. Nevertheless, their po-
sition at the apex of secondary technical and vocational education enables
them to play a catalytic role in the renovation of VET as a whole.
The Future Status of Secondary Vocational Schools
Unlike other Central and East European countries, the Czech Republic
did not abandon secondary vocational schools to the new market forces.
All secondary vocational schools that had belonged to enterprises were placed
temporarily under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Economy, and
the state budget continued to finance their operational costs. Students un-
able to secure sponsorship from an enterprise are paid for by the state and
are known as state apprentices. Since the 1996 elections, all vocational
schools have been the responsibility of the Ministry of Education.
Secondary vocational schools, once the central feature of the VET sys-
tem, now run the risk of becoming the least appreciated type of education.
The authorities are interested in continuing to provide vocational educa-
tion that, in the continental European tradition, offers a combination of
theoretical and practical learning that leads students to skilled occupations,
and hence involves close cooperation between schools and enterprises.
However, the traditional narrowness of courses has come under criticism.
Policy thinking on this matter is not clear. With the development of the
integrated schools, the government may well move toward abolishing sepa-
rate institutions geared to provide skilled worker qualifications. This would
be in line with trends in Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. However, there is also the possibility of changing the current
system, which differentiates secondary vocational schools from secondary
technical schools, into one that distinguishes levels of qualification. Such a
system would lead to another type of relationship between the different
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schools and would be more in line with the VET patterns in a number of
continental European countries.
Modernizing Curricula
The strategy the Ministry of Education has adopted to implement changes
in the provision of vocational education in schools has relied primarily on
curriculum innovations by teachers. Schools were granted a certain au-
tonomy in changing their curricula: they could adapt 10 percent of a cur-
riculum to local circumstances (and change 30 percent of their syllabuses),
and they could make proposals for modernizing curricula with respect to
occupations and newly developing sectors. Schools have used changes in
their curriculum to attract students. Teachers' and schools' efforts to reori-
ent their curricula are apparent, but the extent to which they have accom-
plished meaningful innovation is not known. The Ministry of Education
has recognized more than 800 different curricula that have resulted from
school initiatives, compared with some 500 available before 1989. The
sheer number of courses creates problems, however.
Although curriculum change has become part of the competition be-
tween schools to attract students, its actual impact on teaching and learn-
ing is sometimes limited. This is because some schools have invented new
courses that may differ only in title from ones that already exist; having a
new curriculum approved is easier than having an existing one changed.
Schools have prepared some of these new courses in close collaboration
with enterprises that were seeking to re-establish the old enterprise-specific
relationships with schools. However, the relevance of these courses is un-
clear, because no generally accepted list of occupations exists.
One of the positive aspects of school-based curriculum development is
that teachers become directly involved in deciding what their students need
to know. However, for such a decentralized process to have an impact on
the overall VET system, information on schools' experiences must be con-
tinuously disseminated to all schools, and policymakers should monitor,
evaluate, and make use of such experiences. This is not happening on a
regular basis, and thus little use is being made of the experiences of indi-
vidual schools.
Governance of VET
A combination of circumstances reveals weaknesses in the governance of
VET in the Czech Republic. The relationships between the ministries in-
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volved in the various forms of VET are not close enough to allow rational-
ization of provision, if not of responsibilities. For their part, social partners
play only a small role in curriculum development and are not prepared to
be involved actively in the delivery, let alone the financing, of vocational
education and training. Support structures are too research oriented and
lack the authority to implement the changes suggested by their research.
Finally, individual VET schools operating independently do not foster a
cohesive policy at the national level.
The authorities are now recognizing that the government needs to have
a stronger strategic role. If VET is to do more than react passively to short-
term changes in the labor market, reform policies cannot rely only on bot-
tOm-up initiatives. Monitoring and guidance within a clear policy framework
are required, or else VET will be unable to play its part in modernizing and
restructuring the economy and employment.
Lessons Learned from the Czech Experience
T he Czech experience has revealed the following lessons for other coun-
tries in transition to a market economy:
- Rely on labor supply adjustment while encouraging private employment
growth. In contrast to other Central and Eastern European countries, the
Czech republic has relied more on restricting the labor supply and less on
attempting to prop up labor demand through interventions. The two prin-
cipal instruments for this adjustment were early retirement and delayed
entry of youth into the labor market by expanding the secondary educa-
tion system. The expansion of secondary education, especially technical
streams, was financed by limiting public funding of universities rather than
by borrowing (table 3-6). However, such measures can only buy time and
would not prove effective if the students do not find gainful employment
when they graduate. Private employment growth has been encouraged
through macroeconomic and labor market reforms. Therefore, these stu-
dents are entering a relatively buoyant labor market.
- Generalize vocational education and make it less terminal. Vocational
and technical education has been made more general, and the education
system has been restructured to permit students to go on to postsecondary
technical education. Although in 1989 only 45 percent of secondary stu-
dents were eligible to apply for higher study (that is, had a Maturita), by
1995 this figure had increased to 60 percent. By introducing postsecondary
schools and allowing vocational schools the flexibility to decide on the
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TABLE 3-6
Total Expenditures for Different Levels and Types of Schools,
1989 and 1994
Billions of krona Index
Level and type ofschool 1989 1994 (1984 = 100)
Kindergartens 1,948 5,528 284
Basic schools 6,055 18,299 301
Secondary schools
General 644 3,042 472
Technical 1,192 6,101 512
Vocational 1,651 8,832 535
Special schools 640 2,423 379
Higher education 3,494 8,465 242
Total 22,166 62,877 284
Source: OECD (1995b).
duration and content of instruction, the Czech government was able to
increase the attractiveness of vocational education.
- Keep public training small by maintaining low registered unemployment.
Public training programs, which have a discouraging record elsewhere, have
been kept modest in the Czech Republic through a host of measures, espe-
cially the reform of unemployment compensation mechanisms. In 1992
eligibility for unemployment benefits was tightened, and their generosity
was reduced, resulting in weaker incentives for job seekers to stay unem-
ployed. This reduced the pressure on the government to resort to active
labor programs, of which public training is among the most expensive and
least effective. This may have allowed the Czech government to maintain
its support for formal education.
* Foster private provision of vocational education by means offavorable
laws and industrial growth. Private provision of vocational education has
been encouraged by lenient laws for setting up training centers. Accredita-
tion requirements are more stringent, but they are needed only if certifi-
cates are issued or public funds are sought. Although commercial providers
are the first to proliferate in the private market, industrial sector growth
will encourage a vigorous response from private providers of technical train-
ing, particularly if the regulatory environment is not unduly restrictive.
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4 Russian Federation
RICHARD JOHANSON
WHEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION was restored as an in-
dependent state in 1991, after more than 70 years of rule by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, major steps were taken toward a transition to a
market economy. These followed earlier experiments with various degrees
of privatization and reform under perestroika. In the period that followed,
prices were liberalized and an ambitious program of privatization was
launched. But the period 1991 to 1996 was characterized by a precipitous
drop in production and output, high initial inflation, growing interenterprise
arrears, and a declining labor force with a surprising stability in the osten-
sible level of employment.
Between 1991 and 1995 Russia registered a cumulative decline of 47.3
percent in real gross domestic product (Citrin and Lahiri 1995). Part of the
decline may be attributed to inflation of production statistics under the
previous command economy and incomplete coverage of newly emerging
economic activities (Gavrilenko and Koen 1994). Still, the declines have
been large.
Other problems arose from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and
the collapse of traditional Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
export markets. With the loss of those customers, the share of exports to
CMEA countries dropped from around 60 percent of the Soviet Union's
total trade, to less than 20 percent of Russia's trade with that area alone. At
the same time, Russia experienced disruptions in traditional supplies of
raw materials and other inputs. Relative prices changed dramatically in
response to domestic price liberalization, modifications in subsidies, and
changes in the structure of taxes and demand.
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The pace of privatization has been rapid. By 1994 more than two-thirds
of large and medium enterprises and over 80 percent of small enterprises
had been privatized. Over 60 percent of the industrial work force had been
employed in privatized enterprises. Privatization, however, cannot be equated
with industrial restructuring or competition. Incentive structures for man-
agement have not changed much, and privatization has occurred with little
d.iscernible impact on enterprise behavior. However, some technological
restructuring has begun. About half of all firms by 1994 had introduced
some form of capital innovation or some form of work reorganization.
lThese changes have skill implications, mainly by increasing the range of
tasks for manual jobs. The size of enterprises has also begun to change. The
inherited industrial structure was characterized by large enterprises. These
structures have begun to break up into smaller enterprises, and new job
growth has been concentrated in smaller firms. Changes in the economy
have had significant implications for the labor force.
The Labor Market
Russia had a population of about 148 million people in 1995. The eco-
nomically active population was 72 to 73 million people, or 48 percent of
the total population. This represented a decline from a labor force of 90
rnillion in 1990. Some 67 million persons were employed in 1995, and an
estimated 6 million were unemployed and looking for work. Of this 6
rnillion only 2.4 million were officially registered as unemployed.
The transition period has been characterized by major shifts in employ-
rnent by sector. In 1990 some 70 percent of the labor force worked in
industry, a category that includes transportation, agriculture, industry, and
construction, but this proportion fell to 44 percent in 1995. Growth areas
include trade, hotel and restaurant businesses, auto service, housing refur-
bishing, and office repair and refurbishing. Since 1992 some parts of the
economy have expanded their work forces, including trade and catering
(14 percent), individual economic activity (865 percent), and self employ-
rnent (163 percent). According to the Ministry of Labor, the service sector
grew by 13 percent in 1995 alone. "Informal sector jobs and self-employ-
rnent are becoming increasingly important. Informal sector employment
. .. is a significant source of income in general, and in particular for the
'unemployed"' (World Bank 1995).
However, despite massive declines in output and significant structural
shifts in employment, the overall change in employment has been small.
The decline in output has not yet translated into high rates of open unem-
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ployment, even though geographical imbalances in unemployment rates
are becoming more pronounced. Rates ranged in 1995 from 0.5 percent in
Moscow to 23.0 percent in the eastern Ingushetia Republic. Overall regis-
tered unemployment has increased only gradually; starting from about 1 per-
cent in mid-1992, it reached about 2.7 percent in 1995. Various factors
account for the sluggish adjustment of employment to negative output shocks.
First, there have been relatively few mass layoffs. The share of total sepa-
rations attributable to mass layoffs and enterprise closure was only about 7
to 8 percent at the end of 1994. Layoffs have been relatively infrequent;
indeed many state firms have continued to recruit at relatively high rates
(World Bank 1995). Second, registered unemployment accounts for less
than 40 percent of total unemployment. Third, there is substantial sup-
pressed unemployment in the form of part-time work and unpaid leave.
Employers have found various ways to avoid mass layoffs. These include
work stoppages, reduced work weeks, and administrative leave.
The proportion of employees with technical and vocational preparation
is extremely high. According to the Ministry of Labor, 19.6 percent of all
workers have completed higher education; 68.2 percent have completed
secondary education-including 32 percent with secondary specialized
(technician) training-and only 12.2 percent have less than full secondary
education. Among entrepreneurs, the educational qualifications are even
higher, with 37 percent having engineering or university backgrounds.
Even though the labor force is highly educated, there has been a mis-
match of jobs and skills during the transition. Russian industry initially
tended to shed clerical and professional staff; most of the hiring has been of
manual workers in production (World Bank 1995). If the demand for pro-
duction workers is relatively strong, the same cannot be said for those with
higher technical skills. About 15 percent of basic vocational school gradu-
ates, 60 percent of specialized secondary graduates, and 50 percent of engi-
neers could not get any job in 1994.
The picture is mixed on wage differentials by skill grouping. Commander
and Yemtsov (1995) found convergence in changes to nominal wages across
the main skill categories. This surely is related to the over 80 percent of
cases in which wages remain administratively set rather than bargained.
However, the relative stability of wages disaggregated by skill may be breaking
down. Occupational wage differentials have widened very rapidly. In mid-
1994 the average wage of managerial employees was 3.6 times the average
wage of workers in unskilled manual jobs (Standing and Vaughan 1995).
Moreover, workers receive nontaxable compensation in the form of bo-
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nuses, profit-sharing, some wage individualization, and fringe benefits. These
trends have major implications for the vocational education and training
(VET) system.
The Vocational Education and Training System
'The Russian education system consists of nine years of basic education for
all students, followed by three types of secondary education: academic sec-
ondary education of two years' duration; basic vocational education of two
to four years' duration; and technical education of four to five years' dura-
tion. Higher education consists of four to six years for the first degree, and
it may be provided in academies, institutes, or universities. The enrollment
ratio is nearly 100 percent for basic education, 90 percent for secondary
education, and about 20 percent for higher education. This case study con-
centrates on basic vocational training, technical education, and continuing
education; it explicitly excludes higher education and postgraduate educa-
tion. Table 4-1 provides information on the destination of basic school
completers.
The Russian system of VET has undergone considerable modification
in organization, management, finance, and content since 1991, but it is
still structured much as it was under the Soviet Union. It can be divided
conveniently into three parts: a school-based system for youth; an enter-
prise-based training system for workers; and a retraining system for adults.
One of the striking features of the system as a whole is its sheer size.
School-based education and training includes some 6,900 institutions (al-
TABLE 4-1
Destination of Grade 9 School Leavers, 1990
Duration Number Percentage
Destination (years) (thousands) of total
Academic secondary school 2 970 53.6
Technical secondary school 4-5 280 15.5
Vocational secondary school 2-4 460 25.4
Labor market - 100 5.5
Total - 1,819 100.0
- Not available.
Source: Ministry of Education (1995).
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most 4,300 basic vocational schools with 1.8 million enrolled and 2,600
technical schools with almost 2 million students). Enterprise-based train-
ing has decreased sharply in recent years, but in 1995 the jobs of nearly 1.8
million blue-collar workers were upgraded, and another 1.3 million work-
ers received training for new occupations. The recently created system of
employment training for unemployed adults trained almost half a million
adults in 1995. A basic feature of the occupational training system is a
heavy reliance on pre-employment and the corresponding lack of a formal,
regulated apprenticeship system. An extraordinarily high percentage of all
entrants to the labor force (75 to 80 percent) already have some initial
occupational qualification.
Until the law changed in 1996, the school-based system had the follow-
ing main characteristics:
* The enrollment ratio at the secondary level (Grades 10 and 11) was
relatively high (about 90 percent of the relevant age group) and was di-
vided into academic secondary schools (about 40 to 45 percent of enroll-
ments), vocational secondary schools (about 40 to 45 percent), and technical
secondary schools (about 15 percent).
* Lateral movement between the three types of secondary education
was considerable particularly among secondary graduates subsequently
enrolling in postsecondary grades of technical and accelerated vocational
programs.
* Early occupational specialization was required in vocational secondary.
• Industrial skills were heavily emphasized in the vocational training
programs.
* Students were initiated into work in the early years of education; gen-
eral secondary education included the option of obtaining qualifications
in a vocational specialization, and many centralized workshop facilities
existed for this purpose.
* Training along with production had a long history in all types of
institutions.
In January 1996 the Law of the Russian Federation on Education was
amended, and the structure of VET was subsequently divided into the
following five levels:
* Basic vocational education. It normally continues two to four years
after Grade 9 or one year after Grade 11. Basic vocational education en-
deavors to train skilled workers for all sectors of the economy.
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* Second-level technical education (called "secondary vocational edu-
cation" or "technical secondary education"). It is normally of three to five
years' duration after Grade 9. Second-level technical education gives prepa-
ration for middle-level specialists and technician occupations.
* Higher-level technical education. Usually of four to five years' dura-
tion, this level provides degree training for engineers and other specialists.
* Postgraduate professional and occupational education.
* Additional professional and occupational education. According to the
law, the "key purpose of additional education [is] the continuous upgrad-
ing of the skills of workers and employees" (Russian Federation 1996, Ar-
ticle 26, paragraph 1).
The amended law does not specify the minimum number of years for
either basic vocational or secondary technical education. This provides a
legal basis for flexibility in training duration.
In 1994 the government stopped compulsory secondary education. Stu-
dents were allowed to leave the education system after Grade 9 or on reach-
ing 16 years. Consequently, a growing number of 14- to 1 5-year-olds enter
the labor market without training and unable to qualify for assistance from
the Federal Employment Service (FES), which has a minimum age for ac-
cess to its services of 16 years.
In what follows I will discuss the system of VET that has existed until
recently and focus on basic vocational education, technical education, en-
terprise-based training for workers, and adult retraining.
]Basic Vocational Education
Russia's extensive system of basic vocational schools (tables 4-2 and 4-3)
has three purposes: acquisition of specific vocational skills, continuation of
general education, and the unstated purpose of keeping youth engaged in
socially useful activities (and off the street). Russia has adopted the Euro-
pean standard of five skill levels, and basic vocational schools impart levels
2 through 4. Structurally, basic vocational education spans both secondary
and postsecondary levels. In addition to programs for students completing
Grade 9 of basic education, intensive skill programs are offered to gradu-
ates of secondary schools (Grade 11). Vocational lyceums, a recent inven-
tion, offer an additional year of studies up to the postsecondary certificate
level mainly for advanced skill acquisition. About 15 percent of all institu-
tions have been upgraded to Jyceums. This confers the advantages of status
ii6 TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TABLE 4-2
Features of the Basic Vocational Education System
Type Entry level Duration Qualification awarded
Vocational school Grade 9 2 years Certificate, Grade 2
3 years Certificate, Grade 3 + secondary
education
Vocational school Grade 11 1 + years Certificate, Grade 3
Vocational lyceum Grade 9 4 years Diploma, fourth-level (mid-level
specialist)
Source: Author.
and modest financial benefits, including an extra 15 percent of each teacher's
pay for materials.
According to education administrators and researchers, vocational schools
have traditionally been designed for students of lower academic aptitude.
Entry traditionally has not been competitive, owing to lack of student de-
mand. Entrants are allocated to various occupational fields on the basis of
interviews and examination of school records.
Teaching Programs
The federal government determines the list of occupations that may and
may not be taught. These areas can cover "every basic area of socially-useful
activities," and the duration of schooling can vary from one school to an-
other (de Moura Castro 1994). Basic occupational training is roughly one-
third theory (academic subjects), one-third vocational subjects, and one-third
practical activities and production. Consider the example of an auto repair
school with a two-year program of 1,400 hours. Students spend about 62
percent of this time in workshops and production-somewhat less in the
first year (40 percent of the time) and more in the second year (60 to 100
percent of the time). In the first semester all the instruction is received in
the school, including two days in workshops. In the second semester one
day of instruction takes place in the workshop and one day in an enter-
prise, if the school has managed to arrange sufficient places. In the third
semester two to three days of instruction are in the enterprise. Instruction
during the fourth semester takes place almost completely at the enterprise.
Vocational and technical schools, unlike general secondary schools, tend
to take training cum production activities seriously. Production is not a
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TABLE 4-3
Basic Vocational Training, Selected Years, 1991-96
Change,
1991-96
Categoy 1991 1993 1995 1996 No. Percent
Number of institutions 4,321 4,273 4,166 4,214 -107 -2.5
Number of students
enrolled (thousands) 1,841 1,741 1,689 1,704 -137 -7.5
Number of graduates
(thousands) 1,210 1,031 1,034 955 -255 -21.0
Note: Includes Federal Employment Service, agreements with enterprises, and privately
financed individuals.
Source: Ministry of Education data.
side activity but a core program. The typical vocational or technical school
was built in order to prepare trained personnel for a given enterprise. Lo-
cated near the enterprise, it depended on the enterprise for equipment,
instructors for the practical activities, internships, and jobs for the gradu-
ates. In line with this symbiotic relation, the factories subcontracted with
the school for the manufacturing or assembly of the parts they needed in
their own production lines. This was considered a suitable arrangement for
the schools, since it provided practical experience to students and some
welcome extra revenue (de Moura Castro, Feonova, and Litman 1994).
In the 1980s an extensive system of contract training grew in which
specific enterprises offered workshop experience on or near the enterprise
premises. However, this system started to collapse rapidly in 1990 when a
new enterprise law freed the enterprises of the responsibility for training
students. At present only about 10 percent of the schools have maintained
the arrangements with specific enterprises.
Management
Basic vocational schools are owned and financed at the federal level, but
considerable authority has been delegated to the regions and municipali-
ties for day-to-day operation. In particular, the schools have substantial
autonomy in hiring teaching staff, in the teaching process, and in the use of
funds. From 1991 to 1995, the number of institutions and enrollments
wvas relatively buoyant, but enrollments by sector shifted considerably. En-
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rollments in industrial sectors declined markedly, while training in service-
related occupations increased substantially.
Teacher and instructor qualifications are high: more than 90 percent of
the teachers had higher education qualifications; 85 percent of the instruc-
tors had either postsecondary technical qualifications or higher education.
Teacher/instructor salaries are reportedly only 30 to 60 percent of the aver-
age industrial wage, and this contributes to significant attrition, on the
order of 10 percent, primarily among instructors in fields with strong wages
in the marketplace.
The cost structure of vocational schools is skewed by the inclusion of
student meals, which account for one-third to one-half of total expendi-
tures per student. Utilities make up another 30 to 40 percent of the total.
Thus expenses directly related to teaching (for example, teacher salaries at
20 percent of the total) represent a small share of spending per student.
The federal government in the 1991-95 period was able to finance only
teacher salaries, student meals, and student stipends. It provided nothing
for teaching materials, consumable supplies, maintenance, renovation, or
utilities. This provoked intensive activity by schools to supplement their
income from other sources. The four principal sources are (a) regional and
local budgets; (b) production of goods and services for sale in the market;
(c) leasing of premises, although the schools can keep only 10 percent of
these proceeds; and (d) tuition for additional students, particularly for adult
training being financed by the FES. The latter adds about 15 percent on
average to school income. Production of goods for sale is increasingly var-
ied in product mix and aimed more at the market in general than, as in the
past, at a specific enterprise; on average, schools cover 20 percent of their
total expenses from this source.
Student outcomes are tested by the individual school in the absence of
overall national standards. National norms (what is called the "state educa-
tional standard") are being developed now at the federal level. The external
efficiency of the system has been declining. From 1991 to 1995, the de-
mand for skilled workers dropped. The output of graduates from basic
vocational training increasingly outstripped effective employment demand,
and the rates of employment of graduates fell steadily (table 4-4).
Technical Education
Technical education and training has the following distinguishing char-
acteristics:
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TABLE 4-4
Employment Experience of Basic Vocational School Graduates,
1991, 1993, 1995
1991 1993 1995
Number Per- Number Per Number Per-
Destination (thousands) cent (thousands) cent (thousands) cent
Wage job 672 84.5 494 66.4 393 56.8
Further education 13 1.6 17 2.2 33 4.7
Conscripted into
military 63 7.9 66 8.9 83 12.0
Self-employed 30 3.8 55 7.4 65 9.4
Unemployed 18 2.2 112 15.1 118 17.1
Total graduates 795 100.0 744 100.0 692 100.0
Source: Ministry of Education (1995).
* Four to five years in duration, spanning secondary education (Grades
10 to 11) plus two to three years of postsecondary education
* Recent decline of the secondary level in favor of the postsecondary
level (discrete postsecondary institutions are evolving)
* Recent upgrading of a selected one-fourth of the institutions to "col-
leges" with an extra year of studies
K Frequent changes of administrative responsibility between the Min-
istry of Education and the State Committee of Higher Education,
the latter being responsible at present
* Control of at least 40 percent of the total educational institutions by
sector ministries
* Dominance of three sectors in enrollment: industry, health (nurses
training), and education
e Shifting enrollments out of industry and health care and into new
market-oriented fields such as business and social work.
Purpose and Structure
Technical education is technician training for middle-level specialists (be-
tween skilled workers and engineers) and supervisors requiring a higher
level of formal education than the typical skilled worker prepared by basic
vocational education (de Moura Castro 1994).
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Technical education includes secondary and postsecondary vocational
institutions and technical "colleges." Postsecondary technical education
spans both the final years of secondary education (Grades 10 and 11) and
the first years of postsecondary education (two to three years.) This level is
now officially called "secondary vocational education," which is something
of a misnomer. The institutions are more a combination of academic sec-
ondary schools (the first two years) followed by short-cycle postsecondary
institutions of two or three years' duration. The postsecondary cycle domi-
nates in terms of enrollment.
"Colleges" began to be established in 1989 at the request of enter-
prises. These are independent educational establishments providing ad-
vanced training and longer duration training. A third year is added to the
program, and graduates can enter the second year of higher education
institutions. Many of these institutions offer market-oriented subjects,
including commerce, finance, banking, high technology, management,
small business, and other services. An institution needs permission to be
upgraded from a secondary vocational institution to a college. After sub-
mitting a request and presenting its qualifications, the institution is re-
viewed by the State Committee of Higher Education to determine whether
it meets the required standards. Less than one-fourth of the institutions
that apply to become colleges succeed.
Russia's 2,600 public technical education institutions enroll 1.9 million
students (1.4 million full time) and employ 156,000 teachers and instruc-
tors. Included in the overall total are about 680 colleges (SCHE 1996). In
addition, more than 40 higher education institutions and 600 basic voca-
tional schools (the lyceums) provide programs of postsecondary technical
education. The overall number of establishments has remained fairly con-
stant since independence-that is, there have been no major closings, con-
solidations, or new openings. There were 2,612 institutions in 1995
compared with 2,605 institutions in 1991.
Administratiron
The administration of secondary vocational education has repeatedly shifted
back and forth between the Ministry of Education and the State Commit-
tee for Higher Education, including four changes in 1993-94 (de Moura
Castro 1994). In the mid- 1990s the State Committee of Higher Education
administered secondary vocational education. However, a significant share
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of the schools was actually controlled by sectoral ministries like agriculture
and industry.
Many of these institutions are considered part of the enterprises. In these
cases the State Committee of Higher Education establishes the basic stan-
clards, and the sectoral ministry defines the teaching programs. The staff
for these institutions often come from the degree-level higher education
institutions operated by the sectoral ministry.
Postsecondary technical education confers a diploma that is recognized
across the whole Russian Federation. The final certification, which is com-
pulsory, consists of a final examination in general subjects, examination in
the occupational qualification, and defense of a graduation paper or project.
Student Intake
About 15 to 20 percent of the students who complete basic education
through Grade 9 (that is, about 280,000 students out of 1,800,000) enroll
in Grade 10 in secondary specialized vocational education. However, the
bulk of the enrollment is concentrated in the final two or three years of the
f-our-to-five-year program. In addition to the continuation of the 280,000
students entering Grade 10, the postsecondary technical institutions admit
to the third year approximately 420,000 students from academic second-
ary schools-about 40 to 45 percent of the Grade 11 graduates-plus an-
other 50,000 from basic vocational schools (about 5 percent of those who
complete the second year). As a result of this entry, the enrollment in the
third year of technical education is almost three times greater than enroll-
rment in the first year. The number of students enrolled shows a slight, but
steady downward trend from 2.2 million in 1991 to 1.9 million in 1995.
The occupational distribution of enrollments changed markedly between
1990 and 1995 (table 4-5). Enrollments in technical occupations declined
dramatically from 349,000 in 1990 to 221,000 in 1995, a decrease of 37
percent. Education dropped from 131,000 to 105,000; health care, from
114,000 to 76,000; and agriculture, from 88,000 to 66,000. The main
field registering increases (business and financial occupations) increased by
89 percent from 92,000 to 174,000 (SCHE 1996).
Consistent with their ownership by sectoral ministries, most post-
secondary technical institutions are specialized by branch of economy, or
sector: occupations in industry and construction (907 institutions), health
protection (436 institutions, mainly for training nurses), and education
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TABLE 4-5
Postsecondary Technical Education: Occupational Distribution
of Enrollment, Selected Years, 1985-95
(thousands of students)
Type ofstudies 1985 1990 1993 1994 1995
Technical (industrial) 422 349 249 222 221
Education (teacher training) 124 131 109 102 105
Health care (nursing) 93 114 78 77 76
Agriculture 80 68 67 45 55
Business and finance 92 93 161 183 174
Source: SCHE (1996).
(428 institutions, mainly for training teachers in basic general education
and basic vocational education).
Admission
Unlike basic vocational education, postsecondary technical education is
open for admission only through competition. This competition takes the
form of examinations, interviews, and testing to determine the applicant's
suitability and aptitude for the intended studies. There are two alternative
entry prerequisites: completion of basic general education (Grade 9) for
entry into the first year, and full secondary education or basic vocational
education (Grade 11 equivalent) for entry into the third year, called a "con-
tracted intensive program." Competition for available places was strong in
1995: about 1.8 applicants for every available place (SCHE 1996). The
proportion of students admitted on the basis of Grade 9 has decreased
(only 38 percent of the 1995 enrollment).
Financing
The federal government establishes enrollment quotas, or targets of the
number of students who may be admitted for training at public expense.
Like basic vocational education institutions, technical education institu-
tions are relatively free to determine the uses of their budget and off-budget
assets. The institutions may admit more students on a fee-paying basis.
However, fee-paying students may not exceed 25 percent of the enrollment
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of students in each area of training specialty. This ceiling prevents fee-pay-
ing students from dominating the institutions' teaching program.
Enterprise-Based Training of Workers
Enterprise-based training has the following characteristics:
* Under the former command system, enterprise-based training was
mandated as pre-employment training for students and in-service training
for various categories of workers.
* Enterprise-based training has been severely criticized for its ideologi-
cal content and its often low quality.
* The extensive training provided by enterprises dropped sharply after
1990, when a new law freed enterprises from the requirement to train.
* The worker "qualification enhancement system"-or training to up-
grade-still exists, but it has been sharply curtailed because of enterprises'
budgetary constraints.
* Enterprise managers have shown a lack of interest in spending on
worker training because of more pressing priorities, including finding or
maintaining markets, keeping workers employed, and investing in new
product development and plant. The threat of workers becoming obsoles-
cent because their skills are no longer in demand is not seen as an immedi-
ate priority.
- A marginal tax incentive of up to 1.5 percent of payroll can be de-
ducted from profits for expenditures on training. However, few firms make
profits these days from which to deduct training expenses.
* A limited number of enterprises are beginning to recruit workers with-
out qualifications, and they are providing them with systematic pre-em-
ployment training for three to eight months. This signals the gradual
emergence of an enterprise-specific apprenticeship system.
Large enterprises traditionally have departments of technical training
with responsibility for training workers, or they have their own company
training centers. Training includes initial training, or apprenticeship, for
those who have joined the factory without occupational qualifications; re-
training for work in a new field; or retraining for a second occupation that
will be practiced in addition to the first.
Initial training may be of two types: apprenticeship training or "formal"
training. In the past, apprenticeship training concentrated on the acquisi-
tion of skills under the supervision of a skilled worker on the job, but it is
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now being complemented with formal instruction and a specific individual
training program. As with true apprenticeships, the students sign an em-
ployment contract and earn money during the entire period of induction
training. While in the workshops, the trainees work under the supervision
of a qualified master. In the case of formal training, workers may undergo
several months of initial training at a training center, at the company's
expense, before starting work.
Overall, enterprise-based training has declined. There are two reasons
for this. First, the enterprise law of 1990 eliminated the statutory require-
ment both for training of workers and for training of students from basic
vocational education. Second, training of workers is widely considered to
be a low priority at a time when production is declining and enterprises are
going deeper into debt. A survey in 1993-94 asking enterprise managers to
rate the most important factors for production ranked training of workers
in 14th place.
The Ministry of Labor has been developing various forms of state sup-
port in order to encourage enterprises to develop in-company training. In
1994 a government decree created a network of support among the train-
ing departments of enterprises. Under this decree the Association for Per-
sonnel Development was created. In 1995 it was active in about 20 of
Russia's 89 regions and had a membership of about 2,000 enterprises. The
purpose of the association is to analyze the training requirements of enter-
prises and assist them in their personnel development programs, training
of in-company instructors, and exchange of experiences. However, insuffi-
cient data have been collected to say with any confidence whether this has
led to an increase in enterprise-based training.
Adult Retraining
Adult retraining aims to prepare unemployed adults for new occupations
in demand. The adult retraining system is based on the large and geo-
graphically spread Federal Employment Service, created in 1991 by the law
on employment of that year. Since then the FES has grown to about 3,000
local offices in 89 regions and 10 municipalities with 36,000 employees.
Some of its distinguishing characteristics are as follow:
* The work of the FES is financed through an employment fund, based
on a 1.5 percent payroll tax. The FES pays for the entire cost of training
from the employment fund; participants and employers typically do not
pay anything.
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* The number of adults retrained for new occupations grew from 10,000
in 1991, to about 150,000 in 1993, to nearly 460,000 in 1995.
* The determination of occupations in demand is done through re-
ported vacancies, employer job guarantees, and training for self-employ-
ment-which the FES has pioneered in Russia.
* The unemployed are becoming more interested in receiving training.
!Less than 10 percent were interested in 1991. More than two-thirds of the
e-mployed were interested in 1996.
* The FES uses the school-based training infrastructure: over 90 per-
cent of the training financed by the FES is provided by existing training
institutions, some of which are selected on a competitive basis.
* The Federal Educational Center of the FES develops the content of
adult retraining programs and trains instructors. Training providers must
use the FES training programs.
* Overall, there is about a 90 to 95 percent completion rate for the
training. About 60 to 67 percent of the trainees find employment after
training; 15 to 20 percent of those trainees return eventually to reregister as
unemployed.
Training Purposes
The key question in adult retraining, as in vocational training generally, is
"training for what?" The FES uses three basic methods to select the kinds
of occupations in which training is given. The first approach is to train for
specific vacancies. This method cannot be relied upon solely. Employers
prefer to fill most vacancies by other means and tend to register only the
most unattractive positions as vacancies (for example, those requiring hard
manual labor). The second approach is to rely on the demand of employ-
ers. This approach has the advantage of being demand driven. The third
approach is to train for self-employment. The reasoning is that if there are
not enough jobs to go around, clearly the case in Russia, people should be
trained to make their own jobs. Training is given in such areas as clothes
making, hair dressing, and small business operation. The FES has pio-
neered training for self-employment in Russia.
Training Target Groups
The FES has many more potential clients for training than it can possibly
finance and handle. How does the FES select which people to train? The
law sets some priorities for selecting clients for training. It specifies the
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long-term unemployed as top priority. In addition, the FES gives priority
to young people (ages 16 to 29), women (60 percent of the registered un-
employed), and the disabled.
Training Methods
In January 1993 the FES established a Federal Educational Center to de-
velop suitable programs for training the unemployed, establish effective
training methods, upgrade teachers, and disseminate experience. The cen-
ter has about 150 staff. Training programs delivered through the financing
of the employment service are developed in the center. Training deliverers
contracted by the employment service must use the training programs pre-
pared by the FES.
Results
As in many other countries, in Russia no scientific cost-benefit analysis of
these programs has been attempted in order to get the net impact of these
programs. Gross data suggest that about 60 to 67 percent of training re-
cipients find a job immediately after undertaking training, which is rather
impressive given the employment situation in the country. The number of
trained adults who stay on the job is also impressive. In 1995 only 16
percent of people who previously received training were registered as un-
employed a second time. However, in the absence of rigorous evaluations,
it is not possible to judge the cost-effectiveness of these programs.
Problems and Issues
The Russian system of occupational training has made considerable progress
in orienting itself to changes in the economic system, but there remain
several basic problems before the transformation can be effective.
Structural Problems
Structural problems derive from the overall objectives of the training sys-
tem, which were developed for another era. In the past it was assumed that
everyone had to be trained in a specific occupation before going to work.
This meant that the preservice training system had to be large and accom-
modate virtually all of the secondary age group, and that employers had to
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do little after employment to upgrade or retrain workers. At the same time,
the system required youth to choose an occupation at too early an age.
Students entered basic vocational schools at the ages of 14 to 15 and were
channeled directly into specific-occupation training. At this age students
seldom know the occupation they want to pursue.
The structure of Russian training for vocational qualifications has been
rigid in requiring lengthy training for occupations that do not require
much training and might be better learned on the job. de Moura Castro
(1994) found that 70 percent of the employees in low-skill occupations
did not need the vocational skills they learned over several years, and
these employees believed they could have learned needed skills on the job
in a matter of weeks.
Organization and Management
The VET system combines the disadvantages of overcentralized coordina-
tion and diversified, duplicated management and training bodies. Central-
ized management has played a dominant role in vocational training. It has
developed the content through methodological institutes and allocated
budget funds to each of the 6,000 institutions. Schools have achieved greater
autonomy, but the view among federal training authorities still prevails
that the center should orchestrate and direct the system, which it does
through the Ministry of Education and the State Committee of Higher
Education. The net effect is overcentralization of the system in terms of
budget and definition of teaching programs.
An additional problem is that of duplication. Many other organizations
both in the center and outside have responsibilities for vocational training.
They include functional ministries with specialist training schools for in-
dustries such as oil and gas, ferrous metals, and chemicals. There may be 30
such administrations in addition to the training establishments belonging
to large enterprises. According to the Ministry of Education, "because of
the proliferation of vocational training institutions under the Soviet sys-
tem, there may well be three vocational schools catering to the age range 15
to 19 in the same street of the same town serving the same factories and
enterprises and teaching the same skills" (Humphries and Dimond 1996).
Costs and Financing
The government can no longer maintain 100 percent financing for voca-
tional training. The consequences of this are far-reaching. From 1991 to
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1996 the Ministry of Education was able to finance only salaries, student
meals, stipends, and almost nothing else. Little money was spent on key
teaching expenditures. No provision was made for equipment, teaching
materials, consumable supplies, maintenance, or repair of facilities. Insti-
tutions were left to fend for themselves to finance these items. Utility pay-
ments clearly had priority, with the result that virtually nothing was invested
in system development (teaching materials or equipment). Equipment was
worn out or in disrepair, and textbooks and other teaching materials were
in extremely short supply or nonexistent.
Teacher salaries were also comparatively low. As a result, many experi-
enced and high-quality instructors who had the opportunity to employ
their skills elsewhere left the profession. New instructors are typically not
being hired, in part because salaries are so unattractive but also because
school directors (to approximate a living wage) offer double salaries to the
remaining instructors to teach double classes.
Relevance and Effectiveness of Training
With policies and content being developed from the center, either in min-
istries or methodological institutes, employer participation in these pro-
cesses is nominal. Very few employers other than large state enterprise managers
are being involved in any structured or official way in decisionmaking about
vocational training (Humphries and Dimond 1996). In a market economy
most demand for skills is local or regional. Groups of employers can best
reflect the types of skills needed. At present, however, Russia has no way to
get broad involvement by employers. In the 1980s an extensive system of
contract training developed in which students spent considerable time in
workshops in or near the premises of enterprises (but were never integrated
into the enterprise work force). This system virtually collapsed in the early
1990s when enterprises were no longer forced to take interns.
Conversely, vocational institutions have little means or incentive to learn
about their graduates' performance in the labor market as a basis for mak-
ing adjustments in the supply. The already dramatic change in enrollment
by occupational grouping does demonstrate a certain responsiveness to
changes in the labor markets. However, for sustained progress it is neces-
sary to develop better feedback mechanisms and incentives. Since funding
is not tied to performance, there is little information on the external effi-
ciency of the system, and rigorous cost-benefit analysis of training pro-
grams is rarely conducted in order to study how training can be better
targeted.
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Changes, Innovation, and Reforms
Despite severe problems, the VET system in Russia today differs markedly
from the one inherited from the Soviet system with respect to organiza-
tion, management, finance, training, and content.
* Organization, management, andfinancing. School directors have been
given considerable autonomy in a major decentralization of responsibili-
ties; and financial resources have been substantially diversified because 40
percent of school budgets now must come from nontraditional sources.
* Training. The system of contract training of students within enter-
prises was forced on the enterprises, and it collapsed with the adoption of
laws giving them independence; a new system somewhat akin to appren-
ticeship seems to be developing, although many employers perceive little
advantage at present in investing in worker training.
* Clients and content. Between 1991 and 1996, the official number of
occupations taught dropped from 1,200 specializations to 287 integrated
skill profiles, which include a range of functions that has broadened along
with the range of skills. The composition of enrollments has changed; now
in addition to the pre-employment training they may have received at school,
adults are being retrained by the new Federal Employment Service. The
occupational mix of training has shifted dramatically, away from industrial
occupations toward services and new occupations in a market economy
(for example, accountancy, small business, bank telling).
Although sometimes the result of deliberate policy, these changes have
usually been the spontaneous and natural response to external pressures.
Clearly, financial constraints have been a powerful engine of reform in the
diversification of financing. Creation of the FES and its role in financing
new types of training programs through existing training structures have
had a positive effect on training within the formal school system. In addi-
tion, exposure to external systems has given new ideas to Russian
policymakers, howing them the need to reduce overspecialization a d con-
solidate the number of occupations taught.
Structural Innovations
The length, location, and type of training have become more flexible. Au-
thorities now can adjust the length of training to the requirements of the
occupation. In addition, the law provides for flexibility in the location of
training. Specifically, secondary technical education can be given at the
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first level of higher education institutions, and basic vocational education
can be provided at licensed secondary technical institutions. Some efforts
also have been made to shorten programs. In Nizhny Novgorod, for ex-
ample, the training for some simple occupations has been shortened by six
months, or 25 percent. Programs have also diversified to allow two years of
training for some occupations (without secondary school equivalence), three
years for the standard certificate, and four years for the lyceums.
Retraining services are now available through the FES, a major change
since the reestablishment of the Russian Federation at the end of 1990.
The FES started in 1991 by training 10,000 unemployed workers, and in
1995 it retrained nearly 460,000 adults in intensive courses of four to six
months. In response to the declining ratio of jobs to job seekers, the Fed-
eral Employment Service devotes as much as 30 percent of its training to
preparing the recipients for self-employment. In response to financing con-
straints resulting from reduction in the payroll tax from 2 percent in 1991
to 1.5 percent in 1995, the Nizhny Novgorod Employment Service began
restricting training to training for self-employment or training for enter-
prises that guaranteed employment to the trainees upon completion of the
course. This new form of contract training helps to ensure almost a 100
percent employment rate for trainees.
Regional officials regarded the need to ration training as a problem;
however, limiting training to guaranteed employment could be seen as a
solution. By providing new content and pedagogical training to existing
instructors and training establishments, the FES has had the unintended
but positive and widespread effect of improving the quality and relevance
of training within school-based training. An example is the adoption of
training for self-employment and entrepreneurship, which some basic vo-
cational schools have adopted as a part of their regular programs after it
was first introduced in the schools for adult retraining.
Organization and Management
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the VET system has be-
come increasingly decentralized and open to private management. Under
the former Soviet Union, VET decisionmaking was centralized in the
Committee for Vocational Education, the equivalent of a ministry, with
350 staff. Now vocational education and training is handled by a section
in the Ministry of Education with only 60 staff. Inevitably, some func-
tions have had to be delegated to the regions-part of the government's
radical reform of the administration of education. The reforms of 1991
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and 1992 assigned considerable authority to individual schools, and this
autonomy was reinforced by the 1996 amendment to the education law.
School directors became responsible for hiring staff, setting salaries (above
a minimum), initiating new teaching programs (for regional approval),
managing the teaching process, raising funds, and disposing of self-
generated funds (within certain limits). In fact, the pendulum has swung
so far that external observers now remark that Russian educational estab-
lishments have more freedom and autonomy than do many similar insti-
tutions in the West.
In a major change of policy, new education legislation has allowed
nonstate institutions to operate. Previously, they were banned. There are
remarkably few restrictions on the establishment of private training estab-
lishments. Nonstate institutions can legally operate simply by registering.
][f the schools wish to obtain state recognition, and the possibility for some
public financing, they must be accredited. This is a two-step process. The
first is to be licensed, which requires an initial appraisal of the resources of
the institution. The second step must await the production of graduates, at
vhich point the performance of the institution is assessed on quality stan-
dards. Those institutions that pass the accreditation would be able to award
c ertificates with state recognition. In 1995 some 300 nonstate technikums
amd basic vocational schools applied at the federal level for licensing; 260
were licensed and 40 that were previously licensed were accredited (that is,
produced graduates whose quality could be assessed).
Privatizing public institutions has proved to be a successful experiment
iin some cases. One example is the former state training center, Infrakom,
in Nizhny Novgorod (box 4-1). However, the federal government in 1995
took action against the "spontaneous" privatization of public institutions.
Some public facilities were privatized, then sold off for other purposes by
the new owners; the federal government's opposition to this process report-
edly led to the closure of 10 percent of educational establishments. In other
cases, parts of public facilities were leased out for profit. In vocational schools
this meant that some workshops were used by private parties to produce
goods for private profits. The Presidential Decree against Privatization of
Educational Establishments imposed a three-year moratorium on conver-
Sion of public educational institutions into nonpublic ownership. Another
decree required that all funds raised by leasing out workshops and other
educational facilities for commercial purposes be sent to the federal trea-
sury. The moratorium was superseded by the amendment to the education
law prohibiting privatization of education institutions and their social in-
ifrastructure indefinitely.
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BOX 4-1
Privatization of a State Regional Training Center,
Infrakom, in Nizhny Novgorod
This public training institution is close to 60 years old. Previously a"branch train-
ing combinat" for the construction industry, it responded to state orders for train-
ing people working in municipal infrastructure services. In February 1993-in the
midst of a severe financial crisis-budget funds were eliminated for the institution.
This was the main factor leading to its conversion. The Department of Construc-
tion of the regional administration became the "founder" of the private institution.
It allows the institution to use its present premises free of charge but retains owner-
ship of the building. The privatized training center cannot dispose of the physical
assets of the building for its own benefit.
Under the new structure, the training institution is a nonprofit enterprise. Any
excess income after expenses must be channeled back into development of the
institution. The institution's director serves on the basis of an employment contract
signed by the director of the Department of Construction. As a result of being
privatized, the institution lifted restrictions on teachers' salaries. The salaries of
teachers then tripled, which greatly increased their motivation. Financial constraints
on operation and expansion were also eased. For example, in 1995 the institution
got about six times more income than it had received in the last budget from the
region.
While maintaining services in its traditional fields (training persons to manage
high-pressure quipment and handle dangerous materials and heavy lifting ma-
chinery), the institution has expanded training to new fields of study to meet mar-
ket demands. Total enrollment grew from about 3,000 trainees in 1993 to about
5,000 trainees (taught in two shifts) in 1996. During this period the share of en-
rollments upgraded within their jobs declined from 70 percent to 40 percent; ini-
tial training in 1996 covered about 60 percent of the institution's clientele. Students
are recruited through advertising in newspapers, radio, and sometimes television.
Costs and Financing
A major difference in vocational establishments in the late 1990s com-
pared with earlier in the decade was in sources of income. Previously, the
federal budget financed virtually 100 percent of expenses. In the late 1990s
it provided only 50 to 60 percent. The balance came from other sources
such as the following:
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All students or their employers pay tuition, ranging from US$60 to US$300
per course, depending on the term and subject. The school is free to set the tuition
fee at whatever level it chooses. About 35 percent of the total income of the center
comes from retraining adults on contract with the Regional Employment Service;
about 30 percent comes from enterprises sponsoring their workers for in-service
upgrading training; and 30 percent comes from individual payments of tuition
fees. The balance comes from revenues generated by the institution's own produc-
tion, including printing facilities for commercial production. This revenue source
is expected to grow. The institution has been accepted by the local tax authority
(reportedly after a three-year struggle) as being tax exempt in accordance with an
existing presidential decree that accords tax-free status to educational institutions.
Because income has exceeded expenditures, the institution has been able to invest
in new equipment and refurbish its facilities. A new canteen for students opened in
the mid-1990s. The director estimated that the center had purchased 60 percent of
all existing equipment since it was privatized in 1993.
The main competitors for the training institution come from other former branch
training institutions that have also been privatized. However, the other institutions
do not have the material basis (that is, equipment) to offer a wide variety of courses.
Compared with the 10 to 15 occupations taught in those institutions, the Infrakom
center offers training in 30 occupations. Infrakom has an additional advantage: it
has its own printing press and desk-top publishing facilities so that it can produce
its own teaching materials. This generates some additional income for the school
and enhances the quality of instruction and the reputation of the institution in the
community.
Source: Author's data.
* Regional and local governments. In 1994, 921 out of 2,618 technical
schools were being financed from regional and local budgets, which cov-
ered mainly teacher training and agricultural and cultural technikums (Sec-
tion Report 1994, p. 16).
* Production of goods and services for the market.
* Tuition from additional courses, such as training of adults for the
employment service, or for extra-quota (private) students. In 1994, techni-
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cal schools enrolled 46,000 students, or 9 percent of the total, on a com-
mercial basis.
* Lease of premises for use by others for commercial purposes.
It is instructive to learn from failures as well as from successes. Two
efforts to introduce major changes in the system related to financing ulti-
mately did not work. The first was the failure to decentralize financing. In
1994-95 the government tried to turn over the complete operation and
financing of vocational schools to the regional and municipal governments.
However, this was resisted so strongly because of its financial consequences
for regional and local governments that six months later the decree had to
be rescinded.
Second, attempts to ensure adequate financing for VET (and education
in general) through legislation failed. The July 1992 education law stipu-
lated that not less than 10 percent of gross domestic product could be
spent on education. In 1995 around 3 percent was spent. Moreover, the
law stipulated that the average wage for teachers should not be less than the
average for industry. In 1995 teachers' wages averaged 30 to 50 percent
below the average wage of industrial workers. This points to the dichotomy
between legal documents' good intentions and the realities of allocating
scarce resources among competing priorities.
Relevance and Responsiveness
The content and scope of training offerings have adapted to changes in the
market. Enrollments in industrial fields of technical schools have declined
nationally by 40 percent. At the same time, interest in market-related fields
has grown (table 4-6). Enrollments have increased by about 67 to 90 per-
cent in vocational and technical schools respectively. In training institu-
tions a reorientation has occurred in terms of the breadth of study. The
government decided to reduce the number of recognized occupations from
1,200 to 287. Training institutions now offer a broader range of training,
from 10 to 15 occupations compared with 3 to 5 in the past. However, as
mentioned earlier, there has been no scientific cost-benefit analysis of the
effectiveness of these institutions.
Obstacles to Further Innovation and Reform
The main issue facing policymakers is how to make the system more re-
sponsive to changes in the labor market. This requires close and frequent
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TABLE 4-6
Changes in Enrollment in Postsecondary Technical Education, 1994-95
Specialization Percentage change
Instrument making -36
Power machining -35
Aviation technology -27
Geology -23
Shipbuilding -19
Law +10
Ecology +24
Economics +45
Source: Ministry of Education (1995).
links with employers as well as better feedback mechanisms at the local
level. Given limited government funding, the policy of providing everyone
who enters the labor market with some pre-employment training needs to
be reviewed, and other funding sources need to be tapped.
LABOR MARKET CONSTRAINTS. Given the state of the labor market, it is
likely that a shrinkage of the education system will lead to growing unem-
ployment among those who would otherwise be in schools. Vocational
schools are viewed as a way to keep youth off the street while employment
growth picks up. Enterprises face financial crises and mass layoffs. Under
these circumstances it is understandable that training of apprentices has
low priority. Legislation has been considered to change the tax incentives
for training. This draft legislation calls for enterprises to get tax conces-
sions for up to 2 percent of payroll spent on training their own workers; if
the firms do not spend the 2 percent on training, the funds would be trans-
ferred to approved training institutions. This legislation seems to be misdi-
rected: Russian enterprises already have one of the heaviest tax burdens,
variously reported as 80 to 95 percent. The legislation would, in effect, add
a mandatory 2 percent payroll tax on top of that burden.
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS. The system of technical and vocational educa-
tion and training has huge accumulated shortfalls of investments from years
of neglect of premises and equipment and teacher training and pay. New
investments are essential, but the federal, regional, and local governments
are limited in their capacity to finance them. The current basis for deter-
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mining federal budget allocations to training schools is based on enroll-
ments, size, and past budgets. This makes it difficult to shift resources out
of areas of declining enrollment (for instance, industrial occupations) and
into new areas of high demand (for example, business and finance). New
alternatives must be found to finance the needed improvements. However,
efforts to share the costs of vocational training with the beneficiaries, par-
ticularly the trainees themselves, are limited by legislation: initial voca-
tional training is, by law, free to the participants. Furthermore, vocational
schools must transfer to the federal government 90 percent of all income
generated from the leasing and use of school facilities. This applies to com-
mercial leasing of premises and the use of workshops by small businesses
for purposes of production. This gives little incentive to use a potentially
powerful source of additional resources.
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS. Russia has not yet begun to address the
fundamental question of how to reform the VET system. Most educa-
tional institutions cling to the old ways, and change will require strong
commitment at the central administrative level. Private training provision
has been slow to take root, in part because of the attitude of accrediting
authorities toward private schools, which are viewed as a threat to the pub-
lic system. The moratorium on privatization of public training institutions
has also prevented legitimate devolution of training responsibilities from
the state to private hands.
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5 Kazakhstan
ALAN ABRAHART
FOR MOST PEOPLE IN Kazakhstan, the transition from a
command to a market economy has been traumatic. Life-long security of
employment and an interwoven social safety net provided through state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) have been replaced by uncertainty. For all people,
young and old, the problems are now more or less the same-poverty of
immediate opportunity and a paucity of signposts to the future.
In the face of this dramatic change, the government of Kazakhstan has
chosen to do little to the system of vocational education and training (VET).
This neglect, far from being damaging, can actually be described as benign.
Given the circumstances prevailing in the country, far greater dangers could
have been realized through precipitate action as has occurred in other coun-
tries in transition where major investments in capital and in staff develop-
ment are proving difficult to sustain and difficult to keep well-directed;
insufficient attention is being paid to the policy framework; investments in
VIET are preceding, rather than following, investments in industry; scarce
sources of finance, such as employer levies, are being imposed before it is
clear how, or even if, those funds can be put to good use; and policies and
investments are enabling existing VET systems to resist rather than to fa-
cilitate change.
An Economy in Transition
Prior to independence in 1992, the economy had been dominated by state
ownership, and it still is to a large extent. Agriculture was made up of state
I38
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owned and collective farms, there was a substantial government defense
industry, and the rest of the economy was based on either direct public
sector management or SOEs, the latter mainly operated through industry
ministries. Each area is now in a critical state and investment remains low.
One index of investment declinedfrom 100 to 18 between 1990 and 1995,
and it is not expected to recover to the levels of 1990 until 2000. Despite
all this, the long-term prospects for economic growth remain good, largely
because of the country's extensive natural resources; indeed, this is the only
area of significant current foreign investment in Kazakhstan.
The government, correctly, has concentrated on solving general eco-
nomic problems before considering more detailed issues such as policies
on VET. Throughout 1993 and 1994 the government confronted acceler-
ating inflation, reaching 35 percent a month during the second quarter of
1994. The accumulated losses and arrears within enterprises reached a level
comparable to total outstanding bank credit to enterprises in early 1994.
Losses of nonfinancial enterprises exceeded 20 percent of gross domestic
product in 1993 and were similarly large in 1994.
A Labor Market in Transition
Labor market indicators were all in decline from 1991 to 1994. As table 5-
1 shows, after some early increases, both the population and the labor force
fell. As I will show, incomes declined most of all. General secondary educa-
tion and skill levels were also lower, driven partly by shifts in the makeup of
the population and the labor force, and partly by declining retention rates
in education; and the skills in the labor force were not relevant to the needs
of the economy.
Dependence on administrative data collected through SOEs makes it
difficult to determine a true employment picture. Employment has cer-
tainly declined though not to the extent indicated by the official statistics
shown in table 5- 1, which fully reflect the decline in state employment but
underestimate offsetting increases in the private sector. A study undertaken
by the World Bank in 1996 (table 5-2) estimated that over a third of all
employment was in the private sector, even though many SOEs were hoard-
ing labor. Although gradual and continual separation from the labor force
is taking place, considerable labor shakeout is still to occur.
Apart from the glaring conclusion that labor demand is low, it is diffi-
cult to analyze detailed labor supply and demand with any precision. The
only data available either come from administrative sources such as the
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TABLE 5-1
Labor Market Indicators, 1991-94
Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994
Population (thousands) 16,721 16,892 16,913 6,679
Rural (percent) 42.4 42.5 42.9 44.0
Working-age population (thousands) 9,226 9,325 9,333 9,220
Total employed (thousands) 7,494 7,356 6,926 6,579
In state sector (percent) 75.9 71.1 64.8 n.a.
In rural sector (percent) 23.4 24.4 25.4 21.6
n.a. Not applicable.
Source: World Bank (1996).
employment service or are based on the records of nonrepresentative enter-
prise establishments. Open (that is, registered) unemployment was still low,
just over 2 percent of the labor force in 1995, while hidden unemployment
was variously estimated by officials as anything from 10 to 20 percent and
probably much closer to the latter. Underemployment is widespread, and
growth in the informal sector has been rapid.
As table 5-3 shows, the overall employment decline referred to earlier
was made up of large falls in a wide range of industry groups offset by
generally smaller increases overall in trade and finance. Of these, the largest
single increase-53.7 percent-was in trade. It is unlikely that even the
relatively large increase in trade represents a major skill imbalance since
trade has become the occupation of last resort for many unemployed or
underemployed. When SOEs are considered by themselves, the picture is
TABLE 5-2
State and Private Sector Employment, by Gender, 1994
(percent)
Sector Males Females Total population
State sector 70.7 59.7 64.9
Private sector 29.3 40.3 35.1
Employees 17.3 25.7 21.8
Self-employed, unpaid, etc. 12.0 14.6 13.3
Source: World Bank (1996).
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TABLE 5-3
Employment, Selected Industries, 1991 and 1994
(thousands)
industry 1991 1994 Percentage change
'Trade 551 847 53.7
Finance 42 49 16.7
Health care 465 429 -7.7
'Transport and roads 508 551 -8.5
Agriculture and forestry 1,754 1,419 -19.1
Education 1,036 827 -20.2
Manufacturing 1,533 1,201 -21.7
Construction 771 482 -37.5
Source.' World Bank (1996).
one of declines in all industries. Growth in labor demand is associated
solely with the private sector economy.
Wage levels have deteriorated. In 1992 the country was broadly classi-
fied as a middle-income country with a per capita gross national product
estimated at US$1,690. Incomes, however, fell along with production, and
between March 1992 and March 1994 real average wages more than halved,
Further increasing the relative importance of the nonwage benefits pro-
vided through SOEs. This encouraged employees to remain attached to
enterprises even though there was little work available, and wages were
often paid weeks or months in arrears.
The legislated minimum wage-which can discourage employers from
hiring untrained workers and giving them on-the-job training-has been
allowed to fall substantially below the going rate for low wages. During the
last quarter of 1995, the minimum wage was US$4 a month compared
with average wages of about US$55. Even these figures can be misleading;
tmany people were not actually receiving cash wages or, when they did so,
:received them up to months in arrears. In essence, there was no effective
'legislated minimum wage.
Relative wages are also of limited value in assessing skill shortages. Dur-
ing 1993 to 1995, nominal wages increased more in manufacturing and
construction (about 16 percent), the industries of greatest employment
decline, than in trade or finance (about 13 percent), the only industries
with employment growth.
TABLE 5-4
Enrollment, by Type of School, 1991-94
(thousands)
Total
Percentage Percentage Percentage percentage
change change change change
Population 1991 1992 in year 1993 in year 1994 in year over 4years
Underworkingage 5,559 5,568 0.2 5,498 -1.3 5,436 -1.1 -2.2
In preschool 1,023 868 -15.2 747 -13.9 538 -28.0 -47.4
In primary school 1,192 1,209 1.4 1,227 1.5 1,220 -0.6 2.3
In secondary school 1,846 1,811 -1.9 1,782 -1.6 1,750 -1.8 -5.2
Source: Asian Development Bank (1995).
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Finally, the skill base of the labor force is changing. Some of this can be
traced to population shifts: immigration (1,269,000 people in 1990 and
1991) has favored unskilled rural workers, while emigration (1,449,000
people in 1990 and 1991) has taken its toll of the most educated, skilled
and, perhaps, employable in the country. But much of the change can be
attributed to yet another feature of the transition to a market economy, its
impact on the education and training system.
Education and Training in Transition
Kazakhstan had a well-developed basic education system. In 1990 only 3
percent of the population was considered illiterate, and completions through
compulsory schooling were universal. This has changed drastically as schools
have found themselves with severely restrained budgets and as the impact
of the depressed economy has been felt on family incomes.
The education system began with an extensive system of kindergartens,
most of them attached to SOEs, and it is here that the most dramatic
declines have taken place (table 5-4). Problems are also emerging in the
other levels of schooling. Schooling is compulsory until Grade 11 (to about
age 16). However, fewer students are proceeding beyond Grade 9, prob-
ably because of the increasing financial difficulties faced by families. In
1995, 13 percent of students who had just completed Grade 9 did not
continue their education, and only half of those found work. The effect is
more notable for males. The data show that while there were roughly equal
numbers of male and female students in Grade 9 (say 13 or 14 years of
age), for subsequent grades the proportion of females rose to almost 58
percent, suggesting that fewer than three out of every four males are pro-
ceeding to the final two years of compulsory education.
The decline in higher secondary education is being carried through to
postsecondary levels where admissions to higher education have fallen by 9
percent since 1990. But in VET the decline has been even greater-25
percent since 1990-and the unused capacity of vocational/technical schools
was estimated to be 30 percent in 1995.
The Vocational Education and Training System
The government has historically considered the VET system to have two
purposes: to provide skilled workers required in the command economy
and to provide education and training to vulnerable groups in society in-
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cluding those with low academic achievements. The system began break-
ing down in the early 1990s, and its replacement with something effective
has barely begun. In 1995 the government consolidated all institutions
under the Ministry of Education's Committee for Vocational and Techni-
cal Education, including all those run by line ministries. It then transferred
the committee to the Ministry of Labor, before transferring it back again a
few months later. The government then abolished the Committee for Vo-
cational and Technical Education. By the end of 1996, it had not replaced
the committee with another body.
Vocational Schooling during the Compulsory Years
Vocational schooling during the compulsory years is provided through the
vocational/technical schools (VTSs) and is designed to provide training for
students expecting to become skilled workers. Even though the schools
form part of the compulsory education system, only 342 of the 471 schools
that existed in 1990 were actually administered by the Ministry of Educa-
tion (through the Committee for Vocational and Technical Education).
The remainder were run by industry ministries operating through SOEs.
More than one in ten VTSs had closed by 1995 (table 5-5).
The schools offer courses to students who have completed Grade 9 sec-
ondary school. The students are required to complete a full-time three-year
program; 40 percent of the courses are general education courses. Gradu-
ates obtain a diploma of general education (equivalent to Grade 11 school-
TABLE 5-5
Vocational/Technical Schools, 1990-95
(number)
Year Schools Students Admissions Graduates
1990-91 471 212,654 144,489 134,819
1991-92 446 203,092 152,515 142,625
1992-93 439 188,740 123,739 114,773
1993-94 415 159,600 105,112 97,386
1994-95 422 160,008 79,067 76,566
Four-year per-
centage decline 10.4 24.8 45.3 43.2
Source: Asian Development Bank (1995).
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ing) and a specialist vocational diploma. The program includes six months
of industrial experience, although the system cannot really be considered
an apprenticeship or a dual system. Students are paid for the work experi-
ence, but there is no employment relationship covering the whole period
of training.
Postcompulsory Vocational Education
The major providers of postcompulsory secondary vocational education
are secondary special schools. Like VTSs, they have suffered a decline in
student numbers; unlike VTSs, none of them, all administered by the Min-
istry of Education, has closed. Secondary special schools in 1994-95 had
an average of 850 students each, compared with 400 per school in VTSs
(table 5-6).
Secondary special schools provide training for those expecting to be-
come subprofessional or middle-level workers. They are intended mainly
for students who have completed compulsory education. Courses are usu-
ally three years or slightly less. Students who enter with only a Grade 9
diploma are required to study an extra year. The schools also offer training
under contract to the employment service for retraining unemployed people,
and they are increasingly offering ad hoc courses-on-demand to meet mar-
ket needs.
VTSs also may offer postcompulsory school courses. They may offer
two-year full-time courses in specialist vocational curricula to students who
TABLE 5-6
Secondary Special Schools, 1990-95
(number)
Year Schools Students Admissions Graduates Teachers
1990-91 247 247,600 83,389 69,849 14,528
1991-92 244 238,300 80,897 69,331 14,351
1992-93 248 230,800 75,269 61,827 13,921
1993-94 247 222,100 72,350 59,875 18,650
1994-95 247 214,300 69,993 62,948 13,567
Four-year per-
centage decline 0.0 13.4 16.0 9.9 -
- Not available.
Source: Asian Development Bank (1995).
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have completed compulsory education to year 11. They may also offer
courses-on-demand to all-comers. This may be on a course fee basis, part-
time, or by correspondence. A number of standard programs and special
retraining programs are offered under contract to the employment service.
Almost three-quarters of the students participating in all of these courses-
on-demand have only a Grade-9-entry-level education. About 75 percent
of the places in courses-on-demand are funded by the employment service.
Enterprise Training
Despite the collapsing economy and the falling number of students, the
system has been remarkably slow in moving away from the concept of
training for a command economy. VTSs, closer to the front line of the
market economy than secondary special schools, have reacted more quickly
to the new circumstances, but even they are proving relatively hidebound.
They have, for example, traditionally entered into training agreements
with enterprises to supply courses. Financing came out of the VTSs' an-
nual budgets, and it is estimated that 80 percent of training in VTSs was
for enterprise agreements. Under the agreements, VTSs trained students
to meet the needs of enterprises, while the latter provided an on-the-job
training component. Graduates trained under enterprise agreements were
guaranteed employment.
Enterprise agreements were the core of the supply-driven model of VET
that characterizes command economies. However, the guarantees that backed
them have now fallen away. Yet VTSs still operate under preexisting enter-
prise agreements, including, it is said, with enterprises that no longer exist.
Furthermore, VTSs still operate as if students were being "directed" to work
in specific industrial groupings, notably in manufacturing and agriculture.
Over 60 percent of graduates are employed in these sectors-where em-
ployment declines have been greatest and, in the case of agriculture, where
relative wage rates have fallen the farthest. Students are still being trained
under the system and then being sent to the relevant enterprises covered by
the enterprise agreement.
During the command economy, there were over 1,000 specialist voca-
tions (Asian Development Bank 1995). By the end of 1995, they had been
rationalized to about 400 vocations although the system had not been fully
implemented. The operational list used byVTSs has 42 industry categories
and 257 specialist vocations within them (many in more than one indus-
try). Nevertheless, many of the vocations are still regarded by VTSs as irrel-
evant to the new economy.
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The role of employee and employer associations in VET merits interest
in this respect. Trade unions still exist in Kazakhstan but mainly as rem-
nants of the previous system when they were part of the establishment.
There are embryonic associations of employers, but for the most part indi-
vidualistic entrepreneurship prevails. The most important joint ventures
are in the resources sector, though some major companies have purchased
former SOEs. (For example, Philip Morris has purchased a tobacco factory
in Almaty, and Nabisco has purchased a biscuit factory in Shymkent.) The
immediate concern of joint ventures is with enterprise restructuring, prob-
ably involving significant labor displacement. Joint ventures are likely to
handle their skilled labor needs either through the use of expatriate labor or
internal training. Neither employers nor trade unions can yet be said to be
actively engaged in VET, in particular in retraining arising from industry
r estructuring.
Current Sources of Funding
Finance for VET has been restricted. In 1995 government funding met an
estimated 35 percent of the running costs of vocational/technical schools
(Asian Development Bank 1995). Schools are not meeting their bills for
inany services, particularly utilities. Budgets, traditionally determined on
the basis of norms, particularly related to student and teacher numbers,
have become restricted. Student numbers have declined, although staff
numbers remain higher than the budgets can support, another case of la-
bor hoarding. Staff are unpaid or paid substantially in arrears. Despite the
decline of almost 14 percent in student numbers in secondary special schools
from 1991 to 1995, the teaching staff declined by less than half this pro-
portion over the same period (from about 14,500 to 13,500). The student
to teaching staff ratio was around 16:1 in 1995. VTSs are allowed to supple-
mnent heir budgets through their own production centers, but this amounts
to less than 10 percent of resources. A few rural VTSs with sufficient land
holdings are said to be self-supporting.
A significant source of nonbudget financing for VET now comes from
the Employment Promotion Fund administered by the Ministry of Labor.
The primary purpose of the fund is to finance the operations of the em-
ployment service, the payment of unemployment benefits, and to run em-
ployment and training programs for the unemployed. Almost its entire
revenue comes from a payroll tax of 2 percent levied only on industrial
enterprises. In 1995 the fund had limited reserves, having been adminis-
tered directly by the Department of Finance in the previous couple of years
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when it was used as a general revenue source. Under advice from the World
Bank, the Employment Promotion Fund was returned to the Ministry of
Labor in April 1995, although it went back empty.
The employment fund is now seen by the VET system as a means of
bolstering its meager funds. But a model of the fund has shown the fund to
be relatively unstable. Even small deviations between expected revenues
and expected expenditures of the fund will cause substantial changes in the
balance over a short period. Although the government can control expen-
ditures, by tightening eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits,
it has chosen not to do this for political reasons.
Revenue is no easier to control. Employment is falling, putting revenue
on a declining path at the same time as expenditures rise. Avoidance of the
payroll tax is high, even among established employers, let alone in the in-
formal economy that, by definition, is not paying. For those SOEs that
continue to employ people but are effectively bankrupt, payment of the
levy makes little sense since it contributes to enterprise arrears in the coun-
try. Policies are now in place to extend the coverage of the levy to all em-
ployers (including the government sector) and to introduce an employee
contribution, but the government has been reluctant on both counts.
Therefore, the fund cannot be seen as a substitute for budget restric-
tions. The notion that an alternative training fund can be established is also
quite out of the question. The only short-term option for financing the
public sector VET system is through increased cost recovery: fees and charges
to employers for services. This, of course, raises the question of public
versus private provision. Like everything else, VET has, until now, been
state business. But with the system still largely unequipped physically or
organizationally to handle new demands, a need has grown up for private
providers. As yet, the private training sector is poorly developed. The train-
ing centers run by SOEs may have offered one major source of private
enterprise training, but most of the centers have either discontinued opera-
tions or scaled back activities, and it is difficult to imagine them being
resurrected. Small entrepreneurs have begun entering the training market,
many of them offering short courses, especially in the services sector. The
quality of the training may as yet be dubious, but the field can only grow.
Important VET Issues
Given the plethora of problems facing the economy, the government ap-
pears to have concluded that little can be done in the VET sector and that
developing vocational education and training policies is a low priority. The
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government has not been wrong in this. However, the VET system will
continue to develop, and mistakes now will be difficult to correct later. The
priority should be to invest in change-to get the policies correct, to get
the quality of VET properly set. It is arguable that an initiative to stamp a
policy agenda for VET is urgently required.
Such a policy would have three essential objectives:
* To establish a system of VET that is market driven and responsive to
employers' needs. The existing system is still largely dominated by the phi-
losophies and practices of the earlier system. It is not responsive to the
needs of the labor market, still preferring to predict industry needs and to
t-rain accordingly. The role of employers has diminished to a dangerously
low level. Their previous role, exemplified by industry ministries' training
agreements with VTSs, is clearly no longer viable, but nothing has taken its
place.
* To increase vocational training throughout the country by encouraging
nongovernment rainingproviders. The system is still built around the domi-
nation of the public sector. This has merit for entry-level training, but it
iis counterproductive for postemployment training such as that required
]for industry restructuring or for retraining retrenched and unemployed
workers.
- To establish a wider base offunding by recoveringfrom users some of the
Costs of VET Public sector financing of VET has virtually collapsed. Again,
this largely resulted from the continued maintenance of an extensive sup-
ply-driven public sector training system that simply outgrew its usefulness.
For each of these objectives, two types of VET must be considered: en-
try-level (that is, pre-employment) training and postemployment training.
'The urgency of reforms, the nature of reforms, and the management and
Financing of reforms are totally different in the two types of training.
Establishing a Demand-Driven System
*The single most difficult thing for a VET system to achieve is to convert
from being supply driven (essential in a command economy) to being de-
mand driven (essential in a market economy). The change, in its essence,
sums up all that is required for a country undergoing a transition in its
economy. In general, three developments are required:
* Establishing a mechanism to involve employers and employees in the
management of VET. This would cover both entry-level and post-
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employment training and ensure a connection between the educa-
tion and training providers and the labor market.
* Decentralizing administrative systems to the regional level to better
reflect local economic needs and labor market needs.
* Establishing occupational skill categories and standards suitable for a
market economy and then developing the curricula needed for those
skills.
ENTRY-LEVEL TRAINING. Young people entering the labor market for the
first time need entry-level training. Although other groups cannot be ig-
nored, young people present the greatest political and sociological chal-
lenge in Kazakhstan. Given that entry-level training is closely associated
with the education system and that the Ministry of Education already man-
ages all existing institutions, there is no doubt that the ministry should
remain the primary government agency.
The ministry should be especially concerned with reestablishing a viable
entry-level training system, one that is in tune with the changes in industry
and meets changing labor demands. The details of how the Ministry of
Education should exercise its responsibility can remain open, but the links
with the labor market make a form of tripartite management essential.
Ideally, employers and employee associations would have an executive role
in any future system, but whether this is achievable in the short term is
debatable. The role of employers in entry-level training should also be de-
termined. As far as practicable, all vocational training should include ele-
ments of on-the-job training.
The government intends that vocational education and training should
be administered at the regional level. However, the Ministry of Education
proposes to retain substantial central control, particularly in setting stan-
dards. While acceptable in principle, this may be unacceptable in practice.
The devil is in the detail: the Ministry of Education intends to cover such
things as the allocation of teaching time to general subjects and specialist
subjects, the designation of specialist vocations, the duration of courses,
the classification of VTSs, and the content of general education curricula
in VTSs. Much of this detail harks back to the system of norms that once
prevailed through all aspects of state business. This degree of centralization
may have been appropriate in a command economy, but it is not sustain-
able in a market economy.
The Ministry of Education's approach suggests that more thought should
be given to the development of the school system generally. As many VTSs
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as possible could be converted to general secondary schools; only those that
can be used as postsecondary institutions should be retained. An inventory
of other training establishments, covering both government and industry
centers, should also be undertaken to determine their effective capacity.
The policies and practices in accredited VET institutions are in need of
a thorough overhaul. Accrediting entry-level vocational training involves
establishing standards, regulating examinations, and issuing credentials.
Occupational skills that are attained below the level of higher education
include semiskilled occupations, skilled trades, and some paraprofessional
occupations. Obviously, the Ministry of Education must ensure that any
occupation within its scope has adequate accreditation procedures. Progress
has been made in reclassifying skill groupings, but further developments
should proceed on a tripartite basis at the national level. The system needs
to be urgently refocused to be responsive to labor market needs, and cur-
ricula need to be redeveloped, especially through the importation and ad-
aptation of training materials and procedures used in other countries.
Given financial constraints, the Ministry of Education must determine
iits priorities carefully. It will be unable to develop all the new curricula it
rmay think appropriate. It should look closely at labor market needs and
labor supply and demand. The temptation to seek, for its own sake, an
expansion of the system is present in any country, but it is especially dan-
gerous in places like Kazakhstan, where the resources to maintain the sys-
tem well into the future are severely limited. Donors, for example, may
ciffer expansions or improvements through capital investments, but these
vvill invariably be isolated contributions, and the investments will collapse
the moment the government has to fall back on government budgets for
rnaintenance.
POSTEMPLOYMENT TRAINING. The concerns of postemployment train-
ing are with industry restructuring and the retraining of retrenched work-
ers, the unemployed, and adults in general. Compared with entry-level
training, it has a more short-term focus. Interested in immediate labor
rnarket needs and matching labor supply and demand, it is less concerned
wvith accreditation and credentialing and the formalities associated with
them. Postemployment training focuses on individual industry sectors, on
various geographic regions of the country, or on particular types of vulner-
aLble groups in society.
Postemployment training should be governed separately from entry-level
training because of its far wider range of activities and far more ad hoc
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nature. Primary responsibility for developing policies for postemployment
training should rest with the Ministry of Labor, operating through the
employment service. Employment service responsibilities could be man-
aged through a tripartite mechanism similar to the one used for entry-level
training. Indeed, at the executive level, there is no reason why these mecha-
nisms could not be one and the same. The responsibilities could encom-
pass retraining for the unemployed, retraining for other adults, and support
for training within enterprises seeking to restructure their work forces.
The employment service could become a major buyer or financier of
postemployment training and refrain from being a supplier of training. As
a buyer, it could take full account of labor market circumstances. It could
determine the characteristics of labor supply and demand and focus its
attention on meeting local labor market needs. Indeed, it could act as if it
were in a market, seeking to purchase the courses it required at the best
price. For example, it might require potential training providers to bid for
specified courses. It would act at all skill levels and in all regions, covering
areas of small as well as significant demand. It would act only where the
market was apparently failing to deliver what employers wanted.
Encouraging Nonpublic Training Providers
A great deal of unaccredited training takes place, in both entry-level and
postemployment training, typically in the service industries and in high-
profile occupations such as those associated with computerization. Noth-
ing can, and nothing should, stop this from happening. In Kazakhstan,
where so much is uncertain, unaccredited training should be actively en-
couraged or, at the very least, not inhibited, even though this may run
counter to the traditional inclinations of the Ministry of Education and
the Ministry of Labor. Some of this training may be through private train-
ing providers, and some may be through on-the-job training with em-
ployers. Three main developments are required to encourage nonpublic
training providers to enter the training market. The first is by far the
most important.
* Legislation should ensure open competition for public and nonpublic
training providers.
* Government agencies, such as the employment service, that have an
interest in buying courses should involve nonpublic training provid-
ers through the use of fee-for-service courses financed by the employ-
ment fund.
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Government systems should foster community or cooperative train-
ing providers, especially at the postemployment level in areas of high
unemployment.
Reviewing the Needfor Legislation
All aspects of life under the former system were regulated. With the transi-
tion to a market economy, there is a need to review parliamentary laws as
well as ad hoc government, ministerial, or departmental decrees, all of which
,can have the force of law and can impede change.
Some legislation should be rescinded (for example, legislation that in-
hibits labor mobility and legislation that restricts some occupations to cer-
tain SOEs, giving them a monopoly on providing those skills to the wider
community). Licenses to operate in certain occupations may specify a par-
ticular credential as a prerequisite, effectively blocking private training from
providing skilled operatives in the field. Legislation in Kazakhstan also re-
stricts the Ministry of Education from offering any price for its services
other than that derived from outdated norms. Those same norms prohibit
anyone else from using the ministry's facilities. This makes it impossible
for Ministry of Education trainers to offer courses on a private basis when
school is out. The same legislation requires the Ministry of Labor to accept
no bids that are lower than the Ministry of Education's, effectively stifling
competition.
All current procedures used to accredit courses and training providers
should be reviewed. There should be provision for accrediting enterprise
training providers. Then enterprises could provide off-the-job training with-
out having to rely on government training institutions. All current stan-
dards should be reviewed. Particular attention should be paid to the length
of courses and to course prerequisites. As far as practicable, course length
should be reduced and prerequisites minimized. Course content also should
be reassessed. Testing procedures need to be reviewed as well. Testing should
be handled at local institutions, within individual enterprises, or through
employer associations, if they exist. Practices that serve primarily to justify
large-scale public sector involvement and deny the effective intervention of
other providers should be eliminated.
In postemployment training the case for encouraging nonpublic pro-
viders is overwhelming. The ad hoc nature of the training, the lesser con-
cern with credentials, and the short-term nature of the responses required
all favor nonpublic providers. This is not to say that public sector institu-
tions could not be involved as suppliers. The Ministry of Education is, of
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course, interested in increasing the role of VTSs in retraining the unem-
ployed. However, given that their main role is to provide entry-level train-
ing for young people, meeting ad hoc training needs should be done only
on a strictly competitive basis. Anything else would be a diversion from the
Ministry of Education's main function.
The government should take advantage of existing training capacities in
enterprises and of community groups and associations when marshaling
resources to deliver training. The employment service could assist indi-
vidual enterprises or groups of enterprises that have specific plans to re-
structure their work forces. Assistance could take the form of financial aid
(either direct grants or credits toward their obligations to the employment
fund levy). Or the employment service could offer course information,
materials, and so on. In providing courses, the employment service could
make use of enterprise facilities.
Financing Vocational Education and Training
The VET system, like many government programs in Kazakhstan, is in
extreme financial straits. Arguing that it should receive greater support from
the annual government budget is not especially useful. That could be
achieved only at the expense of other priorities, even such things as making
old age pension payments on schedule.
Recommending other financial support systems also is not useful. Em-
ployers now, and employees in the near future will, make contributions to
pensions and health schemes; and they will make contributions to the em-
ployment fund. However, the use the government has made of the employ-
ment fund as a general revenue source has been quite deliberate and
demonstrates its priorities quite clearly.
Financing the VET system depends on increasing its revenues and de-
creasing its costs. The latter, in particular, can be supported by the develop-
ment of a nonpublic sector training market, relieving the public sector
budget of a burden it is having trouble carrying and which to a certain extent
it does not have to meet. Rationalization of the public sector system will
also have an effect on the provision of vocational education and training.
As far as raising revenue is concerned, VET has to increasingly fend for
itself. Four avenues are open to the system:
* Establish fee scales to enable government institutes to charge indi-
viduals.
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* Allow institutes to take private students paying full fees irrespective
of the level of training offered.
* Allow the employment service to bid for courses for unemployed or
retrenched workers.
* Allow institutes to provide courses on demand.
Yet another avenue has been promoted by others, including the Asian
I)evelopment Bank (1995) in its study of the education sector. This is to
allow institutes to undertake productive activities. They already do this to
some extent, since all institutes under the former system were in the pro-
duction command-chain even if only in some small way. However, increas-
ing productive activities can have a self-defeating element to it, especially
in a system that is failing to rationalize and that is hoarding labor much like
any SOE. In these circumstances, productive activities could easily become
the means by which staff maintain their income. The extent and the qual-
ity of training would be incidental.
Entry-level training is the only area of VET that can lay claim to depen-
dency on the government budget. Even so, the Ministry of Education needs
to present a new strategy for developing adequate industry and occupa-
tional coverage as a basis for determining its budget requirements, and it
should demonstrate the labor market relevance of its spending priorities.
Because of the likely inadequacy of the budget, finances would still need to
be supplemented by fees for services: fees from students who can afford
and are willing to pay, and fees for services provided direct to industry.
Both have the distinct advantage of forcing the public sector to respond to
demand. Courses for the unemployed would be funded from the employ-
mnent fund but only to the extent of its capacity to do so. Other adults
would be able to participate on a user-pays basis. Ministry of Education
schools would be allowed to bid, without preference, to run courses.
]Lessons from Kazakhstan
Despite the problems it has faced, the government of Kazakhstan has gen-
erally been correct in its decision not to accord VET a high priority. Three
major lessons can be drawn from this.
* Economic realities comefirst. Economic development has been slow
and uncertain, giving rise to an extremely poor labor market and slowing
any investments in VET by employers. Exceptions to this have been few
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(mining and banking), although even in these sectors the impact on the
local labor market has been limited. The government's priorities, quite
rightly, have been to reverse this situation by developing a more acceptable
macroeconomic framework within which growth can take place and with-
out which any VET system would operate in a vacuum.
- Institutional realities have to be faced head-on. With the government's
attention elsewhere, progress in developing VET policies has been slow.
Relevant agencies within the government, seemingly caught up in the past
and trapped into inactivity by the trauma of their current circumstances,
have been unable to define their role or set policies. The priorities of agency
employees have been to maintain their own incomes and jobs. They still
see the future much as they saw the past-themselves running a supply-
driven system dominated by the public sector.
* Financial realities cannot be ignored. There are no magic solutions to
financing VET in Kazakhstan. There is no replacement for the paymasters
who dominated the former Soviet Union. Employers cannot finance ev-
erything that was once a state responsibility, simply because they were once
indistinguishable from the state. A price has to be placed on the value of
VET. To that extent, cost recovery has to be a large part of the answer to
financing VET, even in the public sector. No longer is it tenable to assume
that growth of the public sector is the objective. Rather, the objective is to
achieve an efficient system of VET, where cost-effectiveness demands that
the public sector limit its growth.
Benign or not, the neglect of VET should not lead to the long-term
desertion of a major policy field by government. Donors are becoming
anxious to invest in VET. However, financial assistance should not focus
on upgrading the public sector system nor encourage the use of VET insti-
tutes in productive activities as a way of financing their activities. The lat-
ter would place a major value on merchandise (in a country already littered
with moribund factories) rather than on the institutes' primary outputs,
educated and trained graduates. Financial assistance, or even technical as-
sistance, of this type is more likely than not to fit the model that has been
found wanting elsewhere.
Kazakhstan has reached the point when a more positive approach is re-
quired, even if that approach, for the moment, is to continue to do nothing
but get the policy framework in place. In the end, benign neglect must be a
conscious action: even decisions not to proceed should be taken deliberately.
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PARTII High-Growth Economies
PART II ANALYZES the pressures caused by periods of high
economic growth on vocational education and training in China, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Chile, and Mexico. Many of these
countries have experienced a sharp slowdown and even contraction since
the mid- 1990s. The Republic of Korea, accustomed to unemployment rates
in the neighborhood of 2 to 3 percent, saw its GDP shrink by more than 5
percent in 1998, and unemployment rates rose to unprecedentedly high
levels. Malaysia is in the middle of a controversial struggle to limit the
crippling effects of the Asian crisis on its employment and output, which
declined by 7 percent in 1998. Indonesia's woes have been the worst of the
six countries discussed in this section. Political uncertainty compounds the
problems arising from weaknesses in financial and industrial policies. In
China efforts to restructure the economy, through the time and resources
afforded by annual growth rates that topped 10 percent, are in jeopardy.
The contagion effects of the Asian and Russian crises threaten to over-
whelm Mexico, Chile, and other Latin American countries.
These setbacks, which now occupy the attention of policymakers, natu-
rally are affecting adversely the vocational education and training systems
in Asia and Latin America. Their funding will decline, and more will be
asked of them as unemployment and school dropout rates increase. It is
important to remember, however, that the roots of the crises are financial,
and many of the afflicted countries' innovations in vocational education
and training are still worthy of attention. Moreover, there are signs that,
with financial restructuring, growth will resume. Because the horizons ex-
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plored in this book are broader than the immediate past and near future, its
messages remain relevant.
The study on China provides a bridge between the transition economies
discussed in Part I and the East Asian and Latin American economies that
have grown impressively over the past decade. China is facing the dual
challenge of meeting the demand for skilled workers in high-growth coastal
areas while downsizing its bloated public enterprises. Korea's experience
shows the benefits of an evaluative approach to VET policy. The country
has been able to pursue different strategies to encourage investment in en-
terprise-based training by firms. Malaysia has had success through a well-
run levy-grant scheme that has constantly been refined; its experience shows
that firms value the products of private training providers and joint public-
private institutions much more than the products of public vocational
schools. The Indonesia study illustrates another important lesson: by not
discouraging private provision of training, poor countries can ensure that a
fast-growing economy's demands for skilled workers can be met even when
the public VET sector is not operating efficiently.
In Chile the roots of a comprehensive reform of the VET system can be
traced to economywide rethinking since the early 1980s. The study high-
lights the importance of transparent and balanced funding mechanisms
and regulations in encouraging vocational education and training at the
secondary and postsecondary levels. Finally, the study on Mexico-a country
that has experienced both high growth and severe recessions-serves as a
bridge to Part III. In that section we examine countries where high labor-
force growth, low employment growth, and high unemployment and un-
deremployment rates, especially in the informal sector, are the main
challenges facing reform of vocational education and training.
China
PETER R. FALLON AND GORDON HUNTING
CHINA HAS SUCCESSFULLY followed a strategy of economic
reform since 1978. The strategy focused initially on improving incentives
in agriculture and allowing the market to play a greater role in rural areas;
later it expanded to include liberalizing measures aimed at reforming the
urban industrial sectors. Before 1992 the strategy was highly incremental;
reforms were gradually tried out in designated local areas before being ex-
tended to the national economy, and they did not signal a clear commit-
ment to a market system. In 1992, however, the authorities announced
their intention to accelerate the reform process and open up the economy.
Since then reforms signaling a much stronger commitment to the market
hlave been implemented. They liberalize nterprise ownership and gover-
nance, allow the central bank to operate an independent monetary policy,
develop the financial system, reform foreign exchange allocation, and ra-
tionalize the tax system.
Between 1984 and 1993 gross domestic product (GDP) growth was
phenomenal, averaging 10.5 percent per year and peaking at 14 percent in
1992. Growth was mainly spurred by the industrial sector, the manufac-
turing sector, and services, which grew respectively by 13.3, 12.7, and 12.2
percent annually between 1984 and 1993. China's stabilization policies of
1994 and 1995 reduced inflation and nudged GDP growth to more sus-
tainable levels. In 1995 the economy grew at 10.2 percent, while inflation
rates that had reached a peak of 25 percent in October 1994 fell to 8.3
percent by December 1995. Since then inflation has fallen even farther.
With close to 1.2 billion people, China is the world's most populous
country. It has achieved considerable success in reducing its annual popu-
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lation growth rate from 1.8 percent in the 1970s to around 0.9 percent in
1996. Although China is still a low-income country (per capita GDP about
US$600 in 1996), it has made great strides in its social indicators over the
past few decades. Between 1970 and 1996, infant mortality rates more
than halved, the average life expectancy rose to 69 years, adult illiteracy
rates fell to 27 percent, and net enrollment rates at the primary level ap-
proached 100 percent. Some of these figures are comparable to those of
middle-income countries.
The Labor Market
Labor market liberalization started relatively late in the reform process.
Although progress has been made, labor markets still retain some of their
prereform features. Under the centrally planned system, workers were as-
signed by the state to enterprises that were obliged to give them jobs. Job
security was guaranteed for life, and the enterprises paid state-administered
wages as well as retirement, medical, and housing benefits. Mobility be-
tween employers was largely eliminated in this system, and enterprise
management's freedom from market discipline contributed to widespread
overstaffing with little or no link at the enterprise level between wages and
workers' productivity. The virtual absence of any market mechanism for
allocating workers to jobs constrained early industrial reforms. This was an
important source of resource misallocation in China as a whole.
There is still much to be done before labor market liberalization is com-
plete. To function properly, labor markets should possess three main fea-
tures: (a) labor should be able to move freely between jobs; (b) employers
should be able to expand and contract their work forces as they choose; and
(c) wages should be determined by market forces and not by state regula-
tion or formula. Although considerable progress has been made, China
still fails these market tests.
Labor mobility continues to be highly restricted by legislation and a
cumbersome system of nonportable fringe benefits. The principal obstacles
are legal: a rural resident cannot take a job in an urban area without a work
permit, and he or she cannot gain access to state benefits available to urban
residents without a residency permit. This policy has insulated the urban
population from the much lower living standards of most rural residents,
and it has hindered movement from low productivity activities in rural
areas to higher productivity activities in cities-a clear example of resource
misallocation.
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Employment decisions in most urban enterprises are still heavily influ-
enced by the government. Although this is changing, lengthy procedures
continue to make it difficult to retrench surplus workers. In rural areas
conditions are much better since farms and enterprises have considerable
freedom to hire and fire workers.
Wages are largely determined by the state in urban state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs). Control of the macro wage bill remains an important stabi-
lization instrument, and wage bills are subject to administrative control in
the enterprises. There is little evidence that urban wages adjust to the forces
of supply and demand. Urban enterprises are obliged to provide a series of
services at regulated levels (for example, housing, medical care, education,
pensions, and maternity benefits) in addition to wage and bonus payments.
In rural areas there are fewer mandatory benefits and greater latitude in
wage determination.
Labor Allocation, Trends, and Imbalances
Out of a total labor supply of 619.5 million in 1994 (table 6-1), 441.5
million worked in rural areas; most of these workers were engaged in agri-
culture. In urban areas, state-owned enterprises and collectives continue to
provide the great majority of jobs, accounting for 91 percent of urban
employment in 1994. As statistically measured, unemployment was low by
international standards-only 2.9 percent of the urban labor force in 1994-
but, as argued below, underemployment is much more severe.
Labor supply and demand growth rates have closely matched each other
since 1980, and the unemployment rate has remained reasonably stable at
a low level. The composition of labor demand, however, has shifted signifi-
cantly. In rural areas liberalization of nonagricultural activities led to tre-
mendous growth in off-farm employment in rural enterprises, and the share
of such activities at the national level rose from 8.3 percent in 1980 to 24.2
percent by 1994. This was accompanied by a shift in the allocation of labor
within agriculture in favor of small-scale farming and away from agricul-
tural collectives. In urban areas a more permissive stance toward growth in
the private sector encouraged a shift in the composition of employment
away from SOEs and collectives toward privately owned enterprises and
self-employment.
These trends hide major imbalances in the Chinese labor market. There
is a substantial degree of underemployment in SOEs and collectives in
urban areas and a large and growing labor surplus within agriculture. But
TABLE 6-1
Labor Supply and Demand, Selected Years, 1980-94
Millions ofpeople Annualgrowth rates (percent)
Category 1980 1985 1990 1994 1980-85 1986-90 1991-93
Total labor supply 429.0 501.3 571.2 619.5 3.2 2.6 2.1
Total labor demand 423.6 498.7 567.4 614.5 3.3 2.6 2.0
Urban labor force 105.3 128.1 147.3 168.0 4.0 2.8 3.3
State-owned enterprises 80.2 89.9 103.5 112.0 2.3 2.8 2.0
Collectives 24.3 33.2 35.5 32.3 6.5 1.3 -2.4
Private n.a. 0.4 1.6 10.9 n.a. 30.1 61.6
Self-employed 0.8 4.5 6.7 12.3 40.9 8.3 16.4
Rural labor force 318.4 370.7 420.1 441.5 3.1 2.5 1.5
Agriculture 283.3 303.5 333.4 297.9 1.4 1.9 -2.8
Other 35.0 67.1 86.7 148.7 13.9 5.3 14.4
Unemployed (urban) 5.4 2.5 3.8 5.0 -14.0 8.2 7.1
Unemployment rate (percent) 4.9 1.9 2.5 2.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: Under the statistical methodology used in China, the presumption is that the entire rural abor force is employed. In other words, rural unemploy-
ment is assumed to be zero. Data may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Source: Ministry of Labor (1994).
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shortages of skilled workers in the cities and in the township and village
enterprises also are severe.
Public enterprises in China are grossly overstaffed. The Ministry of La-
bor estimates that at least 15 percent of the work force of SOEs, or 16.8
million people, could be made redundant with little or no impact on pro-
ductive capacity. There is also an unknown number of surplus workers in
collectives. If the number of surplus workers in SOEs were added to offi-
cial estimates of urban unemployment, the measured unemployment rate
would rise drastically to about 11.5 percent. Despite a doubling of agricul-
tural output between 1980 and 1993, considerable surplus labor in agri-
culture remains. When applying the labor requirements approach, the
Chinese authorities calculate that about 30 percent of agricultural labor is
in surplus.
Shortages of skilled workers have emerged following rapid growth in the
economy over the past decade. The need to improve international com-
petitiveness and adopt modern technologies in many industries is generat-
ing a demand for professionals, technicians, and manually skilled workers
that is growing faster than supply.
The government's objective is to move away from a state-administered
system of labor allocation toward a market system, while minimizing the
inevitable transition costs. Reform and expansion of vocational education
and training (VET) are an important part of future labor policy. The
government's strategy is to concentrate on five main policy directions. First,
encourage rural labor absorption through further development of the town-
ship and village enterprises, and continue to limit migration from rural to
urban areas. Second, encourage all forms of productive employment growth
in the towns. Third, expand and improve urban labor market services.
Fourth, progressively allow the market to determine wages and remove
barriers to labor mobility within the cities. Fifth, alleviate skill shortages.
These policy directions will be implemented by appropriate legislation.
Vocational Education and Training System
Compared with other developing countries, China has had remarkable
success in providing a comprehensive schooling system to its population.
Enrollment rates in the first nine years of schooling are higher than in most
other low-income countries, with more than 98 percent of the 6-to-i l age
cohort enrolled in primary school, and 74 percent of the 12-to-15 age
cohort enrolled in junior secondary school (table 6-2). After junior sec-
TABLE 6-2
Schools, Enrollment, and Enrollment Ratios, 1980, 1990, 1994
1980 1990 1994
Total Total Total
Number enrollment Enrollment Number enrollment Enrollment Number enrollment Enrollment
Level of schools (thousands) ratio of schools (thousands) ratio of schools (thousands) ratio
Primary 917,316 146,270 93.9 766,072 122,414 97.8 682,588 128,226 98.4
Junior secondary 87,077 45,383 61.5 71,953 39,165 66.0 68,415 43,799 74.4
Senior secondary
General 31,300 9,698 8.9 15,678 7,173 9.9 14,242 6,649 9.5
Specializeda 3,069 1,243 1.2 39,82 2,244 3.1 3,987 3,198 4.6
Secondary vocational
schools 3,314 319 0.3 9,164 2,471 3.4 10,217 3,426 4.9
Skilled workers'
schools 3,305 700 0.6 4,148 1,332 1.8 4,430 1,871 2.7
Higher 675 1,144 - 1,075 2,063 - 1,080 2,799 -
- Not available.
a. Includes econdary technical schools (STSs) and teacher training schools.
Source State Education Commission (various years); People's Republic of China (1995).
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ondary school, students can enroll in senior secondary school. Senior sec-
ondary schools can be general or vocational. Since 1980 general senior
secondary enrollments have dropped as these schools have been converted
into vocational schools.
Most vocational education and training in China is provided through
the education system at the senior secondary level. It is also provided by the
labor bureaus at the state and municipal levels and by medium to large
SOEs. At the senior secondary level there are (in addition to schools pro-
viding general education), three types of vocational schools: secondary spe-
cialist schools, comprising secondary technical schools (STSs) and teacher
training schools; skilled workers' schools (SWSs); and secondary vocational
schools (SVSs).
STSs and teacher training schools are run by central technical minis-
tries, state enterprises, or provincial and local education bureaus. They train
lower technicians: until the late 1980s all specialist secondary school gradu-
ates were guaranteed employment. Under the general control of the Minis-
try of Labor, SWSs are run by central industrial ministries, local labor
bureaus, and enterprises. Students recruited from junior secondary school
receive two to three years of skills training. Until the late 1980s the SWS
graduates were also guaranteed employment. SVSs were originally estab-
lished to enroll primary school graduates for skills training in preparation
for employment. Discontinued during the cultural revolution, SVSs were
reestablished after 1979. They enroll junior secondary graduates in two- or
three-year courses and are mainly under the control of local education bu-
reaus. Graduates have never had guaranteed employment.
Since 1980 the volume of vocational and technical education has dra-
matically increased. Enrollments in specialized secondary schools and SWSs
increased by about 10 percent per year, and the growth in SVSs was even
more dramatic: about 17 percent per year (table 6-2). From 1980 to 1994,
the enrollment in general senior secondary schools dropped by about 2.3 per-
cent per year due to the conversion of these schools into vocational schools.
General secondary schools, with their mission of preparing students for
college entrance examinations, were the major mode of secondary educa-
tion until 1985, and they enrolled about 60 percent of upper secondary
students. This proportion had fallen to below 50 percent by 1994.
Although the STSs and SVSs are primarily senior secondary-level pre-
employment vocational education institutions, they have developed and
expanded enrollment in part-time and short courses for workers to up-
grade skills or be retrained for new employment. By 1994 enrollment in
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part-time and short courses in secondary technical schools had risen to
130,000 from 75,000 in 1987.
Vocational education is also provided to adults outside the regular school
system. More than 60 million persons were enrolled in adult education in
1994. About 50 million were in secondary-level programs, and 95 percent
of these students were in technical training schools.
Local labor departments or bureaus also operate employment training
centers; the main clients are unemployed youth and retrenched workers. In
1991 there were reported to be 2,200 employment training centers with a
training capacity of about 0.9 million. Most large and some medium-size
SOEs operate enterprise training centers to meet their training needs. Data
on the enterprise training centers are not collected nationwide, but it is
clear that many of these centers are in operation.
Vocational education and training is strongly linked to jobs, particularly
within the secondary technical schools and skilled workers' schools owned
by technical ministries and enterprises. Although the central assignment to
jobs of graduates from higher education, specialized secondary schools,
and SWSs is being abolished, students sponsored by enterprises and by
provincial and local governments are guaranteed employment under the
terms of the agreements between the school and the enterprise or local
government. Nevertheless, there are reported to be increasing opportuni-
ties for employers to select among graduates and for graduates to choose
employers.
Vocational Education
Enrollments in the secondary technical and secondary vocational schools
reflect the changing sectoral pattern of employment. Between 1989 and
1994 the share of the services sectors in total employment rose from 18 to
23 percent, while that of industry remained relatively stable at 22 to 23
percent. Meanwhile, the share of agriculture fell from 60 to 54 percent.
Enrollment growth in the SVSs and STSs has been largely in the services
sectors; training in agriculture has sharply declined (tables 6-3 and 6-4). In
the secondary vocational schools the intake in industry and maintenance
and repair increased negligibly between 1990 and 1994, while total intake
increased by 41 percent. Intake in finance, economics, and administration
increased by nearly 220 percent over the same period. By contrast, the
intake in agriculture dropped by nearly 30 percent. The pattern for sec-
ondary technical schools is similar but less marked. An interesting trend is
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TABLE 6-3
Secondary Vocational Schools: Intake and Enrollment,
by Field of Study, 1990 and 1994
(number)
1990 1994
Total Total
Field Intake enrollment Intake enrollment
Industry 295,492 746,200 437,784 1,043,027
Maintenance and repair 135,647 308,787 n.a. n.a.
Agriculture and forestry 251,082 523,033 154,896 394,018
Health 48,307 149,859 101,590 255,715
Finance, economics,
administration 126,676 323,232 401,923 909,406
Politics and law 4,553 10,498 16,088 29,096
Teacher training and
humanities 89,170 214,740 n.a. n.a.
Other 87,443 194,926 355,280 794,166
Total 1,038,350 2,471,275 1,467,726 3,425,583
n.a. Not available.
Note: Maintenance and repair and teacher training humanities are not separately recorded
in 1994.
Source: State Education Commission (various years).
the decreasing percentage of STS entrants who are recruited after graduat-
ing from senior general secondary school. This proportion dropped from
30 percent to 20 percent between 1990 and 1994.
The reorientation of vocational education toward the service sectors re-
flects not only employment patterns but also the lower capital cost of offer-
ing nontechnical courses. In recent reviews of provincial development plans,
Liaoning province, a major industrial province with about 41 percent of
the work force in manufacturing industry, reports over 2,500 programs in
its SVSs in finance and economic majors, compared with only 438 courses
in engineering.
Private higher and secondary-level education and training have been
officially encouraged since 1993. The State Education Commission report
for 1994 shows that about 2.3 percent of SVS enrollment was private. The
percentage was highest in urban areas at 3.4 percent, dropping to 2.0 per-
cent in counties and towns and 0.4 percent in rural areas.
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TABLE 6-4
Secondary Technical Schools: Intake and Enrollment,
by Field of Study, 1990 and 1994
(number)
1990 1994
Total Total
Field Intake enrollment Intake enrollment
Industry 188,506 624,500 336,919 904,600
Agriculture and forestry 65,109 215,600 54,477 186,900
Health 93,261 308,400 125,815 358,200
Finance, economics,
administration 103,299 270,800 327,750 755,400
Politics and law 20,563 43,500 34,541 68,500
Other 32,064 104,300 47,365 125,000
Total 502,802 1,567,100 929,867 2,398,500
Source. State Education Commission (various years).
Enrollment in the SWSs reflects the predominantly industrial orienta-
tion of the enterprises to which these schools belong (table 6-5). Most of
the intake (75 percent) is in industry and manufacturing, with only about
2 percent in agriculture.
Expenditure on vocational education is difficult to analyze because there
are multiple sources of spending under the control of the schools. Data
from 82 leading schools in 5 of the most rapidly developing provinces
showed spending in 1993-94 of RMB 2,450 per year per student for the
secondary technical schools and RMB 1,590 per year per student for the
secondary vocational schools (table 6-6). The average value varied quite
widely by region. The share of recurrent expenditure for salaries was on
average 58 percent for the secondary vocational schools and about 45 per-
cent for the secondary technical schools. The annual unit costs in the SWSs
was about RMB 1,574 per trainee, which is very close to the unit cost for
the SVSs. There is little evidence on the relative costs of vocational and
general secondary education, but data provided by Guangdong and
Shandong provinces suggest that the unit costs of vocational education are
higher than those for general education.
The sample of schools also supplied details on the sources of financing
for recurrent expenditures. Overall, about 53 percent of revenue for recur-
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TABLE 6-5
Skilled Workers' Schools: Intake and Enrollment, by Sector, 1993
(number)
Sector Intake Total enrollment
Agriculture 15,205 42,313
Machinery/manufacture 156,984 430,628
Mining/smelting 27,056 67,513
Power, oil 37,825 108,659
Chemical, precious metals 31,983 90,723
Light industry (paper, textile, electronics) 124,103 306,474
Construction 31,593 84,789
Transport communications 58,917 140,474
Food and tourism 71,477 160,430
Other 84,492 213,340
Total 663,073 1,715,067
Source: State Education Commission (various years).
rent expenditures came from the government allocation. But there were
wide variations: in 1993-94 the share of government finance ranged from
37 to 64 percent, while that of tuition fees ranged from 2 to 38 percent.
Although there are no nationwide data on employment outcomes for
vocational school graduates, evidence suggests that all find jobs. For the
STSs and SVSs in the rapidly developing provinces, it was reported that all
graduates were employed, though most apparently still found employment
in SOEs. For the STS graduates in 1994, 71 percent were employed by
SOEs, 15 percent by joint ventures, and 14 percent by township and vil-
lage enterprises. For the SVS graduates that year the corresponding per-
centages were 52, 23, and 25.
Management and Policy
Overall responsibility for the STSs and SVSs, and for coordination of SWSs,
rests with the State Education Commission and its Vocational and Techni-
cal Education Department. Most of the STSs are managed and financed by
central technical departments or the provincial or local technical bureaus.
All SVSs are managed and financed by local governments. The State Edu-
cation Commission sets broad policy and strategy guidelines for STSs and
SVSs, and the Ministry of Labor does likewise for the SWSs and training
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TABLE 6-6
Annual Cost per Student for Courses at Secondary Technical and
Secondary Vocational Schools, Selected Provinces, 1993-94
(RMB)
Cost Number of schools
Province STS SVS STS SVS
Guangdong 2,380 2,780 5 5
Jiangsu 3,130 1,850 10 10
Liaoning 1,990 1,330 3 12
Shandong 1,410 1,310 4 13
Tianjin 2,720 1,660 4 9
Total 2,450 1,590 26 49
Source: Authors' calculations based on questionnaires returned by 82 schools.
centers. Policy and strategy formulation for vocational education is set by
the State Education Commission; the main responsibility for management
of the system rests with the provincial, county/city, and district-level gov-
ernments. The State Education Commission does not provide direct fund-
ing, except for limited pilot projects, but it controls indirect funding from
international bodies. It uses a number of policy instruments including (a)
broad targets, such as the proportion of senior secondary students enrolled
in vocational schools; (b) standards for staffing, including numbers, quali-
fications, and experience; and (c) guidelines for the curricula for the main
subjects, standard lists of practical exercises to be performed, and lists of
the equipment to be provided in each specialization.
The commission sets targets for the establishment of key schools at the
local, provincial, and national levels. These schools must meet criteria con-
cerning the adequacy and quality of facilities and the number and qualifi-
cations of staff. To be recognized as a key school is a high honor, and this
encourages investment and development to meet the criteria.
The State Education Commission exercises control through regulations
and guidelines. A vocational education law was expected that would estab-
lish the framework for a comprehensive vocational education system. Among
other objectives, the law would establish occupational classification and
skills standards nationwide and improve linkages between government de-
partments and with enterprises through a skills testing system. The law,
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unlike existing State Education Commission regulations, would include
penalties for violation.
Vocational Training
The main suppliers of vocational training through short courses are the
employment training centers operated by the labor departments of local
governments, frequently through a labor service company. The Ministry of
Labor issues regulations governing employment training centers, but they
seem to remain relatively uncontrolled in terms of the content and quality
of their training. Employment training centers cater to local needs. Their
main clients are the unemployed and enterprise workers wanting to learn
new skills. Reportedly, 3.0475 million people completed training in the
employment training centers in 1993 (table 6-7). Of this number, 2.771
million (91 percent) undertook pre-employment training (and about 77
percent of them were classified as unemployed first-time job seekers).
TABLE 6-7
Employment Training Centers, 1993
Number of trainees
Characteristic (thousands)
Number of employment raining centers 2,525.0
Total number trained 3,047.5
Pre-employment training 2,771.0
Of unemployed youth 2,133.5
Training authority
Labor department 1,327.5
Job training center 1,129.1
Business management department 990.7
Society 205.0
Private 149.0
Other 98.9
Length of training
Less than six months 2,190.7
Between six months and one year 370.1
Longer than one year 210.3
Source. Ministry of Labor (1994).
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More than 2 million of those undertaking pre-employment training re-
ceived less than six months of training. A more detailed picture of the
enterprise training centers in 1995 has been provided by a few municipali-
ties. Generally, the training was of relatively short duration-less than three
months-and mainly for the unemployed. The characteristics of trainees
varied between centers. In Shaoxing, for example, all trainees were unem-
ployed, but about 23 percent had been previously employed; in Wuhan
about 40 percent of trainees had current jobs. The employment training
centers appear to respond to the differing needs of their locations.
Employment training centers are funded by capital grants from the la-
bor bureaus, tuition fees, earnings from subsidiary production activities,
and subsidies from the unemployment insurance fund. However, there are
almost no data on the costs of employment training center training.
Enterprise-Based Training
Enterprise-based training is provided in enterprise training centers that are
owned and operated by large and medium SOEs. Data on the enterprise
training centers have not been collected nationwide, but data from two
municipalities (Shaoxing and Wuhan) show that most of the training is
short term (table 6-8). Over 70 percent of the training is provided for
workers, normally employed by the enterprise owning the enterprise train-
ing centers. The regulations governing enterprise training centers are largely
determined by the technical ministries to which the parent enterprises are
responsible. There is no national standard for courses other than those
provided for general education.
Private Sector Training
Private training centers provided about 4.9 percent of all training in 1993.
There are no nationwide data on training centers in private enterprises, nor
are there data available on in-service training as distinct from off-the-job
training. It appears that many enterprises do not have independent work-
shops for practical skills training, so practical training aspects of the course
are normally carried out in the factory.
Major VET Issues
Important issues are management and financing of vocational education
and training and the relevance and responsiveness of VET to state and
student needs.
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TABLE 6-8
Characteristics of Enterprise Training Centers
in Selected Municipalities, 1995
Characteristic Shaoxing Percentage Wuhan Percentage
Number of enterprise training
centers in municipality 10 n.a. 176 n.a.
Total number of trainees 4,420 n.a. 280,865 n.a.
Average number of trainees
per enterprise training centers 442 n.a. 1,596 n.a.
Number enrolled in courses by length
0 to 50 hours 2,400 54.3 150,387 53.6
50 hours to 3 months 2,020 45.7 54,360 18.9
3 to 6 months n.a. n.a. 50,830 17.8
Longer than 6 months n.a. n.a. 24,488 9.7
Trainees by type
Young people waiting for
employment 770 17.4 22,480 8.0
Previous workers waiting for
employment 230 5.2 56,240 20.0
Workers employed by
enterprises 1,950 44.1 105,555 37.6
Workers from township
and village enterprises 1,470 33.3 54,030 19.2
Other workers n.a. n.a. 41,760 14.9
n.a. Not applicable.
Source: State Education Commission (1995).
Management and Financing of VET
The broad policy of the government is to move, incrementally, to a market
responsive system. The real question is whether such a system can be achieved
if the changes that are made are small and existing structures are main-
tained. The main problems are as follows:
* Supply-driven systems of VET provision
* Overlap and duplication of course provision
* Schools' lack of responsibility and accountability
* Inadequate financial resources
* Unjustified differences in fees
* Uneconomic enterprises operated by schools.
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Although central placement and assignment are being discontinued, and
responsibility is being decentralized to provincial and local governments
and enterprises, vocational education and training in China is still supply
driven. For example, the State Planning Council and State Education Com-
mission have set targets for an increasing proportion of the senior second-
ary graduates to enter the vocational and technical schools, and local
authorities appear to give high priority to meeting those targets.
The multiple systems of management duplicate provision. Both the SVSs
and SWSs run three-year pre-employment training programs for junior
secondary leavers, while the enterprise training centers include general edu-
cation as well as secondary technical and vocational school programs. The
secondary technical schools and the secondary vocational schools offer an
increasing proportion of part-time and short specialist courses for upgrad-
ing and retraining workers-supposedly the function of the enterprise train-
ing centers.
School managers appear to have a good deal of freedom and power. This
may be because they lack legally defined responsibility and accountability
rather than because they have been assigned decentralized powers. A more
thorough reform of the organization and management of VET would have
devolved responsibilities to the training institutions in a clearly defined
manner.
In 1995 the State Education Commission proposed the establishment
of 2,000 vocational schools (about 16 percent of all vocational and techni-
cal schools) by the year 2000. For these schools alone, the investment re-
quired from 1995 to 2000 was expected to be about 8 billion RMB per
year-eight times the annual capital expenditure on primary and second-
ary education in 1991. This does not account for the needs of the other
14,000 vocational and technical schools, which are sorely in need of reha-
bilitation because of inadequate financing. One source of this problem has
been the widespread conversion of secondary general schools into second-
ary vocational schools. Studies indicate that unit recurrent costs for 1994
average RMB 2,500 per year for the STSs and RMB 1,600 for the SVSs
and SWSs, which are higher than those of general education.
Analysis of details of source of financing for recurrent expenditure, also
supplied by the sample of schools, showed that overall about 53 percent of
revenue for recurrent expenditure came from the government allocation.
But there were wide variations: the share of government finance ranged
from 37 percent to 64 percent, while that of tuition fees ranged from 2
percent to 38 percent. In general, tuition fee and production income was
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higher for the SVSs, with less than 50 percent of their revenue coming
from the government education budget. Students in some government pro-
grams pay only about RMB 400, while others pay as much as RMB 2,500.
About 6 percent of a sample of schools' operating revenue is obtained from
income from enterprises owned by the schools. But some school-owned
factory workshops derive profit from special benefits, including low inter-
est loans for investment, freedom from taxation and other controls, and
monopoly rights for supply of services.
Relevance and Responsiveness
STS, SVS, and SWS graduates number about 2 million per year and repre-
sent about 17 percent of the total net increase in employment. Until the
late 1980s, graduates of STSs and SWSs were guaranteed employment.
Although these guarantees have been removed, graduates of these institu-
tions who are sponsored by enterprises and by provincial and local govern-
ments are still guaranteed employment. Enrollments in SVSs and STSs
reflect the changing sectoral pattern of employment. SWS enrollment re-
flects the predominantly industrial orientation of the enterprises to which
these schools belong.
Notable VET Reforms
The framework for reform of VET was established in 1985 when the Com-
munist Party of China issued a policy statement "vigorously promoting
vocational and technical education" by (a) increasing the proportion of
students entering senior vocational education (from 40 percent of entrants
to senior secondary education to 50 percent); (b) introducing a system of
pre-employment training; (c) including general education within vocational
education; and (d) encouraging enterprises, technical departments of gov-
ernment, individuals, and communities to set up vocational and technical
education institutions on their own or in cooperation. The policy was fur-
ther developed in 1993 with an outline for reform of education by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council (State
Council 1993, 1994). Following is a discussion of the main components of
the policy.
A major part of the government's education reforms is the introduction
of universal nine-year compulsory education. Compulsory education in
2000 was expected to cover 85 percent of the population.
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Senior secondary education is to be universalized in large cities and eco-
nomically developed coastal regions. Enrollment in technical and voca-
tional education at the senior secondary level is to be increased considerably.
Each city or county is to set up one or two key comprehensive secondary
vocational schools until eventually 2,000 key secondary vocational and tech-
nical schools are established around the country. Enrollment in secondary
vocational education in 2000 was expected to constitute 60 percent of stu-
dents in the upper secondary level, with the proportion reaching 70 per-
cent in cities. Postsecondary vocational education and training for graduates
of secondary general schools is also to be developed.
The object is for all new job entrants to have access to training, and for
job-related training to be available to all employees. A general policy of
requiring pre-employment training is to be followed strictly, and jobs re-
quiring skills are to be open only to those with the relevant job qualifica-
tion certificate. Adult education should be expanded.
The state is to be a major sponsor and source of financing for VET
rather than the only sponsor. While basic education will remain the re-
sponsibility of government, technical and vocational education and adult
education are to be mainly sponsored by trades, enterprises, and public
institutions or jointly by all sectors. The central government will be re-
sponsible for setting overall policies and guidance, and provincial and local
governments will be responsible for administration of the system in line
with that guidance.
Nationwide planning of enrollment and assignment of graduates to
employment will cease. Schools will continue to recruit some students un-
der plans determined by the schools and administering authorities. In prin-
ciple, those students will be assigned to employment within sectors, but in
practice, students and employing units will exercise mutual choice in ac-
tual employment.
The numbers of students sponsored by enterprises and by self-supported
fee payments are to be increased progressively. Sponsored students on gradu-
ation will be employed according to the training contract between the spon-
soring body and the school, or the agreement between the employer and
the individual student. With progressive development of the labor market,
most graduates should be free to find their own jobs.
Quality is to be improved through a number of steps. Quality standards
and evaluation indicators are to be set for schools. Teacher qualifications
are to be improved; the hope was that by the year 2000, 60 percent of
secondary vocational teachers would have the specified qualifications. Teach-
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ers' salaries are to be increased to exceed that of employees in local SOEs,
and to rise with rising gross national product. Teachers' salaries and pro-
motion are to be determined by performance, thus overturning egalitarian-
ism and promotion based on seniority in years of service. Efficiency in the
utilization of resources is to be improved.
Legislation on vocational education will be introduced to ensure the
implementation of the reforms. Local authorities are to follow by formu-
lating local laws and decrees. The system for supervising enforcement of
the vocational education law will be established.
Total expenditure on education was expected to rise to 4 percent of
gross national product by the year 2000, with budgetary expenditure reach-
ing 15 percent of government expenditure. Government will continue to
be the main source of finance, but its assistance will be supplemented by
funds from other channels. Low interest loans for setting up school enter-
prises are proposed. Enterprises and nongovernmental organizations will
be encouraged to invest in education, through tax relief on such expendi-
ture. The education tax will also be collected from township and village
enterprises and other countryside enterprises exempt from paying value
added tax, sales taxes, and consumption taxes. Peasants will also pay an
education tax of 1.5 to 2 percent of per capita income. It is to be consid-
ered as part of their 5 percent tax burden, to be used mainly to subsidize
teachers of schools run by local people and to make up deficiencies in
funding of these schools.
Ongoing and Completed Reforms
The expansion of enrollment in vocational and technical education at the
expense of general secondary education is well on the way to being achieved.
By 1994 the intake to vocational schools at the senior level was about 58
percent of the total entry to senior secondary education. The budgeted
expenditure for education for 1994 was 15.43 percent of the total, thus
exceeding the 15 percent target. The growth of nongovernment budget
spending for vocational education represents close to 50 percent of total
recurrent expenditure in a group of advanced vocational schools in five of
the most developed provinces.
The government is experimenting with funding in-service training.
Under a pilot project, five municipalities will set up vocational training
coordinating committees or similar mechanisms to manage vocational
training funds that will become the channel for all municipal finance for
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provision of in-service training. The vocational training funds will make
grants, to both public and private training providers, on a competitive
basis using criteria of quality, demonstration of market demand, and cost
and outcome benefits. Initially, a bilateral or multilateral loan or credit
could be used to upgrade facilities of training institutions, for example,
but funds could come from any multilateral or bilateral source or from
government grants or allocations. Revenue for the training fund to cover
recurrent costs of training would come from multiple sources, including
the unemployment insurance fund, education tax, and general budget
allocation for training. The vocational training coordination committee
will include representatives from government, enterprises, labor, and train-
ing organizations.
Management of the VET system has been devolved to provincial, county,
and city levels. Indeed, the central government has neither the staffing nor
control over financial resources to manage the systems centrally.
Obstacles to Reform
The major obstacle to the reform of vocational and technical education
and training is the capital cost of improving the quality of training facilities
and of implementing programs for upgrading staff and revising courses. To
establish the target of 2,000 key vocational schools by 2000 required an
annual expenditure of some RMB 8 billion-an increase of about 10 per-
cent in the total education budget. Those 2,000 key schools represented
only about 10 percent of the formal VET system.
A second important obstacle is the lack of close cooperation between
the State Education Commission and the Ministry of Labor, particularly at
the central level, and the resulting duplication of functions in the training
institutions under their care. The vocational training coordination com-
mittees managing training funds from various sources could greatly mini-
mize overlap and inefficiency. To succeed in this regard, however, they must
be free from direct control by either the Ministry of Labor or the State
Education Commission, and they must operate under the direction of sec-
tor training institutions and employers in the private and public sectors.
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_ T 1 .Indonesia
ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS AND HANEEN SAYED
DURING THE PAST 30 years, Indonesia experienced re-
markable economic and demographic transformation. Since 1970 the
economy has grown at an average annual rate of approximately 7 percent.
Aided by a national population policy, the government was able to reduce
the total fertility rate from 5.3 children per woman in 1970 to 2.8 in 1993.
This combination of rapid economic growth and declining fertility resulted
in annual increases in per capita income of 4.5 percent. Other policies that
focused on agriculture, regional development, and human resource devel-
opment helped to reduce poverty from 60 percent in 1970 to 14 percent in
1993 and adult illiteracy from 60 percent o 16 percent during the same
period. Today almost all children start school.
A diversified supply of education and training provided by the public and
private sectors kept pace with the demands of a fast-growing and trans-
forming economy. As a result, Indonesia joined the ranks of the middle-
income countries by the mid-1990s. The financial crisis of 1998 and the
resulting economic ontraction threatened to reverse many of these gains,
but Indonesia may soon recover much of the ground lost. This chapter
takes a long-term view and focuses on the pre-1997 labor market and on
the vocational education and training reforms carried out over the past two
decades.
In the economic sphere the government has engaged in substantial de-
regulation since the late 1980s to lay the basis for future growth. Indonesia's
commitments tofree trade under the Uruguay Round of the General Agree-
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ment on Tariffs and Trade, and under the Asia Free Trade Agreement, pro-
vide for the removal of many trade restrictions by 2004 that will open up
its economy further. The challenge is to create a system for producing skilled
workers that can readily respond to largely unpredictable changes in the
size and composition of future output.
This chapter examines the characteristics of Indonesia's vocational and
technical education and training in relation to recent labor market perfor-
mance and future prospects. It finds that in this connection, Indonesia's
strength is a sizable, effective, and cost-efficient private education and train-
ing sector. Given this finding, the chapter discusses the role of public policy
in vocational education and training and possible reforms in terms of pub-
lic provision, financing, and regulation.
Vocational Education and Training
Indonesia's education system produces each year more than 1 million skilled
workers, broadly defined to include those with academic and vocational
skills at the senior secondary level (ages 16 to 18) and above. This is im-
pressive for a country with a per capita income of US$900 in 1996. Only
a generation ago 70 percent of the labor force had no more than a primary
education.
Vocational education and training in Indonesia is dominated by private
institutions. The number of senior secondary graduates from private schools
equals the number graduating from public schools, and the number of
graduates from private postsecondary institutions is more than double that
from public institutions. Publicly provided training is only a fraction of
the training supplied by the private sector. Approximately 1 million train-
ees are enrolled in private training centers registered with the Ministry of
Manpower, compared with 50,000 trainees enrolled in the ministry's public
vocational centers. An additional 500,000 trainees attend private training
centers registered with the Ministry of Education and Culture. Employer-
provided training is also extensive, but it is more difficult to quantify.
A major determinant of the skill level of the labor force in the future will
be the number of children who leave the education system before they have
completed the basic cycle of nine years of schooling. Approximately 2.0 mil-
lion students dropped out of the basic education system in 1994 (table 7-1).
When examined against costs, government investments at the higher
levels of education are significantly greater than those at basic levels. They
predominantly benefit those from higher-income families or employers in
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TABLE 7-1
Indonesia's Education System
(thousands of people)
Portion Not pro-
of total ceeding
attending to next
Total private Drop- level of
Level of education output facilities outs education
Primarya (ages 7-12) 3,840 256 1,200 1,200
Junior secondary' (ages 13-15) 1,905 522 400 400
Senior secondary (ages 16-18) 1,226 592 300 800
General (including commercial
and home economics) 863 366 - -
Vocational 210 129 -
Technical (three- and four-year) 153 97
Diploma 59 39 -00b
University degree 155 110 - -
Postgraduate 2 - - -
Selected civil service tertiary institutes 54 - - -
Ministry of Manpower vocational centers 50 - -
Private training centers - 1,500 -
- Not available.
Note: Data are for 1992, 1993, or 1994 (whichever year the most recent data were
available).
a. Includes religious chools.
b. Includes diploma and degree dropouts.
Source: Ministry of Education and Culture data; Ministry of Manpower data.
the formal sector (where labor costs are only a fraction of value added,
typically less than 20 percent). The annual unit cost in primary education
averages US$80. The unit cost in senior secondary technical schools is
approximately 40 percent higher on average than for senior secondary gen-
eral schools, where the unit cost is US$170. For public universities the
annual unit cost is approximately US$800, but for pre-employment train-
ing in a public vocational training center the annual unit cost can amount
to more than US$ 1,000.
The public provision of skills outside the general education system is
particularly costly. The discussion that follows takes this as a starting point.
We do not deny that training interventions can have many positive devel-
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opmental effects nor that governments should be engaged in a range of
activities that may appear to have low social returns. However, social in-
vestments and public interventions should have net social gains and should
be fiscally sustainable, and in some cases may be better left to the private
sector.
Vocational Education
Indonesia's human resource policies have been broadly based. The govern-
ment has focused on expanding primary education, which by 1993-94
had become nearly universal (table 7-2). Junior secondary education has
not increased as much and is more likely to lead to senior secondary educa-
tion than to immediate employment. Senior secondary education and uni-
versity education, however, have mushroomed as the labor market continues
to absorb more educated graduates (although their wage premium over
secondary school graduates is smaller than in the past). Because junior sec-
ondary vocational education has been phased out, this chapter focuses on
senior secondary education.
In 1992-93 almost 4 million students were enrolled in approximately
14,000 senior secondary schools. Senior secondary education takes place
in a highly diverse mix of schools. Nearly two-thirds of senior secondary
students attend general education schools. The rest are enrolled in 14 dif-
TABLE 7-2
Enrollment Rates, by Level of Education and Output,
Selected Years, 1968-94
1 992-93
Enrollment rate (percent)
Level of education 1968-69 1993-94 (thousands)
Primary 41a 94a 3,700
Junior secondary 17a 40a 1,900
Senior secondary 9a 25a 1,250
University 2b 10 b 220
a. Net enrollment rate: students in the official age group for a given level of education (see
table 7-1) as a percentage of the total population in that age group.
b. Gross enrollment rate: students (irrespective of their age) enrolled in a university as a
percentage of the population in the official age group for that level of education.
Source: National Development Planning Board.
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ferent types of vocational, technical, and specialized schools. Almost 85
percent of the nongeneral schools are commercial or technical schools. The
private sector accounts for nearly half of total enrollments.
Vocational education covers mainly commercial fields, such as adminis-
tration, accounting, marketing, management, and investment and loan
management. Technical education includes drawing, surveying and map-
ping, building construction, water works, electrical installation, electricity
supply, machining, communication electronics, automotive mechanics,
general mechanics, and ship maintenance. In theory, more than 160 study
programs are available, but in practice recognized curricula exist for fewer
than 100 programs, of which only 75 are actually offered. On average, schools
offer only three to four programs, although a few may offer as many as ten.
The difference between what can be offered at schools and what is actu-
ally provided reflects the limited finances of public schools and the unwill-
ingness of private schools to provide courses in fields not required in their
local labor markets. Yet the five-year plan for 1993-94 to 1998-99 foresaw
a greater increase in enrollments in and output of vocational and technical
education (VTE) schools than in general schools, partly as a result of gov-
ernment policy to support VTE. The authorities expected the annual rate
of increase in the VTE stream to be nearly 50 percent higher than in the
general stream, 7.4 percent compared with 5.1 percent. By the end of the
plan period, the authorities expected the ratio of VTE graduates to general
education graduates to have increased to two-thirds, compared with one-
half at the beginning of the period.
The planned expansion is taking place against a declining wage differ-
ential between general and VTE graduates (table 7-3). Urban labor mar-
kets no longer differentiate between these two groups, and male VTE
graduates now earn less than general graduates. Women VTE graduates
continue to enjoy a small, but declining, premium.
The length of job search is similar for graduates of the different senior
secondary schools, and apparently little variation occurs in the unemploy-
ment rates between graduates from the different types of schools. The inci-
dence of long-term unemployment also does not seem to vary by type of
school: around 50 percent of graduates from all schools have yet to find a
job after six months.
Despite the fact that the type of school and program "are of limited
importance in determining whether graduates are idle or not" (MOEC
and USAID 1992), costs in technical senior secondary schools are 55 per-
cent higher than those in general senior secondary schools. The cost differ-
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TABLE 7-3
Wage Advantage of Graduates of Vocational and Technical Education
Schools, by Gender, 1977 and 1990
(index, senior secondary general = 100)
Type ofsenior Men Women
secondary school 1977 1990 1977 1990
General 100 100 100 100
'Vocational 134 98 127 111
Source: 1990 labor force survey.
ence between commercial and general senior secondary schools is smaller,
5 percent, but the labor market outcomes of commercial school graduates
is not as good as for those from technical schools. The cost disadvantage of
technical schools becomes even greater if one takes repetition and attrition
into account. The percentage of repeaters among technical school students
is 25 percent higher than for general education schools, and the percentage
of dropouts is nearly three times as large. On average, 13 percent of stu-
dents from public general education schools graduate at age 20 or above.
The percentage is 20 percent for public commercial schools and 34 percent
for public technical schools (MOEC and USAID 1992, table 26). Com-
bining these findings, we find that general education school students have
a 94 percent probability of finishing the cycle in the allotted three years,
compared with 86 percent for technical school students. This increases
technical schools' costs by another 10 percent.
In terms of exposure to work, on-the-job training of VTE students does
not always match curricula or the needs of students or industry. Rather, it
(depends on what is locally available (MOEC and USAID 1992, p. 42).
Ninety-nine percent of students in technical and commercial schools par-
ticipate in some on-the-job training before graduation. Seventy percent of
commercial school students train in government offices. Twenty-two per-
cent of technical school students train in a government office and 49 per-
cent in industries or business ventures (although whether this is in a private
or a parastatal establishment is not known). The average length of on-the-
job training is only two weeks for commercial school students and three
weeks for technical school students (MOEC and USAID 1992, table 32).
Donor support for the expansion of VTE has not always produced the
(lesired results. In some instances it has contributed to an oversupply of
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vocational schools. It has also created recurrent demands for funds that
were simply beyond the reach of the public budget once donor funds ran
out. According to the Ministry of Education and Culture and the U.S.
Agency for International Development, "The basis for VTE expansion was
that economic development would create critical shortages of middle-level
technically qualified manpower. However, there is little evidence to suggest
that any shortages are being alleviated by the employment of VTE gradu-
ates nor is it clear that VTE graduates are, on the whole, being adequately
prepared for that type of role in the labor force" (MOEC and USAID
1992, p. 17).
Public Vocational Training Centers
Many ministries provide training. The Ministry of Manpower, the main
supplier of training to the private sector, is officially responsible for coordi-
nating the national training effort. The training programs cover a wide
range of areas and vary in design and in methods of delivery. For example,
the Ministry of Manpower's vocational training centers aim in theory at
school dropouts; secondary school and university graduates; other job seekers
(housewives, handicapped people, older people); professionals; employees;
and self-employed workers in agriculture, manufacturing, and services. In
practice, the programs are targeted at three groups: (a) job seekers such as
school dropouts and secondary school graduates, who can receive training
in the ministry's vocational centers; (b) workers in private or state-owned
enterprises, who can attend fully subsidized training programs; and (c) self-
employed workers in small business or agriculture, who receive training
either through special courses or mobile training units attached to voca-
tional training centers. We concentrate here on training for job seekers and
the vocational centers run by the Ministry of Manpower.
The ministry in 1994 operated 153 vocational centers that were divided
into three types: 33 type A centers (BLKs), which are the biggest ones and
are located in urban areas; 16 type B centers (BLKs), which are located in
smaller urban centers; and 104 type C centers (KLKs), which are the small-
est ones and are located primarily in rural areas. The bigger centers pro-
vided training in industrial and service skills, while the smaller ones offered
training in technologies appropriate for rural areas and in the skills needed
for self-employment.
The centers have the capacity to train approximately 120,000 people a
year, and government-sponsored enrollments (that is, fully subsidized train-
ees) reached nearly that figure in 1984 (table 7-4). However, enrollments
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TABLE 7-4
Enrollment of Government-Sponsored Trainees, Staff Levels,
and Funding in Ministry of Manpower Vocational Training Centers,
Selected Years, 1984-99
Five-year plan
Category 1984 1988 1992 1994_99 a
rrainees (number) 118,000 23,000 80,000 50,000
Staff (number) 1,600 2,240 3,200 -
Development budget allocation
(billions of rupiah) 12.6 7.6 20.0
- Not available.
a. Planned annual enrollment.
Source: Ministry of Manpower data; World Bank estimates.
have fallen over time, reaching as low as 25,000 in the mid-1980s, when
project funds dried up and the macroeconomic situation deteriorated, ne-
czessitating budget cuts. No new centers have been built in the past decade,
although sizable allocations from the development budget have been main-
tained, and the number of instructors has increased (table 7-4).
Year-to-year budget allocations vary significantly and seem to be unpre-
dictable, as indicated by changes in the number of government-sponsored
trainees. Between 1990 and 1991, for example, the number of such train-
ees in selected BLKs and KLKs increased by 300 percent, only to decline
by 11 percent between 1991 and 1992 and then to increase by 18 percent
between 1992 and 1993. Reliance on foreign funds and lack of continuity
in development budget allocations have deprived the centers of the ability
to plan for the long term. The decline in budget allocations (while main-
taining the number of centers and increasing the number of instructors)
has been accompanied by a reduction in the duration of courses. In addi-
tion, the centers have gradually moved to offering less expensive, nonin-
dustrial, short-term training. At the peak of the centers' operations in 1984,
more than 60,000 government-sponsored trainees received training in in-
dustrial skills; by 1992 this number had declined to only 45,000. Yet dur-
ing this time employment in manufacturing increased by more than 3
million workers. Currently, most of the courses focus on agriculture, tour-
ism, and commerce, and some centers offer driving lessons. These are low-
cost areas already well catered to by the private sector. The initial objective
of the centers to provide sophisticated industrial skills remains unfulfilled.
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Two other objectives have also been largely pushed aside. First, the cen-
ters' original intent was to target weak applicants-those who had not gone
beyond a primary school education or who had dropped out of secondary
school. In other words, the centers were to provide opportunities to the less
fortunate, who for lack of ability or for economic or social reasons could
not complete their basic education. Eventually, however, a consistent pat-
tern emerged: those who failed to qualify for entrance were predominantly
the school dropouts, and those who gained entry were mainly senior sec-
ondary schools graduates. In 1995, 90 percent of trainees were senior sec-
ondary school graduates. Students who had less than a senior secondary
education often lacked basic literacy and numeracy skills and were unable
to handle technical equipment.
Second, based on the centers' original aim of catering to poor students,
trainees are exempted by legislation from paying fees. Even though 50,000
trainees are fully sponsored by public funds, cost-recovery measures have
gradually been introduced.
STUDENT AND EMPLOYER ISSUES. Student selection is officially the re-
sponsibility of the Ministry of Manpower's district offices. Students seek-
ing admittance to a program must be good citizens, physically fit, and at
least 18 years old. They also must have registered as job seekers with one of
the ministry's district offices, which screen applications, administer the re-
quired tests, and select the students. This selection process and the use of
criteria that are not related to achievement (for example, being a member
of the government party) reduce the quality of the students selected. The
BLKs, in particular, feel the effects of this, and some have introduced addi-
tional recruitment tests, such as locally administered tests in mathematics.
Individual centers are not involved in placing trainees in jobs. After a
typical three-month basic training course, the BLKs and KLKs send a list
of successful trainees back to the Ministry of Manpower's district offices,
which then place the students. As in the case of student selection, however,
placement is increasingly facilitated by BLK teachers through their con-
tacts with local firms.
There have been several studies of BLK and KLK graduates over the
years (Clark 1985; MOEC and USAID 1992). Their findings are charac-
terized by significant variation with respect to the employment and wages
of graduates compared with some control group. In some studies BLK
graduates found employment before nongraduates, but after a year the
overall unemployment rate for graduates was not substantially different
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from that of nongraduates. It is not clear whether the initial differences
in employment rates relate to the intensity of placement efforts by the
Ministry of Manpower's district offices. In addition, BLK graduates earned
more than nongraduates, but both earnings and employment outcomes
varied significantly by program, location, and trainees' personal charac-
teristics. More recent evaluations have shown, however, that BLK gradu-
ates do not appear to have an earnings advantage over nongraduates, nor
dLo they have a significant advantage in terms of securing permanent or
casual employment.
A 1992 Ministry of Manpower study (Patrinos and Clark 1995) pre-
sented employers' views about BLK and KLK graduates. It compared the
graduates employers had recruited to "similar" workers in the same firms
who had not graduated from a BLK or KLK. The supervisors who were
interviewed stated that three-quarters of BLK and KLK graduates required
basic training on entering the firm, and some required more than three
rnonths of training. (The methodology and sample may not be completely
reliable.) The supervisors argued that the usefulness of training at BLKs
and KLKs is limited because of their lack of modern machinery and tools.
They also pointed out that parts of the curriculum at the BLKs are non-
technical, such as physical fitness and mental disciple, which limits the
time allocated to instruction in pertinent skills.
FINANCING. The BLKs and KLKs are funded from various sources, in-
cluding the public budget, donors, and third parties (cost recovery). In
1992-93 the development budget allocation alone was approximately 20
billion rupiah (US$10 million), and the centers enrolled 80,000 trainees.
Adding an estimated recurrent budget allocation of Rp 14 billion, the unit
cost was approximately Rp 425,000. Since the average course lasts three
rnonths, the yearly unit cost is about Rp 1.7 million (US$860), which is
equivalent to the average unit cost of studies at a public university. Other
estimates of the annual unit cost per full-time BLK and KLK trainee sup-
ported by public funds have been more than US$1,200 (World Bank 1991).
These high costs derive in part from overstaffing and underutilization of
facilities. Public vocational centers have a trainee-per-instructor ratio of
3.3 compared with a ratio of 10 to 15 trainees per instructor in private
centers. Estimates indicate that the public funds allocated for the annual
training of 50,000 students in BLKs and KLKs could be more than ad-
e quate to provide training to 10 percent of all those employed (3.5 million
people) in medium and large manufacturing firms.
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Foreign assistance continues to be instrumental in developing and as-
sisting the operations of public vocational centers. In addition to support-
ing building construction and procurement of equipment, foreign grants
and loans have funded staff development and upgrading. Donors have fi-
nanced many of Indonesia's instructor training facilities. Donors have also
supported the extensive overseas training of instructors. Foreign funds have
helped to develop a system of public vocational training that is now too
large to be sustained by local funds and requires continuous injection of
foreign monies. Hence, this dependence on foreign funds has become more
a liability than an asset. In addition, the stop-go nature of foreign funding
means that long-term planning is difficult, and so the operations of public
vocational centers are determined by narrow, short-run considerations.
After the financial crunch of the mid- 1 980s and the depletion of project
funds, the government introduced legislation that allows cost recovery for
nongovernment-sponsored training. This resulted in individualized train-
ing programs for firms (both private and public) or the leasing of facilities
for training, teaching, and related activities. The proceeds are largely re-
tained locally and often take the form of supplementary staff salaries. In
some BLKs privately funded trainees now outnumber government-spon-
sored trainees, and the proceeds constitute a significant addition to staff
earnings.
The BLKs' ability to contract directly with employers and trainees re-
flects, above all, desirable market linkages. However, this is not a conven-
tional method of cost recovery, whereby the government recovers costs and
uses them to finance activities determined by public (rather than private)
interests. Even though they are increasingly demand driven, the BLKs may
not be supplying the amount of training privately owned firms would have
offered. In a competitive market, an increase in demand normally results in
an increase in supply. In the case of third party funding, an increase in
demand can be met by an increase in the price trainees have to pay, since
staff may be interested in maximizing their own earnings. While this is a
testable proposition, no evaluation has been undertaken to date on the
effects of incentives on the provision of training services by the public vo-
cational centers.
Private Training Centers
Indonesia's private training centers are extremely diverse and cater to a wide
variety of skill needs. They constitute a vigorous market response to local
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demand by students for greater job opportunities. The centers range from
small, store-front shops that offer a single short-term course, such as hair-
dressing or flower arranging, to large, urban institutions with more than
1,000 students. The large centers offer a range of multiyear programs in
areas, such as accounting, computer skills, or secretarial work, that lead
directly to well-paid employment. They are usually owner operated.
Precise figures on the actual number of centers are not available, but
more than 20,000 centers are registered with the Ministry of Education
and Culture and the Ministry of Manpower. They enroll about 1.5 million
trainees per year. The growth of the private training centers has been dra-
matic, and much greater than any government planned and financed pro-
gram could have supported. From 1990 to 1995, private training centers
increased by more than 7 percent per year, more than twice the rate of labor
force growth.
The growth in the number of private training centers has been largely
market driven, reflecting student demand for training in areas that can lead
to employment in the expanding services sector. For example, the demand
for accounting qualifications rose and fell with the changes in the labor
market that followed the deregulation of financial services. The number of
students seeking computer-related skills has risen steadily as demand for
these skills has increased; the market for office workers has tightened in
the last couple of years and reduced the demand for related courses such
as typing.
Surveys of the private training centers conducted in 1992 and 1994 by
the World Bank, the Ministry of Manpower, and the Ministry of Educa-
tion and Culture also confirm their market orientation. About one-fifth of
the centers reported that they had added or dropped a program in the past
two years. The programs most frequently added were in computer fields,
and those most frequently dropped were in electronics, welding, and air
conditioning.
Overall, private centers employed more part-time instructors (an average
of 4.1) than fill-time instructors (an average of 3.4). The predominance of
part-timers is attributable to a combination of factors, such as the small size
of the centers, the need for flexibility from year to year, and the lower costs
for contract instructors. Full-time instructors report an average of seven
years of related work experience and seven years of teaching experience.
More than half the students were job seekers who had graduated from
senior secondary or postsecondary education institutions. One-third were
still students, and the rest were employed. The main reason for taking a
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course was concern for employment. Even among university graduates, the
belief that computer skills are a must for finding work was widespread.
Data from the 1992 Indonesian Socioeconomic Survey confirm these
patterns. Econometric estimation of the probability of wanting training
increases with education after controlling for other characteristics (such as
age, location, and income). Those with a junior secondary education are
40 percent more likely to demand training than are primary school gradu-
ates, while senior secondary school graduates have a 100 percent greater
probability of demanding training than do primary school graduates. De-
mand for training by graduates holding certificates is still high, nearly double
that of primary school graduates, but demand by degree holders is less than
for senior secondary school graduates. This is also the pattern observed for
employer-provided training: more educated workers receive more training.
Large training centers often run for-profit placement services; other cen-
ters offer this service to their graduates as part of their traditional place-
ment and marketing responsibilities. Seventy-one percent of the centers
surveyed in 1992 offered some placement services, although only 25 per-
cent of those centers reported that they regularly received job listings from
employers. In the 1994 survey nearly half the students found employment
through the centers, and most of the rest (38 percent) found jobs through
their own efforts. A few found jobs through advertisements, and only 6
percent found employment through the Ministry of Manpower's employ-
ment exchanges. Many computer training centers (40 percent of those sur-
veyed) had cooperative arrangements with companies, which in most cases
meant the companies provided information about their vacancies. More
companies would have approached centers directly if they had not been
obliged to report their vacancies to the Ministry of Manpower's employ-
ment exchanges and follow that channel of recruitment. Nearly 33 percent
of the centers offered job search training, and 10 percent offered interview
training. The most common service offered was personal referrals to em-
ployers; half the centers that offered placement assistance provided this
service. However, many trainees entered the informal job sector after gradu-
ation, which meant that such assistance was irrelevant.
Enterprise-Based Training
Employers cooperate with private training centers and tend to use them as
much as they use government training centers. Private training centers have
training contracts with employers, and, as already noted, some employers
provide centers with lists of their vacancies.
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Even when engaged in upgrading their workers' skills, companies are
usually reluctant to join formal apprenticeship schemes that involve adher-
ence to ministerial guidelines. Adherence to certain standards and proce-
dures could be beneficial to the economy as a whole, but the companies
often argue that the additional equipment needed to satisfy general train-
ing initiatives may add to their costs but may not benefit them. A reconcili-
ation between these two views can come from voluntary arrangements and
training schemes that are designed in consultation with employers.
Firms that target Indonesia's domestic markets tend to be high-tech firms
that manufacture such items as vehicles and pharmaceuticals; they are usu-
ally foreign or joint ventures. These firms are more likely to offer training,
because they produce expensive products or require complicated and pre-
cise production processes that require the development of specific skills,
such as dexterity, concentration, and judgment. However, even high-tech
products and complex production processes demand only a small number
of highly skilled personnel. For example, a few well-trained computer and
maintenance and repair staff can keep hundreds of barely literate workers
busy when these workers' only task is to put the same component in the
same slot over and over again.
Indonesia's export-oriented firms tend to be low-tech firms that special-
ize in producing labor-intensive products, such as garments and shoes, or
simple products, such as plywood and processed shrimp. Many of these
firms are domestically owned. The simplicity of the production processes
or the low cost of the products suggest that sophisticated skills are unneces-
sary for these firms.
Firms that invest in technology have greater incentives to provide train-
ing or to motivate their workers to learn about new processes than firms
that use older, more established technologies. The vast majority of Indone-
sian firms adhere to simple and traditional production processes for which
they can pay low wages. Most workers are semiskilled operators and assem-
blers who are easily trained on the job in a matter of weeks, rather than
months, given the relative abundance of the educated unemployed.
Conclusions
The current public system of vocational and technical education attracts
large amounts of public funds, but its impact on economic development is
uncertain. Fiscal unsustainability and dependence on project money result
in a lack of continuity. Graduates of secondary-level VTE fare as well in the
labor market as do graduates from general schools. Since the costs of gen-
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eral education are much lower than the costs of VTE, the social rates of
return to general secondary education should be higher than those for VTE.
This problem is perhaps more understandable in Indonesia than else-
where. Indonesian VTE systems were developed quickly and were put into
practice before they were fully tested. The high rates of economic growth
and the initial availability of oil money left little reason to restructure the
system. In addition, donors' advice and support were not easy to coordi-
nate. Indonesian policymakers are now aware that the system is not fiscally
sustainable or very effective. In the past human resource development at-
tracted considerable attention, and a number of reforms were implemented.
These reforms are discussed after we review recent developments in the
labor market, which put the prospects for Indonesian labor and human
resource development in context.
The Labor Market
In the past two decades Indonesia easily absorbed a labor force that grew at
the rate of 3 percent per year. When female activity rates started increasing,
and nearly 10 million women were added to the labor force during the
1980s (compared with fewer than 4 million throughout the 1970s), the
pressure on the labor market to create employment was relieved in two
main ways. First, the rate of growth of the labor force started to decline
because of lower fertility rates (facilitated by family planning) and higher
school enrollment rates (brought about by education policies). Enrollments
increased because of greater public provision, especially at basic levels and
in rural areas, and a laissez-faire attitude toward the expansion of private
education at the secondary level and above.
Second, the deregulation package of the late 1980s largely removed pro-
visions that favored import substitution and capital-intensive industries.
This created many new jobs. For example, in the first half of the 1980s,
growth in manufacturing was driven primarily by the expansion of domes-
tic demand, which accounted for 67 percent of output growth, and of
import substitution, which accounted for 16 percent of output growth.
Exports accounted for only 13 percent of output growth, while the re-
maining 4 percent was attributable to technology upgrading. In the second
half of the 1980s, exports accounted for 41 percent of output growth and
technology for 26 percent. The export effect, particularly pronounced in
textiles, was also significant in the wood and chemicals industries. These
changes resulted in substantial employment creation in manufacturing.
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TABLE 7-5
Occupational and Educational Structure in Manufacturing,
1980 and 1990
(percentage of the labor force)
Occupation 1980 1990 Education 1980 1990
Professional/technical 1.0 0.4 Tertiary 0.5 1.6
Mvanagerial/admin- Senior secondary
istrative 0.3 0.5 vocational 2.7 5.7
Clerical 2.1 2.9 Senior secondary general 2.8 8.5
Sales 1.3 0.9 Junior vocational 1.4 1.1
Service 2.3 0.8 Junior general 5.1 11.5
Production workers 91.1 93.8 Primary 24.3 34.8
Others 2.1 0.9 Below primary 63.2 36.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number (millions) 4.7 8.1 4.7 8.2
Note: Figures may have been rounded.
Source. 1980 and 1990 censuses.
Employment grew by 2.5 million between 1990 and 1995, while in the
preceding five years it had increased by only 1 million.
The result of these two effects was growth driven by exports and favor-
able to employment creation at more or less constant labor costs. Labor
costs did not rise mainly because the education system was expanding faster
than the growth of jobs in the formal sector. The significant educational
upgrading of the manufacturing labor force (table 7-5) and the reduced
dlistortion in the trade regime explain why Indonesia experienced signs of
increasing total factor productivity for the first time in the 1990s.
Despite the relative constancy of wages until the early 1990s, workers
increased their overall returns to their labor. Even at stagnant wages, more
workers became engaged in wage employment, which constituted an im-
provement over lower earnings in agriculture or in marginal activities in
the informal sector. The annual growth in wage employment was 6 percent
in the 1980s; employment in manufacturing and trade increased at more
than 10 percent compared with an average of 3 percent employment growth
in the economy as a whole.
Workers' labor market outcomes, productivity gains, and economic
growth cannot be seen as driven mainly by training interventions. The
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public training system, put in place in the early 1980s, was by 1990 still
vastly underutilized. It has remained largely ineffective for a labor force of
more than 70 million.
A more detailed examination of the characteristics and functioning of
the labor market can help provide a basis for the design of future training
interventions. One way to approach policy design is to pose critical ques-
tions about the objectives of education and training interventions or to ask
where a market failure is likely to exist. Policymakers are rightly concerned
about the following undesirable symptoms: (a) underemployment and un-
employment, which can arise from skill deficiencies on the labor supply
side; (b) skill shortages and unfilled vacancies on the labor demand side; (c)
changes in wages that reflect the interaction of labor demand and labor
supply and have a bearing on labor costs and workers' welfare; and (d)
credit market failures in the market for training and the fear of poaching of
workers by rival firms, which can give rise to underinvestment in skills by
workers and employers.
Can Training Reduce Underemployment?
If we define underemployment as the percentage of the labor force working
less than 35 hours a week, more than one in three workers (or 28 million
people) fell in this category in 1990 (table 7-6). Underemployment by the
year 2000 was projected to be 32 million.
The above definition, however, grossly inflates underemployment. A more
appropriate definition of underemployment is those who work short hours
and are looking for additional work. As table 7-7 shows, less than 10 per-
cent of workers wanted to work longer hours than they were already work-
ing. In addition to workers' unwillingness to work for more hours at current
wage rates, conventional statistics overestimate underemployment. People
in rural areas often report shorter hours than they actually work. In urban
areas many formal sector workers in teaching, the government, and com-
munity services are employed for less than 35 hours a week in their main
job, but they are engaged in additional employment that escapes statistical
enumeration.
Working short hours is particularly prevalent in rural areas. Many rural
households, especially in Java, depend on small landholdings as a major
source of income. Agriculture has attracted less than 5 percent of total
investment since 1980. Most investment has gone to industry, especially to
big firms.
INDONESIA I99
TABLE 7-6
Distribution of the Working Population, by Hours Worked,
1980 and 1990
(percent)
Number of hours 1990
workedper week 1980 total Men Women Total
Less than 25 23 16 35 23
25-34 14 14 18 16
35-39 52 58 38 51
40 or more 1 1 1 1 9 10
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: Figures may have been rounded.
Source: 1980 and 1990 censuses.
How any training effort can overcome these land and investment con-
straints is hard to imagine. Even if all underemployment were attributable
to skills mismatches and shortages, an expansion of publicly provided train-
ing would reduce it only marginally and at great public expense. For ex-
ample, training 10 percent of the underemployed who are willing to work
more would still require a program for nearly 600,000 workers (8 percent
of the 10 percent underemployed of 70 million workers). This would af-
fect less than 1 percent of the labor force. If these previously underem-
ployed workers could increase their weekly hours from an average of, say,
20 hours a week to even 40, the total manhours worked in the whole
TABLE 7-7
Percentage of the Employed Seeking More Work,
by Gender and Location, 1990
Location and gender Percentage
Urban men 5
Rural men 11
Urban women 3
Rural women 7
Weighted average 8
Source: 1990 census.
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economy would increase by only 0.5 percentage points. Existing training
programs undertaken in public vocational training centers in rural areas
and through mobile training units have high average unit costs (about Rp
300,000). This is twice as much as the annual cost of educating a child,
even at the secondary level. Thus training would have only a marginal im-
pact on the reduction of underemployment and at a relatively high cost.
Do the Unemployed Lack Skills?
Unemployment is an inappropriate labor market indicator in low-income
countries with surplus labor that also lack a comprehensive social security
system. Few people out of work can afford to seek work. (The combination
of "not working" and "seeking work" is needed to qualify a person as "un-
employed" by international definition.) The vast majority of Indonesian
workers work at whatever jobs they can while trying to improve their em-
ployment situation as opportunities arise. Partly for this reason, unem-
ployment is primarily an issue among urban and educated young people
from relatively rich families who are looking for their first job.
In 1970 and in 1980 there were approximately 1.0 million unemployed
workers. This number had increased to 2.2 million by 1992. This increase
mirrors the growth in the labor force in the past three decades from 39
million to more than 70 million. The labor force growth in the 1980s of
3.5 percent per year closely parallels the growth in employment of 3.4
percent per year. So employment constraints have at most contributed only
0.13 percent of the total increase in unemployment (or approximately
150,000 workers). In addition, the unemployment rate has been remark-
ably constant over time, exhibiting only a cyclical pattern but no discern-
ible trend.
The data profile and an econometric analysis of the unemployed in In-
donesia support the views on unemployment cited earlier. That is, unem-
ployment is primarily a phenomenon of the young and educated (table
7-8). The unemployment rates increase among the 15-to-19 age group,
when secondary school leavers join the labor force, and then increase fur-
ther among those ages 20 to 24, when their numbers are reinforced by
tertiary education graduates. In the next age group, those ages 25 to 29, the
unemployment rate drops by nearly two-thirds and becomes virtually zero
at older ages.
Education-specific unemployment rates have changed little over time.
If anything, rates have declined for nearly all age groups and for both sexes
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TABLE 7-8
Unemployment Rates, by Age Group and Education, 1990
(percent)
Agegroup Unemployment Education level Unemployment
110-14 1.5 No schooling 0.3
L5-19 6.0 Incomplete primary 0.6
20-24 9.6 Completed primary 1.3
25-29 3.3 Junior secondary (general) 4.1
30-34 0.8 Junior secondary (vocational) 4.4
35-39 0.4 Senior secondary (general) 14.0
40-44 0.3 Senior secondary (vocational) 8.3
45-49 0.3 Diploma 6.9
50+ 0.2 University degree 9.7
All ages 2.5 All levels 2.5
Source: Labor force survey.
since deregulation. Senior secondary graduates have had significant em-
ployment gains, and the apparently better preparedness of vocational gradu-
ates for the world of work does not show up in the statistics.
With respect to graduates of tertiary education institutions, it is the
iincrease in the size of tertiary education output, and not an increase in
their unemployment rate or the duration of job searches, that has been
responsible for the increasing share of tertiary graduates in the unemploy-
iment pool. Indonesia now has more than 1,000 postsecondary institutions,
and their numbers are growing rapidly. The annual growth rate of degree
graduates is 16 percent, followed by 14 percent for diploma graduates (three-
year program), and 9 percent for certificate holders (one or two years of
study). These expansion rates compare with a labor force growth rate of
less than 2 percent.
The average duration of job search among the unemployed has also de-
c,lined for all education groups. In 1987 it averaged more than ten months,
Ibut by 1992 it had declined to nine months. The greatest decline in average
duration of unemployment was among those with low levels of education,
such as junior secondary school graduates, and the graduates of senior sec-
ondary general education programs.
Although graduates of secondary and tertiary institutions represented
;around 7 percent of those working in manufacturing in 1980, that share
had increased to 16 percent by 1990 (table 7-5). Those with less than a
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primary education lost almost half of their share. Opportunities for im-
proving the quality of workers at lower levels will probably continue to
exist for some time. New secondary- and tertiary-level graduates will un-
derstandably continue to resist what they regard as downgrading (loss of
status and income). Thus the absorption of the unemployed, who are mainly
educated, will be gradual unless investment accelerates significantly and
more jobs that require more modern skills are created.
To sum up, much of the increase in unemployment has been attribut-
able to the changing demographic characteristics of the labor supply, namely,
the increase in the working age population, the increased numbers of people
moving from rural to urban areas, the growth of women's share in the labor
force, and the increased levels of education among job seekers. From a
training perspective, this finding suggests that any mismatch between the
output of the education system and labor market needs has changed little,
if at all.
Is the Economy Facing Shortages of Skilled Workers?
Between 1977 and 1990, wage differentials narrowed significantly and for
all education levels. In 1990 a male who had completed senior secondary
education (which takes at least 12 years) earned on average little more than
double the wage of a worker with less than a primary education (table 7-9).
Urban labor markets no longer differentiate between those new entrants
who have completed primary schooling and those who have not, and they
extend only a small premium to junior secondary school leavers. At the
senior secondary level, vocational graduates earn less than do general gradu-
ates. Private rates of return for vocational education declined from 1982 to
1989 (McMahon and Boediono 1992) and are about two-thirds of the
rates of return to general secondary education. The only category with a
relatively resilient premium is university graduates, who continue to enjoy
a wage about four times that of an unschooled worker on initial entry into
the labor force. However, this is considerably less than the tenfold pre-
mium they enjoyed in the 1970s.
Companies do not consider skills shortages to be a major problem. The
results of a manufacturing survey (Dhanani 1992) reveal that employers
are generally satisfied with secondary school graduates and do not care
whether they attended general or vocational schools. Even at the tertiary
level, many employers do not expect graduates to possess practical and
technical skills.
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TABLE 7-9
Wage Differentials, by Education and Gender, Selected Years, 1977-90
(index, less than primary = 100)
Men Women
Education completed 1977 1982 1987 1990 1977 1982 1987 1990
Less than primary 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Primary 151 142 128 122 149 151 128 126
Junior secondary 275 203 170 158 396 290 225 203
Senior (general) 245 249 212 214 380 368 304 287
Senior (vocational) 328 262 214 209 483 375 348 319
Tertiary 1,033 410 372 366 1,428 582 551 508
Source: Labor force surveys.
Our previous discussion on the compression of wage differentials over
time supports the view that, from the employers' perspective, opportuni-
ties for education outside the firm are significant. Competition in the
job market has increased because of changing demographics as discussed
earlier. Thus workers are motivated to increase their educational attain-
ment or attend training courses in the hopes of landing a job in the still
small formal sector, and firms can avoid having to offer their workers spe-
cialized training-something especially important to small firms. The train-
ing courses workers attend tend to be focused, short, and relatively
inexpensive.
Many local surveys reveal that skills upgrading, when required, is pri-
marily internal. Firms rely on in-service training and internal labor mar-
kets. Firms are more likely to hire skilled workers from among job seekers
than by poaching workers from other companies. Firms did not cite poach-
ing as a major reason for not providing training. Manufacturing enter-
prises had poached only 1 percent of their skilled workers and 2 percent of
their supervisors and technicians during an 18-month period (Dhanani
1992). The firms that did cite poaching as a reason for not providing train-
ing were all private Indonesian firms in low-tech sectors, precisely the sec-
tors for which skills are more readily available in the open labor market.
The highest incidence of poaching was from firms that were experiencing
slow growth in either employment or output. This suggests that the poach-
ing of workers does not depend only on other firms' actions, but also on
workers' willingness to leave when their firms are under stress. This can be
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TABLE 7-10
Ranking of Production Problems by Manufacturing Firms, 1992
Rank Problem
1 Quality of raw materials
2 Quality of final products
3 Delays in delivery of materials
4 Availability of electricity and water
5 Quality of skills of operators and assemblers
6 Missed production deadlines
7 Quality of skills of supervisors
8 Quality of skills of managers; waste of materials
9 Quality of skills of technicians; quality of machinery; careless use of
equipment; absenteeism
Source: Dhanani (1992).
taken as an indication of efficiency: workers find employment where their
wages (and, by implication, their productivity) are highest. A tracer study
of science and technology graduates (Dhanani 1995a) also concluded that
the fear of poaching is not widespread and that employers are likely to be
able to pass on some of the costs of training to their employees.
Firms have no effective demand for trained personnel, at least in the
types of jobs generally filled by graduates of public vocational centers. A
1989 survey of manufacturing firms found that 31 percent of respondents
said lack of skills were problematic (World Bank 1991). This problem ranked
only seventh in a list of twelve production problems (and ninth among
export-oriented establishments). In the 1991 manufacturing survey
(Dhanani 1992), manufacturing firms ranked the quality of skilled work-
ers and operators fifth among the problems they faced (table 7-10).
Those workers already employed do not become unemployed because
of a failure to update their skills. In 1980 only half of the unemployed were
new entrants into the labor force, but their share had increased to three-
quarters by 1990.
Are Workers Underinvesting in Training?
Workers may be prohibited from investing in upgrading their skills if unit
costs are high. Although demand for training may be buoyant, it may be
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unmet. Coupled with credit market failures, workers' underinvestment in
training can result in serious social losses in the form of workers' lifetime
earnings and lower rates of growth stemming from higher labor costs, and
possibly from low capital investment in technology. Although credit mar-
ket failures constitute a serious policy concern and a legitimate reason for
certain forms of intervention, there is no evidence to indicate that the
amount of private training is insignificant, although we cannot say whether
it is still socially optimal.
In 1995, 1.5 million trainees attended private training centers super-
vised by the Ministry of Manpower and the Ministry of Education and
Culture. According to the Indonesian Socioeconomic Survey, expensive
training courses, such as those in industrial crafts, have the lowest excess
demand. Excess demand is highest for courses in service occupations, which
are relatively cheap to provide. Many private training providers offer them
at low cost. Among those who would like to be trained but are not cur-
rently enrolled in training courses, more than two-thirds stated that they
would like to pursue courses in computers, languages, business, or home
economics. Training in crafts and industrial skills accounted for less than
15 percent of the excess demand for training.
Underinvestment in training may take the form of low-quality training.
This has often been cited as a characteristic of privately provided training
in Indonesia compared with the more sophisticated training some public
vocational centers offer. In an absolute sense this may be correct: quality
could be higher if students were charged higher fees, if study programs
lasted longer, and if school accreditation and skill certification were more
rigorous. However, the low quality of training that derives from the low
costs and short duration of training is not necessarily a reason for concern.
Private training centers will not spend the money to upgrade the quality
of training if that means students can no longer afford to attend. Their
offerings are driven by the demand for training by students, job seekers,
workers, and employers. The centers' most common strategy is to offer
inexpensively priced short courses, rather than complete programs. Stu-
dents, however, may eventually complete a comprehensive program by tak-
ing a full set of courses over a number of years. The 1992 survey of private
training centers found that median course length was only 72 hours, and
the median course fee was Rp 70,000 (US$35). A few longer, more expen-
sive courses raise the average course length to 109 hours with an average fee
of Rp 145,000 (US$73). The same survey showed that trainees took such
courses when they had spare time, such as during school holidays or be-
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tween graduating from school and starting university. Thus training comple-
ments the education provided by more formal education institutions.
Are Employers Underinvesting in Skills?
Enterprises often provide extensive training. According to the Ministry of
Education and Culture, approximately 2,500 companies operate their own
training centers. Ministry of Manpower data suggest that as many as 230,000
trainees are participating in company training. These figures relate more to
formal training, and they grossly underestimate in-service training. In a
survey of manufacturing enterprises conducted in 1989 (World Bank 1991),
50 percent of the companies surveyed reported providing formal and in-
formal in-service training. The 1991 manufacturing survey (Dhanani 1992)
found that 10 to 15 percent of companies had formal training programs
with specialized training staff, classrooms, and workshops. These figures
are quite high given that at least one-third of the manufacturing work force
is dassified as unskilled, half are on casual or daily contracts, much train-
ing may take place informally, and systems for tracking training activities
are not well developed.
Assuming that half of the manufacturing work force is on some form of
permanent contract (employers are usually not interested in training casual
or temporary workers) and that 10 percent of permanent workers require
training in a single year, then medium and large manufacturing firms would
have to train approximately 175,000 workers of the 3.5 million they cur-
rently employ. Similarly, with respect to the entire formal sector, 400,000
of the work force of 8 million would require training.
By comparing these training needs with the 230,000 people reported as
company-based trainees by the Ministry of Manpower alone, one gets an
idea of the relatively high levels of in-service training. Training is also high
considering the large amount of private pre-employment training taking
place in Indonesia.
Estimating how much firms spend on training is difficult. However,
sporadic data suggest that firms that employ more than 200 workers spend
about 1.7 percent of their payroll on in-service training. For small firms
the amount is closer to 1 percent. This is because small firms employ more
workers on a casual and piece-rate basis and more unskilled workers. They
also hire more women, and since women are more likely to leave the labor
force than men, they are offered less training. Training expenditure of 1
percent of the payroll is comparable to the amount spent on training by
firms in industrial countries and in the newly industrializing countries.
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The ratio of wages to value added in Indonesia's manufacturing sector
was relatively constant from 1986 through 1992, when it stood at 21.3
percent. A 1 percent increase in expenditures on training would increase
labor costs only by one-fifth of 1 percent. In most cases firms would be
willing to incur such an increase in costs if the need arose.
Will Shortages of Skilled Workers Emerge Soon?
To ascertain whether Indonesia is likely to encounter a shortage of skilled
workers in the near future, one can examine the stock of various categories
of skilled workers in manufacturing and compare it to the annual output
of such workers by the education system. Less than 1 percent of the em-
ployees of medium and large manufacturing firms are scientists and engi-
neers. Since such firms employ some 3.5 million workers, around 24,000
of them will be scientists and engineers. A 10 percent growth in manufac-
turing employment in the next few years will mean employment opportu-
nities for an additional 2,500 scientists and engineers. The annual supply
of science and engineering graduates is about 14,000. A shortage of engi-
neers for manufacturing needs is thus unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Indeed, many graduates may have to start their careers as technicians, for
which demand appears to be quite strong.
Shortages of skilled trades workers (industrial and vehicle mechanics,
lathe operators, machine setters, electricians, and so on) are also unlikely.
Annual demand is around 40,000. This compares with an annual output
from technical senior secondary schools of 153,000.
Finally, semiskilled and unskilled workers, who form more than three-
quarters of manufacturing employment, can be recruited easily among se-
nior secondary school graduates regardless of the type of school they have
attended.
If Indonesia were encountering skills bottlenecks, wage differentials be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers would be increasing and vacancy rates
would be high. However, wage differentials are small and have been declin-
ing (table 7-1 1). In the early 1970s, skilled blue-collar workers were paid
two to three times as much as unskilled laborers, supervisors were paid
three to four times as much, and professionals were paid five to ten times as
much. By 1992, however, all these differentials had declined substantially.
Overall vacancy rates in the manufacturing sector are small-only 3 per-
cent for skilled operators, 8 percent for tradespeople, and 5 percent for
supervisors and technicians. These figures apply to Indonesian firms only.
Foreign firms apparently do not have vacancies in these fields.
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TABLE 7-11
Wage Differentials, by Skill, 1970 and 1992
(index, unskilled laborers = 100)
Skill level 1970 1992
Unskilled workers 100 100
Skilled workers 200-300 150-200
Supervisors 300-400 200-250
Professionals 500-900 300-400
Source: 1970: Manning (1979); 1992: Dhanani (1995b).
Is the Scarcity of Skilled Workers Deterring Foreien Investment?
Indonesia has been able to attract substantial amounts of foreign invest-
ment, especially since deregulation in the late 1980s. Table 7-12 summa-
rizes the views of international investors on the quality, availability, and
costs of production labor and managerial labor in Indonesia and ten other
Asian economies. In most of the economies, foreign investors do not see
the quality of production labor as a major problem, although Indonesia
TABLE 7-12
Labor Ratings in Selected Asian Countries, 1991
(best grade possible = 1, worst grade possible = 10)
Production labor Managerial labor
Economy Quality Availability Cost Quality Availability Cost
China 5 1 1 10 10 1
HongKong (China) 1 10 8 1 10 10
Indonesia 5 1 1 10 10 2
Japan 1 10 10 1 1 10
Korea, Republic of 1 8 7 5 10 9
Malaysia 3 3 3 5 5 5
Philippines 3 1 2 3 1 1
Singapore 1 10 8 1 10 8
Taiwan (China) 1 9 8 1 8 9
Thailand 4 2 1 10 10 4
VietNam 3 1 1 10 5 1
Source: International Herald Tribune, July 29, 1991; based on research by Political and
Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd.
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and China received the worst ratings in this category. Availability and cost,
however, are worrying employers in those economies where labor shortages
have emerged, namely, Hong Kong (China), Japan, Singapore, Republic of
Korea, and Taiwan (China). Some availability problems are beginning to
arise in Malaysia and Thailand but not in Indonesia.
In Indonesia foreign investors are more concerned about the compli-
cated and time-consuming process of licensing. In addition, some Indone-
sian policies limit the productive capacities of foreign joint ventures and
restrict their marketing advantage. China, India, and Viet Nam can take
advantage of this in the meantime. To employ an expatriate in Indonesia,
firms must submit three applications: to the Ministry of Manpower, to the
Municipal Manpower Office, and to the Population Affairs Office. In short,
foreign firms are somewhat concerned with workers' skills in Indonesia,
but they experience significant difficulties with red tape and access to other
local inputs and supplies.
Conclusions
Indonesia faces two serious problems. Underemployment, although not as
high as the conventional definition would suggest, is perhaps the biggest
challenge in the labor market, and unemployment is becoming an impor-
tant issue, especially among urban youth. However, the labor market is
providing clear signals as to the direction in which training and more gen-
eral human resource policies and reform should move. Growth will address
the problem of underemployment. Practically the entire increase in unem-
ployment in the past 30 years can be explained by labor supply factors: the
changes in the population structure (age and residence); the increase in the
labor force participation rate, particularly by women; and an increase in
skills availability as proxied by falling wage differentials between those with
different skill and education levels. Individual demand for training has
been high, as has been the response by private providers. Employers pro-
vide add-on training that is sufficient to raise the quality of school leavers
so that they meet employers' requirements. These observations pave the
way for our discussion of reforms and policy directions for the future.
Major Issues
The government has already set its policy agenda. It is contemplating changes
in VTE, the operations of public vocational centers, and the role of the
2IO HIGH-GROWTH ECONOMIES
private sector in financing training. The planning of training is also mov-
ing away from manpower forecasts toward practices that place more em-
phasis on labor market analysis.
The Dual System
In July 1994 the system of vocational and technical education in Indonesia
began to be reoriented as a dual system. The government targeted approxi-
mately 250 vocational and technical schools and also expected some 6,000
small and medium companies to participate. Under the scheme students
will spend some time working in companies as apprentices. Schools will
select the students and seek apprentice slots for them with employers. The
apprenticeships will run for three to four years, the typical duration of
studies in a senior secondary VTE school. The dual system is based on the
view that, on the supply side, it can alleviate future shortages in critical
skills, and, on the demand side, that the private sector is unable to appreci-
ate the value of training or its national role in providing training.
Early information on the dual system suggests that it is going to become
a complex system with multiple objectives. It aims to increase the ability of
the education system to cater to the very diverse needs of the formal sector,
the informal sector, emerging technologies, employers' immediate techni-
cal production requirements, and students' aspirations. This will not be
easy to achieve, though it is not impossible. However, the government has
not yet carried out a complete cost-benefit analysis of the dual system. The
unit cost as currently estimated may reach approximately Rp 15 million
per graduate for the full four years in a vocational senior secondary school,
which is more than ten times the cost of completing the general cycle in a
senior secondary school.
In addition to unit costs, the success of the dual system will depend on
four issues. The first is whether employers are willing to train the appren-
tices the schools supply. Even if employers could be convinced to take on
young apprentices, the quality of training they will provide to students
may be questionable. In a labor market where workers are contracted pri-
marily on a daily and casual basis, long-term employment relationships are
lacking, and most firms' workers use traditional production processes, train-
ing may be offered by near novices to actual novices.
Second, companies may try to mitigate the costs of training apprentices
by asking the best vocational senior secondary schools to send a few of
their top students. Given that the dual system would target the best techni-
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cal schools, it could become elitist. This scheme could be an expensive way
to develop skills, and it runs the risk of neglecting the needs of the bulk of
the student population. In addition, the top students from the best techni-
cal schools are almost certain to proceed to higher education. This will
leave employers with the weaker students and will reinforce their reluc-
tance to participate in the scheme.
Third, the dual system may be constrained by the views of students (and
their parents). Vocational and technical education has low status in Indo-
nesia. Student demand for education and training is driven by available or
expected employment opportunities. Because technology is continuously
restructuring what people do in the workplace, students do not generally
believe it is useful to concentrate on a specific set of skills early on.
The final issue is equity. One premise for intervention in VTE is that
the private sector predominates in regions of high market demand-that
is, where parents can afford to pay and labor markets are thriving. Indeed,
private schools are concentrated in urban and industrialized areas. Urban
areas of East Java have four or five times as many private VTE schools as
public ones, but some rural areas have one or less than one private school
for every public school. However, the presence of public schools does not
necessarily solve the issue of equity. The Ministry of Education and Cul-
ture and U.S. Agency for International Development study (MOEC and
USAID 1992) indicated that more students were enrolled in private than
in public general secondary schools outside Java, and that these students
were more likely to be from the lower socioeconomic levels of society. These
are exactly the two areas (general education and poorer students) where the
public sector is expected to be more prevalent: "Students from the highest
socioeconomic strata were over-represented in public relative to private
STMs [technical schools] in all three provinces. The most expensive type
of education was therefore disproportionately taken up by the more afflu-
ent" (MOEC and USAID 1992).
Ministry of Manpower Reforms
'The Ministry of Manpower is planning reforms in two areas of training
that are important in the present context. The aims of the first set of re-
forms are as follows: diversify and expand the role of the vocational train-
ing centers to accommodate local conditions; change their organizational
structure; upgrade training from low- to middle-level skills; and enable the
centers to place graduates in jobs, establish industry links, and trace the
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fate of trainees after graduation. The second set of reforms includes estab-
lishing an apprenticeship scheme.
The ministry has not yet fully worked out the practical steps of the first
set of reforms, and formal analysis is premature at this time. However,
several positive aspects are already emerging. The planned switch of stu-
dent placement from the Ministry of Manpower's district offices to the
vocational training centers is clearly a change in the right direction. The
current arrangements do not benefit students, and they isolate training
instructors from the labor market. Furthermore, if the placement reforms
are properly implemented, there should be no budgetary implications, be-
cause existing resources devoted to placement activities will be transferred
from one organization to the others.
By far the most important planned reform for the public vocational
training centers is the apprenticeship scheme. Although the Ministry of
Manpower has always had a program to place students with employers for
in-service training, it was never fully implemented, and to a great extent it
was supply led rather than demand led. The new scheme, however, is envi-
sioned as company-based training using the BLKs and KLKs to support
the companies in their training efforts. The interesting issue is: who will be
responsible for the costs of training? The current plan provides for cost
sharing between the government and employers. While the division of costs
is not known at this stage, companies would probably pay for instructors'
honoraria and transport costs, training materials, and facilities, while the
government would pay for BLK facilities, office costs, training software,
and instructor and administrative staff salaries. The two parties would split
the costs of instructor housing, training planning, and skill certification
and program monitoring. The apprenticeship scheme represents a move by
the BLKs toward on-the-job training, but to what extent it constitutes a
departure from the emphasis on pre-employment training is not yet clear.
Information about employers' willingness to finance the scheme and work-
ers' willingness to participate in such training is lacking. It is not known
whether the apprenticeship scheme will take place with the cooperation of
private firms or in government enterprises.
Financing Training through Levy-Grant Schemes
The government introduced a levy-grant scheme in East Java in 1992 with
a view to expanding the scheme to other provinces. The East Java regula-
tions require firms to pay a levy that will be used for their own training
purposes. Although companies that already provide training for their em-
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ployees can opt out of paying the full levy, they still have to pay that por-
tion of the levy that finances the training of job seekers and informal sector
workers. Thus the aim of the scheme is not only to create awareness about
training and to develop a system driven by the private sector, but also to
subsidize training for different groups of workers.
The usefulness of the scheme will depend on whether it becomes a tax
on employers and whether additional training will be offered. For example,
some employers may engage in token training to reduce their contribu-
tions to the fund.
In a levy-grant scheme it is desirable to keep the revenues in a dedicated
account. This has not been the case in East Java, where the funds collected
have become part of general provincial revenues. They are then allocated at
the discretion of government representatives. Instead of committees domi-
nated by government representatives, the private sector should decide which
training activities will be funded by the levy-grant revenues, and it should
manage the scheme.
Between November 1992, when the levy-grant scheme became effec-
tive, and October 1994, nearly 2,000 companies had paid the levy out of
an estimated 20,000 that should have paid. More than Rp 850 million had
been collected, a relatively small amount considering that it took two years
to get this money. Apparently, employers do not consider the scheme's ben-
efits to be worth its costs to them. The number of people trained was also
small, fewer than 1,000. Finally, unit costs seem to be high, averaging Rp
900,000. No information on the duration of training is available, but pub-
licly provided training is typically of short duration (lasting from a day to
a couple of weeks).
Ideally, training funded by the levy-grant scheme would be in areas where
the private sector is absent-that is, where a market failure exists. By 1995
eight training courses had been conducted for job seekers in fields such as
the garment industry, beauty, and handicrafts-the low-cost areas easily
served by existing providers. More than half of the 35 training programs
offered to companies were for supervisory management. The rest included
a fair number of other management courses, such as leadership, marketing
management, and job analysis.
Planning
In the past, manpower planning relied to a considerable extent on the man-
power requirements approach. The Ministry of Manpower has an
economywide manpower demand model that it uses to derive projections
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of output growth, productivity, and employment. The Ministry of Plan-
ning has its own manpower model for monitoring and projecting employ-
ment creation using similar industry, occupation, and education matrices.
The Ministry of Education and Culture uses a third model.
A major issue for manpower projections in a country like Indonesia is
the presence of a sizable informal sector with proven ability to adjust swiftly
to changing economic conditions. The economy has shown a remarkable
degree of adjustment that makes attempts to derive projections futile and
reduces the reliability of forecasts for planning purposes. In addition, the
projections are based on an uncomfortable level of aggregation (usually
"one-digit" occupations and industries and broad education levels) and
outdated information (most often censuses). Gijsberts (1993) and Paaum
(1991) have found that sectoral employment elasticities (the response of
employment to output changes) vary as much as 500 percent between ad-
jacent periods of time and are often negative. A comparison of projections
of shortages and surpluses made at the beginning of one five-year plan with
actual outcomes at the end of the plan showed that manpower estimates
wrongly predicted half of the changes. Random selection could have re-
sulted in the same outcome.
Reforms should increasingly take into account private training efforts,
which so far have not been fully integrated with public provision and fi-
nancing decisions. This has sometimes resulted in a wasteful oversupply of
skills or a crowding out of the private sector. Many of the VTE and ap-
prenticeship plans target areas that are particularly well catered to by the
private sector (for example, secretarial, retail, tourism, and dressmaking
courses). Instruction in these subjects is already plentiful and is provided in
a cost-effective manner, often through employers. Of course, labor market
analysis and the incorporation of the private sector would require a better
information system, an issue that need not occupy us here.
Conclusions
The wave of training reforms in Indonesia in the early 1990s was a natural
extension of policymakers' interest in improving the performance of the
human resource development system. Policymakers moved in the right di-
rection by bringing about greater coordination among government agen-
cies, greater participation by the private sector, and more emphasis on
demand-driven, cost-effective schemes.
Public policy will need to identify relatively soon the strengths and weak-
nesses of the current human resource development system. Our analysis
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suggests that the country's strength beyond basic education lies in the large
private education and training sectors. In this context public policy should
be directed less at the direct provision of training and more on the financ-
ing and regulatory side. The government can address market failures in the
areas of credit markets, skills standards, accreditation of training centers,
certification of workers, and occupational licensing. Such interventions
should be decided on after close consultation with employers, and they
should take into account broad policy objectives, such as equity consider-
ations among job seekers and various groups of workers.
As skills requirements become more complex, the importance of the
allocative, rather than the productive, aspect of education and training
increases. The former refers to workers' ability to adapt to new tech-
niques and use new information, while the latter deals with narrow, tech-
nical aspects directly relevant to production. In this respect training in
specific skills is a poor substitute for general education. Skills training
addresses narrow situations that can quickly become outdated, and usu-
ally it costs more to provide than general education. Therefore, training
in occupation-specific skills should be carefully designed: it should take
place late in the education system, it should be decentralized, and it should
be determined by specific company requirements and specific demands
by workers.
Public policy cannot prevent future shortages of critical skills, but even
new technologies can be adopted swiftly if the work force has the necessary
general education skills. Because productive learning does not end with
formal schooling, the education system must provide sufficient mastery in
verbal and numerical skills upon which lifetime training can build. The
role of public policy is to ensure that children leave school with an ad-
equate education. In 1995 nearly 3 million students left school before they
had completed the basic education cycle of nine years. This is the most
serious constraint Indonesia will face for decades ahead.
Another issue is whether training should be geared toward highly tech-
nical skills. The answer depends on whether a sufficiently clear national
technology policy exists. Technology policy can be defined as a compre-
hensive and consistent set of official guidelines, measures, and instruments
that affect the choice, acquisition, creation, and application of technology
throughout the economy. Although the Indonesian government treats tech-
nology and employment as critical issues, pertinent policies are not yet
fully developed, and the relationship between the two areas is not always
clear. Policymakers often perceive technology somewhat narrowly. They
also emphasize the training of scientists and researchers in such fields as
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nuclear physics, remote sensing, and aeronautics, and the creation of so-
phisticated laboratories. However, they do not provide specific suggestions
on selecting and applying technologies-technologies that would create
jobs and income. The instruments required to distribute income more eq-
uitably have not been fully developed. In the 1980s it took about
US$135,000 of targeted investment to create an additional job in base
metal, machinery, or the chemical industries; the same employment effect
in small industry could have come at an investment of only US$630.
Even well-conceived national training policies will not be able to pre-
vent temporary shortages of skilled workers in critical areas, since such
shortages are present in neighboring countries. Hong Kong (China) and
Singapore, which are noted for their aggressive training policies, have expe-
rienced temporary shortages of skilled workers. When computer experts
and engineers were in short supply in Hong Kong (China), the govern-
ment approved the employment of foreign professionals. Indonesia will
undoubtedly face similar situations, but the solution does not lie in stock-
piling workers with skills that may or may not be needed. Even training
policies that prove to be successful in creating critical skills may, through
emigration, help meet demands for skilled workers in countries where wages
for high-tech skills are higher. To the extent that investment in critical skills
is undertaken privately, the government has little role to play either directly
in the market for training or indirectly through emigration control. How-
ever, if individuals acquire these skills with the support of public funds,
they may substitute private investment and satisfy private objectives in-
stead of social goals. Public funds spent in this way may end up subsidizing
production in other countries, some of which are Indonesia's competitors
in world markets.
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IL r Malaysia
HONG W. TAN AND INDERMIT S. GILL
MALAYSIA'S ECONOMY experienced a sharp turnaround be-
tween the 1985-86 recession and the currency crisis in the late 1990s.
With gross domestic product growth averaging about 9 percent per year
between 1987 and 1995, the economy created almost 2 million jobs (more
than 10 percent of Malaysia's population of 19.5 million). A large share of
those jobs was in the manufacturing sector. Labor force growth of about
2.9 percent per year, fueled by increased female labor-force participation,
was outstripped by a 3.5 percent rate of growth of employment between
1985 and 1994. Per capita income during this period increased by almost
6 percent per year to more than US$3,500 by 1995. In addition, the struc-
ture of the economy changed considerably. Between 1980 and 1994 the
share of agriculture fell from 22 to 14 percent, while the share of manufac-
turing rose from 21 to 32 percent. The changes in the sectoral shares of
employment were even sharper (table 8- 1). The importance of government
employment also declined. These developments are testimony to the suc-
cessful transition of the economy from being mainly a primary goods pro-
ducer-rubber, palm oil, and tin-to the newest East Asian tiger.
The current crisis is testing Malaysia's determination to continue its policy
of export-led development. Although the sharp devaluation of the ringgit
has resulted in a preoccupation with the immediate future, especially with
regard to capital flows and investment, policymakers will likely return to
the problems related to labor markets and skills when the crisis is con-
tained. This chapter abstracts from short-term concerns and focuses on the
longer term issues of labor demand, education, and training.
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TABLE 8-1
Sectoral Employment Shares, Selected Years, 1970-94
(percent)
Sector 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Agriculture 51 45 37 30 26 20
Manufacturing 11 13 15 15 20 25
Services 28 31 36 42 43 42
Other 10 11 12 13 11 13
Source: World Bank (1995).
In the 1970s and 1980s Malaysia achieved remarkable progress in edu-
cation. From 1970 to 1995 primary school enrollment ratios rose from 87
to 100 percent, and secondary school enrollment ratios rose from 34 to 60
percent. Despite their success in both the economic and social areas,
policymakers are not complacent. Malaysia has declared that it expects to
achieve industrial country status by 2020. As a result of the rapid growth of
private sector jobs, the government's policy stance has shifted from a pre-
occupation with creating employment to one where the upgrading of skills
now occupies center stage. Malaysia also recognizes that it may not be able
to compete with countries such as China and India in supplying goods that
are intensive in the use of low-wage unskilled and semiskilled labor. Thus
policymakers increasingly seek strategies to move "up market." Education
and training lie at the core of these strategies.
The changing employment pattern and rapid job growth have contrib-
uted to a tightening of the labor market. Unemployment rates are the most
obvious indicator of this, falling from more than 12 percent in 1985 to less
than 3 percent in 1995. Vacancy rates confirm this: in 1987 about 75 per-
cent of reported vacancies in manufacturing were filled within a year; by
1993, 75 percent of vacancies went unfilled. The quit rate remains high,
indicating especially high turnover for several categories of skilled workers
and professionals, and there are stories of worker poaching in the press.
However, labor market tightness is best captured by wage movements. Sur-
vey results show that from 1987 to 1992 the average real wage rose 46
percent, while manufacturing sector wages rose 55 percent. Rising wages
are not worrisome if productivity growth keeps pace, because this ensures
that firms' profitability is not compromised. However, unit labor costs (la-
bor costs deflated by worker productivity) may have risen considerably.
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With continuous exchange rate adjustment becoming less of an option,
maintaining competitiveness requires a greater effort to upgrade workers'
skills.
Between 1987 and 1993 the wages of skilled and semiskilled workers
rose by about 10.0 percent per year, those of managers and professionals by
about 7.5 percent, and those of unskilled workers by less than 5.0 percent.
There are many reasons, not all of which have implications for vocational
education and training (VET). First, high rates of investment may have
disproportionately increased the demand for technical and managerial per-
sonnel relative to unskilled workers. Alternatively, perhaps fewer substi-
tutes are available for technical and managerial workers, and thus an increase
in the demand for workers translates into higher wages for a given supply.
Unless technology choice has been distorted by policy, these are not "prob-
lems" that can or should be corrected by changes in VET supply. However,
the supply response of skilled workers to higher wages may be lower than
that of unskilled workers, especially in an economy where the shrinking
agriculture and plantation sectors have supplied urban areas with labor for
the past two decades, and where immigration has been used to ensure a
cheap supply of unskilled labor. This would definitely have implications
for the VET system.
A World Bank (1995) study disentangles the effects of these three pos-
sible influences and draws the following conclusions. First, it is not the
level or pattern of investment that has pushed up the wages of skilled work-
ers. In fact, estimates of labor demand indicate that increases in fixed in-
vestment raise the demand for unskilled workers more than for skilled
workers.
Second, although the demand for skilled workers is less elastic, the mag-
nitudes imply that only a small fraction of the rising wage gap between skilled
workers and unskilled workers can be explained by differential demand
elasticities.
Third, the most important determinant of the difference in wage growth
is the smaller supply elasticity of skilled workers. Estimates indicate that
managerial and technical workers have the smallest supply elasticities, fol-
lowed by skilled workers, then semiskilled workers, and then unskilled work-
ers. Not surprisingly, surveys have indicated that foreign firms in Malaysia
view the supply of skilled workers as a serious difficulty (table 8-2).
Improving the supply responses for the required skill categories requires
changes in both higher education and VET. With regard to VET, the focus
of this chapter, there are various policy concerns: the shortage of techni-
MALAYSIA 22I
TABLE 8-2
Difficulties Faced by Japanese Firms in East Asia, 1993
Difficulty Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines China
Labor supply XXX XXx x X XX
Employment restrictions XXX - X
Infrastructure X XXX XX XXX XXX
Inflation X X X XXX
Ownership restrictions X X XX X
Political risk - - - XXX x
XXX More than 50 percent of responses.
XX Between 35 and 50 percent of responses.
X Between 20 and 34 percent of responses.
-Less than 20 percent of responses.
Source: World Bank (1996).
cians, skilled workers, and semiskilled workers and the need for skills up-
grading; the inability of public training institutions to meet employers'
demands; and the growing recognition that the private sector will have to
play a greater role in meeting its own skill needs. In the area of industrial
development, policymakers have increasingly recognized the importance
of having a skilled and trained work force to deepen the technology of
firms, improve the competitiveness of small and medium firms, and con-
tinue to attract foreign direct investment. In response to these concerns,
ithe government has expanded resources for public training institutions,
and it has introduced a variety of policy initiatives to encourage private
sector training.
Supply of Trained Workers
NMalaysia's skill development strategy has focused, until recently, on increasing
the supply capacity of public education and training institutions to meet
the skill needs of industry. Vocational and technical education and training
are provided by a plethora of institutions under several ministries, each
charged with specific responsibilities. In total, there are 26 government
industrial and skills training institutes. They include the following:
* Ten industrial training institutes (ITIs) and the Center for Instructors
and Advanced Skill Training under the Manpower Department of the Min-
istry of Human Resources
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* Nine MARA skills institutes (Institutes Kemahiran Mara or IKMs)
and Pusat Giat MARA under the Ministry of Public Enterprises
* Seven youth training centers (YTCs) under the Ministry of Youth and
Sports.
The government has also set up two advanced training centers, the Ger-
man-Malaysia Institute and the French-Malaysia Institute, in collabora-
tion with the German and French governments. Finally, the Ministry of
Education runs 70 vocational schools, 9 technical schools, and 7 polytech-
nics that provide vocational education similar to that available in the pub-
lic training institutions.
Table 8-3 provides an overview of the supply of skilled workers from
local public education and training institutions. Between 1991 and 1993
these institutions produced a total of more than 146,000 graduates. Of
these, education institutions produced almost 47,000 with degrees (32
percent), some 28,000 with diplomas (19 percent), and close to 14,000
with certificates (9 percent). The remaining 57,600, or about 39 percent,
TABLE 8-3
Production of Skilled Workers, by Education and Training Institutions,
1991-95
1991-93 1994-95
Institution Number Percent Number Percent
Education institutions
Degree graduates 46,810 31.9 43,038 28.4
Engineering-related 3,940 - 4,770 -
Diploma graduates 28,340 19.3 25,720 17.0
Engineering-related 5,540 - 6,670
Certificate graduates 13,900 9.5 12,900 8.5
Engineering-related 8,750 - 8,150 -
Public training institutions
Skilled/semiskilled graduates 57,600 39.3 69,970 46.1
Engineering trades 38,380 - 48,460 -
Skills upgrading 920 - 1,560 -
Total 146,650 100.0 151,628 100.0
-Not calculated.
Source: Economic Planning Unit (1994).
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were produced by public training institutions. Between 1994 and 1995
these institutions produced roughly another 151,000 skilled individuals,
with the local public training institutions accounting for a significantly
higher proportion (46 percent) of graduates. Considering only the gradu-
ates with technical- and engineering-related trade training, the skill group
most in demand by industry, public training institutions are clearly the
principal source of entry-level industrial skills. However, these public train-
ing institutions play a relatively minor role in skills upgrading for the exist-
ing work force. Between 1991 and 1993 they provided skills upgrading to
only 920 trainees. Several surveys of employers in three regions-Klang
Valley, Kedah and Perlis, and Pahang-also revealed a low reliance on pub-
lic training institutions for retraining and skills upgrading. Despite differ-
ences in the level of industrial development across regions, employers
reported that only between 2 and 7 percent of skilled workers scheduled
for training in 1991 were to be trained in public training institutions. In-
plant training was the principal source of training (58 to 93 percent). The
two other major sources were training by the parent company (2 to 6 per-
cent) and by equipment vendors (2 to 13 percent), each source being as
important or more important than public training institutions.
Table 8-4 shows the output of skilled and semiskilled graduates from
these public training institutions. Together, the public training institutions
TABLE 8-4
Production of Skilled Workers, by Public Training Institutions, 1991-95
(number)
Institution 1991-93 1994-95
Industrial training institutes 6,940 5,659
Engineering trades 2,755 2,787
Institutes Kemahiran Mara 9,905 8,225
Engineering trades 6,879 6,293
Youth training centers 1,254
Engineering trades 971
Ministry of Education technical schools 12,549 21,205
Engineering trades 9,478 15,057
Ministry of Education vocational schools 28,633 36,287
Engineering trades 16,221 22,653
- Not available.
Source: Economic PLanning Unit, unpublished data.
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under the Ministry of Human Resources, MARA, and the Ministry of Youth
and Sports produce about 7,000 trainees per year with various technical
skills, primarily at the basic and intermediate levels. The Ministry of
Education's vocational and technical schools produce twice as many train-
ees per year. All these institutions provide training in overlapping technical
and trade areas, including engineering trades (mechanical, electrical, and
civil), building, printing, agriculture, and commerce-related trades. Of these,
the engineering-related trades are the most prevalent, accounting for be-
tween one-half and two-thirds of all training provided in each public train-
ing institution.
Basic Training versus Advanced Skill Training
Higher level skills will increasingly be needed for Malaysian industry to
move toward higher value-added production. What role have public train-
ing institutions played in supplying these higher level industrial skills? Not
all trainees of public institutions take the trade tests administered by the
National Vocational Training Council (NVTC), but those who do include
trainees from small training programs in other government ministries, the
army training center, private training institutes, and places of employment.
This latter group of providers is not inconsequential. In terms of output of
skilled workers in 1993, as many trainees of private training institutes took
the NVTC trade tests as did trainees from the ITIs (4,700 compared with
4,695 trainees).
The test data indicate considerable expansion in the output of trainees
at the basic and intermediate skill levels but not at the advanced skill level.
The number of trainees taking the NVTC trade test each year at the basic
skill level increased fivefold between 1981 and 1993, from about 5,400
trainees in 1981 to 24,500 by 1993. The corresponding increase in the
annual numbers of test takers at the intermediate skill level was somewhat
less, rising from 1,200 trainees in 1981 to 4,200 by 1993. However, the
number taking the trade tests at the advanced skill level rose from only 38
in 1981 to 120 trainees in 1993, when they represented just over half of 1
percent of all NVTC test takers.
The low production of graduates with advanced-level skill training is a
matter of some concern. Highly trained technical personnel play multiple
roles in industry as supervisors, as trainers of other less skilled workers, and
as implementers of new technologies. A shortfall in highly skilled workers
will constrain companies' ability to move toward higher value-added, more
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technology-intensive, production. The government has recognized this, and
several centers for advanced skills training have been set up by various min-
istries and by the government in collaboration with Germany and France.
However, even when these centers reach full capacity, their output of train-
ees with advanced-level skills is unlikely to be adequate.
Coordination of VET
The NVTC was established in 1989 to promote and coordinate vocational
and industrial skills training programs. The NVTC has initiated the estab-
lishment of interagency committees to consult on issues relating to train-
ing and trade certification, and it has carried out several surveys with a
broader focus than the tracer studies that individual ministries have con-
ducted for training institutions under their purview. However, the NVTC
does not have the legal standing to coordinate training in all public and
private training institutions. Private training institutes are supposed to reg-
ister with the Ministry of Education. Some do, but many others register
only with the Registrar of Companies, so few data are available on their
training activities.
This coordination problem is not unique to Malaysia. Many countries'
training systems are highly fragmented, with different vocational schools
and training institutions being operated by different agencies preparing
individuals for broadly similar occupations. Examples include Egypt, where
six different ministries provide vocational and technical training, and Thai-
land, which started the 1970s with two public vocational education sys-
tems and ended the decade with four, all offering the same certificates and
diplomas. Effective national training authorities coordinate training across
different public training institutions, and with participation from the pri-
vate sector, develop strategic plans for training programs to complement
key economic strategies, monitor labor market trends, conduct evaluations
of training programs to adjust training to meet new skill needs, and de-
velop and maintain databases on public and private training provision to
estimate supply capacity.
In Malaysia inadequate policy coordination raises questions about how
efficiently resources are being allocated across training institutions. There
have been recommendations that the government enact a national voca-
tional training law to strengthen the NVTC, perhaps based on Singapore's
Vocational and Industrial Training Board. The board answers to the
Singapore Economic Development Board and is empowered under the
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1979 Vocational and Industrial Training Board Act to be the national au-
thority for the development, provision, and regulation of industrial train-
ing and the registration and regulation of apprenticeship training and private
training institutes.
Evaluating the Performance of Training Institutions
Evaluations of training institutions can inform decisions about how re-
sources should be allocated to them. At the most basic level, estimates of
unit training costs can provide policymakers with an instrument to com-
pare how much it costs different training institutions to produce a trained
worker. The performance of public training providers also should be evalu-
ated in terms of external efficiency-that is, how well their trainees do on
standardized trade tests, such as those administered by the NVTC-and in
terms of labor market outcomes.
This section reports on the findings of such an analysis using data pro-
vided by the NVTC. Comparing unit costs was not possible because no
centralized collection of unit training cost data is available. The Economic
Planning Unit maintains records on the development budgets of different
training institutions but not (except on an ad hoc basis) on the operating
budgets. These records are needed to calculate and compare unit training
costs across training providers. The comparative analysis is restricted to
pass rates on the NVTC trade tests and to labor market outcomes.
Performance on Trade Tests
Table 8-5 shows pass rates on the NVTC trade tests for selected years be-
tween 1984 and 1993 for five types of training institutions: ITIs, IKMs,
YTCs, secondary vocational schools of the Ministry of Education, and
private training institutes. The average pass rate for training institutions as
a whole was about 60 percent in 1993. Particularly striking is the increase
in the pass rates of all training institutions between 1990 and 1993.
Labor Market Outcomes: Tracer Study Results
The relative performance of training providers can be evaluated based on
four labor market outcomes of their trainees: (a) the probability of finding
work after training, (b) the time taken to secure a job, (c) the monthly
starting pay, and (d) the relevance of the training to work. An institution
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TABLE 8-5
Test Takers and Pass Rates, by Training Institution,
Selected Years, 1984-93
Institution 1984 1987 1990 1993
Test takers (number)
ITIs 1,966 2,265 2,768 4,695
]KMs 3,005 3,894 5,637 1,313
YTCs 524 925 1,403 1,702
Secondary vocational schools 483 2,746 4,020 16,011
Private institutes - 1,963 2,215 4,700
Total 9,931 14,166 20,244 32,860
joass rate (percent)
ITIs 62.2 68.3 61.1 72.1
IKMs 70.2 59.9 51.0 78.3
YTCs 56.3 54.8 57.9 74.6
Secondary vocational schools 44.7 39.0 37.5 55.6
Private institutes - 45 1 39 6 58 4
Total 59.8 53.2 46.7 61.4
Not available.
Source: Economic Planning Unit (1994).
can be said to perform well if its graduates are likely to find employment,
take a short time to secure a job, receive high starting pay, and find their
training relevant to their job.
The analysis is based on a 1992 retrospective survey of more than 4,000
individuals who took the NVTC trade tests in 1991-that is, between 6
and 12 months prior to the survey. Since some trainees may not take the
trade tests, analysis using this sample of test takers should not be inter-
preted as reflecting outcomes for all trainees of these training providers.
Training providers covered by the survey included ITIs, IKMs, YTCs, army
training centers (IKKs), PLKJohor, private training institutions, and training
provided by employers and other providers.
Table 8-6 shows the distributions of trade test takers among each of four
labor market outcomes by training provider. The statistics shown in this
table suggest the following:
TABLE 8-6
Labor Market Outcomes, by Training Institution, 1992
Percentage of those working in 1992
Percentage Time to find a job (months) Starting monthly pay (RM)
Sample working Less More Less More Job
Institution (number) in 1992 than 6 6-12 than 12 than 400 401-600 than 601 relevance
Vocational schools 2,621 55.4 79.3 17.1 3.6 62.0 29.7 8.3 43.5
ITIs 322 84.5 86.5 9.5 3.9 23.3 49.2 27.5 69.8
IKMs 670 67.6 82.4 13.5 4.1 29.7 43.2 27.0 75.5
YTCs 81 66.7 83.3 10.4 6.2 34.7 42.9 22.4 77.8
Private institutes 159 89.3 66.9 20.3 12.7 15.8 35.3 48.9 80.3
IKKs 40 60.0 65.0 30.0 5.0 10.0 65.0 25.0 37.5
PLKJohor 90 80.0 81.7 13.3 5.0 60.0 28.3 11.0 76.4
Other 108 71.3 71.7 18.3 10.0 37.5 35.9 26.6 75.3
Total 4,091 62.2 79.8 15.7 4.5 47.7 35.2 17.1 56.7
Source: 1992 survey by the National Vocational Training Council.
MALAYSIA 229
* Probability of working. Among public training providers, ITI gradu-
ates are the most likely to be employed (84.5 percent), followed by gradu-
ates of PLK Johor (80.0 percent); secondary vocational school graduates
are the least likely to be employed, with only 55.4 percent finding work in
1992. Of all providers, public and private, the graduates of private training
institutes are the most likely to find work (89.3 percent). Trainees trained
Iby employers and other providers (the "Other" category) also do well (71.3
percent find work). Many of those trained by private institutes or by other
providers are already employees, so the relatively high percentages in these
two categories should not be surprising.
* Time taken to find work. Of those who find work, ITI trainees are most
likely to find work within six months (86.5 percent). Most trainees from
most of the other public institutions, including secondary vocational schools,
*who find work also do so within six months. Although trainees from pri-
vate institutes are more likely to find work, they appear to take longer to do
so, with 66.9 percent of those finding work doing so within six months,
versus the sample mean of 80 percent finding work within six months.
There does not appear to be an obvious explanation for this finding.
* Startingpay. Of those who found work, trainees of ITIs, IKMs, YTCs,
and IKKs are most likely to get starting pay of RM 401 to RM 600 (42.9 to
(65.0 percent), while secondary vocational school and PLK Johor trainees
are most likely to get starting pay of less than RM 400 (60 to 62 percent).
By contrast, trainees from private training institutes are most likely to get
starting pay greater than RM 600 (48.9 percent). Some of these variations
in starting pay may reflect location effects, an issue addressed later.
* Relevance of training to work. Of those who found work, with the
exception of those trained by secondary vocational schools and IKKs, 69.8
to 77.8 percent reported that the training provided by most public training
institutions was relevant to their work. This figure is consistent with the
range of estimates of training relevance reported in studies of vocational
school graduates in the United States: 50 to 75 percent. For graduates from
secondary vocational schools and IKKs, this figure was much lower: 37.5
to 43.5 percent. Graduates of private training institutes were most likely to
report the training as relevant to their current job.
These simple comparisons are useful, but they can be misleading if not
interpreted carefully. They do not take into account differences in the cli-
entele of training providers. Providers serve student groups that vary by
sex, education and skill levels, occupation, and region. These differences
TABLE 8-7
Predicted Labor Market Outcomes Using Regression Analysis
Percentage of those working in 1992
IPercentage Time to find ajob (months) Starting monthly pay (RM)
Sample working Less More Less More Job
Institution (number) in 1992 than 6 6-12 than 12 than 400 401-600 than 601 relevance
ITIs 322 79.8 85.5 11.8 2.5 36.0 43.8 20.1 66.7
IKMs 670 63.6 82.2 14.1 3.5 36.1 43.8 20.0 77.6
YTCs 81 68.7 81.7 14.5 3.6 36.7 43.6 19.5 75.2
Secondary vocational
schools 2,621 52.1 79.5 16.0 4.3 62.9 30.7 6.3 46.2
Private institutes 159 78.6 64.7 24.8 10.3 22.2 44.4 33.3 75.8
IKKs 40 42.2 69.3 22.4 8.2 33.0 44.4 22.4 33.4
PLKJohor 90 64.3 78.4 16.8 4.7 66.4 28.2 5.2 74.3
Other 108 70.6 70.4 21.7 7.7 37.1 43.5 19.3 76.2
Total 4,091 58.2 79.6 15.9 4.4 51.4 35.9 12.5 57.8
Source: Authors' calculations.
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can have an impact on measured labor market outcomes independent of
the effectiveness of training by the institution. A training institution may
appear to perform well because its graduates are located in areas of high
labor demand and starting pay, compared with others in more remote loca-
tions. Private institutes will select locations (for instance, industrialized
urban areas) with the greatest demand for their services and with good
prospects for job placement and high starting pay for their graduates. Many
public education and training institutions, by contrast, may locate in less
favorable areas to serve disadvantaged populations. Therefore, these factors
should be considered in comparing the performance of different training
providers.
Table 8-7 shows the corresponding outcomes by training provider once
factors such as gender, skill level, trade area, and residence have been taken
into account. The predicted labor market outcomes are based on estimates
from several regression models and on the assumption that trainees from
all training providers have the sample means of all factors except where
they got training. Sample means will primarily reflect the characteristics of
secondary vocational school trainees (by far the largest group), so the pre-
cdicted outcomes for them will be largely unchanged.
The regression analysis indicates the following:
G roup differences in gender of trainees, skill level, trade areas, and
state of residence have an impact on measured labor market outcomes.
Controlling for these factors both reduces the variation in outcomes across
institutions and changes the relative ranking of individual training institu-
tions. Thus simple comparisons are misleading indicators of the perfor-
rnance of various public institutions and of the relative performance of
public versus private training providers.
* Female trainees are more likely to receive low starting pay, and their
training is more likely to be relevant to work. This result may reflect a con-
centration of female trainees in low-paying, gender-segregated jobs such as
hair dressing. Unlike training in basic skills, higher level skill training im-
proves all measured labor market outcomes. Also trainees with engineering
and drafting-related trade training appear to perform best. Trainees in Perak,
Johor, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and Melaka are more successful in finding
employment and in getting high-paying entry-level jobs than are trainees
in the rest of the country. Unless these location effects are taken into ac-
count, training institutions that serve outlying regions of the country for
equity reasons will not score well in terms of labor market outcomes.
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* Among public training institutions, the relative ranking of ITI, IKK,
and YTC trainees in most outcomes remains largely unchanged; however,
the differences between them are greatly reduced. As before, secondary vo-
cational school graduates rank lowest among all the different groups of
trainees in all labor market outcomes.
* When graduates of public and private training institutions are com-
pared, the record is mixed as before, though the differences between them
are greatly reduced. Some outcomes for graduates from private institutes
are poorer than for ITI, IKK, and YTC graduates (time taken to find a
job). Some outcomes are the same-for example, the proportion working
(79 percent for private graduates and 80 percent for ITIs) and relevance of
training (76 percent for private institutes and for "other" institutes). Other
outcomes are better, as in the proportion with a starting salary of RM 600
or more (33 percent compared with an average of 20 percent in the three
public training institutions).
Labor Market Outcomes: Enterprise Survey Results
The Malaysia Industrial Training and Productivity (MITP) Survey of 2,200
manufacturing firms carried out in 1994 and 1995 elicited information on
firm-sponsored training and a wide range of firm attributes, including size,
industry, ownership, equipment, technology, quality control systems, mar-
kets and exports, work force characteristics, wages and other compensa-
tion, and production. These data allow us to document the incidence and
characteristics of training in Malaysian industry across firms of different
sizes, ownership, and industrial sector.
Table 8-8 shows the incidence of enterprise-sponsored formal training
for the manufacturing sector as a whole and by firm size. Two points stand
out. First, a high proportion of firms either provide their workers with no
training (31.8 percent), or they rely exclusively on informal on-the-job
training (47.6 percent). Only 20.7 percent of all employers provide their
workers with any formal, structured training. Second, the incidence of train-
ing differs markedly by firm size. The proportion of firms that do not
provide any training is highest among microenterprises (33.6 percent) and
lowest among the largest firms (3.7 percent). Conversely, formal training is
most common among the largest firms (70.7 percent) and lowest among
the smallest firms (10.1 percent). Most firms that provide formal training
also provide informal on-the-job training.
Most firms meet their skill needs either in-house or through largely pri-
vate sector providers. With the exception of skill development centers and
MALAYSIA 233
TABLE 8-8
Incidence of Training in Manufacturing, by Firm Size
Micro-
Characteristic Overall enterprisea Small b Medium' Larged
Number of firms with
training data 2,200 247 959 535 454
Percentage of firms
Not providing training 31.8 33.6 14.8 5.2 3.7
Providing only informal
training 47.6 56.3 58.7 43.6 25.6
Providing formal training 20.7 10.1 26.5 51.2 70.7
Providing formal and
informal training 17.0 6.9 24.5 48.4 66.5
Note: Overall estimates are weighted. Estimates by firm size are not weighted.
a. 15 or fewer workers.
b. 16-100 workers.
c. 101-250 workers.
d. More than 250 workers.
Source: Malaysia Industrial Training and Productivity Survey.
the Center for Instructors and Advanced Skill Training, public training
institutions play a relatively minor role in meeting the in-service training
needs of private sector firms. Analyses of the determinants of training by
firms show that training decisions are shaped primarily by these factors:
the firm's size; the education, skill, and gender mix of the employees; the
firm's technology level; whether the firm exports; the firm's ownership (for-
eign or domestic); the type of equipment used; and the firm's emphasis or
lack of emphasis on quality control.
Table 8-9 shows the different ways in which firms provide formal in-
service training to their employees. It distinguishes between formal in-house
company training and external sources of training, both public and pri-
vate. Of the 20.7 percent of employers that provide formal training, about
an equal proportion of them (approximately 13 percent) use in-house re-
sources as use external training providers. The table also shows the external
training sources reported by the enterprises. The most commonly cited
external sources are private training institutes (34.9 percent), skill develop-
ment centers (25.8 percent), advanced skills training institutes (21.3 per-
cent), and buyers and material suppliers (1 1.0 percent). The high proportion
of firms that report using skill development centers is striking, especially
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TABLE 8-9
Internal and External Sources of Training
Extent of training and source' Percentage offirms
Firm training status
Provide any formal trainingb 20.7
Provide in-house formal training 12.6
Provide external formal training 13.0
Source of training for those providing any training
Polytechnics 4.0
Vocational and technical schools 3.2
Center for Instructors and Advanced Skill Training 21.3
Skill development centers 25.8
Institutes Kemahiran Mara 1.2
Industrial training institutes 5.3
Youth training centers 0.5
Other government institutes 8.2
Joint venture partners 3.6
Buyers and material suppliers 11.0
Private training institutes 34.9
Overseas training 4.6
a. Weighted using 1988 Industrial Survey weights.
b. In-house or external.
Source: Malaysia Industrial Training and Productivity Survey.
since most of the centers (other than the Penang skill development center)
had been in operation only a few years. The least common external sources
of training are government-run training institutions: YTCs (0.5 percent),
IKMs (1.2 percent), vocational and technical schools (3.2 percent), and
other government institutes (8.2 percent).
The relatively small role of government training institutes reflects their
focus on pre-employment training rather than in-service training. This ori-
entation toward pre-employment training is borne out by data on NVTC
trade tests taken by graduates from different public training institutes. Most
YTC, ITI, and IKM graduates are tested for competencies in basic skills,
not in the intermediate or advanced skills that are needed after entering
employment.
Table 8-10 disaggregates the different sources of training by firm size.
The top panel shows the proportions of firms that provide formal training
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TABLE 8-10
Internal and External Sources of Training, by Size of Firm
(percent)
Micro-
Characteristic enteiprisea Small b Medium Larged
Firm training status
Plrovide any formal traininge 9.1 18.2 44.7 70.6
IProvide in-house training 5.2 13.5 31.7 53.6
IProvide external training 5.2 7.6 27.0 51.4
ETxternal source of trainingfor those
providing training
Plolytechnics 12.5' 2.0 5.1 9.3
lVocational and technical schools 12.5f 0.0 3.1 4.2
Advanced skill training institutes 12.5f 8.2f 6.3 19.9
Skill development centers 25.0f 10.2 14.9 28.8
Institutes Kemahiran Mara 0.0 4.1f 2.3 5.1
Industrial training institutes 12.5' 0.0 11.0 18.2
Youth training centers 0.0 2.0 1.2f 2.1
Other government institutes 0.0 20.4 22.7 27.1
Joint venture partners 0.0 10.2 9.8 11.9
Buyers and material suppliers 25.0 24.5 25.1 25.0
Private training institutes 25..f 28.6 44.3 53.0
:)verseas training 0.0 8.2 12.9 212
a. 15 or fewer workers. Figures for microenterprises are not reliable because of the small
niumber that rely on external training providers.
b. 16-100 workers.
c. 101-250 workers.
d. More than 250 workers.
e. In-house or external.
f: Three observations or fewer.
Source: Malaysia Industrial Training and Productivity Survey.
in-house and externally. In general, the use of both training sources rises
with firm size, with a higher proportion of small and medium firms train-
ing in-house than using external training providers. For those firms that
provide external training, the bottom panel shows the proportion of em-
ployers citing each external source of training. The table clearly shows varia-
tion in the use of different external sources by firms of different sizes. Training
provided by private institutes continues to be the single most commonly
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TABLE 8-11
Workers Obtaining Formal In-House Training, by Skill Group
Total
number Number of Percentage
Occupationalgroup trained employees trained
Supervisors 17,109 67,713 25.3
Technicians 15,105 47,396 31.9
Sklled production workers 76,074 462,855 16.4
Unskilled production workers 59,327 443,051 13.4
Note: Estimates weighted using 1988 Industrial Survey weights.
Source: Malaysia Industrial Training and Productivity Survey.
cited external training source. Among the other sources, both small and
medium firms are most likely to cite training from buyers and materials
suppliers and from other government institutes. Large firms are most likely
to cite skill development centers, other government institutes, buyers and
suppliers, advanced training institutes and, to a growing extent, industrial
training institutes.
Which workers are getting training? Table 8-1 1 presents estimates of the
number of people trained in four broad occupational groups-supervi-
sors, technicians, skilled production workers, and unskilled production
workers-as a proportion of the total number of employees in the relevant
occupation. On average, a higher proportion of technicians (31.9 percent)
and supervisors (25.3 percent) are trained than are production workers;
however, skilled production workers are more likely to be trained (16.4
percent) than unskilled production workers (13.4 percent). Production
workers are also less likely to get external training (14 percent) than are
nonproduction workers (28 percent).
The most important reason why firms provide little or no training is
that they use simple technologies requiring few skills. Firms' training and
technology strategies are inextricably linked, and any policy discussion of
one is necessarily incomplete without the other. Regression analysis indi-
cates the following determinants of formal training by firms:
* Training probability is strongly related to firm size. Small, medium, and
large firms are, respectively, 14, 35, and 53 percent more likely than
microenterprises to provide any formal training. The importance of firm
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size, controlling for the other correlates of training (including level of tech-
nology), may reflect scale economies in training provision, large firms' greater
access to resources for training, and unobserved employer attributes associ-
ated with improved management and training capabilities. The effects of
firm size on training probability differ by skill group: compared with
rmicroenterprises, the likelihood of training for skilled workers in large firms
rises to 61 percent, although it rises to only 43 percent for unskilled work-
ers, a trend evident in the simple tabulations reported earlier. Large firms
are also more likely to use both in-house and external training sources than
are their smaller counterparts.
* The training effects ofeducation standout. Employers are more likely to
provide formal training for all groups and from all sources the more edu-
cated their workers are. A one-year increase in the education of the work
force (the sample mean is 8.7 years) is associated with a 2 to 3 percent
higher probability of training. The significant positive relationship is strong
evidence that the two kinds of human capital-education and training-
are highly complementary. Educated workers are better learners and thus
benefit more from training than do less educated workers. A higher level of
work force education also raises the probability that the firm will train in-
house rather than send workers for external training, a result evident from
the larger estimated effects of education for in-house training.
* Firms with skilled workers are more likely to train than are firms with
uinskilled workers. Skill mix is measured as the share of managers, engineers,
technicians, supervisors, and skilled production workers in the total work
force of the firm. Controlling for education and other factors, we find that
a 1 percent increase in the skill mix is associated with a 0.5 percent increase
in the probability of training. The results also indicate that the skill mix of
the work force is a more important determinant of external training than
of in-house training. To the extent that training of skilled workers tends to
be highly technical and specialized, employers may find it more cost effec-
tive to send nonproduction workers to external training providers than to
develop in-house programs themselves. There is also evidence that a more
highly skilled work force is associated with a greater probability of training
for both skilled workers and unskilled workers. Thus unskilled workers
enjoy an externality by working in a workplace with a high proportion of
skilled workers.
* Skill and training requirements are shaped by thefirms technology. Firms
that invest in research and development (R&D) are about 10 to 15 percent
more likely to provide formal training than are firms that do not invest in
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R&D. The results, by skill group, suggest that while firms that carry out
R&D are more likely to train production and nonproduction workers than
are firms that do not do R&D, the likelihood of their training production
workers is higher. To operate mature, well-established technologies, work-
ers typically require little formal instruction beyond informal on-the-job
training by co-workers. When new technologies are being introduced, how-
ever, production is no longer routine. Under these new and challenging
circumstances, formal, structured training becomes critical for all workers,
both production and nonproduction, if unanticipated problems are to be
detected and fixed, and the productivity advantage of using new technolo-
gies is to be realized. The presence of R&D also affects where employers
train their workers. The marginal effects of doing R&D on training prob-
ability are larger for in-house programs (13.5 percent) than for training by
external sources (9.5 percent). These results-firms that invest in R&D are
more likely to train their workers in-house-are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that the use of advanced technologies is associated with a greater
reliance on in-house training than on external training.
* Foreign firms are more likely to provide in-house training than are local
firms. This effect persists even after controlling for other factors such as
R&D, exports, and firm size. Foreign firms are 8 percent more likely to
train in-house. This may reflect well-developed in-house training capabili-
ties, because many foreign firms are large multinationals involved in tech-
nology-intensive semiconductor and electronics production and assembly.
Finally, foreign firms are no more likely to train skilled workers than are
local firms; however, they are significantly more likely to train their un-
skilled employees.
Training improves firm-level productivity. Firms that train, on average,
are about 32 percent more productive than are firms that provide employ-
ees with no formal training. Productivity effects of this magnitude are not
unusual, and they broadly resemble estimates for Colombia, Indonesia,
and Mexico. The productivity benefits of training are particularly large for
small and medium enterprises, the group least likely to train. This suggests
that small and medium enterprises underinvest in training. Their use of
simple technologies means that skill needs are correspondingly low. Small
and medium enterprises are also deterred from training by several market
failures: limited financing for training; high job turnover, which makes it
difficult to recoup training costs; and weak training capabilities. To be ef-
fective, training policies targeting small and medium enterprises should
not be unidimensional, focusing on just one constraint. An integrated set
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of policies is required that simultaneously addresses a multitude of con-
straints, including financing, identification of training needs, information
about training pedagogy, technology upgrading, and adoption of high-qual-
ity control methods.
The productivity effects of training are larger when new technologies
acquired through licensing are complemented by employee training. In
contrast, a firm's own R&D has limited effects either on overall productiv-
ity or on the productivity of worker training, suggesting that technological
capabilities are relatively weak among local firms. The implication is that
licensing may be an important source of new technology for most firms
and that productivity benefits can be substantive if technology transfer is
accompanied by training. This suggests that the government should place
greater emphasis on promoting technology licensing and the skills training
and technology transfer that accompany such agreements than on encour-
aging firms to increase their provision of training.
No significant productivity effects were discernible for in-service train-
ing provided by public training institutions such as ITIs, IKMs, YTCs,
and vocational and technical institutes. Their focus is on pre-employment
training, a subject that is not examined in detail here. Nonetheless, the
absence of any productivity effects of the in-service training that they pro-
vide is striking and may suggest that their training is not well suited to
employers' needs. A careful study of the effectiveness and relevance of train-
ing provided by public training institutions should be conducted, espe-
cially if they are to play an expanded training role-not only in pre-
employment training but also in meeting employers' in-service skill needs.
Firms that train also pay higher wages. Overall, training is associated
with a 6 percent increase in wage levels, suggesting that one-eighth to one-
fifth of the productivity gains from training are shared with workers in the
form of higher pay. The patterns of wage increases mirror those of the
productivity gains from training-that is, higher in firms that invest in
technology, that export, and that are foreign owned. This result holds for
training of different worker groups. Skilled worker training is more pro-
ductive than unskilled worker training, and training of supervisors and
skilled production workers is associated with higher pay, but not training
for unskilled production workers. The implication is that these productiv-
ity differentials will lead to growing wage disparities between skilled and
unskilled workers in the absence of training policies to upgrade unskilled
workers to skilled status. Technological change, with its associated higher
skill requirements, will also put additional upward pressure on the relative
pay of skilled workers.
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Reform of Demand-Side Incentives for Training
Policymakers recognize the importance of worker retraining and skills up-
grading if industry is to move toward higher value added and more capital-
and technology-intensive production. Given the limited role of public train-
ing institutions in retraining and skills upgrading of the work force, the
government has implemented two training incentive schemes-the Double
Deduction Incentive for Training (DDIT) and the Human Resource De-
velopment Fund (HRDF)-to encourage companies to play a greater role
in meeting their own skill demands.
The employer survey revealed that while most firms do not train be-
cause of the low skill requirements of the relatively simple, standardized
technologies they use, many firms, especially small and medium employ-
ers, did not train because of high labor turnover, lack of knowledge about
how to train, and limited resources for training. These latter responses are
sometimes used as evidence that Malaysian firms underinvest in training.
In this context the results of the DDIT and HRDF training interventions
are relevant.
Lack of information about the Double Deduction Incentive for Train-
ing was the most important reason why most firms, including many large
firms, did not use it. Other reasons pertinent to large firms were bureau-
cratic application procedures and requirements. With regard to the Hu-
man Resource Development Fund, it encountered some teething problems,
including what appears to be serious noncompliance in registering for and
contributing to the HRDF and failure to take advantage of training reim-
bursements. Noncompliance seems to be most severe among small firms,
firms that are doing little training or rely only on informal on-the-job
training, firms with stagnant sales, and firms located on the East Coast
and in East Malaysia. These results may be interpreted by means of an
economic model in which firms make cost-benefit calculations, weighing
the probability of being caught in noncompliance against the benefits of
not registering.
Some firms, especially small ones, are also not claiming reimbursements
from the HRDF scheme despite their payroll contributions. The data sug-
gest that these firms either provide no training or rely exclusively on infor-
mal on-the-job training, which does not qualify as structured training. The
data also indicate that these firms have low skill requirements and limited
resources for training, and that they can readily hire trained workers from
other firms. Although it is too early to judge the efficacy of the HRDF,
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some evidence suggests that it has indeed promoted training and skill up-
grading among the sample of firms that have registered with the Human
Resource Development Council.
Several issues arise in evaluating these incentives. How much training
goes on in industry, in which firms, and is there any evidence of market
f'ailure requiring policy intervention? Have the two schemes had a salutary
impact on the amount of employer-sponsored training, and can they be
made more effective? We will focus on the take-up of the schemes by firm
size and subsector and discuss possible ways to improve their functioning.
Lfnderinvestment in Training
Policymakers believe that Malaysian companies underinvest in training,
especially in relation to the skill requirements of rapidly changing technol-
ogy and growing international competition. To support this view, they cite
(a) technology-related externalities from training; (b) market imperfections
in worker retention and imperfect information; and (c) the weak training
capacity of domestic firms, especially small enterprises.
The first argument-technological externalities related to training-rests
upon the view that a great deal of technology is embodied in workers'
skills. New technology usually requires extensive modification and adapta-
t.ion before it can be used effectively and productivity gains can be realized.
This process involves continuous learning and training on the part of all
vorkers, from engineers down to production workers. Just as firms may
not spend socially optimal amounts on R&D because they are unable to
internalize the benefits of their investments fully, firms may underinvest in
training related to technological innovation, some argue. These positive
technological externalities may justify government involvement.
The second argument is that firms underinvest in training because of
rmarket imperfections in worker retention and information. One argument
commonly heard in Malaysia is that poaching of trained workers by other
firms prevents employers from recouping their training costs and results in
underinvestment in training. Many economists dismiss this view, arguing
that firms only poach workers with general (and transferable) skills, but
ithis would not impose costs on firms that train, because they would shift
the costs of general training to workers through lower wages. These objec-
tions may be diluted, however, if most skills are industry specific or specific
to particular technologies. The appropriate policy response is to provide
incentives for nontraining firms (poachers) to train, or to share the costs of
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training provided by firms or other training institutions. A number of coun-
tries have used payroll levies, either with public provision of training or
with rebates for approved training expenses. Malaysia's HRDF scheme falls
into this latter category.
Imperfect information, especially about new technologies and training
(the value of training, training needs, and training pedagogy), can also lead
to underinvestment in training. Arguably, both technology and training
are experiential forms of knowledge, that is, they require learning by doing.
To the extent that these forms of know-how are not codified and have value
in the market place, firms in the private sector will have incentives to mo-
nopolize this information. This could result in less than socially optimal
diffusion of best practices, both in technology and in training know-how,
and consequently lead to underinvestment in training and technology.
The appropriate policy response is to improve the dissemination of best
practices in technology and training know-how through industrial exten-
sion services (for example, through employer associations and industry
groups) and through matching grants for firms or groups of firms to imple-
ment best practices. Many of these policy instruments are already in place
in Malaysia, although their take-up by the private sector has not been
encouraging.
The third argument is that relatively weak management and training
capabilities of domestic companies, small firms in particular, have led to
underinvestment in training. Certainly, some domestic companies are less
likely to train than are otherwise similar multinational firms. This, how-
ever, may simply reflect the appropriate amount of training given the firms'
level of technology, and not weak management or training capabilities. A
stronger case can be made for small firms. Small firms are especially vulner-
able to market imperfections in training-namely, lack of access to credit
to finance training, poorly developed management and training capabili-
ties, lack of information on appropriate technologies, and high fixed costs
in developing in-house training programs for a small number of employ-
ees. The appropriate policy response here may be to provide a package of
financial services, technical assistance, and education, and to facilitate low-
cost group training through industry associations or consortia of small firms
or collaboration with larger enterprises.
The Double Deduction Scheme
There are two ways in which Double Deduction Incentive Training can be
used: first, by sending employees for training in approved training institu-
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tions; second, by applying to the Malaysian Industrial Development Au-
thority (MIDA) for approval of planned training programs. Firms that
send employees for training in approved training institutions (there were
12 in 1994) are automatically qualified to claim the double deduction in-
centive directly from the Department of Inland Revenue. This facilitates
use of the incentive scheme, but because there are no reporting require-
ments, little direct information is available about the use of, and the num-
ber of, employees trained through DDIT-approved training providers.
Information about DDIT use through the second route is better devel-
oped. Between 1987 and 1993 MIDA approved a total of 591 in-house
training programs, involving 3,253 trainees and costing a total of RM 32.5
million. During this period just over 35 percent of applications for in-
house training were rejected as incomplete or inadequate.
The DDIT scheme has evolved over time, with an expansion in the
number of approved training providers and the addition in 1991 of two
additional types of training that would qualify for the DDIT scheme. These
changes were made in response to criticisms that the types of training that
qualified for the DDIT were excessively restrictive. Originally, training
programs had to be directed at (a) the development of craft, supervisory,
and technical skills for the manufacture of new products or processes, or
(b) the upgrading of craft, supervisory, and technical skills involving exist-
ing products and processes. In 1991 two broader categories were added: (c)
production-related training for productivity improvements, and (d) train-
ing for quality improvements in production. According to MIDA staff,
MIDA reportedly has also simplified the application process and reduced
reporting requirements.
These changes-in the scope of permissible training, in the number of
approved training providers, and in the application process-were associ-
ated with a sharp rise over time in the number of DDIT applications and a
decline in their rejection rate by MIDA. The number of applications rose
from 37 in 1991, to 214 in 1992, and 392 in 1993. However, the numbers
have remained low despite the rejection rate of training applications de-
clining over time from a high of more than two-thirds (69 percent) in 1988
to less than 25 percent in the 1990s.
ASSESSMENT OF THE DDIT SCHEME. Several questions arise in assessing
the efficacy of DDIT as a training policy. How effective was DDIT in
encouraging employer provision of training? Were many firms induced to
begin training or to increase training by the public subsidization of train-
ing costs, or was the incentive simply a windfall for employers who would
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have provided training anyway, even without DDIT? Furthermore, now
that DDIT is the only training policy for companies with fewer than 50
employees, will it be an effective policy instrument for small firms?
The take-up of Double Deduction Incentive Training through MIDA
has been limited, notwithstanding the rise in the number of training pro-
grams approved since 1991. Statistics on approved programs overstate the
number of firms that use DDIT, because firms submit multiple applica-
tions. For example, the 317 training programs MIDA approved between
October 1988 and March 1993 were filed by only 159 companies. The
total number trained through MIDA-approved DDIT programs by the
end of 1993 was only 3,253 workers, with more than half trained in 1993
alone. The take-up of the scheme has been uneven across subsectors, with
firms in the electric and electronics subsectors being the main beneficia-
ries. Between 1988 and March 1993, these subsectors accounted for 57
percent of programs approved by MIDA. On the other end of the scale, the
beverage and food industry had no approved programs.
DDIT use has been dominated by multinational companies, again pri-
marily in the electric and electronics subsectors. Of the 68 firms that filed
applications in 1992, 48 percent were wholly foreign owned, 45 percent
had some foreign ownership, and only 7 percent were wholly Malaysian
owned. Finally, the take-up of DDIT by small companies has been low.
This pattern of use by firm size is important. As of June 1993, only firms
with fewer than 50 employees were eligible for the DDIT scheme, yet dur-
ing 1988-94 only some 7 percent of DDIT applicants fell into this cat-
egory. Companies with 50 to 99, 100 to 499, and 500 or more employees
accounted for 22, 30, and 41 percent of the take-up, respectively.
These findings raise questions about whether the DDIT scheme can be
effective in encouraging new training among domestic firms that are not
training intensive. The 1988 survey of labor market flexibility suggests that
most multinational and foreign-owned firms would train even without the
scheme given the subsectors in which they operate. In the other domestic-
oriented subsectors and in the larger group of Malaysian-owned compa-
nies, where skill levels are generally lower, the low take-up of the scheme
suggests that it has been ineffective in encouraging training.
EVALUATION FROM THE MITP SURVEY. Although the DDIT schemes
coverage of manufacturing firms has been limited, accurate figures on its
use have not been available. The figures reported in table 8-12 are thus
broadly based and refer to DDIT use in the entire 1987-93 period when it
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TABLE 8-12
Participation in the Double Deduction Incentive for Training,
by Firm Size and Industrial Sector, 1993
Percentage
Number of MITP of allfirms
firms reporting in thatfirm
Firm size and sector use of DDIT size or industry
Overall sample 183 8.3
Firm size
Microenterprise (15 or fewer workers) 4 2.6
Small (16-100 workers) 14 2.2
Medium (101-250 workers) 74 7.8
Large (more than 250 workers) 91 19.8
Industry
Food 14 5.28
Other food, beverages, tobacco 5 39.0a
Textiles 7 6.5
Apparel 2 1.7a
Wood and furniture 16 5.2
Paper and printing 10 7.9
Chemicals 13 14.4
Rubber 12 9.2
Plastics 8 6.0
Glass and pottery 16 11.2
Iron and basic metals 8 11.3
Fabricated metals 18 16.7
Machinery 4 4.7a
Electrical machinery 34 16.0
Transport 10 12.8
Other industries 6 8.3
a. Fewer than five observations.
Source: Malaysia Industrial Training and Productivity Survey.
was the principal policy instrument for training. (The HRDF scheme was
not introduced until 1992.)
Several points emerge from the table and from examination of the MITP
data. First, the overall use of the DDIT scheme since its inception has been
quite low: only 8 percent of the firms in our sample used the DDIT scheme
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before 1993. This figure falls to 4 percent when the survey is weighted to
reflect the oversampling of large firms in the MITP sample. Second, the
take-up of DDIT by firm size and industrial sector has been uneven, and
its use by small companies has been extremely low. Across industrial sec-
tors, the primary users of the scheme were firms in the electrical machin-
ery, fabricated metals, chemicals, and transportation equipment subsectors.
Its use was low among firms in the food, wood and furniture, and textiles
subsectors. Thus use of the DDIT scheme tended to be highest among
large firms and industries characterized by a high percentage of firms in-
vesting in R&D and having technology licenses, foreign capital participa-
tion, and export orientation. Third, firms with foreign capital participation
are much more likely to use the DDIT scheme than are purely domestic
firms. Only 6 percent of all domestic firms used DDIT before 1993, com-
pared with 14 percent of joint venture firms and 14 percent of fully for-
eign-owned firms.
The ownership pattern and the uneven take-up of DDIT across subsectors
raise questions about the scheme's design and implementation and its ef-
fectiveness in encouraging firms to train. Arguably, most multinationals
and majority foreign-owned firms would train even without the scheme,
given the high-tech subsectors in which they operate and their production
for export markets. In the domestic-oriented subsectors and among Malay-
sian-owned companies, where skill levels and technological capabilities are
generally low, the low take-up of DDIT suggests that it has been ineffective
in encouraging training among firms that were not training before.
REASONS FOR NOT USING THE DDIT SCHEME. The MITP survey elic-
ited information about why firms did not use the DDIT scheme prior to
1993, and got responses from about 1,500 firms. We classified their re-
sponses into 15 categories: not aware of the scheme, do not need training,
do not know details of the scheme, bureaucratic nature of the procedures,
nonavailability of appropriate training, do not meet requirements, have no
training capabilities, small scale of production, high cost of training, con-
fusion with the HRDF scheme, extent of labor turnover, no permission
from management, and several minor reasons. Table 8-13 lists the seven
principal reasons, with the remaining reasons combined into the "other"
category, because less than 1 percent of firms cited each of these.
The most commonly cited reason (45.4 percent of respondents) was
unawareness of the DDIT scheme. Some firms (5.5 percent) cited a related
reason: did not know the details of DDIT. Thus more than 50 percent of
the firms did not use the scheme because they were unaware of it or were
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TABLE 8-13
Reasons Cited for Not Using the Double Deduction
Incentive for Training
Reason Number offirms Percentage offirms
Not aware of the scheme 682 45.4
Do not need training 260 17.3
Do not meet requirements 163 10.8
Do not train 110 7.3
Do not know details 83 5.5
Small scale of operations 60 4.0
No training capabilities 29 1.9
Other 26 1.7
Source: Malaysia Industrial Training and Productivity Survey.
not sure of its details. This occurred despite considerable effort by the gov-
ernment to publicize its availability. Another cluster of reasons cited were
not needing training (17.3 percent), not currently providing training (7.3
percent), or a lack of training capabilities (1.9 percent). Collectively, these
reasons suggest that about one-quarter of the firms did not train because
they did not need the training. Finally, 10.8 percent of firms did not use
the scheme because their training did not meet the requirements and stan-
dards established by the scheme, and 4.0 percent did not use it because of
the small number of trainees involved.
A decomposition of these responses by firm size shows that lack of in-
formation about DDIT was pervasive among firms of all sizes, even among
large firms (40 percent). A higher proportion of small-scale firms did not
use the scheme-either because they did not need it or did not train (25 to
28 percent)-than large firms (13 percent). This is consistent with the low
skill requirements of small and medium enterprises associated with their
use of relatively mature technology. A reason for not using the DDIT scheme
unique to large firms and not cited by small and medium enterprises is the
bureaucratic application procedures.
The HRDF Scheme
The Human Resource Development Fund was established in 1992 with a
matching grant from the government. (The government contributed RM
48.9 million to match projected company levies in the first year, and in
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each of the following three years it added an additional RM 16.3 million.)
The Human Resource Development Act created the Human Resource
Development Council, with representatives from the private sector and
from responsible government agencies, and a secretariat to administer the
scheme. Unlike the DDIT scheme, the HRDF is not a subsidy scheme.
Employers who have contributed for a minimum of six months are eligible
to claim a portion of allowable training expenditures up to the limit of
their total levy (1 percent of payroll) for any given year. The council has set
rates of reimbursement that vary by type of training and are generally lower
for large firms-companies with 200 or more employees-than for those
with fewer than 200 employees. Reimbursement is as follows: (a) technical,
craft, and computer training at 60 percent for large firms and 70 percent
for small firms; (b) quality-related training at 60 percent for large firms
and 70 percent for small firms; (c) supervisory training at 60 percent for
large firms and 70 percent for small firms; (d) other retraining at 40 per-
cent for large firms and 50 percent for small firms; and (e) overseas training
at 30 percent for both types of firms.
Three training schemes were introduced in July 1993: the Approved
Training Program for training in registered training institutions, the Skim
Bantuan Latihan scheme for ad hoc in-plant or external training from
nonapproved institutions, and the Pelan Latihan Tahunan scheme for firms
that wanted training on an annual basis. Under the Approved Training
Program employers can send their employees for training without the prior
approval of the Human Resource Development Council, and they can sub-
mit claims on completion of the course. Employers can select Approved
Training Program courses offered by training providers in the PROLUS
system. Under the Skim Bantuan Latihan scheme, which is intended to be
the main funding mechanism, prior approval of training programs must be
obtained from the council. Employers submit structured training plans
with specific objectives, areas of training, duration, number of trainees,
instructors, and means of assessment. Under the Pelan Latihan Tahunan
scheme, which is designed to minimize the burden of multiple filings,
employers submit detailed annual training plans covering at least 10 per-
cent of the company's work force and 15 percent of junior employees.
Table 8-14 shows the numbers of firms registered, claims filed, and
workers trained under each of the three schemes between June 1993 and
March 1994. By the end of the first quarter of 1994, a total of 3,304 com-
panies had registered with the HRDF. Skim Bantuan Latihan had the larg-
est number of training programs (2,010), followed by Pelan LatihanTahunan
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TABLE 8-14
Summary Data on the Operation of the Human Resource Development
Fund, 1993 and 1994
(number)
HRDFscheme 1993 1994 Total
Companies registered 3,273 31 3,304
Approved Training Program
Training programs 446 169 615
Trainees 1,308 761 2,069
Skim Bantuan Latihan
Training programs 1,129 881 2,010
Trainees 23,780 28,269 52,049
Pelan Latihan Tahunan
Training programs - 923 923
Trainees - 56,206 56,206
-Not available.
Note: 1993 refers to the second half of 1993 and 1994 to the first quarter of 1994.
Source: Human Resource Development Fund data.
(923) and the Approved Training Program (615). However, in terms of the
numbers of workers trained, the Pelan Latihan Tahunan scheme was the
largest, with 56,206 trainees, followed by the Skim Bantuan Latihan scheme
with 52,049 trainees, while only 2,069 employees have been trained under
the Approved Training Program. This finding is consistent with earlier evi-
dence about employers' preferences for in-plant training over training of-
fered by external private training institutions, because firms can tailor
training to their specific skill and technology requirements.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE HRDF SCHEME. Several issues arise in evaluat-
ing the HRDF scheme. First, is the HRDF having the desired effect of
encouraging companies to begin providing or to increase the provision of
more structured training for their employees? Second, are the differenti-
ated rates of reimbursement by type of training generally eliciting the right
kinds of training? Finally, as currently structured, is the HRDF well orga-
nized to administer and to promote training by employers?
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The first issue, whether the HRDF is encouraging companies to pro-
vide their employees with more structured training, can only be answered
with data on the incidence and level of training and its rate of change over
time. This was not feasible given the newness of the HRDF in the mid-
1990s. Instead the analysis focuses on the rate of take-up of different HRDF
schemes. This take-up rate can be used as a benchmark against which out-
comes in future years can be compared to evaluate the HDRF's impact on
increasing training. The analysis also focuses on take-up rates by firm size
and subsector to identify the broad attributes of nontraining firms that
might be targeted for closer attention by the fund. The analysis used data
for the Skim Bantuan Latihan and Approved Training Program schemes.
(Data on the Pelan Latihan Tahunan scheme were not available for this
analysis.)
The initial use of the HRDF was low, especially among small firms. For
all firms combined, the take-up rate of the Skim Bantuan Latihan scheme
was more than 12 percent and that of the Approved Training Program was
about 14 percent. About 6 percent of companies used both schemes, while
about 80 companies used neither. The rate of take-up in each scheme rises
dramatically with firm size, as does the take-up of both schemes. In small
firms with fewer than 100 employees, the take-up rate for the Skim Bantuan
Latihan and Approved Training Program is 4.3 and 6.3 percent, respec-
tively. In the largest firm size category with more than 1,000 employees,
the corresponding take-up rates are much higher-about 52 and 40 per-
cent, respectively. Note, however, that even among large firms the take-up
of these schemes is not universal. More than 38 percent of large companies
did not file training claims under either scheme. This finding is essentially
unchanged if use of the Pelan Latihan Tahunan scheme is considered, be-
cause only 24 companies have approved annual training plans.
Small companies are training a lower proportion of their work forces
than are large firms. This finding is consistent with evidence from the 1988
survey. Companies with fewer than 100, 100 to 199, 200 to 1,000, and
more than 1,000 employees accounted for about 11, 3, 26, and 60 percent
of all Skim Bantuan Latihan trainees, respectively. Their share of all em-
ployees in companies registered with the HRDF was approximately 15,
16, 52, and 17 percent, respectively. Thus, relative to their share of all
employees in registered firms, large firms are providing more employees
with Skim Bantuan Latihan training than are smaller employers. A similar
pattern is found in the case of the Approved Training Program, but the
differences by firm size are less marked. Compared with large firms, small
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firms are more likely not to use HRDF schemes, and when they do, to use
them less intensively.
These data revealed wide variations across subsectors in the take-up of
the HRDE The highest take-up rates of either scheme by employers were
in professional and scientific instruments, general machinery, electric ma-
chinery, and ceramics and glass. Subsectors with low take-up rates were
food, beverages and tobacco, textiles and apparel, and wood products and
furniture. With 44 percent of all employees in registered companies, the
electric machinery subsector accounted for more than 80 percent of all
Skim Bantuan Latihan trainees and 39 percent of all Approved Training
Program trainees. In contrast, the wood products and furniture and the
textiles, apparel, and footwear subsectors each had less than 2 percent of
trainees in either scheme, even though their shares of all employees were 7
and 4 percent, respectively.
The second issue concerns the types of training provided by employers,
and whether differential rates of reimbursement are broadly effective in
shaping the mix of training. Implicitly, the current rate structure values
technical, craft, computer, quality, and supervisory-related training most
highly (60 or 70 percent), followed by "other training" (40 or 50 percent),
and overseas training (30 percent). With one year of data, we cannot assess
the impact of the rate structure on the training mix. All that can be done is
to compare the composition of training and the rate structure. Perhaps the
more critical question at this point is whether policymakers should be in-
volved in determining the mix of training for firms when their skill needs
are so heterogeneous.
Is the distribution of training by type consistent with the reimburse-
ment rate structure? Table 8-15 shows the numbers of Approved Training
Program and Skim Bantuan Latihan trainees by types of training. It distin-
guishes between six types of training: computer, quality, supervisory, tech-
nical and craft, overseas, and "other." In both schemes the "other" training
category is the predominant type-5 5.6 percent of Approved Training Pro-
gram trainees and 37.7 percent of Skim Bantuan Latihan trainees-even
though this training category has the lowest rate of reimbursement after
overseas training. Note that employers placed the same emphasis on "other"
training under the DDIT scheme. This may be because the "other" cat-
egory is primarily for retraining and skills upgrading of production work-
ers, who typically make up the largest occupational group in industry. The
two other largest groups of Approved Training Program trainees are con-
centrated in supervisory training (12.3 percent) and computer training (10.6
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TABLE 8-15
Distribution of Approved Training Program and Skim Bantuan Latihan
Trainees, by Type of Training, 1995
Approved Skim Number of employees
Training Bantuan Fewer Fewer Fewer More
Program Latihan than than than than
Training type total total 100 200 1,000 1,000
Number of trainees 2,069 54,644 5,923 1,579 14,410 32,732
Percentage in each
type of training
Computer 10.6 6.5 1.6 3.9 5.3 8.0
Quality 2.2 21.7 6.5 9.6 13.3 28.7
Foreign 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.9 1.2 0.9
Supervisory 12.3 5.2 2.2 16.2 8.3 3.9
Technical and craft 19.2 27.9 82.7 11.0 35.4 15.6
Other 55.6 37.7 6.5 57.4 36.4 43.0
Source: Approved Training Program estimates: unpublished Human Resource Develop-
ment Fund data; Skim Bantuan Latihan estimates: World Bank data.
percent). In the case of Skim Bantuan Latihan trainees, the other large
groups are technical and craft training (27.9 percent) and quality-related
training (21.7 percent).
What are the patterns of Skim Bantuan Latihan training across firm
size? In the smallest firm size category (fewer than 100 employees), by far
the most trainees are in technical and craft-related training. This is encour-
aging, because small firms have traditionally been weakest in technical kinds
of training. In contrast, companies with more than 100 employees are most
likely to provide training in the "other" category. Furthermore, the propor-
tion of trainees receiving computer- and quality-related training rises with
firm size.
The data on Skim Bantuan Latihan take-up by subsector suggest that
there are different skill requirements across industries. Compared with
the sample mean, quality-related training is emphasized by fabricated
metals companies, computer training by food and beverage firms, tech-
nical training by scientific instrument companies, and "other" training
by the transport equipment subsector. For Skim Bantuan Latihan train-
ees, the technical and craft category can be further broken down into
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technical training (25 percent) and craft-related training (3 percent). Craft-
related training under the Skim Bantuan Latihan scheme is important in
only three subsectors: textiles, apparel, and footwear (21 percent), ma-
chinery (5 percent), and electrical machinery (3 percent). In the other
subsectors virtually no Skim Bantuan Latihan training is craft related.
These large differences in skill requirements by subsector call into ques-
tion the likelihood of success and the merit of policy intervention to
shape the socially desired mix of training.
EVALUATION FROM THE MITP SURVEY. Table 8-16 provides information
on the responses of MITP firms about the Human Resource Development
Fund. It shows the numbers of firms that were eligible for the HRDF;
those that said they were registered with the HRDF; those that reported
filing claims under the Skim Bantuan Latihan, Approved Training Pro-
gram, and Pelan Latihan Tahunan schemes; and those not claiming under
any of these schemes. Following the 1995 HRDF guidelines, we define
eligible firms as those employing 50 or more workers. Of the 1,450 eligible
firms, 402 firms (27.7 percent) reported that they were not registered with
the HRDF. Of those that were registered, 44.7 percent claimed reimburse-
ments under the Approved Training Program, 47.0 percent under the Skim
Bantuan Latihan scheme, and 9.5 percent under the Pelan Latihan Tahunan
scheme. However, 34.5 percent of registered firms reported that they did
not claim reimbursements under any of the three schemes.
TABLE 8-16
Operation of the Human Resource Development Fund, 1994
Number Percentage
Category offirms of sample
Firms eligible for the HRDF 1,450 65.9
Firms registered with the HRDF 1,048 72.3
Approved Training Program 468 44.7
Skim Bantuan Latihan 493 47.0
Pelan Latihan Tahunan 99 9.5
Firms not claiming under the HRDF 362 34.5
Source: Malaysia Industrial Training and Productivity Survey.
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Noncompliance with the HRDF
The Human Resource Development Act of 1992 made it mandatory for
eligible firms to register with the Human Resource Development Council.
Twenty-seven percent of eligible firms did not comply with this regulation.
Such noncompliance appears to be significant, even recognizing the possi-
bility of response or coding errors. Noncompliance with the HRDF varies
systematically by firm size and industry. Small firms (with 50 to 100 work-
ers) are more likely to be noncompliant (49 percent) than large firms (8
percent). Noncompliance is higher in the food, beverages, and tobacco;
wood and furniture; and glass and pottery industries (33 to 50 percent of
firms) than in the electrical machinery, chemicals, and textile industries
(10 to 20 percent). Noncompliance appears to be concentrated among small
firms and firms operating in traditional, domestic-oriented industries.
To identify the factors associated with noncompliance, we estimate a
probit model. The results suggest the following. First, medium and large
firms are more likely than small firms to comply, possibly because they
believe that the probability of their being caught is high given their high
profile. Second, firms that do not train or that rely only on informal train-
ing are significantly more likely not to comply than those that provide
their employees with formal training. This is consistent with the high fixed
costs involved in developing and setting up training programs and incor-
porating the new skills into existing production. Third, systematic regional
variations are apparent, with noncompliance being higher in East Malaysia
than in the West Coast states. Finally, firms with stagnant or declining sales
are more likely not to register with the HRDF.
CLAIMS UNDER THE HRDF. A sizable number (362) of registered firms
do not claim reimbursements for training expenditures despite contribut-
ing payroll levies to the fund. Their claims for training under any of the
schemes are an indicator of the effectiveness of the HRDF in encouraging
firms to begin or increase training provision. Tabulations suggest that small
firms are less likely to claim than their larger counterparts: 50.2 percent for
small firms with 50 to 100 employees, 41.3 percent for medium firms with
101 to 250 employees, and 19.4 percent for large firms with more than
250 workers. This is an important issue, because firms paying the levy but
not claiming the rebate in effect pay a tax of 1 percent of payroll without
getting any tangible benefits as a result.
Who are these nonclaimant firms, and why are they not training? Table
8-17 presents the distribution of registered firms that do not claim accord-
MALAYSIA 255
TABLE 8-17
Registered Firms Not Claiming Reimbursements from the HRDF,
by Training Status, 1995
Percentage
Number of registered distribution offirms
Training status firms not claiming not claiming
Firms not training 22 6.1
Firms training informally only 196 54.1
Firms training formally 144 39.8
Source: Authors' calculations.
ing to their training status: no training for workers, only informal on-the-
job training, and the provision of formal training. Note that only 6.1 per-
cent of these nonclaimants do no training. The majority of firms not
claiming (54.1 percent) are those that provide only informal on-the-job
training. Thus about 60 percent of these firms are not eligible to claim for
reimbursements because they either do not provide training or are only
training informally. The remaining 40 percent report that they provide
formal training, yet do not claim reimbursements for these expenditures.
We estimated probit models to obtain insights into why these registered
firms do not implement training programs and claim reimbursements. The
results indicate that the firms least likely to claim from HRDF are small
firms and firms providing no training or only informal training. This re-
sult was evident in the simple tabulations. Having a training plan, how-
ever, is associated with a greater likelihood of a claim from the HRDF. This
is not surprising, because it indicates a systematic commitment on the part
of the employer to training employees. Results from the second model high-
light the important factors that employers cite as inhibiting their training:
the limited resources available for training, the use of mature technology
with low skill requirements, the adequacy of skills provided by schools,
and the availability of skilled workers who can be hired from other firms.
HAS THE HRDF INCREASED TRAINING BY FIRMS? We used retrospective
responses from employers about how their level of training changed-in-
creased, stayed the same, or decreased-between 1992 and 1995. We can
compare the training experiences of two groups of firms: those registered
with the HRDF, and those that were eligible but chose not to register. In
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TABLE 8-18
Changes in Training Levels from 1992 to 1995, by Firm Registration
(percent)
Increased Training Decreased
Registration status training is the same training
Eligible registered firms 39.3 49.8 1.2
Eligible unregistered firms 47.3 27.1 5.2
Note: The percentages do not sum to 1 00 because of firms responding that they "did not
know."
Source: Authors' calculations.
principle, the registered group would have increased incentives to train in
order to recover its payroll levy contributions, while the unregistered group
would not have the same incentives.
Table 8-18 compares the training experiences of these two groups of
firms. Of those registered with the HRDF, 49.8 percent said that they had
increased training over the three-year period, 39.3 percent firms said that
their training had remained the same, and only 1.2 percent said that their
training had decreased. In contrast, of the eligible firms not registered with
the HRDF, 27.1 percent said that their training had increased, 47.3 per-
cent said that their training had remained unchanged, and 5.2 percent said
that their training had decreased over the three years. Thus HRDF appears
to have played a role in increasing training provision.
We tested this hypothesis formally using a probit model, which com-
pares the likelihood of increased training over the three years for registered
HRDF firms and unregistered firms. The effects of the HRDF are allowed
to vary by firm size; we used a set of interaction terms between firm size
and an indicator variable for being registered with the HRDE The model
includes a set of industry dummies to control for possible differences in
industry composition of registered and unregistered firms. We also include
a measure of whether the firm introduced new technologies over the three-
year period. The intent was to net out the confounding effects of increased
training because of new technology that is independent of the HRDE Fi-
nally, to see if the effects of the HRDF vary by ownership, we estimated
separate models for domestic firms and firms with foreign capital.
The HRDF has had a role in increasing training among medium and
large firms with foreign capital (table 8-19). Among purely domestic firms,
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TABLE 8-19
Probit Estimates of Increased Training under the
Human Resource Development Fund
Combined Purely Firms with
sample of domestic foreign
Independent variable firms firms capital
Small firm * HRDF 0.160 0.141 0.179
(0.122) (0.151) (0.215)
Medium firm * HRDF 0.312a (0.101) 0.171
(0.129) 0.435a (0.179)
Large firm * HRDF 0.788a (0.102) 0.839a
(0.147) 0.753' (0.175)
Introduced new technology
between 1992 and 1995 0.428a (0.076) 0.499a
(0.103) 0.365' (0.114)
Constant -0.574' (0.083) -0.616'
(0.099) -0.516' (0.160)
Note.' Industry dummies were included but were not statistically significant. Estimated
standard errors are in parentheses.
a. Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors' calculations.
the HRDF has been effective in increasing training only for firms with
more than 250 employees. These results were not affected by differences in
industrial composition of the two groups. However, whether or not firms
had introduced new technology in the past made a difference: increases in
training and introduction of new technology are significantly correlated.
Conclusions
Between the recession of 1985-86 and 1995, Malaysia's economy experi-
enced a sharp turnaround. The changing employment pattern and rapid
job growth contributed to a tightening of the labor market. Unemploy-
ment rates fell to less than 3 percent in 1995, and quit rates for skilled and
technical workers increased. While average wages have increased consider-
ably, wage patterns show increasing disparities between skilled and unskilled
workers. Between 1987 and 1993 the wages of skilled and semiskilled work-
ers rose by 10 percent per year; those of managers, technical workers, and
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professionals rose by 7.5 percent; those of unskilled workers rose by less
than 5 percent. There are many reasons for these wage patterns, not all of
which have implications for vocational education and training. High rates
of investment may have disproportionately increased the demand for tech-
nical and managerial personnel, or there may be fewer substitutes for these
workers relative to the unskilled. Studies show, however, that the main
reason for widening wage differentials is that the supply of skilled workers
has not kept pace with demand. This has implications for the VET system,
which tries to ensure an adequate supply of technical, skilled, and semi-
skilled workers.
Main Findings
Recent surveys indicate that a high proportion of firms provide their work-
ers with no training or rely exclusively on informal on-the-job training.
Marked differences are apparent in the incidence of training by firm size:
the proportion of firms that do not provide any training is highest among
microenterprises, and, conversely, formal training is most common among
large firms. The most important reason why firms provide little or no train-
ing is that they use simple technologies that require few skills. The firms
that do train either meet their skill needs in-house or rely heavily on private
providers. Public training institutions play a relatively minor role in meet-
ing the in-service training needs of private firms. Among employers pro-
viding external training, the most commonly cited external sources are
private training institutes, followed by skill development centers, advanced
skills training institutes, and buyers and materials suppliers. The least com-
mon external sources of training are government-run training institutions.
The relatively small role played by government training institutes reflects
their focus on pre-employment training rather than on in-service training.
Policy Incentives for Training
Policymakers believe that Malaysian companies underinvest in training,
especially in relation to the skill requirements necessitated by rapidly chang-
ing technology and growing international competition. Given the limited
role of public training institutions in retraining workers and upgrading
their skills, the government has implemented two training incentive
schemes-Double Deduction Incentive Training and the Human Resource
Development Fund-to encourage companies to meet their own skill needs.
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Despite changes to the system, use of the DDIT scheme has remained
low and take-up has been uneven across subsectors, firm size, and owner-
ship. Initial use of the HRDF scheme was also low, and take-up varied
widely across sectors. It is too early to make firm judgments about whether
the HRDF has increased training, but a preliminary analysis indicates that
the scheme may have increased the incidence of training modestly.
Lessons from Malaysia's Experience with VET Reforms
In a rapidly growing economy, only careful analysis can identify training
policies and institutions that are performing poorly. We offer the following
lessons based on Malaysia's experience.
First, formal training is not widespread even in a rapidly industrializing
economy. Surveys show that about one-third of firms in Malaysia provide
no training for workers, about half rely on informal training alone, and
only a fifth provide formal training. Firm size matters: almost one-third of
extremely small firms provide neither formal nor informal training, but
almost all large firms provide some training, generally both formal and
informal. The main reason why firms do not train is that they do not need
to train. They cite as reasons mature technology, the high cost of training,
and the availability of skilled workers from schools and other firms.
Second, tax incentives have been given to firms that would have pro-
vided training anyway. Despite considerable simplification of the scheme,
less than 3 percent of small firms used the government's DDIT scheme for
training. Most of the participants were large export-oriented firms, prima-
rily multinationals making electric and electronic goods. Surveys indicate
that many foreign-owned firms would provide training even without such
incentives. This raises serious doubts whether tax incentives can encourage
training among small domestically oriented firms.
Third, a well-run levy-rebate scheme has increased training only mod-
estly. Malaysia's levy-rebate scheme is extremely well run, but it still faces
considerable noncompliance problems and uneven take-up across indus-
tries. Despite being efficient in reimbursing claims and making application
procedures easy for employers to comply with, the scheme appears to have
had only modest training effects.
Finally, private providers are the most common external source for em-
ployer-sponsored training. Employer surveys indicate that in-house and
private external training have the highest payoffs and that training in gov-
ernment institutions has the lowest productivity. Not surprisingly, the most
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popular choices among firms are private institutes and joint venture skill
development centers. The least popular external sources used for employer
training are youth training centers and vocational and technical schools.
Firms use public institutes that offer advanced training somewhat more
frequently.
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01 Republic of Korea
INDERMIT S. GILL AND CHON-SUN IHM
THE REPUBLIC OF KoREA, with a population of about 45
million, is smaller in area than Honduras (which has a population of less
than 6 million) and is less than one-third the size of the Philippines. Im-
poverished by years of foreign occupation and internal strife until the 1950s,
Korea has since embarked on a path to progress that is nothing short of
spectacular. By 1995 Koreans enjoyed a per capita income about ten times
that of Hondurans and Filipinos. The mainstays of growth in Korea, which
has meager natural resources, were its people and its policies. This chapter
explores one aspect of each: investment in the skills of people, and the voca-
tional education and training (VET) policies that made sure that these in-
vestments over the long term were consistent with the economy's changing
requirements. This chapter also shows that Korean policymakers have made
mistakes. In fact, perhaps the single most important lesson from Korea's
experience is that successful policymaking is not about being infallible.
Rather, it is about being willing to learn from the mistakes that are made.
In 1994 Korea's annual population growth rate was about 0.9 percent,
almost half the rate of growth of just 20 years earlier. Between 1975 and
1985, the crude birth rate fell from 25 to 16 per 1,000, with a steady
decline since then. With annual real economic growth rates that exceeded
10 percent in some years, Korea's real per capita income grew thirteenfold
from less than US$600 to about US$8,000 between 1975 and 1995. In the
mid-1980s, when growth was most rapid, Korean manufacturing grew by
almost 20 percent every year, and services by more than 10 percent. The
share of agriculture in employment fell from more than 45 percent in 1975
26I
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to less than 15 percent two decades later.' The financial crisis of 1997
contracted Korea's GNP, and Korea is likely to recover only after a few
more years. This chapter concentrates on the longer term issues of voca-
tional education and training.2 The economic crisis is affecting the resources
available for further reform. Indeed, rising unemployment has already placed
additional burdens on the financial system.
Between 1986 and 1991, gross domestic capital grew by more than 15
percent annually. This investment in capital was paralleled by large invest-
ments in human capital. In 1970 almost three out of four Koreans had no
more than an elementary school degree; by 1990 this ratio was one in three.
The average years of educational attainment rose from fewer than 6 years
to almost 10 years during this period. The number of students in voca-
tional and academic high schools rose from fewer than 0.6 million in 1970
to more than 2 million in 1994, and enrollment in higher education rose
eightfold from 0.2 million to 1.6 million over the same period. The num-
ber of vocational trainees quadrupled between 1970 and 1992: from about
30,000 to 115,000. These investments in physical and human capital paid
huge dividends for employers and workers: labor productivity doubled
between 1985 and 1993, and monthly wages rose from 200,000 won to
1,000,000 won.
Vocational Education and Training before the Financial Crisis
Due to these investments in education and training, the large wage differ-
entials between college graduates and workers without a high school di-
ploma that existed in the 1970s fell by half by 1993. But Korea's appetite
for education remains unsatisfied. There is a strong demand for more edu-
cation and of better quality. Fearing either "overeducation" or a mismatch
between the economys "needs" and the output of the education system,
Korean policymakers have tried to curb this appetite using questionable
interventionist strategies. In 1975, worried about the adverse social effects
of competition among parents to enroll their children in a small number of
good schools, policymakers instituted a system in which elementary school
leavers were allocated to junior secondary schools through a lottery. Dur-
ing the 1970s some of the best private schools came under direct govern-
ment control in order to curb "credentialist endencies." Again, in the 1980s,
the government outlawed private tutoring to reduce wealthy families' ad-
vantage in getting their children placed in the top public universities. These
changes have had only limited success in meeting their objectives. Besides,
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with greater democratization, similarly intrusive measures may no longer
be a viable option.
VET has played a pivotal role in this social context, and it contributed
greatly to the rapid economic growth in Korea before the economic crisis.
In the view of policymakers, VET reduces the pressure on universities to
enroll more students, and it meets a "shortage" of skilled and semiskilled
workers, especially technicians. But parents see vocational schools as sec-
ond-best after academic schools, "even though the employability of voca-
tional high school graduates in Seoul and Pusan has been better than for
academic high school graduates" (Sorensen 1994), and even though gradu-
ate unemployment remains a concern. One reason for this is that social
prestige is considerably enhanced by attending university: parental pres-
sure has resulted in successive additions of general subjects in vocational
school curricula so that their children have some hope of getting into col-
lege. Policymakers lament that Koreans are generally overeducated for the
economy's demands but undertrained to fill jobs that are critical for the
country's final push toward industrial-country status. Policymakers are care-
fully evaluating the feasibility of expanding vocational-technical school
enrollment or (since there is now a large private industrial base) of shifting
more training to the workplace.3
After examining the evolution of the labor market, we assess how the
VET system has changed in response to developments in the labor market
and the economy in general. We identify the general directions that Korean
policymakers believed to be appropriate given these developments and the
obstacles to moving swiftly in these directions. Finally, we describe how
Korea has overcome some of these obstacles to reform and ongoing efforts
to deal with the others. Because the focus of this chapter is on long-term
issues, we abstract from issues involving the financial crisis.
Labor Market Conditions
In this section we discuss Korea's labor force, employment, unemployment
and labor "shortages," wages, and labor issues relevant to vocational educa-
tion and training.
Labor Force
The economically active population in Korea increased from about 10
million in 1970 to about 20 million in 1995, a moderate growth rate of
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about 2.8 percent annually. During the same period, the total population
increased at an annual rate of 1.4 percent, from 32 to 45 million. Overall,
therefore, labor force participation rates increased over this period from 58
to 62 percent.
Population growth rates rapidly declined (from annual increases of more
than 1.7 in the 1970s to less than 1 percent by the late 1980s). In 1995 the
population ages 15 to 24 years began to decline in absolute numbers. Be-
cause of increasing advancement to higher education, the labor force par-
ticipation of persons ages 15 to 19 years fell from 36.9 percent in 1975 to
13.3 percent in 1995. Countering this reduced supply of young workers is
a steady increase in female participation, which rose from about 39 percent
in 1970 to close to 49 percent in 1995, and increased participation rates of
older workers which increased from less than 10 percent to about 15 percent
during this period. Korea has moved to a stage where labor quality ques-
tions are paramount, since the growth of the quantity of labor has obvi-
ously declined to very low levels. The strong emphasis on education and
training in the country's economic strategy should be seen in this context.
Employment
Employment in Korea increased from 9.5 million in 1970 to about 19.5
million in 1994. The share of agriculture declined from 50 to 15 percent
over this period, the manufacturing share increased from 13 to 24 percent,
and the share of other sectors (mainly construction and services) increased
from 35 to 62 percent (KLI 1994). Agriculture, which provided a relatively
elastic supply of unskilled workers to the other sectors during the 1960s
and 1970s, was no longer a source of cheap unskilled labor by the early
1980s. The rapid expansion of VET in the mid-1980s coincided with the
drying up of this source of unskilled labor. This push to substitute labor
quality for quantity coincided with Korea's big push into (export-oriented)
manufacturing, construction, and service-oriented activities, which require
increasingly greater amounts of skilled labor. Compared with when manu-
facturing dominated the nonfarm sector, the skill-mix required today is
more complex.
Shifts in the occupational structure have paralleled these sectoral changes.
Between 1970 and 1994, the share of farm workers declined from 50 to 15
percent; the share of professional, managerial, administrative, technical,
and clerical workers increased from 10 to 25 percent; the share of sales and
service workers increased from 19 to 28 percent; and the share of equip-
ment operators and laborers increased from 20 to 32 percent of employ-
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ment (KLI 1994). Note that these occupational patterns are clearly indica-
tive of the rising share of skilled workers in the Korean labor force, and
they explain why education and training have remained at the forefront of
policy discussions.
Unemployment and Labor "Shortages"
From the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, the absolute number of the un-
employed remained in a narrow range between 400,000 and 750,000 work-
ers, peaking during the recession of 1980-82 at 5.2 percent of the work
force. It fell to about 2.5 percent in 1995. But despite the fall in participa-
tion of young people, youth unemployment rates remained relatively high:
the unemployment rate for males ages 15 to 24 years was about 12 percent
in 1993; female unemployment for the same age group was somewhat lower,
but was still above 7 percent.4 Unemployment rates rose sharply during
1997 and 1998 due to the economic contraction that Korea suffered.
Unemployment rates were higher for educated job-seekers in Korea, as
in many other countries. In 1994 those with middle school diplomas or
less education had an unemployment rate of close to 1 percent. The unem-
ployment rate for high school graduates was about 3.5 percent, and for
junior college graduates and those with more education, it was 4 percent.
From 1980 to 1993, unemployment declined at a roughly uniform rate for
all education groups (KEDI 1994). Although the unemployment rate of
high school graduates was the highest of all groups in 1980, since 1985
college graduates have been the most likely to be unemployed. Among
high school graduates, unemployment rates are higher for academic school
graduates than for those from vocational schools.
With an aggregate unemployment rate of about 2 percent, and with
educated job-seekers being a large share of the unemployed, claims of labor
"shortages" are common. Unfilled vacancies as a share of employment rose
from 2 percent to 7 percent between 1980 and 1991 for skilled workers,
but from 5 to 20 percent for unskilled workers; although it stayed at about
1 percent for office workers over the same period, it rose from 2 to 9 per-
cent for production workers (Uh 1993).
Wages
Labor shortages-in a competitive market-should be eliminated by in-
creases in the wages of workers who are "in demand" and by reduced wages
for those whose skills are abundant (for example, the unemployed). Be-
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FIGURE 9-1
Wage Trends in Korea, by Education Level, 1975-93
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tween 1980 and 1992, wages for workers with a middle school diploma or
less education rose 5.5 times, 4.3 times for high school graduates, and 3.2
times for those with a junior college degree or more education. While those
with a middle school diploma or less earned a quarter of what college gradu-
ates earned in 1975, this ratio had changed to one-half by 1993. The wages
of those with a junior college degree, compared with the wages of graduates
of high school, steadily declined from 1978 to 1993; and the relative wages
of those with at least a college degree fell between 1987 and 1993 (figure
9-1). But note also that the relative wages of less educated workers rose
steadily. This implies that, as the supply of educated workers increased, the
returns to education fell.
Nominal wages for professionals; technical workers; and administrative,
managerial, and clerical workers rose twelvefold between 1975 and 1992.
They rose more than sixteenfold for sales and service workers, and more
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than twentyfold for production workers. Thus, while the average wage for
production workers was less than 40 percent of that for professional and
itechnical workers in 1975, it was more than 65 percent by 1993. This
ifinding appears to contradict current claims that technicians were in scarce
supply during the past two decades, but more disaggregated data are re-
quired to confirm this.
Another noteworthy feature of Korea's labor market is the presence of
sizable wage differentials by firm size. This was not always the case. In
1980, for example, average wages in large firms (those with 500 or more
employees) were only 8 percent higher than those in small firms (between
10 and 100 employees); by 1993 this differential was more than 35 percent
(KLI 1994). The apparent ability of large firms to pay higher wages to
workers is widely, but casually, cited as the major reason for their ability to
lure (trained) workers from small firms, which are therefore reluctant to
invest in in-service worker training.
Labor Issues Relevant to VET
Three labor issues are particularly relevant to vocational education and
training. First, until just before the crisis, unemployment rates remained
low (by international standards). The labor-market focus of VET policies
was naturally on upgrading workers' skills, not on helping the unemployed
get jobs by retraining them.5 This has changed somewhat since then. In
-1995 the unemployment insurance system was introduced, and compensa-
tion was combined with vocational training. Public retraining programs
f-or the unemployed-which have a spotty record elsewhere-are likely to
become important in Korea.
Second, there is no evidence of increasing unemployment among the
educated (despite claims by policymakers that, because unemployment rates
of educated workers are higher than for the less educated, Koreans are be-
coming "overeducated"). The finding that educated job-seekers have higher
unemployment rates is not unique to Korea.6 Viewed this way, the Korean
labor market appears to provide little support for the view that more middle
school graduates should be diverted from pursuing university education
and channeled instead into vocational high schools to be prepared for jobs
as skilled workers. This raises serious questions regarding the appropriate-
ness and timing of the recent expansion of vocational school enrollment.
Finally, preliminary evidence on unemployment, labor "shortages," and
wages indicates that the demand for higher occupations (professionals,
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administrators) and middle-level occupations (supervisors, clerical work-
ers, technicians) is largely met, and the market for semiskilled workers (pro-
duction) and unskilled workers (service workers and laborers) is tight. But
this does not imply that enrollments in vocational high schools and pre-
employment training institutes-which produce mostly skilled workers-
should be expanded.
Vocational Education and Training
In Korea like in most countries, VET is delivered in private and public
sector institutions, and by private firms, and it is overseen by the ministries
of education and labor. More than 2 million people were trained or edu-
cated in Korea's VET institutions between 1987 and 1994. In-plant train-
ing accounted for about 57 percent of the trainees, public training
institutions for about 27 percent, and authorized training centers for about
16 percent. Table 9-1 sums up the main features.
In 1994 about 758,000 students were enrolled in vocational high schools,
which represented about 38.5 percent of total senior secondary enrollment.
The graduates of these three-year programs are considered skilled workers.
About 500,000 students were enrolled in two- and four-year programs in
TABLE 9-1
Korea's Vocational Education and Training System
Category Vocational education Training
Implementing Vocational high schools Public vocational institutes
institutions Junior technical colleges In-plant vocational institutes
Open colleges Authorized vocational institutes
Ministries
concerned Ministry of Education Ministry of Labor
Period of
education 2 to 3 years 1 month to 3 years
Curriculum Major field, and knowledge Knowledge and skill related
and skill related to major: directly to major:
70 percent theory 30 percent theory
30 percent practice 70 percent practice
Source: Ministry of Labor (1993).
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junior technical colleges, which produce technicians and master techni-
cians, respectively. Public vocational training is conducted by the Korea
Manpower Agency (KOMA), a branch of the Ministry of Labor, and by
local bodies. In 1994 there were 41 training centers under KOMA, and 8
under local governments.7
Private vocational training is conducted in plants and in "authorized"
vocational training centers. In all sectors other than construction, until
1995, firms with more than 150 employees were obliged to meet a speci-
fied minimum training amount, or pay a vocational training levy.' In 1994
there were 138 authorized training centers run by nonprofit bodies and
individuals with the approval of the Ministry of Labor. The centers cater to
firms that prefer to not pay the levy, but lack the means to conduct in-plant
training. Enrollment in these institutions increased from about 9,000 in
1987 to 48,000 in 1994.
Vocational and Technical Education
About 40 percent of Korean students who successfully complete nine years
of formal school at the elementary and middle school levels go on to re-
ceive vocational and technical education. Table 9-2 illustrates trends in
vocational education from 1960 to 1994. Nonacademic high schools con-
sist of commercial (45 percent), technical (32 percent), vocational and com-
prehensive (20 percent), agricultural (2 percent), and fishery and maritime
(1 percent) schools; figures in parentheses denote the share of each in total
vocational enrollment in 1994.9 The required period of study in all voca-
tional schools is three years, but the amount of time spent in field training
differs: 1 to 12 months for fishery and maritime students, 1 to 6 months
for technical students, and 1 to 3 months for agricultural and commercial
students. Twenty technical schools (with about 3,000 students) began a
new "2+ 1 " system, in which the period of field training is one year, follow-
ing two years of classroom instruction. (The 2+1 system is discussed later
in the chapter.)
Ever since the 1960s, the government has tried to increase the share of
the vocational track. The government put considerable resources into vo-
cational education. Considerable donor assistance was sought for this, and
policymakers exhorted private business to contribute financially to the ex-
pansion of vocational education. But the government was not able to achieve
its target of having two-thirds of high school students in the vocational
track (Takeda 1992). By the mid-1980s, the ratio was closer to one-third.
TABLE 9-2
Trends in Vocational Education, Selected Years, 1960-94
Category 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Technical high schools
Number 196 212 327 294 - 408 379 501a
Enrollment (thousands) 63 105 175 283 435 506 440 418a
Percentage female 
- 8.6 15.1 14.9 22.3 30.6 30.0 -
Commercial high schools
Number 87 100 154 182 - 227 208 239
Enrollment (thousands) 37 68 101 190 323 380 371 340
Percentage female 17.4 38.3 50.2 59.9 68.2 74.2 79.0 -
- Not available.
Note: Includes agricultural, technical, fishery and maritime, and vocational and comprehensive high schools. Therefore, the numbers may not be
comparable with earlier numbers.
Source: For 1960-90, Chang (1994); for 1995, Ministry of Education.
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In 1990, concerned once again that the nation's growing demands for tech-
nical skills would not be met, policymakers decided that the size of the
vocational track would be expanded so that the ratio of general to voca-
tional enrollment would be reduced from 68:32 to 50:50. This was to be
done by expanding enrollment in existing vocational schools, opening new
(largely private) vocational high schools, and converting 120 general schools
tc' comprehensive schools. According to the Ministry of Education, this
would increase vocational enrollment by about 100,000 at a cost of about
US$513 million-that is, at a cost per enrollee of more than US$5,000.
Despite these efforts by policymakers (assisted by the World Bank), the
ratio of general to vocational enrollment was only 61:39 in 1995. Koreans
remained reluctant to enter the vocational track. Vocational high schools
have had difficulty in recruiting enough students to satisfy their allotted
enrollment quotas (Ihm and others 1993).
ADMISSION TO SECONDARY SCHOOL. In 1995 almost all middle school
graduates went on to high school. Ever since the 1970s the government has
actively encouraged students to enroll in vocational schools. Since 1974
applicants for vocational high schools have taken entrance exams earlier
than those for general high schools. Applicants who had opted for general
high schools and those who fail to get admission to vocational schools take
another exam; those who pass it are assigned to a school in their district by
lcttery.
This admissions system-part of the general system of examinations
that is believed to have spawned a culture of "testocracy"-allows
policymakers to influence the share of students opting for the vocational
an-d general tracks, albeit with a lag. For example, making admission to
general high schools harder would, in the following year, result in more
students accepting admission in vocational high school instead of taking
the (now higher) risk of losing a year.
POSTSECONDARY VOCATIONAL EDUCATION. In 1994 about 45 percent of
high school graduates entered institutions of higher learning. The ratio was
about 65 percent for general high school graduates and 15 percent for
vocational school completers.
Postsecondary vocational and technical education is in two- or three-
year programs in junior colleges and in colleges and universities (largely in
four-year programs), which aim to produce middle-level "technicians" (in
fields such as nursing, technical occupations, agriculture, commerce and
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business, home economics, and athletics). In 1979 junior colleges were
established by merging two-year institutions and two- to three-year profes-
sional schools. By 1993 the number of junior colleges had grown to 135
with an enrollment of 507,000, according to Ministry of Education data.
The basic requirement for junior colleges is graduation from high school.
Entrance is determined on the basis of school scores, a nationwide scholas-
tic achievement test, an entrance exam administered by the college, an in-
terview, and an aptitude test. Between 30 and 50 percent of the freshman
quota is reserved for graduates of vocational high schools, certified crafts-
men, and experienced industrial workers. Graduates of junior colleges can
go on to university.
In 1994 about 1.25 million students were enrolled at 131 colleges and
universities, 11 teachers' colleges, and 368 graduate schools. Korea has con-
stantly experimented with admissions procedures for higher education to
balance the "educational zeal" of Koreans with the public costs of provid-
ing this education and employers' demands for skilled workers. Until 1968
colleges selected students by conducting their own entrance exams. Be-
tween 1969 and 1979, a nationwide Preliminary Examination for College
Entrance was administered to further deter applicants; only successful ex-
aminees could take the entrance exams of individual institutions. In 1980
the Preliminary Examination for College Entrance was replaced by a Scho-
lastic Achievement Examination for College Entrance. Applicants must
select universities and colleges before they take this exam, and the institu-
tions themselves had some restrictions on how the selection could be done.
Since 1994 the institutions have been given more autonomy (especially in
selecting students), but restrictions on both students and colleges remain
in force.
CURRIcULUM. Although the Ministry of Education sets the formal cur-
riculum requirements in general and vocational education, university en-
trance examinations are an important determinant of what is taught in
high schools (Kim 1995). About 45 percent (90 out of 210 units) of the
curriculum-for both academic and vocational schools-consists of gen-
eral subjects such as languages, history, science, and mathematics. Aca-
demic students take electives from these general subjects to specialize in
either science or humanities (another 100 units). Vocational education or
home economics electives also are offered to academic students. Vocational
school students take electives from the same general subjects. These elec-
tives add up to about 50 units; the remaining electives are the additional
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vocational element. Perhaps as much as 75 percent of the curriculum for
academic and vocational students is common and consists of "general" or
nonvocational subjects such as sciences, social sciences, humanities, and
moral and physical education.'"
The general curriculum of vocational schools is perhaps understandable
given many Koreans' intense desire that their children receive a university
education. Vocational students often do not give up hopes of entering uni-
versities. Although education in a vocational high school usually leads chil-
dren to postsecondary vocational education or the labor market, it does
not rule out entrance to a four-year college or university program.
RELATIVE COSTS OF ACADEMIC AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION. With so
much overlap between the curriculum of vocational and academic schools,
it would be surprising to observe large differences in unit costs. Nonethe-
less, it appears that vocational education is about three times more expen-
sive than academic education, although the school fees are the same.
Therefore, even if vocational school graduates fare better in the labor mar-
ket than those with academic high school diplomas, these higher costs im-
ply that the social benefit-cost ratio could still be lower for vocational
education. Because the higher labor market returns to vocational educa-
tion are captured largely by the individual, this may also be considered a
reason to charge higher tuition fees for vocational students.
But there are reasons to doubt the claim that vocational education pro-
duces a better, quicker match between workers and jobs. Ihm and others
(1992, 1993) find, for example, that vocational graduates do not stay long
in their first job. This seems to be a result of poor working conditions, lack
of promotion opportunities, and a distaste for menial and repetitive tasks,
which do not necessarily require three years of technical education.
"DUAL SYSTEM" EXPERIMENTS. As the pace of economic transformation
of the economy has picked up, Korean vocational schools have faced in-
creased pressures to ensure that vocational education is relevant (that is,
has strong ties to employers). To facilitate this, the dual system was launched
in 1994 with German technical assistance. It is called the "2+1" program
because two years of vocational education in schools are followed by one
year of field training with a firm. Twenty technical schools with about
3,200 students participated in the pilot program in 1995. Although the
new system is called "dual" (Chang and Y. Kim 1995), it only loosely re-
sembles the much-vaunted German system of VET in which trainees usu-
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ally attend school and work as apprentices during all three years. (See chap-
ter 19 in this volume for a description of the German dual system.) Unlike
in the German system, the vocational school in the Korean system is re-
sponsible for instruction on the factory floor; even though companies par-
ticipate in the program, they do not have any responsibility for training.
The 2+1 system is not without controversy. The Presidential Commis-
sion on Educational Reform has suggested that the 2+1 program be viewed
as one way to reform vocational education. If past experience is a guide, it
may be difficult to sustain the program given Korea's industrial and labor
relations. A similar experiment by the Ministry of Labor between 1980
and 1986 to introduce "cooperative training" between KOMAs vocational
training institutes and firms failed to result in increased training of appren-
tices. Personnel managers did not perceive major differences between the
skills of graduates of cooperative training and of other training institutes,
and trainees reported no benefits from participation in the experiment.
The apprentices were used mainly as low-wage labor Ueong 1995). Per-
haps anticipating this problem, the designers of the 2+1 program have lim-
ited the role of employers in the practical training component to allowing
use of the plant and machinery. Therefore, the program cannot be classi-
fied as an apprenticeship scheme. This may compromise the main objec-
tive of the program-namely, to improve the relevance of training in a
rapidly changing work environment by strengthening linkages between
schools and employers.
SHARE OF PRIVATE SECTOR IN FINANCE AND PROVISION. Korea's public
expenditure patterns for education are cited the world over as an example
of good practice. Public expenditures are concentrated at primary and jun-
ior secondary levels, senior secondary education is financed almost equally
from public and private funds, and higher education is financed more by
the private sector than by the government. Policymakers have allowed pri-
vate provision of education to proliferate at all levels of education, but
especially at the higher levels. While this has some drawbacks (for example,
Korea's policies for regulating higher education may have compromised
quality objectives), Korea's public expenditure patterns are praised and rec-
ommended to other countries as "best practice."
In fact, the system of financing is somewhat more complicated than a
quick look at the share of private provision at each level might suggest. The
distinction between public and private provision of education is blurred in
Korea, and it is easy to misinterpret statistics on private and public provi-
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TABLE 9-3
Share of Private Enrollment, by School Level and Type,
Selected Years, 1965-94
(percent)
Elementary Middle High school Junior college
lear school school Academic Vocational and university
11965 1 44 59 39 73
1970 1 49 60 48 67
1975 1 41 60 52 70
1980 1 39 62 57 74
1985 1 32 60 62 76
1990 1 29 62 62 78
1994 2 24 63 58 80
Source: KEDI (1994).
sion as indicators of cost sharing. Table 9-3 shows that the share of private
enrollment by school level is exactly what is widely reported and praised:
private provision is almost nonexistent at the primary level, and it rises to
about 80 percent in higher education.
But this observation does not reflect the rather unique nature of Korea's
system of education finance. Parents pay tuition fees in both public and
private schools, but these fees are tightly regulated. Private schools-which
do not have the option to increase fees to meet increases in operation costs-
receive government support, mainly for paying teachers' salaries (which are
also regulated). Table 9-4 summarizes this subsidization by the govern-
ment. In 1994 the share of government spending going to public schools
wras almost 100 percent at the elementary level, 80 percent in middle school,
about 50 percent in high school, and only about 20 percent in higher edu-
cation. At the high school level, there is little difference between vocational
and academic education, other than the fact that public provision is greater
for vocational education. This pattern-the government shouldering a larger
share of the cost of education at lower levels-has become steadily stronger
since 1970.
Despite these efforts to eliminate differences between private and public
provision of education, public schools have greater access to Ministry of
Education funds. This generally implies that public schools are better
equipped or have smaller class sizes. These restrictions on private schools
276 HIGH-GROWTH ECONOMIES
TABLE 9-4
Government Expenditures on Education, by Level and Type,
Selected Years, 1970-94
(billions of won, current prices)
Higher
Elementary school Middle school High school education
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Year Total private Total private Total private Total private
1970 68 1.8 32 50.0 19 55.3 28 72.1
1975 148 1.8 81 43.0 82 53.5 83 66.3
1980 671 1.8 389 32.9 424 51.6 535 68.6
1985 1,565 1.5 834 29.1 856 56.3 1,363 73.7
1990 2,757 1.4 1,591 24.5 1,797 49.6 2,378 73.3
1994 4,452 1.5 2,976 21.2 3,239 48.7 5,174 78.7
Note: Percent private indicates the share of the government budget going to private schools
and colleges.
Source: KEDI (1994).
may in part explain why student-teacher ratios are significantly higher in
private schools for all levels of education than in public schools.
Vocational Training Institutes
In 1967 a national training system was formally established with the enact-
ment of the Vocational Training Law. This was followed in 1973 by the
National Technical Qualification Law, which set up a system of skill certi-
fication. Laws enacted in 1976 introduced and formalized obligatory in-
plant vocational training and established a Vocational Training Promotion
Fund that was financed through a training levy on firms that did not meet
stipulated training requirements. In 1982 the Korea Manpower Agency
was founded as the training arm of the Ministry of Labor Affairs. Finally,
in 1989 the Korea Institute for Technology and Education was established
for higher-level technical training. In 1994 the public vocational training
system was reorganized as part of general reforms in the education sector.
By 1995 almost 500 vocational training institutes were providing train-
ing at various levels for a broad range of occupations. KOMA is in charge
of 38 public vocational training institutes. They aim to provide skills that
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are commonly needed by industry but cannot be met through in-plant
training and skills needed for export-oriented trades. The central govern-
ment administers 38 vocational training institutes, largely for prisoners.
Local governments manage 8 vocational training institutes that mostly ad-
minister training programs for unemployed youth and women seeking to
increase their incomes. The remainder are in-plant centers (250) and autho-
rized training centers (138) run by nonprofit organizations and private sec-
tor firms. Between 1988 and 1993, almost 2 million persons attended
training courses in these institutions: about 27 percent in public training
institutes, 16 percent in authorized centers, and 57 percent in in-plant
facilities, according to the Korea Manpower Agency.
PUBLIC VOCATIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES. The Korea Manpower Agency
administers 38 vocational training institutes, 12 master's colleges, and the
Korea Institute for Technology and Education. These institutions together
certify about 26,000 craftsmen and master craftsmen annually in almost
100 trades. Between 1988 and 1993, the number of trainees rose from
21,000 to about 26,000. More than 95 percent were trained at the level of
craftsman (Ministry of Labor 1993), and more than 90 percent of the train-
ees were men. All training expenses are fully paid for by the government.
The main clientele of the vocational training institutes are out-of-school
youth. These institutes also provide training for employed workers wishing
tO upgrade their skills. Programs in the vocational training institutes last
between one month and three years. For basic training, a six-month pro-
gram leads to certification as an assistant craftsman, a one-year program
leads to certification as a Class II craftsman, and programs lasting two to
three years qualify workers as a Class I craftsman. Skill upgrade programs
are tailored more specifically to the firms' or workers' needs (Ministry of
Labor 1993).
Trainees from vocational training centers reportedly had a high rate of
placement in the 1970s and 1980s-about 90 percent between 1974 and
1981 (Takeda 1992). But this may not be a stellar performance: at that
time unemployment rates for labor force participants between the ages of
15 and 24 were no higher than 15 percent (KLI 1994). These institutes
provide substantial financial support to their trainees and are quite expen-
sive to maintain.
It is now believed that public vocational training institutes would have
dLone better to help employed workers upgrade their skills than to help
unemployed youth find suitable employment. The Presidential Commis-
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TABLE 9-5
Number of Authorized Training Centers and Trainees, 1987-94
Year Centers Trainees
1987 54 9,258
1988 73 10,335
1989 58 21,671
1990 69 17,571
1991 52 24,249
1992 62 30,276
1993 71 35,677
1994 138 48,247
Source: Ministry of Labor.
sion on Education Reform examined the functioning of these institutes
and concluded that there was considerable overlap in the clientele and func-
tions of these institutes and the vocational schools under the Ministry of
Education. Contrary to their original mission, the training institutes un-
der the Ministry of Labor have increasingly emphasized the vocational edu-
cation of students, rather than retraining and upgrading of the skills of
currently employed workers.
AUTHORIZED TRAINING CENTERS. In 1994 there were 138 training cen-
ters authorized or approved by the Ministry of Labor. The number of au-
thorized centers fluctuates considerably from year to year, indicating either
the very short-lived nature of these organizations or sharp changes in the
approval rates by the ministry. Enrollment has increased steadily, growing
more than fivefold since 1987 (table 9-5). These centers, usually run by
nonprofit organizations, provide training for trades that are not catered to
by public and in-plant training, such as cooking, hairdressing, wallpaper-
ing, and teletypewriting (Ministry of Labor 1993). In a subsector that ca-
ters to males, these organizations are exceptional in that their clientele is
largely female.
Enterprise-Based Training
The main law governing employer-provided training is the Vocational Train-
ing Law, based broadly on the premise that left to themselves, firms will
not train "enough" to meet national growth and equity objectives. Besides
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laying out the conditions of the training promotion levy, the law forms the
basis for government incentives to increase in-plant training. The Voca-
tional Training Law has been amended several times. In addition, the Skill
Encouragement Law was enacted in 1989 to exhort employers to provide
more training, and to admonish Korean society to accord more prestige to
craftspeople and technicians, relative to professionals.
TRAINING INCENTIVES AND LEVIES. A number of incentives are offered
to employers to conduct in-plant training. First, employers who offer or
intend to offer this training can get low-interest loans (below annual mar-
ket rates) and long-term loans (a 10-year repayment term, with a five-year
grace period) for up to 90 percent of the cost of training facilities. Second,
local revenue laws exempt employers whose training conforms with the
Vocational Training Law from local acquisition, registration, property, and
land taxes. Third, under certain conditions, up to 10 percent of the train-
ing costs is deductible from annual corporation or income taxes. Finally,
repayments of bank loans taken for in-plant training are considered as pay-
ment toward a training levy, which is levied on larger employers.
The system of incentives may have been effective initially. From 1968,
when the government introduced a system of subsidies for in-plant train-
ing, until 1971, when the subsidy was (temporarily) discontinued, the num-
ber of trainees grew steadily. In 1974 the government made in-plant training
compulsory for firms with more than 500 employees, and the number of
trainees rose sharply from 13,000 to a peak of 96,820 by 1976. In 1976 the
government expanded the coverage to include all firms with more than
300 employees, but it provided firms with an option to pay a levy instead
of providing the training." The Office of Labor Affairs stipulated stringent
conditions for what constituted "recognized training," and the levy was
used mainly to subsidize public and joint training institutes through the
Training Promotion Fund. The number of registered trainees declined to
15,000 in 1989 (table 9-6), despite an increase in the levy from about
12,000 won in 1977 to almost 100,000 won in 1985. About one-third of
covered firms opted to pay the levy instead, sometimes even when they
were providing in-house training (Takeda 1992). In 1990 the coverage was
expanded to include all firms with more than 150 employees. The govern-
ment also tried to simplify the requirements, but the levy system failed to
promote in-plant training.
In part, this failure can be attributed to the complicated rules for deter-
mining the training requirements, the levy, and the criteria for approval.
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TABLE 9-6
Rate and Coverage of the Training Levy, 1977-91
Percentage Number
Rate Covered of training of training Number
Year (percent) firms centers centers of trainees
1977 5.70 1,012 66.5 558 58,709
1978 6.20 1,095 70.7 553 73,038
1979 6.70 1,223 59.1 575 90,992
1980 3.14 1,103 60.7 472 66,213
1981 4.13 1,103 44.0 388 48,406
1982 2.44 1,106 45.8 283 30,131
1983 1.78 1,185 32.2 172 20,960
1984 1.82 1,263 21.1 182 22,011
1985 1.73 1,341 38.7 185 23,876
1986 1.63 1,398 25.5 179 19,042
1987 0.17 1,537 20.6 130 14,208
1988 0.20 1,573 25.6 132 18,168
1989 0.18 1,612 24.3 110 15,019
1990 0.30 2,575 19.6 122 25,690
1991 0.48 2,675 18.9 147 52,566
Note: The coverage was of firms with more than 300 employees between 1977 and 1989
and of firms with more than 150 employees after 1989. The levy was calculated as a speci-
fied percentage of salaries of workers on permanent contracts until 1986. From 1986 to
1991, the levy was assessed as a fraction of the total wages paid.
Source: KEDI (1994).
For example, the formula for calculating the compulsory training ratio is
quite nontransparent. The training levy is based on unit costs of training
by the Ministry of Labor, but the ministry has considerable power to raise
or lower the levy arbitrarily. Regarding the content and duration of enter-
prise-sponsored training, the laws were even more intrusive. Employers
were required to submit annual in-service training plans to the ministry for
its approval, the training had to have a substantial theoretical component,
and the courses had to be at least six months long to be approved (Kim
1987). With all these restrictions, it is hardly surprising that in spite of
huge increases in the levy (for example, from 11,500 won in 1981 to 98,000
won in 1986), many employers chose to pay the levy instead.
Beginning July 1, 1995, the coverage of the training levy was reduced to
manufacturing firms with more than 1,000 employees, and the levy may
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be repealed entirely soon. Claims of poaching by large firms remain wide-
spread, and this is cited as a reason to continue the levy, not as a device to
encourage training (which it does not appear to do) but as a mechanism for
redistributing resources from large firms to small firms.
Employers that opted to train in conformity with Ministry of Labor
stipulations could provide in-plant training, they could arrange coopera-
tiLve training with other employers, or they could commission a third party
to do the training. The number of firms doing independent training has
declined over time, while those cooperating with other firms has remained
relatively constant (Kim 1987).
COSTS. As in other countries, it is difficult to obtain cost figures for in-
service training. One study of vocational high schools (three-year programs),
public vocational training institutes (one-year programs), and in-service
training (varying duration) found that the cost per trainee was lowest for
in-plant training and highest for vocational high schools (Lee 1985). But
since the education and experience of trainees are likely to be quite differ-
ent for these three training modes, such comparisons are at best suggestive.
NEW APPROACH. It is now acknowledged that the government interfered
too strongly in the content and duration of in-service training: this forced
firms to undertake suboptimal training but did not increase private train-
ing expenditures. Korea's lessons in this regard are valuable for countries
considering the adoption or expansion of training levies. Korea's new ap-
proach to enterprise training marks a retreat from relatively coercive mea-
sures (based on a training levy, exemptions, and attempts to tightly regulate
training activities) to a noninterventionist system of broad tax incentives
and balanced regulations.
P'ressures to Reform VET
Korea is experiencing pressures from two sides to reform its vocational
cducation and training: labor-related pressures and education-related pres-
sures. Policymakers perceive a tightening labor market for technicians that
is reflected in a narrowing of wage differentials between the graduates of
junior colleges and universities and those of technical secondary schools.
This is seen by some as a signal for expanding vocational education. Gen-
eral secondary schooling has virtually been reduced to a vehicle to prepare
pupils for the college entrance examination. Preoccupied with making sure
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that human resource development policies meet "industrial manpower
needs," policymakers have paid less attention to individual or social de-
mand for higher education. In this social contest, and given the rapid eco-
nomic growth from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, policymakers view
VET as the key to reducing the pressure on universities to enroll great
numbers and to meeting a "shortage" of skilled and semiskilled workers,
especially technicians.
The Uncurbed Demandfor Higher Education
Although the main goal of VET policies was always to meet industrial
demands, once Korea reached near universal secondary enrollment,
policymakers began using vocational tracking in high schools to limit en-
try to higher education. The underlying belief was that if this appetite of
Koreans for higher education was left unchecked, there would be a "sur-
plus" of college graduates in the labor market. Manpower requirement pro-
jections indicated this, and the higher rates of unemployment for graduates
of academic high schools and colleges appeared to confirm it. Given the
willingness of Korean parents to pay for their children's higher education,
the supply of college places would hardly be a check. In other words, a
private sector supply response would be forthcoming.
Vocational schools are seen as second-best by parents after academic
schools, "even though the employability of vocational high school gradu-
ates in Seoul and Pusan has been better than for academic high school
graduates" (Sorensen 1994), and even though graduate unemployment re-
mains relatively high. One reason for this is that socialprestige is consider-
ably enhanced by attending university (table 9-7). To give their children
some hope of getting into college, parents have pressured authorities to
keep adding general subjects to vocational school curricula. Presumably
this is a rational decision on the part of the parents and pupils in terms of
balancing social and job prospects.
Efforts by Korean policymakers to curb this "social" demand for educa-
tion have not succeeded, despite a decline in the relative wages of more
educated workers. In 1975 those with a middle school diploma or less
earned a quarter of what college graduates earned; by 1993 this ratio had
changed to one-half. This is reinforced by a higher rate of unemployment
among academic secondary graduates who cannot pursue higher studies,
and among the graduates of both two-year and four-year postsecondary
programs. The differences in annual earnings between university graduates
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TABLE 9-7
The Purpose of Educating Children According to Korean Parents, 1993
(percentage of responses)
Sons Daughters
Overall Overall
Purpose education College education College
Character and culture 35 43 35 43
Job 37 28 13 8
Improvement of nature 14 20 21 28
Marital advantage 9 8 26 19
Compensation for education 6 1 5 1
Other 0 1 0 1
Source: KEDI (1994).
and high school graduates have narrowed."2 Nevertheless, they remain con-
siderable and continue to rise: between 1980 and 1992, wages rose 3.2
times for those with a junior college degree or more.'3 In part, of course,
this demand for higher education is attributable to its considerable non-
labor-market benefits (table 9-7).
Inefficient Public Training Institutes
Academic high school graduates (and high school dropouts) who cannot get
admission into a university or junior college are trained for up to three years
at vocational training centers run by the Ministry of Labor. The training is
free of charge, with additional financial support determined by a means test.
In the 1970s and 1980s, when unemployment rates were relatively high,
these training centers were pressed to address the problem of youth unem-
ployment. By the mid-1990s, however, this problem had diminished, largely
because of the impressive economic performance and absolute declines in
the school-age population. The role, costs, and effectiveness of these cen-
ters then began to be questioned.
No rigorous evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of these centers is avail-
able. With declining numbers of trainees, these institutes are now compet-
ing with vocational schools and junior colleges for students. In 1995 the
Presidential Commission on Educational Reform addressed the possibility
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of consolidating vocational schools and training institutes (under the min-
istries of education and labor, respectively) into one administrative body in
order to increase efficiency and cost-saving. The commission's subcommit-
tee on vocational education recommended that the training institutes con-
centrate on upgrading the skills of workers who are already employed, rather
than providing pre-employment training.
Unsuccessful Legislative Measures
Since the 1 960s, Korea has experimented with various measures to increase
in-plant training. Large firms were exhorted to provide in-plant training,
and they were forced to pay a levy if they did not or if their training did not
meet government regulations. This mandate applied initially to firms with
at least 500 employees, but the coverage was later expanded to firms larger
than 300, then to firms with more than 150 employees, and finally to firms
with more than 1,000 employees. The levy itself has varied, from almost 7
percent of payroll to less than half percent. The measure is now recognized
to be ineffective in increasing training by firms.
Recent Policy Reforms: Constraints and Innovations
The government's efforts to reform VET faced constraints shared by many
developing countries: first, a manpower projections approach to
decisionmaking that reflected an interventionist stance on matters con-
cerning education and training; second, problems in keeping VET institu-
tions relevant in a rapidly growing economy; and third, a strong social
demand for higher education.
Principal Constraints
Until the 1997 crisis, labor market trends indicated scarcities of lower-level
skilled and temporary workers and a "surplus" of white-collar workers. There
was also a structural imbalance between the demand for graduates in the
scientific and technical fields, on the one hand, and the excess supply in the
area of nontechnical and liberal arts, on the other. These imbalances may
be related to the fact that the government intervenes in the admission pro-
cess by setting quotas for different program fields, based on demand and
supply forecasted using manpower planning techniques. The reluctance to
shift from this approach has proved to be a major constraint.
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Efforts to vocationalize secondary schools met serious obstacles. There
was the difficulty in funding costly facilities and equipment for existing
and new vocational schools to accommodate an increased quota of voca-
itional students. There was also the problem of justifying the practice of
:forcing children into the vocational track. Parents and children clearly fa-
vored the general track, which kept the way open for university education.
Many middle school graduates are still reluctant to enter vocational high
schools, because of their desire to go on to a university education, and
because of the relatively poor quality of instruction in vocational schools.
Not surprisingly, the number of students enrolled in vocational high
schools has declined. The strong, perhaps even exaggerated, social demand
for higher education is a factor, but so too is the relevance and quality of
the instruction received. These institutions had difficulty attracting stu-
dents despite narrowing wage differentials between university graduates
and vocational high school graduates. Problems also have occurred in the
employment and utilization of the graduates of vocational programs.
Though the rate of employment in recent years has improved, at least at
the initial entry point upon graduation, many graduates do not stay long
in their first job.
Vocational Schools and Institutes:
Proposals of the Presidential Commission
The Korean government, since 1991, has introduced various measures to
strengthen the VET system. The most distinctive effort has been to re-
structure the secondary school system toward greater vocationalization. The
plan called to drastically reduce the enrollment quota of students in the
general and humanities track and increase the proportion of vocational
track students. Also, special vocational classes attached to general high
schools were expanded for humanities students who wanted vocational
education. The period from 1990 to 1995 was characterized by an uncom-
fortable contradiction: vocational/technical education, the sector of edu-
cation with seemingly the lowest social demand, was expanded in response
to government perceptions that it produced workers who were in high
demand in the labor market.
In 1994 and 1995 the Presidential Commission for Educational Re-
form deliberated whether expanding vocational enrollments and encour-
aging closer industry-school linkages was an effective way to respond to
labor market trends. By the end of 1995, it had decided that the on-going
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vocationalization effort was not adequate and that some of the earlier policy
approaches taken were inappropriate. The judgment of the commission
was that expanding enrollment in existing vocational programs would not
be effective in luring students and parents away from the university race. It
was clear that existing vocational school programs did not provide "real"
and attractive alternatives to students. And since the vocational track is a
dead end, it is unpopular.
Changes proposed by the presidential commission imply a shift from
rigid and uniform government control of secondary schools to less coer-
cive policies, and efforts to redesign vocational education to conform to
social conditions rather than the other way round. The commission stated
that the new system would diversify student choice and make vocational
education more attractive to consumers. This emphasis on delivery qual-
ity-rather than quantitative targets-and an adequate supply response
are the fundamental themes reflected in the commission's specific recom-
mendations.
EMPHASIZING QUALITY TO ELICIT GREATER DEMAND. Recognizing that
demand will rise if the quality of education improves, the commission pro-
posed the following:
* Diversified programs. One way to improve quality in the provision
and management of vocational programs is to diversify programs and in-
stitutions to better accommodate the changing needs of the industry and
students.
i Specialized high schools. One of the commission's proposals is the es-
tablishment of specialized vocational high schools. Existing vocational high
schools will be encouraged to upgrade to specialized high school status.'4
Specialized high schools will have up-to-date facilities and be easily acces-
sible by public transportation. Proposed measures include improving the
external conditions of the school building, playground, and minimum land
area. These specialized high schools will allow students, early in their lives,
to consider their interests and talents in deciding their future and help
them develop marketable competencies in specialized skill areas (for in-
stance, electronic communications, design, popular music). Freed from
various regulations imposed on other schools, specialized vocational schools
will be given privileges to design programs and select their students. Gradu-
ates of specialized vocational schools will be exempt from the requirements
of scholastic aptitude test results for college admission, if they apply in the
same major field area.
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* Further education for vocational graduates and workers. To attract stu-
dents into secondary-level vocational programs, opportunities will be ex-
panded for vocational secondary school completers to continue their
education. Exempting admission exam scores for entry into junior techni-
cal colleges and other vocational institutions of higher education is an ex-
ample. Among the innovative programs proposed in this regard is the
introduction of a "new college" system to be built on the actual work sites.
A business or a consortium of employers may establish a college program,
which would allow workers to earn a college-level degree while employed.
Lectures for basic courses and theory will be offered through distance learn-
ing technology, and on-site duty will count as lab credits.
FACILITATING AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY RESPONSE. The commission has also
recommended the following to ensure that the supply response is adequate:
* Integration of vocational and academic curricula. Schools that wish to
do so can integrate the curricula of vocational and general high schools.
This will give students a wider selection of courses irrespective of their
fields of study. Schools that integrate and operate both types of curricula
will minimize the number of compulsory courses that students must take
and increase the number of elective courses. The commission has suggested
that integrated schools provide open curricula in which the school curricula
are linked to area training institutes or technical schools for lab facilities.
* Deregulation. Rigid and uniform regulations and criteria for school
charters will be greatly relaxed to allow flexibility in management and uti-
lization of innovative types of vocational programs and new schools. Build-
ing, facilities, and land requirements will be eased and simplified. Equipment
requirements will be strengthened instead. In addition, distance learning
technology will be expanded for area vocational schools.
* Changes in teacher certification. To improve the quality of vocational
programs, a more open system of teacher certification and appointment is
proposed. The recruitment and appointment of vocational teachers will be
deregulated and diversified by inviting experienced personnel from indus-
tries to teach. Retired but experienced and competent individuals with tech-
nical expertise will be given teaching qualification. To upgrade the quality
of education for vocational high schools, industry personnel with field ex-
pertise will be invited to conduct practice-oriented classes. Also, vocational
teachers will be sent to companies for field experience.
* Expandedfinancial supportfor vocational high schools and students. As
the result of a recommendation by the Presidential Commission for Edu-
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cation Reform in 1995, the education budget was expanded to 5 percent of
gross national product from about 3.7 percent. Priority was given to voca-
tional programs in allocating the funds that have been increased. The new
funding was used to upgrade lab conditions, innovate programs, and at-
tract students with scholarships.
* More in-plant trainingprograms. The commission recommended other
means to encourage firms to establish in-plant training programs. It hoped
to reduce the government's role in training and increase the role by the
private sector. The scope of school-industry cooperation will be extended
to provide students of vocational high schools with on-the-job training.
The 2+1 system will be adjusted so that the duration, time, and type of
training will become flexible.
Enterprise Training
Research at the Korea Labor Institute indicated that the levy had been inef-
fective in raising the incidence and amount of training. After several changes,
the coverage of the training levy was reduced in July 1995 to manufactur-
ing firms with more than 1,000 workers. The levy on large firms was main-
tained at least in part because it was believed that they "poach" the best
(namely, most trained) workers from small and medium-size firms, though
there is no rigorous evidence to substantiate this claim. The levy is ex-
pected to be eliminated soon. Korea introduced an unemployment insur-
ance system in 1995, and vocational training was integrated into this system.
The previous beneficiaries of the training levy were primarily the public
training centers of the Korea Manpower Agency. They will have to be funded
from the unemployment insurance levy or from general funds, or they must
raise finances from students and employers.
The reduction in the levy's coverage and a reevaluation of its role signal
a slow retreat from coercive policies to increase training in the workplace.
Calls on the Ministry of Labor to focus on occupational upgrading of cur-
rently employed workers (rather than on training secondary school stu-
dents) should also be seen in the light of this retreat.
Lessons from Korea's Experience
Korea's experience with VET is distinctive for two reasons: its high share of
private involvement in provision and financing at all stages of develop-
ment, and its rare willingness-compared with most other developing coun-
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tries-to conduct a hard-nosed evaluation of its policies and to discon-
tinue those that are revealed to be ineffective.
These features make Korea's VET system an invaluable "model" for other
countries to study. Rather than blindly emulating Korea, they can learn
what strategies are effective at various stages of institutional and economic
development and under differing labor market conditions. Korea's experi-
ence with vocational and technical education and training offers specific
lessons with regard to the sequencing of government policies, the difficulty
of encouraging private sector participation, and the limits of government
involvement.
Sequencing
By design or by coincidence, Korea invested in vocational education (at the
senior secondary level) only after achieving universal primary education.
Even when vocational and technical high school enrollments were expand-
ing, their share remained below 40 percent of total senior secondary enroll-
ment. Postsecondary vocational education expanded after near universal
secondary enrollment was attained. Even so, the structure of vocational
education has to be restructured to reflect changes in economic conditions
and the demand of students.
The government encouraged the establishment of vocational training
centers outside of formal education. These centers specialized in short courses
of up to one year for people with junior secondary schooling. In fact, many
of the trainees had higher levels of schooling and work experience.
A similar pattern applies for governmental initiatives to encourage in-
service training. Measures to increase in-service training were taken after
the working population had achieved high levels of literacy. By the mid-
1960s, when the first initiatives were taken, the labor force was largely
literate, and almost all new entrants had at least a primary education. The
working population without formal education had declined from 40 per-
cent in 1946 to 6 percent in 1960; illiteracy rates had fallen from 78 per-
cent in 1945 to 28 percent in 1960, to 12 percent in 1970. Students and
workers in VET programs thus had a sound education base, which means
high levels of trainability.
Private-Public Partnership
The private sector in Korea has always borne a large share of the cost of
VET, either through fees charged in publicly provided education, or through
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direct provision in schools, training centers, and firms. While the govern-
ment provides financial support for public and (to some extent) private
schools and colleges, over 40 percent of junior secondary schools were pri-
vate until the mid- 1970s, and private sector participation was even greater
for higher levels of vocational education.
The private share of commercial secondary schools grew from 57 per-
cent in 1969 to 71 percent in 1981 and that of technical secondary schools
increased from 40 to 46 percent during this period. To a lesser extent, firms
also gave financial support and equipment to schools and to employees
enrolling in these schools. While the government established some insti-
tutes, its main contribution was to monitor instruction quality.
Limits of Government Involvement
Because of these investments in education and training, the large wage
differentials between college graduates and workers without a high school
diploma that existed in the 1970s fell by half by 1993. But Korea's appetite
for education remains unsatisfied. There is a strong demand for better quality
and more education, and Korea's policymakers-fearing either
"overeducation" or a mismatch between the economy's needs and the out-
put of the education system-have tried to curb this demand using ques-
tionable interventionist strategies.
For example, in 1975, worried about the adverse social effects of com-
petition among parents to enroll their children in a small number of good
schools, policymakers instituted a system in which elementary school
completers were allocated to junior secondary schools through a lottery. In
the 1980s, when secondary education had expanded to near universal enroll-
ment, the government outlawed private tutoring at the senior secondary
school level to reduce the advantage wealthy families had in getting their
children placed in the top public universities. But these changes have had
only limited success in meeting their objectives. Besides, with greater democ-
ratization, similarly intrusive measures may no longer be a viable option.
Korea's experience encouraging enterprise-based training also provides
important lessons on what the government can and cannot do. In 1968 the
government introduced a system of subsidies for in-plant training. The
number of trainees grew steadily until 1971, when the subsidy was discon-
tinued. In 1974 the government made in-plant training compulsory for
firms with more than 500 employees, and the number of trainees rose sharply
to a peak of 96,820 trainees by 1976. That year the government expanded
the coverage to include all firms with more than 300 employees, but it
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provided firms with an option to pay a levy instead of providing the train-
ing. The Office of Labor Affairs stipulated stringent conditions for what
constituted "training." The number of registered trainees declined to 15,000
in 1989. Despite an eightfold increase in the levy between 1977 and 1985,
about one-third of covered firms opted to pay it. In July 1995 the coverage
was reduced to firms with more than 1,000 workers, after evaluations indi-
cated that the levy had been ineffective in raising the incidence and amount
of training.
Conclusion
Korea's approach to VET illustrates a general strength in policymaking
that contributed to its stellar economic performance until the mid-1990s:
the willingness to evaluate whether policy actions were effective, and to
alter or abandon efforts if they were less than satisfactory. For example,
government efforts to promote enterprise-based training have been criti-
c ally evaluated, and the policies changed quite often in the face of evidence
Of their ineffectiveness.
Procedures for selection to higher education have been repeatedly changed
as previous practices have been evaluated and found inadequate for meet-
iing either equity or efficiency objectives. Although some countries would
have been content with the results that Korea's policies have yielded, the
government appointed a Presidential Commission on Education Reform
ito re-examine all aspects of education and training so that Korea's changing
demands for skilled workers would be met more efficiently and equitably.
Korea's most recent VET policies signal a retreat from a relatively coer-
cive approach that involved quantitative targets (for example, in vocational
tracking in secondary education), forced contributions from the private
sector (for example, the training levy), and exhorted private firms and indi-
viduals to conform with governmental objectives. The new approach takes
,ocietal and employer preferences as given, emphasizes quality (for instance,
in the case of vocational schools), and relies on realigning government fund-
ing mechanisms to improve VET outcomes.
Notes
1. The source of all of these statistics is KLI (1994).
2. Special attention to technical education came in the early 1970s, when voca-
tional schools were established in conjunction with the government's plans to move
into heavy industry and the chemical industry (Sorensen 1994).
292 HIGH-GROWTH ECONOMIES
3. The Presidential Commission on Educational Reform has deliberated at
length on these issues.
4. The data were supplied by the National Statistical Office in 1995.
5. On-the-job training of already employed workers was encouraged by policy
measures to increase in-service training in private enterprises. These measures in-
cluded apprenticeships and financial incentives to train workers, as well as coercive
measures. Korea's attempts to increase in-service training are particularly interest-
ing for countries that believe that governments must actively encourage training of
workers by private firms.
6. This is because in most countries, the educated generally come from wealthier
families and can finance longer periods of unemployment, and because finding a
good skill-job match is more difficult in educated occupations.
7. The national government ran 38 training centers for prison inmates.
8. In the construction sector, the cutoff limit was based on the size of business
(sales/turnover) in the previous year. The levy was established under the Vocational
Training Promotion Fund Law enacted in 1976.
9. There are supplementary (nontraditional) vocational schools (such as civic,
trade, correspondence, and other schools), but they are regarded as nonformal
institutions that are a part of social education. These schools had an enrollment of
more than 200,000 in the early 1990s; two-thirds of the students were female. We
do not discuss these supplementary vocational schools in this chapter.
10. In the early 1990s general secondary schools were instructed to expand the
teaching of vocational subjects and to strengthen their ties with vocational training
centers run by the Ministry of Labor.
11. The covered sectors are mining, manufacturing, construction, utilities, ser-
vices, transportation, communications, and warehousing. For construction firms,
the size is calculated by seeing if the contract amount is equivalent to the stipulated
employment size (Kim 1987).
12. The ratio of earnings declined from about 2.1 in 1975 to about 1.6 in 1995.
13. Wages for workers with a middle school diploma or less rose 5.5 times and
4.3 times for high school graduates.
14. The Ministry of Education commissioned a national project to develop
specific details on standards and policy guidelines for newly proposed schools.
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Chile
ALEJANDRA Cox EDWARDS
SINCE 1990 CHILE'S gross domestic product per capita
has grown by about 5 percent annually. Open unemployment rates fell
from more than 20 percent in the early 1980s to less than 6 percent today.
Between 1984 and 1994 average real wages grew by 28 percent. By 1995,
aided by a system of targeted transfers, headcount poverty had fallen to
about half of what it had been in the early 1980s. By 1997 gross national
product per capita was US$5,022, and during the first half of 1998 em-
ployment growth was 5.4 percent. Chile's performance in improving the
most basic labor-market indicators and reducing poverty is impressive and,
unfortunately, rare outside of East Asia.
Background
Chile's reliance on market-friendly, outward-oriented economic policies
has been credited with these successes. However, the successes have also
invited closer scrutiny of other outcomes of these policies. In particular,
observers have questioned whether economic success as measured by aver-
age magnitudes-such as per capita income, average labor earnings, and
job creation-mask important socioeconomic failures, as indicated by grow-
ing inequality in the distribution of income and in the quality of social
services such as education and health. Indeed, some observers foresee a
frightening possibility in 20 years, with Chile being transformed into a
booming economy atop a sea of unskilled and underpaid citizens. The
combination of an open economy and a flexible labor market is seen by
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some to be the cause of growing socioeconomic ills, especially income in-
equality. They argue that international trade has led to widening differen-
tials in earnings between the poor and the rich, and that labor market reforms
have prevented the disadvantaged from stemming this tide.
Increasing or high inequality of earnings can slow growth and may in-
duce reversal of earlier reforms, especially the reform of labor legislation.
Accordingly, the government is concerned about this development. How-
ever, the distribution of income did not worsen between 1987 and 1994.
Nevertheless, Chile remains a highly unequal economy despite government
efforts to provide targeted assistance to the poorest households (Ferreira
and Litchfield 1996). Gill and Montenegro (forthcoming) find that labor
earnings have, in fact, become less unequal since the early 1990s. The gov-
ernment has been appropriately cautious about changing labor laws, but it
views education and training as a major instrument to help poor segments
reap some of the reward of economic prosperity. Vocational education and
training-traditionally the forms of investment in human capital most rel-
evant for poor segments in countries that have attained near universal pri-
mary enrollment-occupied an important part of the debate in Chile in
the 1990s.
Patterns and Trends in Labor Earnings and Unemployment
Between 1992 and 1994, average labor earnings for all workers fell by 1.7
percent. Earnings for the lowest three decile groups fell between 2 and 5
percent. The ratio of earnings of the richest to the poorest group stayed
steady at about 14. These findings suggest that inequality in earnings re-
mained roughly constant between 1987 and 1992, with some redistribu-
tion away from the richest 10 percent and poorest 30 percent of households
and toward the middle and upper-middle classes between 1992 and 1994.
Naturally, labor earnings are observed only for those who work. Unem-
ployment may be an important determinant of a household's relative posi-
tion in the per capita income distribution. Changes in unemployment rates
are important in explaining short-term fluctuations in the income distri-
bution through losses in the share of the poorest households.
In Chile, as expected, unemployment is significantly correlated with
being in a poor household for both men and women: workers in the poor-
est 10 percent of households are almost four times more likely to be unem-
ployed than the average worker. This ratio does not change significantly
over the years, indicating that unemployment is always critical in deter-
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mining household income, the variable used to classify households into the
decile groups (Gill and Montenegro forthcoming).
Short-term fluctuations in unemployment by income group defy simple
characterizations. Between 1987 and 1992, average male unemployment
rates fell steadily from almost 9.0 percent to 4.7 percent, and then rose to
about 6.0 percent in 1994. Female unemployment rates were higher, but
they exhibit similar trends. These changes are fairly uniform across income
classes for men between 1987 and 1992: unemployment rates fell by half
for almost all groups. Between 1992 and 1994, however, the increases are
not uniform: male unemployment rates rose by 25 percent or more for the
decile groups 1, 4, 5, and 10, and rose marginally or fell for the other
groups. Patterns for women are similar to those for men, with the differ-
ence that female unemployment rates for the poorest three groups rose by
roughly the same proportion between 1992 and 1994 (Gill and Montenegro
forthcoming)
Returns to Education and Training
The main results of a study of earnings in Chile (Gill and Montenegro
forthcoming) are that rates of return to education are systematically higher
for higher education levels. These broad patterns also hold for rates of re-
turn to education for different decile groups (by household per capita in-
come). Not surprisingly, workers from poor households also have lower
levels of education. At the secondary school level, the most immediate and
direct impact of improvements in education on poor segments of the popu-
lation will likely come through improved relevance and quality of technical
and vocational education. Poor groups constitute a large share of this stream
of education, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. Training
programs for unemployed workers are also believed to have been effective
in lowering unemployment among certain groups. Therefore, vocational
education and training (VET) may be of primary importance in providing
labor market skills in a manner that also reduces inequality. This chapter
explores the development of vocational education and training in Chile
and the lessons for other countries from the many innovations made in the
country since the early 1980s.
Reform of Vocational Education and Training
The objectives of and constraints to reform of VET in Chile are best un-
derstood in the context of broader education sector reforms, which began
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in the late 1970s as part of a comprehensive structural adjustment in re-
sponse to triple-digit inflation, unsustainable budget deficits, and sluggish
economic growth. The new, decentralized approach to funding the social
sectors, including education and training, was part of the effort to reduce
the public sector deficit, which by the late 1970s had reached 25 percent
of gross domestic product, and inflation, which by that time amounted
to 600 percent per year. While the expansion of education was deemed
necessary for economic and social progress, public expenditures had to be
reduced.
The main components of the education reform that affected vocational
and training schools included implementing decentralized management at
all levels, removing barriers to entry by new providers, and changing the
rules for allocating public funds to educational institutions at all levels. At
the primary and secondary educational levels the reforms based funding on
per student subsidies, expanded the private subsidized sector, and required
local governments to administer publicly managed schools. These reforms,
which began in the late 1970s, stalled during the recession of 1982 as fi-
nancial support for reforms declined, but they were resumed and com-
pleted in 1986.
In 1990 public spending for education started to rise again, and by 1994
public expenditures were 20 percent above their 1980 level. The expansion
of primary, secondary, and postsecondary systems has resulted in universal
coverage for primary education, 75 percent coverage for secondary educa-
tion, and a doubling of postsecondary enrollments. While in 1980 all
postsecondary enrollment was concentrated in eight traditional universi-
ties, by 1991 these eight universities represented only 46 percent of all
enrollment. These educational gains were made despite reduced public fund-
ing at all levels of education.
Vocational education in Chile begins at the secondary school level, where
about 40 percent of students are in the technical-vocational training track,
up from 31 percent in 1980. Postsecondary education consists of instruc-
tion at professional institutes, technical training centers, and universities,
with professional institutes and technical training centers accounting for
up to 40 percent of postsecondary enrollment.
Vocational Secondary Education Reforms
In the 1980s publicly financed vocational schooling consisted of two types
of schools: public schools, which were financed and managed by the Min-
istry of Education, and religious schools, which were partially subsidized
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by the Ministry of Education. Technical-vocational schools, henceforth
referred to simply as vocational schools, represented 30 percent of total
secondary enrollment and were facing fiscal difficulties. The new fiscal re-
ality that came with structural adjustment dictated that vocational schools
modernize or disappear. Curricular changes and better coordination be-
tween the supply of skilled graduates and the demand for skilled workers
had to be instituted for vocational schools to survive.
ENTERPRISE-ORIENTED SCHOOLS. Despite budgetary limitations, the
weakness of the private sector in the 1980s, and the lack of experience with
private management of vocational schools in countries at a similar level of
development, the government decided to keep vocational schools open and
to incorporate them into the educational reform. With the encouragement
of the Chilean Planning Office, the first vocational schools were legally
transferred to private corporations. An important condition of this agree-
ment was the stipulation that guaranteed state funding or a base budget.
These regulations favored vocational schools managed by corporations. The
hope behind this policy was that, in the future, enterprises could manage
all vocational schools. The 1983 curricular framework for vocational schools
mandated that those schools respond to job market needs. This directive
brought about an important revision in curricula. The first two years of
secondary education would have a common curriculum for all students,
who would then specialize in the third year according to occupational
demands.
MONEY FOLLOWS STUDENTS. The funding formula that the reform in-
troduced left the question of the relative size of vocational schooling open
to market forces. Money, in this case public subsidies, follows students.
Nevertheless, the state maintains control over two key variables that influ-
ence school choice, namely, the basic curriculum and financial support.
The law establishes the basic subsidies for all schools, with the exception
of vocational schools transferred to corporations. The value of the subsidy
increases with the grade of the student and allows for additional funds to
cover the expenses of handicapped children. In some cases transport is cov-
ered. Schools that comply with ministerial requirements related to maxi-
mum number of students per class, basic curriculum regulations, and
physical facilities are permitted to apply for funding.
The government has responded to pressures to increase subsidies in line
with higher costs, even though the original intent was not to finance the
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entire per student cost. The structure of the subsidy was modified in 1987
and in 1993. The 1987 law introduced a unit of account that automati-
cally adjusted the subsidy with the adjustment of public sector salaries;
modified the payment structure to approximate more closely the costs per
school grade, with significant increases given to the secondary vocational
track; and introduced special coefficients for allocating additional payments
to "low density schools." Since 1993, aided by changes in the law, schools
have relied more on voluntary contributions from parents to augment funds.
Agricultural schools receive a subsidy that is about twice the size of the
one given to general secondary schools, plus a living expenses allowance in
the case of boarding schools. The per student subsidy given to industrial
schools in 1993 was about 60 percent higher, and that given to commercial
schools was about 25 percent higher, than that directed toward general
secondary schools (table 10-1). In 1992 in municipal and subsidized schools,
the per unit cost of secondary general education was about US$1,700, while
that of vocational education was about US$2,500; in corporation-run vo-
cational schools the corresponding figure was US$3,200 (table 10-2).
TABLE 10-1
Per Student Subsidy, 1980, 1987, 1993
(U.S. dollars)
Type of education 1980 1987 1993
Preschool 8.5 9.6 11.6
Primary
Grades 1-6 8.5-9.6 10.5 12.8
Grades 7-8 10.3 11.7 14.2
Adult education 2.9 3.3 6.1
Special education 21.5 21.0-31.5 38.4
Secondary
General 11.6 13.1 15.9
Adult education 3.5 3.9 7.2
Technical-vocational 6.8-11.6 - -
Agriculture and seamanship - 21.1-31.6 25.2
Industrial - 16.9-23.2 18.9
Commercial - 10.5-13.7 16.6
- Not available.
Source: Government of Chile data.
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TABLE 10-2
Total Cost of a Secondary Graduate, 1992
(U.S. dollars)
School type Municipal Subsidized Private Corporation
General secondary 1,697 1,643 4,329 n.a.
Vocational 2,573 2,465 n.a. 3,223
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: August 1992 U.S. dollars converted at the rate of US$1 = Ch$375.
Source: Salas Opazo and Gaymer Cortes (1993).
JUSTIFICATION FOR HIGHER SUBSIDIES TO VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS. The
1980 reform established a funding structure that differentiated schools by
level and made allowances for distance. Municipal and subsidized schools
enrolling first-year students in vocational programs get less funding than if
they enrolled them in the general track. The government was willing to
continue funding vocational schools more generously only if they were
transferred to corporations, but in 1987 the funding structure changed
and improved incentives for maintaining the vocational track in municipal
and other subsidized schools.
The financial support that the government gives to vocational schools
over and above that offered to general secondary schools has efficiency
effects. The evidence on private returns to vocational education indicate
that school-to-work transitions for vocational graduates are faster than tran-
sitions for general secondary graduates, and that vocational graduates earn
more than their general secondary counterparts. Butelmann and Romaguera
(1994) show that rates of return to vocational and general secondary school-
ing are not significantly different when the sample is restricted to males.
They argue persuasively that a positive selection bias affects the compari-
son for females, because those that choose vocational schooling are more
likely to make a transfer to the labor market. Therefore, measured differ-
ences in rates of return between vocational and general secondary educa-
tion for females are an overestimate of differences in returns for a random
sample.
The financial support that the government gives to vocational schools
also has equity effects. There are reasons to believe that students who choose
the vocational track are typically less well off than their counterparts in the
general secondary track. Parents' education is correlated with parents' in-
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come, and there is a correlation between parents' education and the types
of schools their children attend: parents of general secondary students have
three to four more years of schooling than do parents of children in voca-
tional schools. This means that the extra support for vocational schools
does benefit a relatively poor segment of the population (table 10-3).
DIVERSIFICATION OF FUNDING SOURCES. In addition to the per student
funding from the state, all subsidized schools can receive payments of tu-
ition fees from parents. Schools are free to decide their fees, but they can-
not make entry conditional on tuition payments, and therefore parents are
not obliged to pay. Until 1993, unaffiliated, private subsidized schools de-
pended almost exclusively on subsidy payments for their revenues. The
possibility of accepting voluntary contributions from parents gained new
impetus in a law passed in 1993 that referred to this option as shared fund-
ing. Monthly incomes from voluntarily paid tuition fees must be reported,
and the Ministry of Education has the legal right to reduce the state sub-
sidy in proportion to the amount received as fees. This right is currently
being exercised, and about 40 percent of the tuition fees collected is dis-
counted from the state subsidy. The new law also established a threshold
for tuition fees equal to two to three times the basic subsidy, above which
schools would be disqualified from receipt of the subsidy.
TABLE 10-3
Schooling of Parents and Type of Schools their Children Attend,
by Gender, 1992
(years of schooling)
Gender of children Schooling ofparents
and school type General secondary Commercial Industrial Agricultural
MVales
Private subsidized 14.2 7.9 7.6 7.2
Mqunicipal 11.3 8.4 6.6 4.5
Corporation 9.9 9.3 7.9 7.3
Fremales
Private subsidized 14.2 7.3 7.2 4.2
Municipal 11.3 7.8 7.2 -
Corporation 9.2 8.2 8.3
- Not available.
Source: Cox Edwards and Dar (1994).
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Private subsidized schools affiliated with business or religious organiza-
tions receive both public subsidies and donations from their sponsors. In
1979 a reform of the tax law allowed taxpayers to treat donations to schools
and nonprofit organizations as expenses for tax purposes. Vocational schools
have an additional avenue for generating their own resources through sell-
ing products or services. Unlike municipal and corporate schools, which
were granted the land and infrastructure, newly private subsidized schools
were compelled to make large investments in fixed capital.
Municipal schools have seen distinct advantages on many fronts as a
result of reforms. In addition to the advantage of being granted both the
land and the school buildings, municipal schools have access to municipal
funds, which in wealthy municipalities can be substantial. Municipal
governments receive funding from three main sources: the Ministry of
Education; the Ministry of the Interior, which is traditionally responsible
for their budgets; and the Ministry of Planning, which is responsible for
poverty alleviation programs, taxes, and user fees. The Ministry of Educa-
tion provides per student subsidies and extraordinary funding to cover
all teacher salary increases. The Ministry of the Interior provides funding
for the construction of new schools, for the expansion of buildings, for
repairs, and for upkeep. The Ministry of Planning, through the Social In-
vestment Fund, provides funding for secondary education. These addi-
tional budgetary sources have changed the funding formula in favor of
municipal schools.
TEACHERS' PAY AND PREROGATIVES. Responsibility for teachers' pay was
decentralized along with the transfer of schools. Prior to reforms, public
school teachers were paid according to the public sector pay scale and were
promoted according to seniority rules. After the reform, teachers had two
options: they could continue being paid according to the public sector pay
scale, or they could accept the private sector rules for voluntary negotiation
of pay. Both alternatives were to be regulated by the new Labor Code intro-
duced in 1979, which eliminated the special statutes for teachers.
Facing the risk of dismissals and wage losses, municipal teachers started
to exert a great deal of pressure to recover the statutory rights that teachers
employed under the auspices of the Ministry of Education still enjoyed.
This brought the Ministry of Education back into management of munici-
pal schools in terms of (a) restricting the opening of new schools in a given
jurisdiction whenever schools already in existence had places available; (b)
preventing municipalities from firing teachers; and (c) mandating wage
adjustments, even after municipal school teachers had received full sever-
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ance pay for the transfer. However, further funding crises in the mid- 1980s,
this time arising from the municipalities, forced the Ministry of Education
to substantially revise downward its guarantees of salary supplementation,
which eventually led to the removal of job guarantees (Castaneda 1992). The
restrictions on school openings were removed in 1986, but municipal schools
cannot be closed without prior approval of the Ministry of Education.
In 1991, a decade after the reforms were initiated, and under mounting
pressure from teachers' unions, Congress approved a new statute that regu-
lates teachers' contracts with municipalities in detail, including allocation
of time, activities, and hourly salaries. The statute unified the individual
contract clauses of all teachers, except those hired by private schools or by
corporations, which are regulated by the Labor Code. Moreover, article 52
gives municipal teachers job stability. Employment stability created a for-
midable constraint on budget allocations during the late 1980s, especially
during the period when enrollments declined. The difference between teach-
ers and administrators is that the latter come under the rules of the general
Labor Code. However, both groups have the right to organize in unions
and bargain collectively.
To hire new teachers, private subsidized schools and corporations use
their own procedures, as long as their candidates conform with the mini-
mum eligibility established in the statute. In the case of municipal schools
administered by municipalities, teacher selection is handled at the munici-
pal level and not at the school level. The municipalities also determine the
number of openings in a given school, with the approval of the Provincial
Department of the Ministry of Education. Up to 20 percent of the person-
nel can be hired on fixed term contracts, and in this case job openings do
not have to be publicly advertised. Each school has the freedom to deter-
mine the salaries of its personnel or to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement. However, the salaries must conform to the minimum standards
established in the statute. The statute also established norms regarding
teacher training, and it leaves to the Ministry of Education the responsibil-
ity of deciding which courses grant certificates to trainees. While training
in the private sector is a decision that involves managers and teachers, it
can be a unilateral decision of teachers in the case of municipal schools.
THE SYSTEM'S INITIAL RESPONSE. The number of students classified as
being in the vocational track declined suddenly in 1983, as all first- and
second-year students were reclassified into a common track. Many schools
that had originally offered vocational programs were not considered ready
for approval under the new guidelines. As a result, the relative size of the
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TABLE 10-4
Enrollment in Vocational Track, Selected Years, 1980-93
(thousands of students)
1980 1983 1985 1988 1990 1992 1993
Enrollment 541.6 613.5 667.8 735.7 719.8 675.1 652.8
General secondary 371.6 488.6 539.2 601.8 464.4 410.9 391.5
Technical-vocational 170.0 125.2 128.7 134.0 255.4 264.2 261.4
Percentage of enrollment
invocational track 31.4 20.4 19.3 18.2 35.4 39.1 40.0
Percentage of enrollment
in general secondary track 53.0 65.0 76.0 82.0 80.0 76.0 75.0
Source: Ministry of Education data.
vocational track fell from 31.4 percent in 1980 to 18.2 percent in 1988.
Decree 130 of 1988 greatly simplified the process of approving curricular
reforms in vocational schools. The decree allowed specialized programs to
begin in the first, second, or third year of secondary school, and it short-
ened the minimum requirement to four years. The result was a reclassifica-
tion of many secondary students back into the vocational track (table 10-4).
QUALITY AND PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE. Between 1980 and 1986, many
vocational schools that had been administered by the Ministry of Educa-
tion were adopted by private corporations or were transferred to munici-
palities or municipal corporations. In 1990 private corporations managed
70 vocational schools, or 18 percent of all vocational schools, 32 of them
in the Santiago metropolitan area. The participation of the private sector
continued to increase. In 1993 a new foundation, the Fundacion
Educacional Arauco, set up by Celulosa Arauco y Constitucion, a large
cellulose company, initiated steps to take over 22 schools in a southern
region where wood-related production had grown considerably. In some
cases entities such as CODESSER have incorporated schools that were
originally transferred to municipalities (box 10-1). Table 10-5 summarizes
the changes in enrollment by funding type between 1980 and 1993.
Postsecondary Training
Postsecondary technical education training is highly diversified and for
many years went officially unrecorded. Traditionally, worker training was
CHILE 305
TABLE 10-5
Enrollment in Vocational Secondary Schools,
by Funding Type, 1980 and 1993
(percentage ofenrollment)
Type of funding 1980 1993
Ministry of Education 71.8 -
Municipalities - 44.3
Private subsidized 28.0 37.6
Corporation subsidized - 17.7
Private unsubsidized 0.2 0.4
- Not available.
Source: Cox Edwards and Dar (1994).
considered a remedial step for individuals who entered the labor force with-
out formal education.
Key elements of the postsecondary education reform were (a) the estab-
lishment of three types of postsecondary degrees: university, professional,
and technical; (b) the passage of labor legislation that eliminated the 1
percent payroll tax earmarked for workers' training and the introduction of
tax credits to encourage voluntary participation in training by private em-
ployers; (c) the changes in labor policy that reoriented the focus of the
Ministry of Labor in targeting certain groups in the labor market; and (d)
the opening of markets that increased competitive pressures on firms, thereby
encouraging firm-specific research and development and worker training.
PRE-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING. Before the reforms, pre-employment edu-
cation, both general and technical, was concentrated in eight universities.
They were the only institutions that were allowed to offer postsecondary
degrees. State support of these universities accounted for 35 percent of the
education sector budget in 1980. Two of the eight institutions were ori-
ented toward technical degrees, and roughly a quarter of all students en-
rolled were taking short professional or technical degree programs.
Since these eight universities were the only entities allowed to offer tech-
nical degrees at the pre-employment level, the entry of private providers
was limited. Two public institutions created in the 1960s, INACAP and
DUOC, were the key arms of public sector training policy until 1981, and
they offered a variety of training courses for workers. Funding for these
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BOX 10-1
Vocational Education for Chilean Farming: The CODESSER Model
CODESSER (la Corporaci6n de Desarrollo Social del Sector Rural) is a nonprofit
organization created by the National Society of Farmers in 1976. Initially, it admin-
istered four schools. Their reputation was so low that attracting enough students was
difficult. By contrast, in 1995 some of the schools received more than 300 applica-
tions for 45 first-year openings. Additional schools were incorporated later, including
two industrial schools in 1987, and by 1993 CODESSER was managing 17 schools.
The management style of CODESSER schools is unique, and merits special
attention because it has produced graduates that easily make the transition to jobs
in their field. In 1995 more than 75 percent of the graduates in agriculture schools
were working in mid-level management jobs in agriculture. This figure is a far cry
from the 15 percent match between vocational training and the job descriptions of
the schools' graduates in the 1970s. In industry, where CODESSER's impact is
more recent, the percentage in 1995 was close to 62. When examining the reasons
for the program's success, one should not overlook the healthy growth of labor
demand in the Chilean economy from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.
The CODESSER model includes the following six distinguishing features:
* Private sectorparticipation in management. A regional directorate made up of
seven farmers or industrial entrepreneurs oversees each school. The participation
of the private sector ensures greater job-skill matches, a direct connection to the
labor market for graduates, and an effective medium through which to bring about
organizational and productive innovations in the schools.
* Teachers hired as private sector employees. As part of the transfer process, all
contracts for teachers and other personnel are voided. CODESSER has established
a dear personnel policy, including selection and promotion criteria, and new con-
tracts conform with the general Labor Code as do contracts for other private sector
employees. Teachers' salaries are about 50 percent higher than in municipal schools,
and there has been a consistent effort to upgrade teachers' training. Currently, at
institutes was derived in part from a 1 percent payroll tax. However, in
1978, 571 unregulated private establishments offered technical training.
Entry into these private institutions did not require candidates to have
completed secondary school.
The reforms in the 1980s successfully restructured the eight traditional
universities. The following legal changes occurred in 1981:
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least in the San Felipe schools, some 60 to 70 percent of the personnel once taught
under the old system.
* Educationalprograms. The aims of educational programs are to deliver a solid
general knowledge in humanities and sciences, prepare students to work in a vari-
ety of occupations, teach the students to be problem solvers, and encourage them
to continue learning. The schools also emphasize general growth and the develop-
rnent of responsibility, leadership, and personnel management. To give the curricu-
lum local relevance, CODESSER updated the programs after a thorough field
study and approval by the Ministry of Education.
* Curriculum revisions. CODESSER conducts periodic surveys of job require-
raents in the areas around each school. Currently, the surveys, which vary slightly
by locality, are a list of tasks that potential employers are asked to identify.
CODESSER uses the results of the surveys to adjust vocation-specific components
in the curriculum and to prepare teachers in those areas.
* Student selection. In Chile grades range from one to seven, where seven repre-
sents excellence. To be considered for admission, students must have achieved a
mninimum of grade five in each course in levels seven and eight. Prospective stu-
d.ents must also present a recommendation letter, spend two days at the school to
take written examinations in four basic areas, go through a personal interview and
psychological tests, and undertake a farming activity. The school selects the best
applicants.
e Funding and budget allocations. The real value of public subsidies fell in the
early 1980s and declined again by about 15 percent between 1987 and 1991.
CODESSER schools have developed independent means of funding. While in
1982 the public subsidy represented the bulk of the schools' budget, by 1992 pub-
lic sector support represented about 50 percent of the schools' combined budget.
Source: Compiled by author.
* The establishment of basic requirements for opening educational in-
stitutions, including universities. This law eventually came into effect in
1989, and during 1980-89 official approval of new institutions was con-
ducted on a case-by-case basis.
* The diversification of pre-employment education into three levels:
universities, professional institutes, and technical training centers. The law
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classified universities as institutions that confer academic degrees in 12
professional areas, professional institutes as entities that confer professional
degrees in other areas not exclusively reserved for universities, and techni-
cal training centers as institutions that confer postsecondary technician
degrees after relatively short programs. However, universities can also offer
professional and technical degrees and professional institutes can also con-
fer postsecondary technician degrees. Entry to any of these institutions
requires completion of secondary education.
* The offering of incentives for creating new postsecondary institutions
with minimum requirements and access to a new public funding formula.
In 1980 the eight traditional universities received all their funding directly
from the state. The plan was that this direct funding would decline over
time, and the government would open up two additional areas of funding:
indirect support (initially attached to the best 20,000 students of each en-
tering cohort, or about 20 percent of total enrollment) and a new credit
program (see Brunner 1992 for details). As in the case of secondary educa-
tion, the plan was that competitive forces would enhance opportunities,
especially for the poor.
In practice, however, budgetary allocations for postsecondary education
did not evolve as planned. There were budget cuts associated with the 1982
recession and changes to the legislation regarding the indirect funding for-
mula. Until 1990 access to public funding was reserved for the universities,
and the expectation was that professional institutes and training centers
could recover their costs through tuition fees. Since 1990 professional in-
stitutes and technical training centers have been allowed to apply for indi-
rect funding as they compete for the 20,000 best graduates of each cohort.
Table 10-6 shows the evolution of actual funding for postsecondary edu-
cation in relation to planned allocations. The allocations for credit pro-
grams were on target until 1982, but from 1984 to 1990, the plan was
significantly greater than the allocation. Once it realized that demand was
greater than the amounts allocated, the Budget Office started to allocate
funds by establishment. Since the creation of the University Credit Fund
in 1987, each postsecondary education institution that receives direct pub-
lic funding has administered its own credit allocation.
The initial reform and the norms that defined its application were per-
ceived as too permissive by some groups inside and outside the govern-
ment. Several attempts to regulate curricular programs followed, and until
1988 the approval of new institutions was determined on a case by case basis.
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TABLE 10-6
Funding for Postsecondary Education as a Percentage
of Planned Allocations, Selected Years, 1980-90
Transfer mechanism 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Direct funding 100.0 86.2 58.7 47.9 41.6 33.4
][ndirect funding 0.0 11.0 9.4 7.8 7.8 10.8
C^redit program 0.0 14.7 22.7 17.7 15.6 9.4
Development Fund
and other funds 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0 7.1 5.6
Total funding 100.0 112.2 91.3 74.4 72.1 59.1
Totalplanned 100.0 115.0 130.0 150.0 150.0 150.0
Source: Ministry of Education as cited in Cox (1992).
Some 20 professional institutes were created during 1981-83; virtually
all of them originated as a result of the reorganization of the eight tradi-
itional universities. During this initial period, the government introduced
czonstraints on the creation of new institutions. When it lifted these con-
itrols in 1987, a new wave of private expansion followed, along with the
disappearance of some of the public institutions. As table 10-7 shows, by
1990, 80 of the 82 professional institutes were private.
Enrollment in technical training institutes grew within institutions that
existed before the reform but were not officially recognized. Estimates in-
dicate that enrollment in those institutions was about 66,000 in 1980.
The reforms quickly met their objectives of expanding enrollments and
increasing cost recovery. Enrollments in postsecondary institutions with
direct public funding fell in 1981, recovered in subsequent years, and started
to decline again in the late 1980s because of competitive pressures. In 1993
postsecondary enrollment in institutions with direct public funding was
about the same as in 1980. The new universities, which operate without
public funding, and the professional institutes have seen steady increases in
enrollment since 1983. Technical training centers exhibit the fastest growth,
and in 1990 represented about one-third of total postsecondary enroll-
ment. Figure 10-1 shows the expansion of postsecondary education in its
diversified form, and figure 10-2 shows expansions of enrollment by fund-
ing source.
All postsecondary education institutions, both with and without public
funding, charge tuition fees (table 10-8). Tuition fees are typically highest
TABLE 10-7
Postsecondary Institutions after Reforms, Selected Years, 1980-90
(number of institutions)
Type of institution 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Universities
With public funding 8 17 17 18 20 20 20 20 20
Without public funding - 3 3 3 3 3 6 14 40
Professional institutes
With public funding - 7 7 6 4 4 4 2 2
Without public funding - 17 18 19 19 19 26 39 80
Technical training centersa - 86 102 102 122 116 123 133 168
-Not available.
a. Do not receive direct public funding.
Source: Ministry of Education as cited in Cox (1992).
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FIGURE 10-1
I'ostsecondary Enrollment in Chile, by Type of Institution, 1980, 1983, 1990
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in private universities, followed by universities with public funding and
professional institutes. Technical training centers charge the lowest annual
f'ees. Average values mask considerable variation across programs. Within
specific institutions, fees vary directly with demand and supply conditions.
'Technical fields command low tuition fees relative to management fields.
IN-SERVICE TRAINING REFORM. The most important incentives for in-
vesting in training workers are intrinsic to market forces. As real wages
increase, employment must be more productive. Productivity increases
are achieved through improvements in the organization of production
and through a shift from labor-intensive activities to more capital-inten-
sive activities. Achievement of production increases in this way requires
knowledge, training, and skilled labor. The concept of skills in this con-
text includes schooling, which improves an individual's capacity to learn
on the job, and training. Firms and their workers gain from investments
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FIGURE 10-2
Postsecondary Enrollment in Chile, by Funding Source, 1980, 1983, 1991
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in training, and they can normally arrive at agreement to share the costs
of such investment.
Before the economic reforms of the 1970s, many distortionary factors
reduced incentives for private sector investment in training, and the public
sector was extremely active in encouraging such training. Since the reforms
the incidence of training within the private sector has increased signifi-
cantly. Nevertheless, the government chose to subsidize worker training
using tax credits. Enterprises that take the initiative to train their workers
can obtain tax credits under three, often complementary, formulas.
* Tax credits may fully compensate an enterprise for the cost of train-
ing, up to the equivalent of 1 percent of its payroll. The National Service
for Training and Employment, a division of the Ministry of Labor with
offices in the central metropolitan area and in the regions, certifies if and
how much credit an enterprise obtains. The procedure, while not auto-
matic, is relatively straightforward.
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TABLE 10-8
Average Annual Fees in Postsecondary Education, 1990 and 1991
(U.S. dollars)
Type of institution 1990 1991
Universities
With public finding 974 992
Without public funding 1,257 1,306
Professional institutes
With public funding 535 575
Without public funding 735 784
Technical training centers 425 471
Note: U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of US$1 = Ch$305 in 1990 and US$1 = Ch$349
in 1991.
Source: Ministry of Education as cited in Cox (1992).
* Member enterprises' contributions to their technical assistance insti-
tution are also eligible for the tax credit. Technical assistance institutions
are intermediate-level organizations that represent sectors of economic ac-
tivity or regions and support their members through training activities and
diffusion of technology. They can charge for their services, but they are
established as nonprofit organizations.
* Wages paid to workers under the apprenticeships program are also
eligible for tax credits. This program consists of temporary work contracts
aimed at training young workers. It is limited to workers up to 21 years of
age, and up to 60 percent of the salary paid (with a limit of 60 percent of
the minimum income) can be added to the tax credit.
In short, direct expenditure on training or indirect support to the mar-
ket for training through contributions to technical assistance institutions is
partially tax deductible. For example, in the case of agriculture, the techni-
cal assistance institution is CODESSER, whose presence in secondary vo-
cational education, technology diffusion, and worker training has been
growing.
Reforms and Challenges
Chile diversified institutional options for vocational education and train-
ing, introduced decentralized management of schools, and implemented
student-based funding.
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Notable Reforms
Schools were eligible for public subsidies as long as they met six require-
ments, including curricular conformity with official requirements; basic
approval of school direction; basic standards for school facilities; enroll-
ments per course within a ratio of 1: 45; qualified teachers; and the prohi-
bition of payments as entry barriers other than one annual basic fee, which
was set at less than half of the monthly subsidy for primary education.
Schools were transferred to municipal governments or to private corpo-
rations. The transfer agreements presented different challenges in the case
of municipal versus private administrators. Under a special egal formula,
municipalities were guaranteed autonomous management of school infra-
structure. School infrastructure was transferred to private corporations in
exchange for an agreement o administer the schools and design their cur-
ricula, but the corporations had to accept financial and pedagogical super-
vision by the Ministry of Education and report on annual enrollments and
expenses.
The funding formula left the question of the relative size of technical
vocational schooling open to market forces. Money, in this case public
subsidies, would follow the students. Nevertheless, the state maintained
control over two key variables that influence school choice: basic curricu-
lum requirements and financial support. Per student payments are made
available on an equal basis to private and municipal schools, in the expec-
tation that the two sectors will compete for students and upgrade schools'
quality. Incentives to improve attendance and retention are built into the
funding. In the first five days of each month, schools deliver the previous
month's attendance roll to the corresponding provincial directorate, which
in turn sends the information to the central office of the Ministry of Edu-
cation. The per student subsidies are delivered to each school during the
last five days of that same month. Actual attendance is checked by inspec-
tors who randomly visit schools, and differences between real and declared
attendance result in financial penalties.
Daunting Challenges
To implement hese reforms, the Ministry of Education had to increase its
expenditures substantially. Real government expenditures for education rose
by 6 percent between 1979 and 1980, 20 percent between 1980 and 1981,
and 2 percent between 1981 and 1982, when the transfers were suspended.
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E]xpenditures increased to bring subsidies to private schools to the level of
municipal ones, to pay severance to teachers that were losing their public
sector contracts, and to finance special incentives for the municipalities to
accept the transfers of schools (Castaneda 1992). By 1983, 83 percent of
all public establishments had been transferred to local authorities (Matte
and Sancho 1991). At the same time, the increase in funding to privately
managed schools compared with what they had been receiving resulted in
an explosion in the number of private establishments, from 1,674 in 1980
to 2,643 in 1985.
The 1982 economic crisis severely affected the public sector's capacity
to sustain this reform process. With 17 percent of students still enrolled in
schools totally dependent on the Ministry of Education, school transfers
were suspended because of the lack of funding for severance payments. The
crisis was severe enough to force a freeze in the per student subsidy, which
resulted in a real decline of 20 percent between 1982 and 1985, and by
1990 it had fallen 30 percent in real terms. The government restricted the
opening of new schools in areas where municipal schools had vacant places.
Trhe municipalities faced deficits in their administration costs, a large part
of which the Ministry of Education eventually covered, but differences
among municipalities in their capacity to absorb deficits began to affect
the school system. Estimates indicate that in 1981, 7 percent of education
expenditure was funded by municipal funds.
A second major challenge concerned the hiring and firing of teachers. In
1986 teachers had become opposed to the change because of their experi-
e nce during the 1982 recession, which demonstrated the vulnerability of
their employment status with municipal administrations. They lobbied for
the re-establishment of job security guarantees and for automatic index-
ation of salaries. This culminated in the approval of the new statute in
1991. The statute legally re-established job security for teachers and took
away much of the freedom to negotiate employment conditions at the local
level.
A final major challenge involved disadvantaged families. Rising demand
ifor places in some schools has led to enrollment expansion, and ultimately
iro stricter criteria governing student selection. Enrollment expansion within
schools has natural limits, and rising demand is bound to generate rents
among students who succeed in gaining entrance into popular schools.
'Thus parents' willingness to pay for better services in some schools is not
surprising. Similarly, other schools whose services are deteriorating relative
to alternatives face declining enrollments. Declining enrollments, in turn,
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create financial difficulties and probably a further a decline in services,
precipitating an even faster decline in enrollment.
The current system does not deny good education opportunities to the
poor, because access to schools is not limited by location. As long as alter-
native schools are accessible by public transportation, good schools are within
the reach of poor students. Students who live in sparsely populated areas
have fewer choices or have to spend more on transportation. To make up
for this disadvantage, the state is more generous with schools located in
sparsely populated areas, adjusting subsidies by a rural factor and allowing
those schools to compete with smaller enrollments. The system is tough on
poor achievers, who cannot get entrance into well-managed schools, and
with schools that lose enrollment. Schools that cannot attract a minimum
number of students have no choice but to close. However, school survival
ultimately depends on funding, and funding depends on the number of
students, thus there is a danger of matching low achievers with poorly
managed schools.
Lessons Learned
Chile's reforms provide the following valuable lessons for countries attempt-
ing to improve their VET systems:
* Refonns are not always smooth andpainless. Changes trigger resistance.
However, Chile's experience shows that the judicious use of public funds is
an effective instrument for overcoming resistance to reform, as illustrated
by the stalling of reforms during the severe budget crunch of 1982. An-
other obstacle was strong resistance from teachers' unions, which continue
to this day, but this obstacle can probably only be fully overcome in the
long term.
- Public funding is often more important than public provision. Privately
provided vocational and technical education is growing faster than general
secondary education. This is convincing evidence that a private sector re-
sponse can be forthcoming even in low- and-middle-income countries if
public funding mechanisms encourage private provision, instead of pro-
moting public provision, which crowds out private providers. Chile's expe-
rience also shows that both equity and efficiency objectives can be well
served through simple financing mechanisms.
* The regulatory environment is sometimes more important than public
funding. The sharp expansion of postsecondary technical education after
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1989, after rules had been made transparent and the in-service certification
process for tax credits had been streamlined, points to the importance of a
friendly regulatory environment for training provision. Note that publicly
funded organizations were a small part of the additional supply of VET at
the postsecondary level.
- Matching instruments to target groups is important. While the mecha-
nisms through which VET is supplied (for instance, public, private, or
subsidized private) are important, VET programs must target the groups
that will benefit the most. Thus Chile put in place regulations to favor
underprivileged students and implemented special measures for children
traveling some distance to school; introduced competition to improve the
relevance of VET to the economy; and unbundled policy, planning, fi-
nancing, and management to increase institutional options and lower pub-
lic costs.
* The governments role in facilitating VET is vital. Often preoccupied
with providing, regulating, or financing VET, the government should not
neglect its role as a provider of information about the availability and effec-
tiveness of vocational programs. In Chile a heated and publicized debate
about Chile's economy helped the general public learn about VET.
X A vigorous private sector response can be expected. In Chile regulations
concerning governance and financing were designed to increase the share
of private VET providers. Within 10 years enrollments in private subsi-
dized schools had grown dramatically and several corporation-sponsored
schools had been opened. Postsecondary training saw a dramatic shift to-
ward private sector provision.
* Political will, not institutional capacity, is the key to comprehensive re-
jform. The experience in Chile points to strong political will as the main
factor behind comprehensive reform. Successful reform comes from deter-
mnined and sustained effort. Although the 1982 economic crisis may have
slowed the pace of reforms, Chile's political will saw the country through
the crisis and allowed it to pursue its reform policies.
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Mexico
MARI MINOWA
MEXICO IS A MIDDLE-INCOME country with a population
of 90 million people. In 1996 gross national product per capita was around
US$4,000. During the Mexican "miracle" from 1950 to 1981, Mexico's
gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 6.5 percent per
year. This growth was based on an inward-looking, import-substitution
model and was sustained by foreign exchange earnings, initially through
agricultural exports and later through petroleum exports. In the early 1970s,
with expectations of growing oil income, the government abandoned poli-
cies of fiscal equilibrium and private-sector-led economic growth and
adopted policies of public-sector-led growth, with expansion of direct public
investment in the productive sector and expansionary fiscal policies. By the
early 1980s, at the peak of the parastatal era, public enterprises accounted
for 24 percent of GDP. Private sector development became increasingly
constrained as a result, and in 1982 rising world interest rates and falling
oil prices led to a collapse of these unsustainable policies.
After the 1982 financial and economic crisis, structural reforms began
gradually with some limited privatization of state enterprises and the be-
ginning of trade liberalization in mid-1986. Mexico moved rapidly from
being a closed economy to an open economy, with the aim of improving
the productivity of the tradables sector and encouraging efficiency in both
export and import substitution activities by opening the economy to inter-
national competition. After the stagnation of 1982-88, GDP growth re-
sumed during 1989-92 to an average of 3.6 percent per year, or 1.6 percent
in per capita terms. However, Mexico was unable to repeat the growth rates
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achieved in earlier decades, and at the end of 1994 it became immersed in
a financial crisis from which it has yet to recover fully.
The Labor Market
Mexico's labor force grew at an average rate of 3.1 percent per year from
1980 to 1993 to reach 33 million workers. This means that about 1 mil-
lion new entrants were added to the labor force every year. Despite the
rapid expansion of the public sector during the 1970s, the private sector in
1980 continued to account for 83 percent of total employment, a much
larger share than that prevalent in the countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The Mexican private sector exhibits a growing duality: a large tradi-
tional sector coexisting alongside an expanding modern sector. The former,
which consists primarily of microenterprises and small and medium-size
enterprises (defined to include firms with up to 250 workers), employs a
large fraction of the labor force but accounts for a much smaller portion of
output and exports. These enterprises account for 71 percent of total em-
ployment, 53 percent of employment in manufacturing, 95 percent of
employment in the retail sector, and 73 percent of employment in services.
Productivity growth in this traditional sector has been slow, and output
growth has been sluggish. In contrast, the modern sector has experienced
faster productivity growth and stronger output and export performance.
Labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector has been slow.
While some studies have shown that the manufacturing sector has become
more efficient as a result of trade liberalization, with gross labor productiv-
ity increasing at an annual rate of 3.5 percent rate during the 1986-91
period, this rate was still low compared with that in other developing coun-
tries, and about the same as in the United States. Between 1982 and 1989,
output per hour of labor in the manufacturing sector grew at a rate of 1.5
percent per year. In contrast, output per hour of labor grew by 4.2 percent
per year in the United States and 2.5 percent per year in Canada. Other
countries of the OECD also experienced productivity increases in the manu-
facturing sector during the same period that were higher than Mexico's.
One explanation for this slow growth in labor productivity is the lower
education level of Mexican workers and the resulting deficiency in on-the-
job human capital accumulation compared with their counterparts else-
where. Supporting evidence for this hypothesis is provided by the fact that
experience-wage profiles for Mexican workers are flatter than those esti-
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mated for workers in other countries. The increase in wages associated with
an additional year of work experience for men is 3.8 percent in Mexico,
compared with 8.1 percent in the United States, 8.4 percent in Japan, and
9'.1 percent in France. This rate is low even when compared with the rate in
countries at a similar level of development and with comparable education
indicators, such as Brazil (6.2 percent) and Colombia (5.8 percent). Given
the well-documented correlation between wage growth, on-the-job train-
ing, and productivity observed in many countries, these differences are
consistent with the hypothesis of less postschool investment in human capital
and resulting lower productivity growth.
The observed low level of investment in human capital can also be ex-
plained by the incentive structure of labor regulations. Labor laws regard-
ing job security and promotion policy have important implications for
employers' incentives to provide in-service training. A strict interpretation
of the Mexican Labor Law would suggest a restrictive and overregulated
labor market, where labor mobility is highly restricted because of job secu-
rity considerations and promotion is based on seniority and a rigid job
assignment scheme, and not on individual performance or flexible job ro-
tation. However, in practice, firms appear to enjoy more flexibility than a
strict interpretation of the law would suggest. In particular, firms appear to
1have substantial flexibility in hiring categories of labor that can be dis-
missed without significant costs; they seem to be relying increasingly on
performance-based promotion and compensation schemes and moving away
ifrom the more traditional seniority-based mechanisms; and they seem to
have flexibility in defining job assignments and pay scales.
In sum, deficiencies in the education and vocational education and train-
ing system in Mexico present a significant bottleneck to human capital
accumulation. In the next section I turn to a description of that system.
.National Education System
To strengthen basic human capital, the government in 1993 extended com-
pulsory education from six years to nine years. Thus, as established in the
General Education Law, the national education system includes nine years
of basic education (six years of primary education and three years of lower
secondary education), followed by upper secondary and higher education
in the form of either formal, in-class instruction or nontraditional exten-
sion programs. During the 1993-94 academic year, the public sector, its
decentralized agencies, and private accredited institutions provided educa-
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tion services to about 25 million students: 14.5 million were in primary
education with public schools accounting for about 94 percent of the en-
rollment, 3.1 million students (72 percent of total lower secondary) were
in general academic middle schools, and 1.2 million students (28 percent
of total lower secondary) were in technical middle schools.
At the upper secondary level, two tracks are offered: an academic track,
which includes technical specialization (bachillerato tecnol/gico), a prereq-
uisite for higher education; and a technical vocational track (profesional
tecnico), which does not lead to higher education. Thus those students who
plan to pursue a technical career have to choose either a vocational-techni-
cal curriculum and be prepared to enter the work force on graduation, or a
technical college preparatory curriculum that qualifies graduates to enter
undergraduate programs in technical fields. During 1993-94 some 1.3
million students (58 percent of total upper secondary enrollment) were in
general academic high schools (including teacher training schools), and
530,300 (24 percent of total upper secondary enrollment) were in techni-
cal academic high schools, both leading to a high school diploma (bachillerato).
The remainder (406,500 students) were in technical professional schools
and were not eligible for higher education.
The national education system also offers job skills training programs in
a formal classroom format, with courses ranging from a few hours to three
to four months. These courses have no academic prerequisites and provide
job skills training for entry-level technical positions. Most students in job
skills training programs have a primary education background. The system
also encompasses adult education, including nontraditional job skills train-
ing in self-instructional formats, special education, education for indig-
enous and rural populations, and open education at all levels.
National System of Technical Education
The public sector offers both formal and informal technical education and
training through the Education Secretariat and the Labor Secretariat. The
Education Secretariat's Office of Undersecretary for Technological Educa-
tion and Research is responsible for managing the National System of Tech-
nical Education.
Public Technical Education and Training
Formal technical education and training are given at four levels: (a) job
skills training with no formal academic requirements, (b) upper-second-
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ary-level (high school) training with completion of middle school required,
(c) undergraduate-university-level training, and (d) graduate-level train-
ing. In the 1992-93 academic year 973,000 students were registered in the
National System of Technical Education-about 45 percent of upper sec-
ondary school enrollment or 3.8 percent of the total student enrollment in
the entire education system. Table 11-1 presents key statistics of the Na-
tional System of Technical Education, and table 11-2 further disaggregates
enrollment.
Formal job skills training without academic requirements prepares skilled
workers and craftspeople, and it is provided through 196 industrial train-
ing centers (CECATIs). They enrolled 91,700 students in 1992-93. The
CECATIs offer short courses ranging from 100 to 450 hours of technical
skills training, both in their training centers and at the place of employ-
ment. Of total enrollment in Mexico's formal job skills training, the
CECATIs' share was about 24 percent. Nearly 65 percent of those enrolled
were trained in private institutions and the rest in state and autonomous
institutions. While CECATI programs concentrate on the industrial sec-
tor, particularly on manufacturing, private sector job skills training is pri-
marily oriented toward the commercial and services sectors.
The upper secondary level public technical programs are divided into
(a) terminal technical and vocational programs; and (b) bachillerato tecno-
Idgico programs whose graduates can go on to university-level education.
The terminal vocational and technical programs enrolled 210,500 students
in 1992-93, preparing them to be technicians. During 1992-93, enroll-
ment in the National System of Technical Education programs represented
about 53 percent of total enrollment in the mid-level, terminal, vocational
and technical education track nationwide, with about 30 percent enrolled
in private training institutions and the rest in state and other independent
training institutions. Of the 210,500 students enrolled in the National
System of Technical Education terminal programs, 81 percent were en-
rolled in 253 schools run by the National College of Professional Technical
Education (CONALEP), 18 percent were enrolled in either the Center for
Industrial and Service Technical Studies or the Center for the Industrial
and Service Bachillerato Tecnoldgico managed by the General Directorate
for Industrial Technical Education, and a small number of trainees were en-
rolled in the National Polytechnic Institute. These terminal programs offer
three-year courses in a total of 164 career specializations in engineering
and technology, agriculture, livestock, health sciences, and administration.
While the Center for Industrial and Service Technical Studies and the
Center for the Industrial and Service Bachillerato Tecnolo'gico train some
TABLE 11-1
Formal Training Offered by the National System of Technical Education, 1992-93
(number)
Schools Educa- Facilities
Type of technical education Total New and tional Instruc- Other Grad- Class- Labor- Work-
and training enrollmen? enrollment centers Courses services tors personnel uates rooms atories shops Other
Job skills training 93,149 92,994 217 57 209 4,460 3,761 40,683 523 28 1,175 4,145
Upper-secondary-level
training 675,082 341,796 944 331 1,354 45,170 34,312 124,680 11,342 3,090 4,970 21,260
Terminal 210,487 109,517 264 183 413 14,934 11,461 39,061 2,916 1,025 1,415 13,968
Bachillerato tecnol4gico 464,595 232,279 680 148 941 30,236 22,851 285,619 8,426 2,065 3,555 7,292
University-level training 200,610 55,370 129 141 179 19,567 13,388 24,871 4,302 1,156 594 4,907
Graduate-level training 4,136 1,128 16 168 73 1,867 815 701 59 260 23 229
Professional 505 126 0 21 12 0 0 179 0 0 0 0
Masters 3,309 963 16 109 50 1,867 815 491 59 260 23 229
Doctorate 322 39 0 38 11 0 0 31 0 0 0 0
Total 972,977 491,288 1,306 697 1,815 71,064 52,276 190,935 16,226 4,534 6,762 30,541
a. At the beginning of the school year.
Source: Education Secretariat (1994).
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students in their terminal programs, most of their students are enrolled in
the bachillerato track or high school diploma program, and on graduation
obtain a technical high school diploma. In 1992-93, 464,600 students
were enrolled in technical high schools; 75 percent of those students were
enrolled in the General Directorate for Industrial Technical Education sys-
tem (Center for Industrial and Service Technical Studies and Center for
the Industrial and Service Bachillerato Tecnoldgico) and about 9 percent in
the National Polytechnic Institute. Although this diploma allows those
graduates to enroll in universities, the actual progression rate is not high: of
the total of 381,531 graduates with a bachillerato diploma in the 1993-94
academic year, only 56,556 (14.8 percent) went on to higher education.
In addition to the formal training programs, the public sector provides
informal training programs in the form of short courses to upgrade the
skills of employed and unemployed adults. The informal training programs
are provided in training institutions and at the workplace. In total, about
230,000 trainees received informal training during 1992-93. Preservice
informal training is offered in training institutions of the National System
of Technical Education through short courses of 15 to 350 hours, and in-
service informal training is part of employer-provided training required by
the Federal Labor Law. For the latter, employers often contract the Na-
tional System of Technical Education institutions to provide short courses
for their employees. Finally, the Labor Secretariat finances the Labor Re-
training Program for Unemployed Workers (PROBECAT). The program's
beneficiaries are trained at one of the many training institutions nation-
wide or at enterprises, which are obligated to employ at least 70 percent of
program participants on completion of the training. The program finances
the stipend equivalent of the regional minimum wage plus a transportation
allowance during the duration of training courses, which last from two to
three months. Since 1984 the National System of Technical Education has
participated in this program, training more than 50,000 unemployed work-
ers per year in its training institutions.
Private Technical Education and Training
Skills development of workers after entering the workplace has been left to
employers. However, in reality, training for employed workers is limited.
While large firms provide their own training programs, small and medium-
size firms, if they offer training for workers, rely mostly on contracting out
TABLE 11-2
Enrollment by Training Institution Units of the National System of Technical Education, 1992-93
(number and percentage in parentheses)
Upper secondary Graduate-level training
Job skill Bachillerato University-
Responsible unit training Terminal tecnol6gico level training Professional Masters Doctorate Total
DGCC 91,700 0 0 0 0 0 0 91,700
(98.44) (9.42)
CONALEP 0 171,142 0 0 0 0 0 171,142
(81.31) (17.59)
DGETI 0 37,735 348,340 0 0 0 0 386,075
(17.93) (74.98) (39.68)
CETI 0 0 2,208 670 0 0 0 2,878
(0.48) (0.33) (0.3)
UECyTM 0 0 11,025 1,628 0 0 0 12,653
(2.37) (0.81) (1.30)
DGETA 0 0 58,404 5,853 0 107 0 64,364
(12.57) (2.92) (3.23) (6.62)
DGIT 0 16 0 133,623 311 1,058 13 135,005
(0.01) (66.61) (61.58) (31.97) (4.04) (13.88)
ODE 1,449 1,594 4,095 1,941 0 0 0 7,501
(1.56) (0.76) (0.88) (0.97) (0.77)
IPN 0 0 40,523 56,895 194 1,536 73 100,815
(8.72) (28.36) (38.42) (46.42) (22.67) (10.36)
CIEAA-IPN 0 0 0 0 0 608 236 844
(18.37) (73.29) (0.09)
Total 93,149 210,487 464,595 200,610 505 3,309 322 972,977
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
DGCC Direccidn General de Centros de Capacitacidn
CONALEP Colegio Nacional de Educacidn Profesional Ticnica
DGETI General Directorate for Industrial Technical Education
CETI Centro de ensefianza Tecnica Industrial
UECyTM Unidad de Educacidn en Cienciay Tecnologia del Mar
DGETA Direccion general de Educacion Tecnoldgica Agropecuaria
DGIT Direccion General de Institutos TecnolSgicos
ODE Decentralized state government institutions with federal participation
IPN National Polytechnic Institute
CIEA-IPN Centro de Investigaci%n y de Estudios avanzados del Instituto Politecnico Nacional
Note: Enrollment at the beginning of the school year.
Source: Education Secretariat (1994).
3Z8 HIGH-GROWTH ECONOMIES
to specific training courses in public training institutions. In all cases train-
ing provided by employers has served only as a complement to the basic
technical education and training provided by public training institutions.
In recent years, with the support of the World Bank, the Labor Secre-
tariat has been implementing the Total Quality and Modernization Program
(CIMO), a program of technical and financial assistance to microenterprises
and small and medium-size enterprises to improve their productivity and
competitiveness through worker training and related advisory services.
Between 1984 and the mid-1990s CIMO helped about 4,000 enterprises
per year to develop their human resource strategies and to design and imple-
ment training and retraining courses for their workers.
In addition to the training provided by employers in the private sector,
there are about 500 privately managed training institutions currently listed
in the Education Secretariat's registry. The private training institutions of-
fer programs mostly in the nonmanufacturing areas that do not require a
large capital investment. The relative shares of subject areas are as follows:
secretarial and clerical (32 percent); computers (25 percent); accounting
(19 percent); construction, trades, and manufacturing (12 percent); ser-
vices, including health and personal services (9 percent); and other areas (3
percent). Little information is available on the quality of the training these
institutions provide.
Enterprise Training
Given the lack of systematic information on training provided by enter-
prises, the administrative registry of the Labor Secretariat serves as a useful
source of information on the general characteristics of enterprise-based train-
ing. This registry maintains information on mixed training commissions,
training plans and programs, certification of workers' skills, and training
providers, which are all part of the system that the Federal Labor Law has
established to promote enterprise-based training.
In the early 1980s, faced with the absence of a legal framework to pro-
mote enterprise-based training, the authorities amended both the Consti-
tution and the Federal Labor Law to declare that training was a right
guaranteed to all workers. The law stipulates that every enterprise set up a
bipartite mixed training commission to oversee whether training plans and
programs are properly prepared and to authenticate the labor competency
certification. In 1989 enterprises registered a total of about 108,000 mixed
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training commissions with the Labor Secretariat. That same year about
509,000 firms were registered with the Social Security System, implying
that only about 20 percent of firms were complying with the requirement
to establish a mixed training commission. However, in terms of the num-
ber of workers, firms that had set up mixed training commissions repre-
sented about 61.6 percent of all workers who were insured by the Social
Security System. Only about half of the workers in firms with fewer than
100 workers have mixed training commissions; this figure increases to 71
percent for those in firms with more than 100 workers.
In the early 1990s only about 28 percent of firms with mixed training
commissions had registered their training plans and programs. The per-
centage of firms with mixed training commissions and registered training
plans and programs increased from 26 percent for firms with fewer than 5
workers to 39 percent for firms with more than 250 workers. Employers
attribute the insufficient level of training in small firms to scarcity of re-
sources; lack of knowledge about externally available training opportuni-
ties; organizational deficiencies; or the operational characteristics of the
firms, where workers perform multiple functions and are thus difficult to
train in specific skills.
By law, firms are required to provide proof of workers' skills and to
register training providers for their training programs. In the early 1990s
just over 1,800 training institutions with 28,000 instructors were regis-
tered with the Labor Secretariat as external training providers. Of these
training institutions 62 percent were in the public sector, both federal and
state. The remaining 38 percent correspond mostly to private institutions
and a few social sector institutions (for example, union training centers).
More than 90 percent of training institutions in the public sector at the
basic and upper-middle level had registered as external training providers
for enterprise training by the mid-1990s. While this could indicate a high
level of effort by the education sector to establish links with productive
sectors, more detailed analysis is necessary to evaluate the level of success in
forging such links. Private training institutions participate much less in
enterprise-provided training: only 27 percent were registered with the La-
bor Secretariat as external training providers. This could be because most
private training institutions offer courses in business or administration of
extremely diverse quality.
The Federal Labor Law established three levels of organizations auxil-
iary to the Labor Secretariat that have authority over training activities. As
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an intermediary between the Labor Secretariat and the firms, these organi-
zations are responsible for providing advisory services, including analyzing
problems related to training and promoting training within firms. Sectoral
national training committees are auxiliary bodies that help determine train-
ing requirements. They have the authority to propose training that they
deem pertinent within their particular sector. In 1995, 14 different sectors
had national training committees. The Federal Labor Law also established
the national-level Consultative Council, which consists of representatives
of national labor organizations, employers' associations, the Labor Secre-
tariat, the Education Secretariat, the Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento
Industrial, the Energy Secretariat, and the Social Security System. Its func-
tion as a consultative body covers virtually all aspects of training, from the
formulation of policy and national programs to the establishment of crite-
ria for forming enterprise-level mixed training commissions. Consultative
councils have also been established at the state level. Their functions are
similar to those of the sectoral national training committees and the na-
tional Consultative Council. By 1995, 31 state-level consultative councils
had been formed.
Vocational and Technical Education and Training Issues
Despite the progress made during the past 25 years, Mexico's training sys-
tem still does not meet the requirements of the labor market. The most
critical weaknesses of the vocational and technical training system are (a)
poor preparation of workers for vocational and technical education and
training; (b) supply-driven programs, which lack flexibility and relevance
to changing labor market needs; (c) the uneven quality of training pro-
grams, with no objective measures available to gauge the quality of out-
puts; and (d) lack of an adequate institutional framework for private sector
involvement in training design and provision.
Poor Preparation of Workers for Vocational
and Technical Education and Training
The existing labor force has an average of six years of schooling; new en-
trants to the labor market typically have finished eight years of education.
While the average worker has low levels of trainability because of low school-
ing levels, new entrants may also suffer from low levels of trainability be-
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cause of the poor quality of their education in primary and secondary
schools.
Issues related to primary education include the following:
* Low educational achievement. A 1992 study found that primary
school students mastered only 53 percent of the national core cur-
riculum in Spanish and 30 percent of the national core curriculum in
mathematics.
* Inappropriate curriculum. In 1992 the curriculum was revised for
the first time in 20 years.
* Inadequate teaching quality.
* Teacher absenteeism and misallocation, especially in rural and re-
mote areas because of poor salaries and harsh physical conditions.
* Inadequate supervision.
* Shortage of library books and other materials and deficiencies in text-
book distribution.
* Dilapidated infrastructure.
* Insufficient community participation to ensure teachers' attendance
and students' motivation.
X Inadequate managerial capacity.
'To overcome these obstacles, the government has been increasing invest-
ments in basic education to improve its quality, especially in the poor south-
ern and central states with low educational indicators, and to extend free
Compulsory basic education from six to nine years.
Supply-Driven Programs
A predominant characteristic of the training system has been its supply ori-
entation. Even though some training programs (including courses in
CONALEP, CECATIs, and the Center for Industrial and Service Technical
Studies) have been strengthening their ties to employers and involving them
in the design of curricula, many training programs still follow the academic
model of the vocational and technical schools. Even when employers ask for
specific courses, curricula tend to be driven by academic subjects and related
to obsolete occupational classifications that bear little resemblance to the
needs of the workplace today. Many of the degree-granting courses tend to
be rigid programs that are inaccessible to most of those already employed.
This rigidity makes training not only long and costly, but also irrelevant,
unattractive, and unresponsive to changes in the labor marker.
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Uneven Quality of Training Programs
Given weak traditions of training in Mexico, standardization of the output
of training institutions has been minimal. The quality of training varies
substantially across institutions and courses. Even within the public sub-
systems of CONALEP, the Center for Industrial and Service Technical Stud-
ies, the Center for the Industrial and Service Bachillerato Tecnologico, and
CECATI schools, the quality of training provided by each school system
can vary substantially. Across the systems, the quality differences are even
greater (box 11-1).
BOX 11-1
Impact Evaluation of Three Training Programs in Mexico
It has not been a common practice in the public sector in Mexico to conduct
rigorous impact evaluation studies of programs that have been implemented. How-
ever, such evaluation studies were carried out for the CONALEP, PROBECAT,
and CIMO programs.
CONALEP (Colegio Nacional de Educaci6n Profesional Tecnica; the National
College of Professional Technical Education). This program's graduate tracer study
compared the placement rates and earnings of CONALEP graduates to those of
control groups. Unfortunately, the findings are not conclusive because of the fail-
ure to control for other factors that could account for different labor market out-
comes by the two groups. With this caveat, the results suggest that CONALEP
graduates actively participated in the labor market at a higher rate than the similar
age cohort of the general population, and at a much higher rate than graduates of
traditional vocational high schools. On average, CONALEP graduates found jobs
faster, and about two-thirds of CONALEP graduates worked in jobs related to the
specialization they had studied. Using cross-cohort comparisons, the study results
also suggest that CONALEP graduates' earnings increased rapidly within the first
two to three years of employment.
PROBECAT (the Labor Retraining Program for Unemployed Workers). Two
impact evaluation studies have been conducted for this program: one for the 1990
cohort of trainees and a control group of unemployed workers drawn from the
1990-91 national urban employment survey, and the second study for the 1993
cohort of trainees and the control group from the 1993-94 national urban em-
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,Lack of Private Sector Involvement in Training Design and Provision
Preservice training, considered an integral part of the education system, is
governed accordingly and dominated by the public education sector. Most
of the technical training programs are highly subsidized by the govern-
mnent. Few policy measures and strategic incentives have been employed to
induce more active participation by employers in worker training. As a
consequence of past policies, which did not provide incentives for employ-
ers to invest in human resource development, the financing of skills forma-
ployment survey. The survey design and the data analysis were better in these stud-
ies than in the CONALEP evaluation. The findings of both studies were consis-
tent, and showed that PROBECAT was fairly effective in shortening the duration
of unemployment for certain target groups, namely, trainees with prior work expe-
rience (both men and women). The program also appeared to have improved the
likelihood of employment for participants over a longer period of time. In addi-
tion, the evaluation suggested that program participation raised the post-training
earnings of men but not of women.
CIMO (Total Quality and Modernization Program). Evaluation of the CIMO
program involved a comparative analysis of various quantitative indicators of train-
ing, production, production processes, organizational structure, markets, employ-
ment, and remuneration using a sample of 248 firms assisted by the CIMO program
during 1991-93 and a sample of 316 firms in a control group selected from the
industrial survey to match the CIMO sample. The study showed that participation
in the program helped firms increase their productivity faster than those in the
control group. The initial productivity level was lower for CIMO firms than con-
trol group firms, but this gap diminished after program participation. However,
the corresponding gap in the wage level between the two groups did not diminish
even after program participation. Thus the benefits of the CIMO program ap-
peared largely to be reaped by employers.
Source: Compiled by author.
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tion has been perceived as a responsibility of individuals or of the govern-
ment, and not as a responsibility of employers.
In recent years some efforts have been made to enlist the involvement of
the productive sector in training program design, such as the industrial
advisory committees of the CONALEP system. However, such efforts need
to be expanded significantly. Furthermore, the government has established
the National System of Labor Competency Standards, which emphasizes
involving the private sector in defining competency standards for each skill
area. The governing body of the new system is a tripartite council with
representatives of the government and of employers' and workers' associa-
tions; the private sector has majority representation.
Notable Reforms
The government has launched several efforts to improve primary educa-
tion to make future workers more trainable and to help workers and job
seekers to acquire skills relevant to jobs. The success of the reforms depends
on the financial sustainability of the new vocational education and training
system since the government proposes to reduce gradually its financial con-
tributions.
Improving Primary Education
Increasing access to and improving the quality of primary education is a
priority issue, and visible progress has been made. Since 1950 Mexico has
made great strides in increasing both access to and the quality of basic
education: school enrollments have increased sevenfold while the total popu-
lation tripled, and adult illiteracy has decreased from 40 to 12 percent. The
government implemented a comprehensive reform of the education sector
from 1990 to 1995, with an emphasis on improving literacy and numeracy.
improving Technical Education and Training
Faced with new pressures brought about by international competition, and
drawing from the lessons learned from existing training programs, the gov-
ernment has undertaken a comprehensive overhaul of the country's techni-
cal education and vocational training programs. In 1994 it launched the
Technical Education and Training Modernization Project to help achieve
this objective. The specific aims of the project were to (a) establish the
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National System of Labor Competency Standards, (b) redesign training
programs into modular courses based on the new standards, (c) promote
private participation in training design and implementation by providing
incentives to enterprises and individuals, and (d) establish an information
system and undertake studies to improve training programs.
Establishing National Skill Standards and Stronger Links
with Employers
Financial sustainability will be attained only if the new system brings the
expected value added to employers and workers. The government is study-
ing how to achieve this self-sufficiency, using a mechanism similar to the
franchising of certification agencies to generate resources. The National
System of Labor Competency Standards will serve as the measure against
which both workers and training programs will be judged. The system will
also provide a reliable basis for updating curricula, training equipment,
and instructor training. Links between training institutions and potential
employers will be strengthened through employers' participation in course
design and through arrangements whereby businesses provide practical train-
ing opportunities for trainees.
Reference
Education Secretariat. 1994. Estatistica Bdsica Sistema Nacidnal de Educaion
Tecnologica, 1992-93, Inicio de Cursos.

PARTIII Low-Growth Economies
THE COUNTRIES DISCUSSED in Part III-South Africa,
Tanzania, Zambia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank
and Gaza Strip-have high labor-force growth, low employment growth,
and high unemployment and underemployment rates, especially in the in-
formal sector. Training reform in South Africa is best seen in the context of
the dramatic changes in the political arena. With the breakdown of the
apartheid system in the early 1 990s, policy reform and institutional change
began. The roots of South Africa's poor development of human resources
lie in the legacy of black citizens' lack of access to a basic education and in
the poor quality of that education. Training provision takes place within
this context. Two-thirds of the South African labor force is employed in the
formal sector; industrial training boards collect and disburse training levies
and organize training in companies. There is no structured system of train-
ing in place to meet the needs of informal sector workers. The reform of
vocational education and training in South Africa is based on consensus
building. Rather than creating new institutions to develop and implement
reforms, the authorities have relied on existing institutions.
Tanzania is one of the five poorest countries in the world, and it is not
surprising that the financing of social sector investments has been inad-
equate. Vocational education and training (VET) in Tanzania has been
plagued by the inefficient use of resources, inequitable educational oppor-
tunities, poor labor market linkages, and a lack of coordination between
donors and the government. Reforms were initiated in response to these
problems, but the preliminary diagnosis of their results is discouraging.
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Inefficiency in the allocation of resources continues, leading to high unit
costs in public secondary schools and training institutions. The quality of
training remains poor. Students who enter secondary schools and training
institutions are mainly from upper income households. Although the gov-
ernment is still a major employer, the private formal sector has grown rela-
tively rapidly over the past decade. Public training institutions have done
poorly in catering to this new client, or to the large informal sector.
Zambia's vocational education and training system faces similar con-
straints relating to its purpose, clientele, management, and product qual-
ity. Current training efforts reach less than 3 percent of those entering the
labor market every year, and programs are focused on providing youth
with skills for formal sector jobs that are almost nonexistent. The
government's capacity to collect and analyze information for policy devel-
opment or implementation is weak. Donors are important, but their role is
not always clear. Not surprisingly, the quality of training is poor. Following
the election of a new government in 1991, concern about the deplorable
state of skills development in the country led to several policy reviews and
reform initiatives. Of these, vocational education and training reforms have
perhaps been the most innovative in terms of procedures and proposals.
These reforms, however, face formidable obstacles: a sluggish economy,
lack of consensus, and unwillingness to accept a reduced role of govern-
ment in the finance and provision of VET. Among the most promising
measures are efforts to strengthen nonformal training by making it easier
and financially attractive for private providers and microentrepreneurs to
train informal sector workers.
In Egypt the main problems seem to be an oversupply of technical and
vocational skills to a sluggish economy and a fundamental mismatch be-
tween the needs of a largely informal economy and the VET system, which
is designed to meet relatively formal needs. In the former centrally planned
system, vocational and technical graduates were guaranteed employment.
Now that employment cannot be guaranteed, the rationale for attending
vocational and technical training has shifted from educational to social
reasons. Even in unrealistically optimistic scenarios, the likely supply-to-
demand ratios for university and secondary school graduates are greater
than 400 percent. The system is inequitable as well: Egypt spends almost
half of its education budget on fewer than one million university students,
while primary and secondary schools enroll about 13 million students.
The study concludes that there are few ways to reform the VET system
without transferring resources from higher education.
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Despite lacking natural resources and being constrained by a small in-
dustrial base, Jordan has developed good education and training programs.
Its workers have achieved high education and skill levels, and they have
proved to be the most successful export of the economy. Jordan is excep-
tional in terms of economic performance within the region, and it com-
pares favorably with other countries with low-middle incomes. As in Egypt,
however, VET faces problems of low relevance, quality, and efficiency. Vo-
cational school students tend to specialize quickly and narrowly upon en-
try into training centers, and community colleges are out of touch with
community demands. But the high levels of cost recovery in postbasic edu-
cation make the system equitable, and laissez-faire labor policies have hid-
den weaknesses in the VET system. The high education of Jordanians and
employment opportunities in neighboring countries have acted as a buffer
for surplus or mismatched labor and put little pressure on the VET system
to reform. The emphasis has been on public training; relatively little is
known about the provision of VET in the private sector. The Jordan study
optimistically concludes that the existing structure of the education and
training system is adequate. What is now required is consolidation and
selective expansion.
The West Bank and Gaza study is special in that it describes efforts
undertaken by an authority not yet a government, and by territories not yet
a country. Since 1948 education in the West Bank has been modeled after
the Jordanian system; Gaza adopted the Egyptian model. The Palestinian
Authority assumed control of education in 1994 and has taken steps to
unify the system. Only a small proportion of secondary enrollment is in
vocational schools; graduates can continue education at the tertiary level in
community colleges or universities. Training for school-leavers is provided
in vocational training centers. A major expansion of the Palestinian train-
ing system would, naturally, raise the issue of financing and sustainability.
Unit costs are three times those in neighboring Jordan and Egypt. Like in
Egypt, in the West Bank and Gaza there is little or no cost recovery. In-
struction in government vocational centers and schools is of poor quality,
and these institutions rate their contact with industry as mediocre at best.
Having decided that such constraints are no excuse for inaction, Palestin-
ian authorities have embarked upon a reform process that promises to be
gradual, substantive, and even innovative. Vocational education and train-
ing enrollments are to be expanded using a modular format that is inte-
grated with the general education system, and greater cost recovery is to be
used to overcome problems of efficiency and finance.

South Africa
ADRIAN ZIDERMAN AND ARVIL VAN ADAMS
WITH THE BREAKDOWN of the apartheid system of sepa-
irate racial development in the early 1990s, the beginnings of a process of
appraisal, policy reform, and institutional change became evident in many
areas of South African life. This process is both remedial-to correct he ill
effects stemming from the legacy of apartheid-and innovative, witnessed
uin a wave of sweeping moves to fashion a "new South Africa." The reform
of the vocational education and training system (VET) is a central element
iin the broad process of social and institutional change in the country. In-
deed, the development of the education and training system and of effi-
c iently functioning labor markets are two areas that were particularly stunted
during the apartheid period. There is broad consensus on the pressing need
iFor change in the area of human resource development in general and VET
in particular, as a necessary condition for achieving national objectives in
rhe economic, industrial, and social fields.
The root of poor human resource development in South Africa lies in
ithe historical egacy of black citizens' lack of access to basic education and
iin the poor quality of education received by those that gained access. Re-
sults from the 1991 census indicate that 30 percent (41 percent for blacks)
of the adult population ages 20 to 64 were functionally illiterate, that is,
with an educational evel of Standard 3 or below. Similar ratios have been
estimated for labor force participants. If illiteracy is defined as failure to
complete Standard 8, then 12.5 million people may be regarded as illiterate
(NTB 1994a); some 60 percent of them are estimated to be economically
active. Yet the provision of adult basic education by industry, nongovern-
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mental organizations, and the Ministry of Education combined reaches
less than a quarter of a million individuals. The dramatic changes in the
political arena have led to growing optimism on the part of the black popu-
lation and to an inflation of expectations in the economic sphere, espe-
cially in relation to job opportunities and living standards.
The Economy and Labor Force
Training provision takes place within the context of a sluggish economy.'
While the gross national product (GNP) per capita of some US$3,000 is
considerably in excess of that in neighboring countries, annual output
growth has declined. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita fell at the
rate of 2 percent per year from 1980 to 1993; gross output per employee
stood at only 75 percent of 1980 levels in 1993; gross investment declined
by 4.7 percent per year during the 1980-93 period; and the investment-to-
GDP ratio, which stood at 30 percent in 1980, was only 15 percent in
1993. In addition, the economy suffered from limited technological ad-
vancement, high unemployment, and continued widespread poverty.
South African labor is mostly urban: only 38.5 percent of the labor
force was in rural areas in 1995. Despite attempts to restrict Africans to
their homeland areas during the apartheid era, 49 percent of African work-
ers were urban. Agriculture accounted for only about 10.7 percent of the
labor force.
The formal sector is by far the largest employer. Estimates of the labor
force and employment in 1995 suggest that about 49.9 percent of the labor
force held formal jobs. This proportion varied across racial groups: Afri-
cans (42.6 percent), Asians (64.1 percent), coloreds (66.8 percent), and
whites (71.6 percent). Yet it remains true that the formal sector generates
the most employment for every group. Estimates based on the Poverty
Survey are similar. The survey also shows that the formal sector is the big-
gest employer for both men and women. Regular wage jobs provide the
bulk of employment for all workers regardless of gender or racial group
(table 12-1).
In 1995 formal employment was quite highly unionized by developing-
country standards. It accounted for 26.6 percent of formal workers. Unions
are especially strong in mining and much of manufacturing, but as in most
countries are weak in agriculture and most services sectors. Whites are the
least unionized racial group among regular employees (table 12-1), and
TABLE 12-1
Employment Status of Adults Ages 16 to 70, by Gender and Population Group, 1995
(percent)
Male Female
Status African White Colored Asian African White Colored Asian Total
Regular wage employment
Public sector 8.4 16.8 12.9 16.7 4.7 16.3 8.1 8.1 8.3
Private sector 26.6 49.9 41.2 41.7 13.3 29.5 28.2 21.7 23.8
Informal employment
Casual wage employment 4.3 2.8 6.0 3.8 2.8 4.7 5.9 1.2 3.7
Self-employed 4.1 8.3 2.7 9.8 4.7 5.1 2.2 3.7 4.6
Total employed 43.6 77.9 62.7 71.6 25.5 55.7 44.5 34.6 40.5
Unemployment
Lookingforwork 7.2 2.1 8.5 5.2 5.3 1.9 9.9 3.4 5.7
Discouraged 14.9 0.8 4.4 0.8 14.7 1.1 4.5 3.4 11.5
Total unemployed 22.1 2.9 12.9 6.0 20.0 3.0 14.4 6.8 17.2
(Table continues on the following page.)
TABLE 12-1 (continued)
Male Female
Status African White Colored Asian African White Colored Asian Total
Totaloutoflaborforce 34.3 19.2 24.4 22.4 54.5 41.3 41.1 58.6 42.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Union members as percentage of
regular employment 34.9 18.7 40.9 39.4 20.6 10.7 39.7 34.6 26.6
Percentage of laborforce
Regular employment 53.2 82.5 71.6 75.3 39.6 76.7 50.6 72.0 55.6
Informal employment 13.2 13.9 10.8 17.0 16.4 18.2 25.0 11.6 14.6
Unemployment 33.6 3.6 17.6 7.7 44.0 5.1 24.4 16.4 29.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Fallon (1997).
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consistent with experience in other countries, women are much less union-
ized than men.
There is a great contrast between the incidence of unemployment among
Africans and whites (table 12-1). White unemployment is modest by inter-
national standards, but African unemployment is high. In 1995, 33.6 per-
cent of males and 44 percent of females in the labor force were unemployed.
lJnemployment is particularly severe among young people (table 12-2).
More than two-thirds of African males ages 16 to 19 are unemployed un-
(ler the broad definition, and extremely high unemployment rates prevail
among teenagers in other racial groups. In virtually every country unem-
ployment among young people is more severe than for other age groups,
because as first-time job seekers they often experience a period of unem-
ployment before securing a job; however, the South African problem is one
of the worst in the world.
Census data point to another troublesome fact: unemployment has been
r ising over time. Changes in unemployment rates for South Africa, as mea-
sured in the censuses of 1980, 1985, and 1991, are roughly consistent with
the movements in the percentage of the labor force outside formal employ-
inent shown in figure 12-1. (These numbers do not include discouraged
workers.) The figure shows that black unemployment rates nearly doubled
in the 1980-95 period, while white unemployment rose less sharply.
To some degree labor allocation by race can be reinterpreted according
to skill levels. Even though levels of education and skill attainment be-
tween the racial groups have narrowed significantly over the years (Fallon
:1992), large gaps still remain. Whites tend to have much more education
and skills than other groups, among which Africans lag well behind Asians
and coloreds. One can make the following observations about labor alloca-
tion: (a) skilled workers are more likely to work in the formal sector than
are semiskilled or unskilled workers, (b) unskilled workers are more likely
to end up in the informal sector than are skilled workers, and (c) unskilled
workers experience much higher unemployment rates than do other work-
ers. But the likelihood of being unemployed or employed in the formal
sector depends not only on skill levels. It also depends on other character-
istics, including race.
As unemployment rates have risen, so have real wages, especially for
Africans; however, rising wages have dampened the demand for labor. Fig-
ure 12-2 shows real product wage behavior from 1970 to 1996. The most
striking feature is that wages for whites were virtually stationary, while wages
for Africans grew in a somewhat erratic manner. Wage differentials thus
TABLE 12-2
Unemployment Rates, by Gender, Population Group, and Age Group, 1995
(percent)
Male Female
Status African White Colored Asian African White Colored Asian Total
All ages 33.6 3.6 17.6 7.7 44.0 5.1 24.4 16.4 29.8
16-19 66.9 40.0 54.3 0.0 74.3 9.3 48.0 43.0
20-24 57.0 3.8 29.6 18.8 68.9 10.1 44.2 25.7
Source: Fallon (1997).
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FIGURE 12-1
South African Labor Force Outside Formal Employment, 1970-95
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Source: Fallon (1997).
narrowed considerably between whites and other groups of workers. Growth
in real wages for Africans largely ceased after the economic recession deep-
ened in 1989, but Asians and coloreds continued to make some gains,
although at a slower pace than before. These slowdowns are broadly in line
wvith the behavior of real GDP per capita. Although figure 12-2 is based
only on manufacturing, the picture is broadly similar in other major sectors.
Rising real product wages have had a substantial dampening effect on
the demand for black workers. Labor demand equations indicate an aver-
age long-run wage elasticity across the sectors of -0.71. (A similar value is
quoted in the 1996 Presidential Labor Commission's report.) In other words,
a 10 percent increase in the real product wage would eventually lead to a
7.1 percent decrease in black employment. Furthermore, markets clear for
skilled workers but not for the unskilled. Econometric analysis indicates
that unskilled wages have been much less responsive to unemployment
levels than those of the skilled. Although average unemployment prob-
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FIGURE 12-2
Real Manufacturing Wage Index in South Africa, 1970-96
(1970= 100)
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Source: Fallon (1997).
abilities are much higher for nonwhites than for whites, these probabilities
fall off sharply at high education levels, indicating that markets clear for
skilled nonwhites.
However, as noted earlier, educational attainment levels for nonwhites
are significantly below those for whites. Segregated education limited fund-
ing for black education: in 1975 average educational expenditure on white
students exceeded that on black students by a factor of more than 15. Al-
though resources were then shifted toward black education, they were di-
rected toward expanding enrollments rather than improving quality. It is
within this context that the VET system operates.
The VET System
The South African education and training system displays the classic divi-
sion of responsibilities between the labor and education departments. Tech-
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nical education institutions at the postsecondary level (68 technical col-
leges and 15 technikons) are run by the Department of Education and fi-
nanced from central budgetary appropriations. Secondary schools offer
rmainly academic programs, but a few schools provide technical courses,
including practical workshops in such traditional vocational education ar-
eas as woodworking, metalworking, electrical and electronics, motor me-
chanics, and, more recently, bricklaying and plastering. South Africa does
rLot appear to have traditional secondary vocational schools. The greatest
area of concern is the poor levels of mathematics and science teaching across
the system (Department of Labor 1996).
The main institutional players in the vocational training system are the
I)epartment of Labor, the National Training Board (NTB), industrial train-
ing boards (ITBs), employers, and public and private training providers.
The Manpower Training Act, as amended in 1990, places primary respon-
sibility for formal sector vocational training firmly on the shoulders of
employers. The Department of Labor assumes a mainly supportive role.
The amended act paved the way for the introduction of a largely new train-
ing system based on the establishment of industry-based training boards,
the mechanism through which business assumes responsibility for training
within its sector, including the structuring and control of apprenticeship
training. In practice, this new system has displayed a number of weak-
nesses, particularly in relation to coverage, control, national accountability,
and financing. Proponents of reform are seeking to understand the nature
of these shortcomings. They want to introduce appropriate reforms in the
context of best-practice international experience.
While the major thrust of this section is on training provision and fi-
nancing for formal sector employment, it also looks at training for the
informal sector and special needs groups, such as the unemployed and the
poor. Training for these diverse groups is recognized as the responsibility of
the state. Although it does not provide training courses directly, the De-
partment of Labor funds programs for these groups through special bud-
getary allocations. However, current funding is inadequate to meet needs,
training efforts are insufficiently focused on particular needs, courses are
too short and of a low standard, and coverage is poor.
Information on the extent of these training submarkets and emerging
training gaps is meager. Coopers and Lybrand estimated that between 3.7
and 5.4 million workers in 1994 were unemployed and at the subsistence
level or attached to the urban informal sector. (Even higher estimates of more
than 7 million have been suggested.) Government training programs in
1994 reached less that 5 percent of this sector (Coopers and Lybrand 1995).
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Department of Labor
The Directorate for Manpower Training at the Department of Labor holds
the view that employers are primarily responsible for training and retrain-
ing workers, and the department's role in training workers for the formal
sector is a supportive one. The department's total training budget in the
early 1990s represented only some 3 percent of training expenditures
(NTB 1994a, p. 67). This supportive role comprises a number of func-
tions, including creating an appropriate legal and administrative frame-
work. In particular, the directorate administers the national apprenticeship
scheme and runs the national trades tests through its Central Organization
for Trade Testing; establishes and accredits industrial training boards; and
runs the national program for training the unemployed (Department of
Labor 1995).
Unlike the situation in many other African countries, the Department
of Labor's role in both the provision and financing of training is marginal.
It does not operate its own vocational training centers, nor does it finance
training to any major extent. However, the department does participate in
financing training through the partial subsidization of a number of train-
ing programs, as well by bearing part of the administrative costs of the
apprentice training scheme and the costs of running the trades test centers.
The only major program that is financed wholly by the department is train-
ing for the unemployed: 100 percent cost coverage includes a daily allow-
ance for trainees and payment of the pre-set instruction costs of courses
provided by the nine regional training centers (RTCs) and their satellites
and by registered private contractors.
National Training Board
There is no central control or steering of the national training effort. The
NTB does not function as a national training authority in the sense de-
fined by the World Bank (1991), and it has no executive powers. Estab-
lished under the 1981 act, the NTB advises the minister of labor on policy
matters arising from the act and, more generally, coordinates, facilitates,
and promotes training. The NTB was a tripartite body, with the bulk of its
membership drawn equally from business, labor, and government, until
1995, when it was restructured to be more representative of the main stake-
holders in education and training. Representation of training providers,
community organizations, and special interest groups was increased to half
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of the board's membership. The NTB's main work is conducted by com-
mittees, such as those concerned with artisans, in-service training, and the
disabled. Specialist regional training committees also exist.
The NTB ran the task team the minister of labor appointed in 1993 to
develop a national training strategy for South Africa and to coordinate the
activities of its eight specialized groups. This work culminated in the pub-
lication of the National Training Strategy Initiative a year later (NTB 1994a,
1994b). This influential report was instrumental in establishing a national
integrated framework for education and training qualifications. The report
also provided the point of departure for initiatives relating to reform of the
national system of training management, control, and financing.
National Economic Development and Labor Council
TIhe National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC) was
launched in February 1995 as a tripartite forum for reaching consensus on
economic issues. The three main stakeholders-unions, business, and gov-
ernment-have equal membership. Representation of community and de-
velopment interests is more limited. NEDLAC presides over four chambers.
Its Trade and Industry Chamber has assumed the leadership role in reform
(based on broad consensus) of the financing and management of the train-
ing system.
NEDLAC set up the Counterpart Group, composed of nominees rep-
resenting the three main constituencies, to oversee research projects on train-
ing financing commissioned by the NTB. The objective was to develop
and agree on a financing model suitable for implementation in South Af-
rica using a process of engagement and consensus building. The idea was
that group members would be responsible for reporting back to their con-
sitituencies on progress made and concerns that arose.2
Industrial Training Boards
South Africa's industrial training boards are a unique feature of its training
system and operate under regulations outlined in the 1981 act. In terms of
comparative international practice, the 27 ITBs are unusual: they are sec-
tor based and voluntary. Industries may voluntarily decide to establish an
I'TB. The functions of ITBs vary. While all are concerned with accredita-
tion and setting standards, most do not engage in training provision (BMI
Industrial Consulting 1995); most impose a training levy on members;
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and most are bipartite, following amendments to the act in 1990 that per-
mitted black union representation on ITBs. (Board membership had pre-
viously been restricted to state officials, business representatives, and white
union members.)
Only about a third of South African industries are represented by an
ITB. ITBs are noticeably lacking in the government sector and in service
sectors such as retail, banking, insurance, and health. Because each ITB
does not represent the entire industry (coverage varies between 50 and 100
percent), only about one-fifth of formal sector employees are represented
by an ITB. However, ITBs strongly focus on artisan training. In 1995 some
90 percent of all registered apprentices were represented by ITBs (Rockey
1993). However, the number of trainees and apprentices enrolled in arti-
san training declined from 37,000 in 1982 to some 22,200 in 1994 (De-
partment of Labor 1996).
Training Providers
The flagship training institutions in South Africa are the nine regional
training centers. They operate as autonomous organizations, each with an
independent governing body, although they maintain close ties with the
Department of Labor. Together with some 60 satellite campuses and 165
mobile units, RTCs mainly provide training for the unemployed. They
train more than 60 percent of the unemployed receiving training under the
Department of Labor-financed Scheme for the Training of Unemployed
Persons, launched in 1985. The RTCs also have sole responsibility for pro-
viding training under the Employee Training Program, which caters to the
training needs of small enterprises (those with fewer than 200 workers).
Under this scheme, the Department of Labor covers 60 percent of ap-
proved course fees (70 percent for agricultural workers).
Almost all of the RTCs' income comes from Department of Labor con-
tracts, particularly under the Scheme for the Training of the Unemployed
(Coopers and Lybrand 1995). Constant Department of Labor budgets and
rising course costs have led to a decline in the numbers of trainees at RTCs
and satellites (Department of Labor 1995). Capacity utilization at RTCs is
low, estimated at less than 50 percent (Rockey 1993), and a number of
satellites have closed in recent years because of a lack of funding. While
training courses for the unemployed and heavily subsidized short training
courses for workers from small enterprises dominate their activities, RTCs
may offer courses to any organization (or individuals) prepared to finance
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the training. However, they have not proved successful in broadening the
scope of their nonsubsidized activities in this way. Historically, links be-
tween RTCs and industry have been weak, with few courses offered being
recognized or accredited by the relevant industry sector (NTB 1994a). In
1995, 26,500 people were trained at RTCs.
There were some 1,400 private training centers in 1995 established by
employers registered with the Department of Labor. These centers provide
certain skills training for the unemployed under contact with the Depart-
ment of Labor. In 1995 more than 130,000 people were trained under this
scheme but with questionable effectiveness. Follow-up support was lim-
ited and placement rates were low. The 66 technical colleges (under the
aegis of the Department of Education but with parastatal status) had a
student enrollment of 62,000 in 1994 (Central Statistical Service 1995).
Somewhat less than 30 percent of students were registered as apprentices.
Generally, however, the colleges have limited links with ITBs.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Training System
TFhe following paragraphs explore some of the strengths and weaknesses of
the training system for the formal and informal sectors.
Training in the Formal Sector
About 56 percent of the South African labor force was in formal sector
employment, including government employment, in 1994. Thirty percent
of these workers were in small enterprises with fewer than 200 workers
('Coopers and Lybrand 1995, p. 62). Yet it is widely accepted that training
p)rovision for formal sector employment falls considerably short of needs.
Updating earlier BMI estimates, the NTB (1994a, p. 67) estimated train-
ing expenditures by the private sector at R 5 billion in 1993, less than 1
percent of total employment costs. This contrasts poorly with a training
expenditure of 5 percent of employment by major trading partners.
ITBs are responsible for collecting and disbursing training levies and
organizing training for companies in their sectors. However, the ITBs have
not constituted a comprehensive, well-financed, and integrated national
itraining system. In retrospect, the system's two central features-its sector-
based structure rather than national board and its voluntary nature-are
lbuilt-in weaknesses mitigating against an effective system able to meet the
needs of a changing economy.
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The advantage of industry-based boards is that they can concentrate
more directly on meeting the particular needs of the industry in question.
This may be difficult to achieve in nationally based schemes. Diverse prac-
tices among ITBs are apparent not only in their different functions and
activities (BMI Industrial Consulting 1995, p. 153), but also in different
levy schemes in terms of type of levy, categories of workers covered, and
disbursement policies. (Note that a small minority have not introduced a
levy scheme.) There are positive features of levy schemes linked to given
industries: they provide a self-financing mechanism and place control of
funds in the hands of those directly concerned, while minimizing direct
intervention by the state.
The voluntary nature of the South African scheme is also unique. Under
the 1981 act, the government is not empowered to establish ITBs where
it deems a need is present. The initiative for accreditation of an ITB by
the Department of Labor comes from the industry itself, whether a group
of employers, employers' associations, or trade unions. The minister may
impose a binding levy on employers in the industry but only with general
board agreement. The voluntary system perhaps reflects a local ethos, but
it also may have been introduced to assuage opposition from business
interests.
The following are weaknesses of the ITB system (Adams 1995) that
stem from its two central features:
* Inadequate ITB coverage of the work force. In 1994 only 27 industries
had voluntarily chosen to form ITBs under the Manpower Training Act. In
addition, there was less than full worker coverage in industries with ITBs.
As a result, only about 20 percent of workers in the formal sector were
covered by an ITB. Most enterprises and their workers fell outside the ITB
system.
X Inefficient levy collection by ITBs. Not all ITBs have a levy system in
place. Although most of them do, compliance with regard to levy pay-
ments is not always satisfactory (Coopers and Lybrand 1995, pp. 17-18;
Adams 1995). Given minimal funding from government appropriations
(the only notable contribution being Department of Labor-subsidized train-
ing courses for workers of small enterprises at regional training centers)
and the limitations and gaps of the existing sectoral funding framework,
formal sector training as a whole remains underfunded . 3
* Limited capacity forflexibility across sectors. A major shortcoming of a
system of training boards, each linked to a particular industry, is that it
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may produce a narrow approach to training, with duplication of effort and
a failure to develop a functional approach to common core skills transfer-
able across industries. It is also poorly adapted to meeting regional needs.
* Failure to target key economic sectors. In sectors where ITBs have not
been established, the absence of a coordinating institution may lead to gaps
in provision for key economic groups, such as the informal sector (which
in 1994 absorbed some 15 percent of the work force), survival-oriented
nnicroenterprises, people retrenched during industrial restructuring, and
dLynamic small enterprises. While some ITBs have been proactive in devel-
oping pioneering training programs for some of these key economic groups,
ITBs dominated by large and medium firms may fail to meet their needs.
* Lack of national coordination orstrategicplanning. The lack of a centraL
coordinating institution means an absence of any national strategy, targets,
cr agreed priorities for funding and promoting training. The system does
riot facilitate the shifting of resources between industries to meet the needs
of emerging sectors. These shortcomings are of particular concern in an
economy such as that of South Africa, which is undergoing considerable
structural change, with major shifts in the composition of output and em-
ployment.
- Weak research capacity, monitoring, and evaluation. ITBs possess nei-
ther the resources nor the expertise to identify strategic trends and intro-
cluce cost-effective, efficient management of the training system. No central
body has been charged with these tasks.
* Failure to contribute to meeting social equity needs. The ITB system has
failed to address the nonformal segments of the labor market in any mean-
ingful way. The emphasis on sector-based training and the lack of national
coordination of the training system have resulted in considerable
underprovision of skills development to meet social needs, particularly in
relation to school leavers, the unemployed, and rural populations.
Trainingfor the Informal Sector and Special Groups
No structured system of training is in place to meet the needs of informal
sector workers. Under its program for training the unemployed, the De-
partment of Labor finances courses for the informal sector. The courses are
aimed at equipping unemployed people with appropriate skills for infor-
rnal sector employment or to operate as independent entrepreneurs. How-
ever, the outcomes are poor. Only one-quarter found work in the sector; a
third of these workers started their own businesses. Programs meeting the
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needs of special and disadvantaged groups (including the long-term unem-
ployed, the disabled, and retrenched workers) are limited in coverage and
poorly responsive to market needs. The biggest program is the Scheme for
the Training of Unemployed Persons, administered and financed by the
Department of Labor. In 1995 funding was disbursed to some 450 public
and private training contractors. Funding was on a cost basis, according to
a pre-set formula, rather than on the basis of outcomes, such as achieving a
qualification, finding a job, or starting a business. Placement rates were
low, around 20 percent.
The VET Reform Process
The VET reform process is internally driven and is based on consensus
building. Rather than creating new institutions to develop and implement
the reform process, preference has been given to using existing institutions
to run the reform initiative. Much emphasis has been placed on the main
VET stakeholders assuming ownership of the reform process and on the
building of consensus. The core of the team designing the reform strategy
was drawn from the NTB, with additional membership constituted so as
to provide broad representation from the four central stakeholders: em-
ployers, unions, government, and education and training providers. The
result was the National Training Strategy Initiative. The NEDLAC Coun-
terpart Group was also presented with options for reform of the system.
However, none of the proposals from the National Training Strategy Initia-
tive or NEDLAC for new governance structures or financing of the system
has received broad support because of major stakeholders' conflicting in-
terests. Furthermore, the proposed reforms were unconvincing. The Na-
tional Training Strategy Initiative attached great importance to the
establishment of a national qualifications framework; however, governance
and financing issues were accorded a secondary role.
Given this impasse, the Department of Labor moved ahead with its own
comprehensive proposals for training reform. These were included as part
of the government's new skills development strategy, outlined in a green
paper issued in March 1997 (Department of Labor 1997). Independent of
but complementary to the national qualifications framework, set up under
the South African Qualifications Act of 1995, the skills development strat-
egy seeks to address issues of investment and prioritization for economic
growth and development. The national qualifications framework addresses
two key aspects of the learning system: quality and access. Both the na-
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tional qualifications framework and the core proposals of the skills devel-
opment strategy will be discussed in the sections that follow.
National Qualifications Framework
The national qualifications framework provides a comprehensive mecha-
nism for awarding qualifications based on credits for achieving learning
outcomes. The South African Qualifications Authority develops and imple-
ments this framework.
Attainment of credits goes toward the achievement of eight levels of
nationally recognized qualifications including both training and educa-
tion. Thus the framework provides formal qualifications, against clearly
defined standards, for a wide range of training programs. Moreover, it pro-
vides portability of learning outcomes by cutting across the training-edu-
cation divide through the development of equivalencies of learning achieved
within the education and training systems. Integration of the education
and training systems will facilitate maximum flexibility for horizontal and
vertical mobility between different levels. For example, on-the-job training
and prior informal learning are recognized on an equal basis with skills and
knowledge acquired through the formal education and training process,
leading in each case to appropriate certification.
The system facilitates entry into higher levels of training based on hith-
erto unrecognized skills achievement and provides greater portability of
existing skills. Thus it attempts to narrow the disparate skill distribution
among black and white Africans. Ultimately, the system would lead to a
more flexible training approach, adaptable to new developments in the
labor market, the workplace, and education and training (BMI Industrial
Consulting 1995).
The national qualifications framework has been widely welcomed, but a
note of caution is in order. Although the advantages of the new system are
maanifest, it is likely to be extremely costly. Moreover, by making skills
mnore portable, the framework will increase the probability that workers
will leave for other employment after training. This may lower firms' ex-
pected returns from training investments and reduce their willingness to
participate in training (Katz and Ziderman 1990).
learnerships
The learnership system broadens the apprenticeship system now in de-
cline. Apprenticeships had been the traditional framework for combining
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structured learning with work experience. Learnership coverage extends
beyond the traditional blue-collar confines of the apprenticeship system to
include a wide range of services. Access includes those in formal employ-
ment, in self-employment, in the informal sector, and in pre-employment,
as well as members of special target groups, including unemployed young
people and women in rural areas.
Through learnerships, structured learning and work experience are or-
ganized for accreditation within the national qualifications framework.
Learnership contracts are formulated between the learner, the provider of
structured learning, and the organization providing work experience.
Learnership contracts must be registered with a sectoral education and train-
ing organization to qualify for public support. The learnership system is
highly original in its breadth of client coverage, sectoral spread, and poten-
tial range of skills to be covered. Its development will be monitored with
much interest.
Funding the Public Training Delivery System
Budgetary allocations would continue to fund training programs for spe-
cial groups, including the unemployed and young people, as well as pre-
employment public sector training. Proposals for the disbursement of public
funding for training programs aimed at target groups envisage the removal
of protection from all providers. A new system of competitive tendering
for long-term training contracts would be introduced. These measures would
end the privileged position of regional training centers in relation to pri-
vate sector institutions. The system would encourage competition between
education and training providers, both public and private, and it would
enhance providers' responsiveness to the performance criteria governing
the allocation of public funds.
Sectoral Intermediaries
The Department of Labor proposed the introduction of sectoral agencies,
or intermediaries, to promote high-quality and relevant education and train-
ing provision under the skills development strategy (Department of Labor
1997). The new sectoral education and training organizations will be de-
veloped from existing ITBs, whose functions will be appropriately broad-
ened. Current training levy powers at the sectoral level will be replaced by
a national training levy, which will fund sectoral education and training
organization activities.
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National Coordination
fBroad agreement has been reached on the need for national coordination
and strategic direction of the training system. The advisory status of the
NTB has not provided scope for these activities, however.
The NEDLAC Counterpart Group favored a tripartite coordinating
body. Given the traditions of volunteerism in the training sector, this body
would not exercise the strong degree of central control found in national
training authorities in many other countries, but it would assume overall
responsibility for developing national policy, national research capacity,
and monitoring and evaluation studies. It also would coordinate the activi-
ties of ITBs and provide them with advice and support.
The government's proposals for governance of the training system are a
f ar cry from this scenario. The NTB is to be restructured into a new tripar-
tite National Skills Authority. Although it will be given "much stronger
advisory powers than the old NTB," it will remain purely as an advisory
body to the minister of labor (Department of Labor 1997). It appears that
the minister and the Department of Labor will assume greater control over
the governance of the national training system as a whole. Rather than run
the new Research and Strategic Planning Unit, the National Skills Author-
ity would only have "access" to it. The Research and Strategic Planning
lJnit would be based in the Department of Labor.
In sum, these proposals provide unions and employer representatives
with an advisory role only, thereby denying these stakeholders any real role
in the governance of the national training system. The opportunity to cre-
ate a central, tripartite training authority to coordinate the system and to
assume overall responsibility for control over training development and
policy has been passed by.
Funding of Skills Development
The government intends to replace sectoral training levies with a national
levy-grant scheme, based on a national payroll levy, to fund industry-based
itraining. The case for a national levy-grant system is set out in Department
of Labor (1997, p. 67). For a more comprehensive discussion, see Middleton,
Ziderman, and Adams (1993, chap. 4) and Whalley and Ziderman (1990).
The system will be flexible in relation to the needs of different indus-
tries and sectors. The sectoral education and training organizations will
Ibe responsible for managing the sectoral dimension of the levy scheme
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using sectoral skills development funds (80 percent of total levy revenue).
The remaining 20 percent of revenues will go toward a national skills
fund (perhaps supplemented by allocations from relevant government
departments and donor funds). The national portion of the levy scheme
will target learnerships and employee training in priority sectors and skill
categories.
Conclusions
Much can be learned from South Africa's ongoing experiment in training
reform. The national qualifications framework represents an important ef-
fort to equalize the training and education experiences of black and white
Africans and to create a level playing field between formal and informal
training modalities. The proposed skills development strategy is compre-
hensive in its coverage of in-service and pre-service training. Learnerships
are an innovation to broaden apprenticeship and dual training systems and
to link training more firmly with work experience. Public technical train-
ing institutions will now have to compete with the private sector for public
funding.
The approach of building on present institutional structures is sound.
Retaining and expanding the role of the industrial training boards will
keep training decisions close to beneficiaries and provide a mechanism for
coordinating the national qualifications framework and in-service training
expenditures at the sectoral level. Of all the ingredients of the skills devel-
opment strategy, the design of a new financing mechanism has proven to
be the most contentious. Opposition by the business community to a na-
tional training levy and failure to agree on a national coordinating mecha-
nism have prompted the government to move forward with its own proposals.
In sum, we applaud South Africans' comprehensive, participatory, con-
sensus-building approach to reform and welcome their innovations in train-
ing. Yet a note of caution is in order. By screening employers and labor
representatives out of the system of governance, the government has adopted
a risk-prone strategy that could lead to serious problems in the long term.
Notes
1. Note that this section draws heavily on Fallon (1992, 1997).
2. These comments are based on the minutes of the group's first meeting held
on March 17, 1995.
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3. Under the Employee Training Program in the early and mid-1990s, some
20,000 workers from enterprises with fewer than 200 workers attended courses for
four to five weeks. In 1992-93 the Department of Labor budgeted 0.93 million
Rand, or 60 percent of the cost; most of the remainder came from employers,
partially via the levy system. The average course cost was R 290.
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Tanzania
AMIT DAR
TANZANIA IS ONE of the poorest countries in the world.
Since gaining independence in 1961, its economy has undergone a series
of internal and external shocks. Tanzania inherited an economic system
based on private enterprise with some government regulation. The economy
remained largely laissez-faire for some five years after independence, but in
1967 the Arusha Declaration turned Tanzania into a socialist state that was
supposed to be self-reliant with regard to national development. The gov-
ernment considered this move necessary to achieve conomic equality, and
it considered it essential that the state should be responsible for providing
education, including vocational education and training (VET), and health
services. This led to a surge in government involvement in the economy
and a concomitant rise in government employment. All major firms were
nationalized, many parastatals were created, and agricultural cooperatives
under state control were encouraged. Unfortunately, these policies did not
turn out to be beneficial. On the contrary, exacerbated by oil shocks in the
1970s, a fall in export prices, and drought, the growth rates of the gross
domestic product fell drastically. The public sector became overstaffed, while
the private sector shrank. Simultaneously, real wages fell between 1967 and
1986 because of poor macroeconomic onditions.
Given these adverse economic conditions, the government in the mid-
1980s launched the Economic Recovery Program with the objective of
liberalizing the economy. The authorities liberalized agricultural input and
output prices and industrial policies, removed quantitative controls on ex-
ports and imports, established controls on interest rates, reformed the
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parastatal sector, and deregulated private investment. These reforms have
succeeded to some extent: while progress in implementing structural re-
forms has been modest, Tanzania has accomplished its basic liberalization
objectives and has phased out the regime of pervasive and restrictive gov-
ernment intervention. Gross domestic product growth rates increased from
0.8 percent per year in the early 1980s to more than 4.5 percent by the late
1990s. Employment in the private formal sector has been growing rapidly,
and public sector reform has led to a decline in the growth of government
employment. The client of the VET system, for all practical purposes, is
now the private sector.
The reforms and economic recovery have also improved household wel-
fare. The incidence of rural poverty declined from about 65 percent in
1983 to 51 percent in the early 1990s. However, this decline in poverty has
yet to be reflected in most human resource indicators. Social indicators
deteriorated during the 1970s through the mid-1980s when the economy
stagnated. Some progress has been made, but the signs are still not encour-
aging. Access to secondary education remains low, less than 5 percent. Pri-
mary enrollment rates fell from more than 90 percent in the early 1970s to
70 percent in 1990, and school outcomes are worsening. Life expectancy,
infant mortality rates, and morbidity rates have either stagnated or de-
clined. Tanzania lags substantially behind other low-income countries in
basic social indicators, including education enrollments at all levels. Be-
yond the primary level, opportunities for formal education and training
are tightly rationed, inequitable, and expensive. In addition, the quality of
the education is substandard, and it is not aligned with the needs of the
labor market.
The Labor Market
Until very recently, government employment dominated the formal labor
market. The remainder of employment was mostly agricultural, with a siz-
able informal urban sector that absorbed the large annual additions to the
labor force.
The Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment
Tanzania's population has been growing rapidly. For more than a decade,
until the early 1990s, the growth rate was around 3 percent per year. In
1994 the population numbered some 27 million. The high population
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TABLE 13-1
Profile of the Labor Force, by Education Level and Gender, 1991
Category Total Male Female
Total abor force (millions) 8.9 4.5 4.4
Participation rate (percent) 76.8 80.9 73.1
Formal education participation
rate (percent)
None 29.2 19.3 39.4
Primary 66.8 75.4 58.0
Secondary 3.8 5.0 2.5
Postsecondary 0.2 0.3 0.1
Training (any level) 8.3 12.8 3.8
Source: World Bank (1995).
growth rate has led to a skewed distribution of population by age: about
half the population consists of children younger than 15 years of age. The
growth in labor supply matches the growth in population. Between 1984
and 1994 the working-age population grew by some 3.5 percent per year.
One outcome is that the work force is becoming younger, with a third
lbelow the age of 25 and half below the age of 30. This has resulted in a
surge of inexperienced and unskilled job seekers. These trends are expected
to continue, since population growth rates have not dropped significantly
in the past few years and are not expected to do so in the near future.
The level of education of the labor force is extremely low. In 1991, 29
percent had received no education at all, 5 percent of the male labor force
and 2.5 percent of the female labor force had more than a primary educa-
tion, and just over 8 percent of the labor force had received any formal
training (table 13-1).
Tanzania is an agricultural economy. In 1994 the agricultural sector ab-
sorbed more than 80 percent of the work force, mostly in subsistence agri-
'culture. The informal sector was small but growing rapidly. More than 10
percent of the work force was employed in this sector, while the formal
sector employed less than 10 percent of the work force. Until the mid-
1990s the public sector dominated the formal sector.
The vast majority of agricultural workers have low levels of education
(primary or below). The demand is low for skilled workers in a sector that
remains primarily subsistence farming. This suggests that the demand for
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TABLE 13-2
Employment Levels in the Formal Sector, by Employer,
Selected Years, 1978-91
Number ofpeople employed
(thousands) Annual change (percent)
Employer 1978 1984 1991 1978-83 1984-91 1978-91
Private sector 150.1 145.7 275.2 -0.5 9.5 4.8
Government 186.2 302.1 331.6 8.4 1.3 4.5
Parastatals 199.6 185.6 185.6 -1.2 0.0 -0.6
Total 535.9 633.4 792.4 2.8 3.2 3.0
Source: Abe (1995).
VET is likely to be limited in agriculture. The informal sector is the most
rapidly growing source of employment in Tanzania-probably a result of
the high rate of labor force growth coupled with the decline in the supply
of public sector jobs. Furthermore, entry into the informal sector is rela-
tively easy, not only because of the low skill requirements (only about 10
percent of informal sector workers acquired their skills through a formal
training program or apprenticeship), but also because the capital require-
ments to start up an informal enterprise are modest (Abe 1995). Thus ex-
pansion of the urban informal sector does not appear to depend on a supply
of skilled workers.
The formal sector, where the demand for skilled workers is likely to be
the greatest, is relatively small and accounts for less than 8 percent of total
employment. Tanzania's formal sector consists mainly of the civil service
(42 percent of the formal sector work force), parastatals (23 percent), and
medium and large private enterprises (35 percent).
Until the mid- 1980s Tanzania relied excessively on the public sector for
generating employment. Since then economic and political liberalization
and civil service reform have encouraged private sector growth and reduced
the government's role as the country's major employer. Between 1984 and
1991 the private formal sector grew from 23 percent of total formal em-
ployment to 35 percent (table 13-2). Constraints in the supply of skilled
workers do not appear to have slowed the growth of the private formal
sector.
Because of the highly informal labor market, measuring unemployment
does not make much sense in Tanzania. However, with the public sector
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shrinking, recent government figures indicate that unemployment is be-
coming a growing problem in Tanzania. Official unemployment rates are
still below 5 percent.
Earnings and Returns to Education
Because labor force data are not regularly collected, data on earnings are
outdated. According to the 1990-91 labor force survey, only a small pro-
portion of Tanzanian workers, 9.3 percent, received income from paid
employment. Wage data point toward wage compression in the public sec-
tor but high returns to education and training in the private sector. Table
13-3 presents private and social rates of return to education. For men an-
nual private rates of return increase sharply with level of education; for
women the rates of return are higher than for men at all levels of education
but are fairly constant across education levels.
The social rates of return to education are small for secondary education
and negligible for training and higher education (table 13-3). This is pri-
marily because public expenditures per pupil (unit costs) in postprimary
education are high, a result of inefficient government spending in this sec-
tor. Given that most of the beneficiaries of vocational education and train-
ing come from the better-off segments of society, the high private and low
social rates of return provide a rationale for reducing government invest-
ment in VET and increasing private investment in the sector.
TABLE 13-3
Private and Social Annual Rates of Return to Education and Training,
by Level, 1991
(percent)
Education level
Secondary Vocational
Group Primary vocational University training
Private rates
All 3.6 6.9 9.0 19.4
Male 1.9 6.6 9.9 17.8
Female 10.8 9.0 11.4 20.2
Social rates 3.6 1.5 0.0 0.0
Source. Author's calculations based on the 1990-91 Tanzania Labor Force Survey.
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Although employment in the economy is growing, labor shortages are
not apparent. One study even predicted that the supply of graduates from
technical training institutions in the industrial, mining, transportation, and
agricultural fields would far exceed the demand (ESAURP 1992). Recently,
private and semiautonomous training institutions are providing instruc-
tion in skills for the services and trade sectors, which constitute the major-
ity of private formal sector employment. With this as a background, I now
turn to a description of the VET system in Tanzania.
An Overview of Vocational Education and Training
The Tanzanian education system follows a seven-four-two-three pattern.
After seven years of primary school, pupils who qualify for further educa-
tion by passing an examination administered by the Ministry of Education
can choose to pursue four years of lower secondary education at a public
school or training at a postprimary training institution that provides basic
vocational training. Lower secondary education is followed by two years of
higher secondary education. Individuals can also enter training institutions
after completing either lower secondary or higher secondary education.
In 1993-94 some 350,000 students completed primary education, but
fewer than 70,000 places in secondary education (lower secondary schools
and postprimary training institutions) were available in public and private
institutions. About 16,000 openings were available in upper secondary
schools and other vocational institutions for the 35,000 students who fin-
ished lower secondary school (World Bank 1996). These figures illustrate
the tight rationing of educational opportunities following primary educa-
tion. Table 13-4 presents the situation in public sector institutions in 1993-
94. Equivalent data for private institutions were not readily available.
Despite the tight rationing, Tanzania has many public training institu-
tions. The 1967 Arusha Declaration, which emphasized socialism and self-
reliance and stated that Tanzania should be self-sufficient in manpower
needs by 1980, led to the proliferation of these institutions. The authori-
ties believed that training individuals at the postprimary and postsecondary
levels would lead to self-sufficiency. They started crash training programs.
With the nationalization of large companies and the creation of many
parastatals, a large public sector sprang up. To be self-sufficient in high-
level manpower, the sector needed trained employees. The rallying theme
was that only Tanzanians could be truly dedicated to the work at hand.
Public training institutions multiplied in proportion to the number of
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TABLE 13-4
Enrollment in Public Education and Training Institutions, 1993-94
Number Total Enroll- Females as
of students enrollment ment share of
entering (number of rates entrants
Program yearly students) (percent) (percent)
After higher secondary 1
University 2,000 5,700 11.3
Other 3,200 6,200 27.0
After lower secondary 2
Upper secondary 4,300 8,300 32.2
Other 5,500 14,900 34.0
After primary 3
Lower secondary 20,000 73,000 43.5
Other 10,200 29,500 - -
Primary - 1,800,000 70 50.0
- Not available.
Source: Bureau of Statistics (1993); Ministry of Education and Culture (1994).
parastatals, ministries, and departments created. Private training became
almost nonexistent (Omari 1994).
The Complex System of Training Institutions
Tanzania now has a multitude of ministries that deal with the provision of
technical and vocational education and training at various levels. The most
important ministries in this connection are (a) the Ministry of Education
and Culture through its diversified secondary schools and postprimary train-
ing centers; (b) the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Higher Educa-
tion, which operates 14 nonuniversity training centers and teacher training
colleges; (c) the Ministry of Labor and Youth Development through its
vocational training centers; (d) a number of other ministries, government
agencies, mission trade schools, and parastatals that have their own special-
ized training institutions; and (e) private training institutions.
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE. The Ministry of Education
and Culture operates all public secondary schools as well as various
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postprimary training institutions that admit students who could not gain
entrance into secondary schools.
The perceived failure of secondary education in preparing students for
wage employment or self-employment led to the diversification of the sec-
ondary school curriculum in 1978, including making it more vocational.
All public lower secondary schools were converted into so-called diversi-
fied schools that focused on agricultural, commercial, industrial, and home
economics courses. Private schools were also required to offer courses in at
least one specialization. However, upper secondary schools were not re-
quired to specialize. In 1994 Tanzania had about 164 public lower second-
ary schools and 258 private lower secondary schools.
Because of the rationing of secondary school places, the government
opened postprimary training centers in 1976 to provide primary school
leavers with the skills that would make them employable. Some 300 cen-
ters offer two-year (on average) training programs in such fields as carpen-
try, masonry, sheet metal work, home crafts, and electrical work.
MINISTRY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND HIGHER EDUCATION. In ad-
dition to operating all three of Tanzania's universities, this ministry is re-
sponsible for overseeing the technical training centers and teacher training
colleges. The ministry operates 14 nonuniversity training centers. These
intermediate-level colleges are dedicated to training students in specific
professions, such as management, accountancy, teacher training, journal-
ism, and social welfare. Entry into the colleges is predicated on completion
of lower secondary school, plus extended academic exposure to senior sec-
ondary education. Courses last two or three years and students graduating
from these institutions are awarded diplomas or certificates.
MINISTRY OF LABOR AND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT. The Ministry of Labor
and Youth Development is responsible for operating the 19 national voca-
tional training centers. The passage of the 1974 National Vocational Train-
ing Act led to the creation of the National Vocational Training Division
within the Ministry of Labor and Youth Development in 1975. The funda-
mental building block of the training system developed by the division is
basic training at a national vocational training center, which teaches the
rudimentary skills needed for employment in one- or two-year courses.
The programs are open to primary school leavers who are at least 15 years
old, but for some courses a lower secondary completion certificate is also
required. Students spend 60 percent of their time on practical work and
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the remainder on theory and general education. To receive a certificate of
basic training, they must pass a test at the end of the course. The Na-
tional Vocational Training Division can place those who pass the test in
two-to-three-year apprenticeships in industry. Apprentices are expected
to attend evening classes run by a national vocational training center. On
fulfillment of all the requirements, apprentices receive a certificate of
apprentice completion.
The system is focused almost exclusively on training young people to
become craftspeople. In the mid-1990s training was provided in 34 trades.
The general opinion is that the centers are unsuccessful. After two de-
cades, only basic training is in place, and what passes for apprenticeship
is usually placement (or self-placement) in a semiskilled job without any
organized training within the firm. Thus apart from the mandatory
evening classes, for the vast majority of trainees organized training ceases
at the end of basic training. Studies conducted in the late 1980s (Lauglo
1990) estimated that for every 100 trainees entering basic training, 93
completed their courses, 66 were recorded as placed in an industry, 13
signed an apprenticeship contract, and only 4 were awarded an appren-
ticeship certificate.
Recognizing that the old system was failing to produce graduates suit-
able for the labor market, the government passed a new Vocational Educa-
tion and Training Act in 1994 (Government of Tanzania 1994). The main
provisions of this act were (a) the establishment of the Vocational Educa-
tion and Training Authority (VETA), an autonomous body that took over
the functions of the National Vocational Training Division; (b) the intro-
duction of a vocational education and training levy, a 2 percent payroll tax
on all employers used to finance VETA activities; (c) the establishment of a
vocational education and training fund to receive levy payments and pay
for activities approved by the VETA; and (d) the establishment of regional
'VET boards responsible for coordinating and supervising VET in the re-
gions. The new system, supposedly demand driven, is expected to meet the
skill needs of both the formal and informal sectors.
OTHER VOCATIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS. The Ministry of Culture
and Women's Development is responsible for running 52 folk develop-
ment colleges. Established in 1975 with support from the Swedish Interna-
tional Development Authority (SIDA), they provide programs related to
the needs of rural communities. For example, they offer short courses (one
day to six months) and long courses (six to eighteen months) on a wide
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variety of topics, including carpentry, masonry, electrical work, dressmak-
ing, and domestic crafts.
A number of training institutions fall under the jurisdiction of a minis-
try or parastatal agency. They operate mainly at the postsecondary level
and cater to the needs of the specific ministry or agency. For example, in
1994 the Ministry of Agriculture ran 18 training institutions that offered
certificate and diploma courses in animal husbandry and veterinary sci-
ences; the Ministry of Health operated 43 training institutions that offered
courses for medical assistants, nurses, midwives, and others lasting two to
four years; and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism operated
about 10 training institutions with courses on such varied topics as bee
keeping, wildlife management, and hotel management. Most other minis-
tries also operate training institutions on a smaller scale. Parastatals-such
as the Tanzania Portland Cement Company, the Tanzania Electric Supply
Company (Tanesco), the Tanzania Post Corporation, and the Sugar Devel-
opment Corporation-run their own specialized training institutes. These
provide on-the-job training to their own employees. In 1995 about 10,000
students were enrolled in parastatal training institutions. Tanzania also had
58 registered mission trade schools (run by the church) that mainly pro-
vided skills for the informal sector.
PRIVATE TRAINING INSTITUTIONS. The number of private training insti-
tutions, which was virtually zero in the early 1990s, has increased. Most
private sector involvement in education has been at the secondary level,
where private schools outnumber public schools and private enrollment
outnumbers public enrollment. Private training institutions mainly teach
secretarial, commercial, and computer skills. While the number of such
institutions is unknown and relatively scant data are available, estimates
suggest that private training institutions enrolled about 16,000 students in
1995 (World Bank 1996). The lack of information about this increasingly
important subsector is worrisome, because it may reflect neglect of this
subsector on the part of policymakers.
Costs and Financing of VET
In Tanzania the government has historically been the major financier of
VET, with assistance from donor agencies. In fiscal 1995-96 the govern-
ment of Tanzania planned to spend 23 billion Tanzanian shillings (about
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TABLE 13-5
Recurrent Government Expenditures on Education and Training,
Fiscal 1993-94 and 1995-96
(T Sh millions)
1993-94 1995-96
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Actual of total of VET Budgeted of total of VET
expend- spend- spend- expend- spend- spend-
Program iture ing ing iture ing ing
Primary education 23,997 53 n.a. 45,766 66 n.a.
Secondary education 6,741 15 42 7,310 11 43
!Universities 5,772 13 n.a. 6,512 9 n.a.
'Vocational training in
government and
parastatals 8,251 18 51 8,271 12 50
Technical training under
MOSTHE 1,106 2 7 1,124 2 7
n.a. Not applicable.
MOSTHE Ministry of Science, Technology, and Higher Education
Source: World Bank (1996).
US$46 million, or 2 percent of budget expenditures) on recurrent costs for
its postprimary education and training institutions. Of this figure, T Sh
16.7 billion was expected to be spent on training at the secondary and
tertiary levels and on diversified secondary education (table 13-5).
Of the total recurrent spending on vocational and technical education
and training, in fiscal 1995-96, close to T Sh 7 billion, or about 43 percent
of recurrent expenditure, was devoted to diversified government secondary
schools operated by the Ministry of Education, while T Sh 1.1 billion, or 7
percent, was spent on running the technical training institutes under the
Ministry of Science, Technology, and Higher Education.
The rest of the recurrent expenditure-around T Sh 8.3 billion-was
divided among the many vocational and technical training institutions op-
erated by several parastatals and by the ministries of Health, Education and
Culture, Home Affairs, Agriculture, Labor, Community Development, and
others. Among the various vocational programs, teacher training absorbs
the single largest share of recurrent spending, closely followed by training
programs in the Ministry of Health.
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Selected Issues
As we have seen, Tanzania has a complex system of public VET institu-
tions. As the economy has liberalized and the government has had to face
tight budget constraints, the system's efficacy has increasingly been called
into question. The main issues facing the VET sector concern costs, labor
market and training linkages, and the role of donors.
Unsustainable Training Costs
The inefficient allocation of resources has led to extremely high unit costs
in public secondary schools and training institutions, while the quality of
training remains low because of insufficient expenditure on developmental
and learning materials. The cost of educating one student varies widely
across programs and institutions. In public institutions the recurrent cost
per student for any type of training is at least ten times the comparable cost
for primary school (table 13-6). Although the greater cost of higher level
education is not surprising given the more costly inputs required and the
more highly trained staff needed, some of the unit costs are extremely-
and unsustainably-high. For example, the unit cost of a year of education
at one of the technical training colleges run by the Ministry of Science,
Technology, and Higher Education (some US$1,500) is 75 times the unit
cost of a year of primary school (US$21) and about 10 times the unit cost
of a year of secondary school (US$154).
Vocational education is an expensive venture in any setting, but it is
particularly costly in Tanzania. Many of the government financed and op-
erated training institutions that were created to provide alternatives to lower
or upper secondary education are far more costly than secondary school-
ing. For example, vocational training in the folk development colleges, which
are intended to equip students who could not go on to receive a secondary
education with skills for the informal sector, are nearly three times as ex-
pensive per student year than are secondary schools.
The government faces high costs in the postprimary subsector because it
is the main, and in many programs the sole, financier. Cost sharing would,
by definition, reduce the financial burden on the state. However, many
types of training in Tanzania cost more than necessary. The reasons for this
include low capacity utilization and poor use of available facilities; low
student-to-faculty ratios; large amounts spent on student room and board
and welfare; and large wage bills despite low salaries. The government ab-
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TABLE 13-6
Recurrent Expenditures per Student on Selected Public Programs,
1994-95
(thousands of T Sh)
Multiple of Multiple of
Recurrent expenditures expenditures
expenditures on primary on secondary
Program per student education education
Primary education 12.5 1 n.a.
Secondary education 92.7 7.4 n.a.
Teacher training 131.7 10.5 1.4
Folk development colleges and other
training institutions under the Ministry
of Community Development 267.6 21.4 2.9
Health worker training 415.9 33.3 4.5
Technical training under MOSTHE 937.4 75.0 10.1
n.a. Not applicable.
MOSTHE Ministry of Science, Technology, and Higher Education
Source: World Bank (1996).
sorbs most of these costs since the proportion of costs borne by students is
still small.
Low CAPACITY UTILIZATION. According to one study (ESAURP 1992),
many public training institutions are operating at low capacity, with only
about 50 percent of available places filled. At the Muhimbili College of
Health Sciences, capacity utilization was 51 percent (Mukyanuzi 1994).
Data from agricultural training institutions in particular show a large
decline in enrollments (Omari 1994). Another approach to capacity uti-
lization is to consider the intensity of use of facilities, including human
resources. While few hard data on the intensity of use are available, some
indicators are illustrative. For example, many public training institutions
follow government working hours and close by 4 P.M. instead of offering
evening classes. A study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO 1994) showed that in many of the Ministry of
Agriculture's training institutions, farm utilization was well below capac-
ity and tractors and farm machinery were either unused or in a state of
disrepair.
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Low STUDENT-STAFF RATIOS. Compared with international standards,
student-staff ratios in Tanzania are low across the board in government
secondary and tertiary institutions. Government secondary schools have
about 14 students per teacher compared with an average of 24 in the rest of
Sub-Saharan Africa. Twenty-eight students per teacher is the ratio recom-
mended by the Tanzanian government. Many of the vocational and techni-
cal training institutions have even lower ratios, perhaps ten or fewer students
per instructor. For example, at the National Social Welfare Training Insti-
tute, two faculty members are available for every student; at the Institute
for Rural Planning and many agricultural training centers, the student-
staff ratio is 1:1; and in the technical colleges operated by the Ministry of
Science, Technology, and Higher Education, the average ratio is 8.8:1.0.
By employing fewer teachers and administrators, the institutions could al-
locate resources to critical nonpersonnel inputs that improve achievement,
such as textbooks and equipment.
SPENDING ON ROOM AND BOARD AND STUDENT WELFARE. Excessive spend-
ing on student welfare is endemic throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, and
Tanzania is no exception. While public training institutions in Tanzania
spend about 33 percent of their budgets on student welfare, Asian coun-
tries devote about 7 percent of their budgets to such expenditures. All in-
stitutions use a significant share of the funds invested in education and
training for nonteaching-related inputs (table 13-7). Across the board, ex-
penditures on student welfare take up at least one-quarter of the budget for
education and training at each level. Even though the government has be-
gun to institute cost-sharing measures, welfare expenditures still make up a
significant proportion of recurrent expenditures.
SPENDING ON WAGES AND SALARIES. In most VET institutions more than
50 percent of recurrent expenditures goes to pay salaries (table 13-7). Al-
though teachers and nonacademic staff are not overpaid relative to other
civil servants in Tanzania, overstaffing has contributed to the large wage
bill. Thus the high proportion of expenditure on salaries is directly related
to the low student-staff ratios. Another reason for the high wage bill is the
sizable allowances and other benefits available to teachers (as well as to
other civil servants) in the form of reimbursement for housing rent, medi-
cal and travel allowances, and so on. The civil service reform under way is
in the midst of monetizing these benefits.
Given these excessive expenditures, few resources are left to cover devel-
opmental expenses-namely, teaching and learning materials, operations
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TABLE 13-7
Budgeted Recurrent Spending on Selected Programs, by Input, 1995-96
(percent)
Percentage of total spending
VET institution Salaries Student welfare Other
Technical 35 43 22
Commercial 60 27 13
Agriculture and home economics 52 32 16
Teacher training 53 33 14
Health worker training 21 47 32
Source: Government data; Kaijage and Abayo (1995).
and maintenance, examination costs, and other miscellaneous inputs. This
results in a substandard quality of education and training. By contrast,
private training institutions allocate funds more efficiently. The student-
staff ratios are higher, and even though the salaries are more competitive
than in the public sector, a smaller proportion of expenditure is spent on
the wage bill. Furthermore, private training institutions' low expenditures
on student welfare ensure that a greater proportion of funds is spent on
developmental expenses, such as teaching and learning materials. This leads
to the provision of higher quality education (box 13-1).
Poor Linkages between the Labor Market and Training
Policies pertinent to training have undergone major changes. On the mac-
roeconomic level, past policies supported a centrally planned economy;
restricted trade; provided universal subsidies across many sectors; and na-
tionalized or prohibited most private sector enterprises, including those
delivering health and education services. Since the late 1 980s, however, the
government has introduced public sector reforms to stimulate the private
sector to produce and deliver goods and services, including social services.
These changes have revealed weaknesses in Tanzania's VET system, which
was designed to cater to a largely public sector clientele.
Although labor force data are extremely limited and somewhat outdated,
one can get some idea of the labor market conditions facing graduates of
the education and training system. In the past the vast majority of students
who completed primary school and did not go on to additional formal
378 LOW-GROWTH ECONOMIES
BOX 13-1
Recurrent Expenditures on Public and Private Training Institutions
To analyze the main determinants of recurrent expenditures, Kaijage and Abayo
(1995) examined spending in eight public tertiary training institutions and one
private training institution (Microtex). Their analysis revealed that staff salaries
and student welfare expenses constituted about 80 percent of the expenditures in
the public training institutions. Student-staff ratios were low in all the public ter-
tiary training institutions.
The largest proportion of the recurrent education budget went to pay teachers'
salaries and allowances. In 1993-94 this figure amounted to more than 42 percent
in the eight public tertiary institutions but less than 30 percent in Microtex. A
significant reason for these differences is that the public tertiary institutions were
overstaffed, while Microtex was not.
The second large expenditure item for the public institutions in the sample was
student welfare. About a third of recurrent expenditures was spent on student wel-
fare, mosdy on room and board. The private institution did not provide food for its
students; hence, Microtex's expenditure on student welfare was less than 15 per-
cent of total recurrent expenditure. Microtex spent less than T Sh 30,000 per stu-
dent on welfare, but more than T Sh 150,000 per student was spent by the public
training institutions. Given this large amount, they had relatively little money to
spend on teaching materials and other inputs (5 percent). In comparison, Microtex
spent 34 percent of its recurrent budget on such items.
Source: Kaijage and Abayo (1995).
education or training worked in agriculture or were engaged in labor-
intensive informal sector activities. The same holds true today. In the
past those students who obtained a postprimary education were guaran-
teed secure employment in the public sector, either in the civil service or
in parastatals. The government, however, has eliminated such employ-
ment guarantees. Private sector opportunities are slowly emerging, and the
labor market has changed markedly as a result. These changes-along with
the reforms to liberalize the economy, reduce government involvement,
and encourage the growth of the private sector-imply that the education
system must change to become more responsive to the labor market's fu-
ture needs.
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As noted earlier, the formal sector in 1995 constituted less than 8 per-
cent of total employment. Although the government is still a major em-
ployer, the private formal sector has grown rapidly. Public sector employment
is likely to remain stagnant, but employment in the private sector is ex-
pected to grow quite fast. However, demand for graduates of government
tertiary institutions is not high in the private sector. In 1993 about 20
percent of educated youth were unemployed, compared with 10 percent in
the mid-1970s, when the government hired most of them (Omari 1994).
Studies to examine demand for these trainees in the private sector have not
been conducted, but informal interviews with employers suggest that gov-
ernment tertiary institutions are not providing their students with skills
needed in the labor market. Two private enterprises, D. T. Dobbie, an au-
tomotive sales company, and the New Arusha Hotel preferred to hire stu-
dents from private training institutions to fill their secretarial and accounting
positions. In some cases the companies had found that if they hired em-
ployees who had been trained in public institutions, they had to send them
to private training institutions for short courses to attain the requisite skill
levels (Sumra 1995).
Another means of examining the demand for trainees in the labor mar-
ket is to look at job placement rates for trainees from public institutions. A
World Bank-sponsored study (Olomi and Assad 1995) that examined dif-
ferences between public and private training institutions sheds some light
on this issue. The study examined costs, financing, and training relevance
in five institutions: one private, one semiautonomous, two public, and one
parastatal.
The study concludes that private training institutions allocate their ex-
penditures more efficiently while providing relevant and demand-sensitive
training. Public institutions did badly on both counts. In the two institu-
tions not under government control, teachers and support staff are fully
qualified and student-staff ratios are adequate. By contrast, the three pub-
lic sector institutions are overstaffed, and fewer academic and support staff
are fully qualified.
The main sources of funding for these institutions are fees, government
assistance, grants, and self-generated incomes. The nongovernmental insti-
tutions obtain most of their resources from fees and self-generated income,
while the public training institutions depend almost entirely on the govern-
ment for their revenues. This dependence is proving to be unsustainable.
As noted earlier, expenditures on salaries, administration, and student
welfare leave little to be spent on teaching and learning materials, especially
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TABLE 13-8
Performance of Public and Private Training Institutions
National
Social Ministry of
Institute of Institute of Welfare Agriculture Tanesco
Information Financial Training training Training
Indicator Technology Management Institute institutions Institute
Program demand High High Low Low Low
Job placement High High Low Low
Return on assets
(percent) 58 -2 -6 _ _
- Not available.
Source: Olomi and Assad (1995).
in the public institutions. Private training institutions try to keep abreast
of the latest technological advances to maintain their niche in the market-
place, but public institutions appear to be unresponsive to market demand.
It comes as no surprise that the private institutions have the best quali-
tative performance indicators. Their programs are in great demand because
their job placement rates are high. By the same token, demand for pro-
grams in the other three institutions is low because students and their fami-
lies perceive that employment opportunities are poor for those graduates.
The complete government support these institutions receive insulates them
from the market. Therefore, their management sees no need to change
courses to meet labor market demands (table 13-8).
Most graduates from the private institutions had been hired by the time
they completed their training. The picture was less rosy for public training
institution graduates. With the abolition of government employment guar-
antees in the early 1990s, graduates of the sampled government institu-
tions were finding it increasingly difficult to gain employment in the private
sector.
An FAO (1994) study of 15 Ministry of Agriculture training institu-
tions found similar results. Graduates' employability was low once govern-
ment employment guarantees were removed, and most sought employment
in the informal sector.
Faced with a low demand for their skills in the private sector, many
graduates from public training institutions are joining the informal sector
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or the ranks of the unemployed. The skill requirements in the informal
sector are generally low, and the training acquired in public institutions is
not useful for these jobs; however, training programs do not seem to be
responding to these realities.
Dependence on Donors
The main donors to Tanzania's education sector are Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden. Other contributors include France, Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Multilateral agencies such as the
'World Bank and the United Nations Children's Fund have also been in-
volved in this sector.
The government has become largely dependent on donors for its nonre-
current capital expenditures. Donors mainly lend for activities in the
postprimary subsector. Funding for VET composed about 64 percent of
total donor assistance in 1993 (table 13-9).
Data on the actual amounts committed to each activity are not avail-
able. Donors primarily fund such items as staff development, infrastruc-
ture creation and rehabilitation, educational materials, curriculum
development, and technical assistance. They may provide some support to
maintenance, research, transport, central administration, and national edu-
cation trust funds, but this is less common. Despite the large donor contri-
butions, their effectiveness is limited by the following constraints.
UNSUSTAINABILITY. Most projects funded by donors do not include phas-
ing out mechanisms that give local institutions a period for learning and
TABLE 13-9
Donor Funding to Postprimary Education and Training, 1991-93
(T Sh billions)
Sector 1991 1992 1993
Secondary education 3.0 5.2 9.1
Vocational and technical training 5.5 6.7 6.0
Total VET funding 8.5 11.9 15.1
lVET funding as a percentage of
total donor funding for education 53.0 58.0 64.0
Source: Materu and Omari (1995).
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taking over the project when donor aid stops. In some cases little dialogue
takes place with local administrators while the aid is being supplied, and so
the work ceases as soon as aid is no longer provided. In addition, the long-
term impact of aiding institutions is sometimes given little thought. A clas-
sic example is the support the Swedish International Development Authority
gave to the folk development colleges. These institutions produce poorly
skilled graduates at high costs both to the government and to SIDA. Reluc-
tant to write off these institutions as failures, both sources continue to fund
them at the expense of other, more important, programs (for example, pri-
mary education).
LACK OF COORDINATION. Lack of coordination among donors and be-
tween donors and the government is a related problem. Donors, some-
times unintentionally, are working at crosspurposes with the government.
For example, they may invest in institutions that should not be the top
priority in terms of meeting the country's needs. In the long run, when
donor funding for such institutions declines, the government must bear
the usually unsustainable costs of running them. Similarly, donors do not
coordinate with each other. Not only does this work against capacity build-
ing, it also leads to less flexibility in operations. Often it results in duplica-
tion of efforts and wasted resources, a criticism that donors frequently level
at government ministries.
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY. Institution administrators do not know how
much money is being committed to projects in their institutions. Donor
agency representatives use their own discretion to decide what or how much
to provide, often after little consultation with local counterparts. Lack of
transparency also obscures the institutional lines of accountability, since
materials and equipment received in this manner are not recorded in insti-
tutional budgets. In this situation even parent ministries are not aware of
institutions' real budgetary needs.
Too MUCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. Many countries are once again tying
aid to technical expertise. While the original objective of technical assis-
tance was to close the technology gap between industrial and developing
countries by accelerating the transfer of knowledge, skills, and expertise,
this outcome is rarely achieved because technical experts are not always of
the highest quality. The large proportion of aid that is usually devoted to
technical assistance and the excessive dependence on expatriate staff for
TANZANIA 383
management and implementation diminish the funds that can be devoted
to educational activities. For example, of the US$2.4 million that was spent
to upgrade a vocational training center at Morogoro as part of the VETA
initiative, close to 45 percent was used for technical assistance from inter-
national consultants, and only 25 percent for staff development, equip-
ment, and materials (World Bank 1996).
Reforms and Obstacles to Reform
At the sectoral level the government's policies represent a shift in the state's
conceptualization of its role. The Education and Training Policy and the
Higher Education Policy put forward in the mid-1990s emphasized the
government's continued responsibility to finance and provide more and
better basic education opportunities. At the same time the policies reduced
untargeted subsidies by increasing cost sharing, liberalizing private educa-
tion and training at all levels, and decentralizing authority. The higher edu-
cation policy highlights the importance of rationalizing the government's
contribution to higher education. It advocates competition for grants to
institutions, cost sharing to reduce the government's expenditure, and a
student loan scheme to ensure that students from the poorest segments of
society have more access to education and training. The authorities have
also established the VETA to ensure that the training provided meets the
labor market's needs. While some of these reforms are steps in the right
direction, the efficacy of others is questionable.
Fiscal Sustainability and Cost Sharing
Because of the financial constraints facing the public sector and the high
expenditures incurred in recent years, the government recognized that it
could not fully finance education at the higher levels or use its resources
efficiently. The result has been the gradual introduction of cost-sharing
schemes: some government-owned institutions have begun to charge fees
for instruction, and room and board. This will reduce the government's
expenditure in connection with pre-employment training.
Cost sharing is most significant at the secondary education level. In
1994 parents bore about 37 percent of total expenditures on public institu-
tions and only around 10 percent on training institutions. In comparison,
households absorbed 62 percent of educational expenditures at the second-
ary level in Kenya (World Bank 1995). In Vietnam households bore 22
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percent of the costs of public tertiary education; both Botswana and Ghana
have eliminated subsidies for student meals (World Bank 1996). Clearly
there is ample scope for greater cost sharing at all levels of education in
Tanzania (Galaitsi 1995).
Although no official policy on cost sharing for training institutions ex-
ists, many institutions have instituted cost-recovery schemes to alleviate
severe budget constraints. In these institutions students tend to bear the
costs of transportation, stationery, uniforms, bedding, and personal hy-
giene items. In some institutions students are required to pay examination
and registration fees and to buy some of their food.
Official documents on the subject of cost sharing lack clarity. They do
not specify the fees that should be charged institutions. (With no official
policy, training institutions charge what they want.) Furthermore, the gov-
ernment circulars do not state what measures to take when students do not
pay their fees. In the mid-1990s at least 20 percent of students were not
paying any of the costs of their education (Mushi, Baisi, and Mbamba
1995). In some cases this was because the households were unable to pay,
but some students from better-off households were simply not paying. An
adverse impact of the policy has been delayed starting times for schools.
Students' failure to pay for transportation leads to late arrivals, and schools
end up starting three or four weeks late. Failure to make up this lost time
further diminishes the quality of education the students receive.
The government continues to allocate resources inefficiently. Cost shar-
ing will reduce the government's burden, but until it closes poorly per-
forming schools, retrenches staff based on clear criteria, lowers expenditures
on student welfare, and recycles some of the money saved back into the
institutions in the form of quality-enhancing inputs, the quality of educa-
tion in public VET institutions is unlikely to improve.
Cost Sharing and the Poor
As in other countries, the better-off in Tanzania have greater access to
postprimary education and training opportunities than do the poor. To
ensure that access to education by the poor does not become even more
limited, the government has initiated loan schemes for students in training
institutions.
To make user charges workable, the government should exempt poor
students from payment. However, the cost of obtaining information to
differentiate between poor and better-off students is often prohibitive.
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Moreover, in a society where income is difficult to measure, it is hard to
identify households that can afford to pay. The means-testing scheme relies
on grassroots-level institutions to identify parents with the ability to pay
(Mushi, Baisi, and Mbamba 1995). If students cannot pay the fees, they
apply to the village government for exemption. If the village government
determines that a particular student is unable to pay, then it is required to
foot the bill, and this is where the system is prone to abuse. If the village
government is also unable to pay, it passes the burden on to the district
council. Even when their resources are limited, village governments tend to
approve the applications submitted to them. Thus the burden is passed on
to the district councils. In this way the government ends up paying, often
For students who can afford to pay for themselves.
In response to growing student unrest over the cost-sharing policy, the
government of Tanzania started a student loan scheme in 1994-95. The
scheme covers students enrolled in tertiary institutions, and it is designed
co help meet the room and board expenses of students who cannot afford
to pay. Students are supposed to fill out an application form that sets out
their sources of income, and local district commissioners must endorse
these forms, which have the status of legal contracts. The repayment terms
are generous: the loans are interest free (in a country where the inflation
rate is between 30 and 40 percent a year), and the loans can be repaid up to
16 years after graduation. A student who borrowedT Sh 200,000 in 1994-
95 would end up having paid only the equivalent of T Sh 33,000 16 years
later given the current rate of inflation. Thus, even in the best-case scenario
(no defaults and low administrative costs), the government will be repaid
only a small fraction of the worth of the loans.
Currently, almost all students receive loans. This suggests that the infor-
imation collection procedure is not working. Furthermore, the loan collec-
tion mechanism is unclear: the means by which the government plans to
tLrace students and recover loans after they leave the institutions have not
been spelled out. The problems the government faces in administering this
loan scheme are similar to those facing other developing countries where
loan schemes have proved a dismal failure (Ziderman and Albrecht 1995).
Alternative Financing Mechanisms and the Cost of Labor
lEvaluations of vocational education and training in Tanzania reveal the
f^ollowing shortcomings: (a) training centers are insensitive to the labor
market, and employers are not involved in curriculum development; (b)
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training facilities are inadequate because of the lack of funds and the inef-
ficient use of existing funds; (c) the quality of training is unsatisfactory;
and (d) the apprenticeship system has not worked successfully.
Realizing that its training institutes are operating inefficiently, the gov-
ernment of Tanzania has set up the VETA, which it expects to provide
tailor-made training courses not only to meet the training needs of the
formal sector, but also to help the unemployed attain skills that they can
use in the informal sector. This training will be financed through a payroll
levy on firms that equals 2 percent of gross emoluments payable by the
employer to all employees (Government of Tanzania 1994). The authori-
ties believe that because enterprises are bearing the costs of training that
will benefit them, such a tax is fair.
This innovation was implemented in 1995, but its efficacy has not yet
been assessed. Research from industrial countries suggests that, in reality,
either labor bears the cost of these taxes or, since payroll levies are a tax on
labor, they tend to raise the price of labor relative to capital, thereby en-
couraging a shift to more capital-intensive techniques and inhibiting em-
ployment growth. In addition, enterprises are likely to resist this because
their experience with graduates from government vocational training insti-
tutions has not been positive. Given that public enterprises are not subject
to this levy, the private sector is, in effect, subsidizing their training-some-
thing that private employers will be reluctant to do.
Donors, Efficiency, and Labor Market Linkages
The shortcomings of the VET system triggered the establishment of the
Vocational Education and Training Authority. The Danish International
Development Agency and the Swedish International Development Authority
are working with the government to implement the VETA's strategic ac-
tion plan.
Under the VETA, vocational training centers will provide short, tailor-
made courses for the formal and informal sectors, skill upgrading and up-
dating for craftspeople and laborers, entrepreneurial courses and other
support for people who want to be self-employed, and advisory services for
the local business community. To achieve this the national vocational training
centers will be transformed into vocational training and service centers.
Each region will have one vocational training and service center; all other
centers registered with and managed by the VETA will be referred to as
vocational training centers. Regional boards will govern vocational train-
ing and service centers and coordinate training activities in the regions.
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The government envisages that the system will be more responsive to
the needs of the labor market than the old system. By involving employers'
associations (such as chambers of commerce and trade unions) in curricu-
lum design and trade testing (testing whether students are proficient in the
trade), the government hopes to respond more successfully to changes in
demand. New courses offered at the vocational training and service centers
wvill be designed specifically to meet the needs of local labor markets.
'Whether employers will show an interest in curriculum development is not
yet clear.
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A / Zambia
FRED FLUITMAN AND WIM ALBERTS
ZAMBIA, A LANDLOCKED COUNTRY in the southern part
of Sub-Saharan Africa, has a land surface area of 753,000 square kilome-
ters. Its population in 1995 was 9.4 million, and its population growth rate
in the mid-1990s was 2.9 percent per year (World Bank 1994, 1996a,b,c).
Despite vast mineral resources, copper in particular, and an abundance of
fertile soil, Zambia is a low-income country. In 1995 gross national prod-
uct per capita (US$370) remained well below the average in Sub-Saharan
AJrica (US$490).
Zambia's economy suffers from a very high debt service burden, heavy
reliance on a single export product (copper), and excessive public sector
clirection of, and direct participation in, the production of goods and ser-
vices. Soon after independence in 1964, Zambia moved toward a public
sector-led economy dominated by inefficient parastatal monopolies and
further characterized by a pro-urban, anti-agricultural bias. The situation
derived, in part, from a distrust, rooted in colonial experience, of the pri-
,,ate sector. Rising copper prices helped Zambia to grow at an average rate
of 2.5 percent over the first decade, but since 1975 the declining produc-
tion and falling world prices of copper, the general deterioration in Zambia's
terms of trade, and the country's failure to develop a dynamic and diversi-
fied economy have caused economic decline. With copper prices down,
many social indicators talled and even reversed. Per capita income fell by
more than 50 percent from 1974 to 1994. Life expectancy and access to
safe water are estimated over the years to have fallen below Sub-Saharan
averages; female primary school enrollments and per capita health spend-
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ing are among the lowest in the Southern Africa region, and infant mortal-
ity is almost twice as high as the average for low-income countries. By the
mid-1990s more than 60 percent of all Zambians were living in house-
holds with expenditures below the level considered sufficient to provide
for basic needs.
In 1990 Zambia decided to undertake a major structural adjustment
program to counter its rising problems. By this time many parastatals had
experienced large losses, private investment had collapsed, social sector
budgets had declined, physical infrastructure had deteriorated, and basic
goods and services were in short supply. The structural adjustment pro-
gram combined trade policy reforms, deregulation, and exchange rate ad-
justment with stabilization policies designed to restore fiscal and balance
of payments equilibrium and price stability. While improvements were re-
ported for several key economic indicators, gross domestic product remained
more or less constant during 1991-95, mainly as a result of one major and
two minor droughts, necessitating maize imports, and a further drop in
copper production. Nevertheless, medium-term prospects for renewed
growth are believed to be reasonably good.
The Labor Market
In the decade following independence, Zambia witnessed considerable
changes in its labor force. People moved away from subsistence agriculture
into nonagricultural activities and, conversely, from rural to urban em-
ployment. Initially, there was a significant increase in the number of formal
sector wage jobs, but these jobs never represented more than 20 to 25 per-
cent of the labor force. However defined or measured, formal sector em-
ployment stalled in the mid-1970s and has continued to decline in the
wake of the country's economic misfortunes. With Zambia's labor force
growing at 3 percent per year in the early 1990s, the share of formal sector
employment in the labor force dropped to between 10 and 15 percent
during this period.'
A comprehensive survey in 1993 estimated that 41 percent of all Zam-
bians participated in the labor force; participation was higher in rural than
in urban areas, both in absolute and relative terms. Two-thirds of the na-
tional labor force resided in rural areas. Moreover, the rural labor force
represented 46 percent of all rural dwellers, with men and women partici-
pating in almost equal proportions. In urban areas, where one-third of the
national labor force resided, overall participation was lower at 33 percent,
with 41 and 25 percent for men and women, respectively.
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TABLE 14-1
Employment Status in Urban and Rural Areas, 1993
(percent)
Employment status Urban areas Rural areas Total
Self-employed 31 52 46
Unpaid family worker 6 44 34
Public sector employee 40 3 13
Private sector employee 21 1 6
Not stated 2 - I
Total 100 100 100
- Not available.
Source: Central Statistics Office (1993).
Some 3.3 million people, most of them under the age of 25, were part of
the country's labor force. Around 0.5 million (15 percent) were reported to
be employed, most of them for wages, in the formal sector of the economy.
Some 2.1 million workers (68 percent), whose number includes subsis-
tence farmers, were counted to be employed in the informal sector, most of
them self-employed or unpaid family workers. The remainder, some 0.6
million people (17 percent), were reported to be unemployed.
Eighty percent of workers were either self-employed or unpaid family
workers. Wage employment was an almost exclusively urban phenomenon,
and two-thirds of all wage employees worked for the public sector-that is,
for the government or a parastatal company (table 14-1). Almost three out
of four Zambians employed found work in the agricultural sector, where
miost of them were subsistence farmers. Even in urban areas some 14 per-
cent of those who worked were involved in agricultural activities. Manu-
facturing employed only 4 percent of the national work force, or 12 percent
of urban workers; the figures for mining were are 3 and 9 percent, respec-
tively. Employment in the services sector, 18 percent of the national total,
was also concentrated in towns and cities.
Unemployment was much lower (11 percent) in rural areas than in ur-
ban areas (30 percent). Whereas in rural areas men and women were be-
lieved to be equally affected, in urban areas women were worse off than
men, with unemployment rates of 40 and 24 percent, respectively. Three
out of four among the unemployed, both in urban and rural areas, were
youth under the age of 25. A large share of youth, after having been to
school, pass through a phase of unemployment. Except for the few who
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have had access to higher education, unemployment rates hardly vary by
level of education. Periods of unemployment appear to last longer in urban
areas than in rural areas. A typical scenario would see most young school
leavers "hang on" in town and look for a job, at least for a while; gradually
some of them would return to their villages and be quickly absorbed in the
never-ending activities of the subsistence farm.
Survey results indicate that the Zambian labor force has become in-
creasingly educated, reflecting considerable investment in schooling, at least
until the early 1980s. The proportion in the labor force without any school-
ing was reported to have declined from 24 percent in 1986 to 16 percent in
1993; the proportion of those who had completed all or part of primary
school remained about the same during this period (56 to 58 percent). The
percentage of those who had completed all or part of secondary education
increased from 18 to 24 percent. While there is little doubt that the average
level of schooling among labor force participants in all categories went up,
differences among such categories have remained intact. Average educa-
tion levels are higher for men than for women. Education levels are higher
for wage workers than for the self-employed and, therefore, higher in ur-
ban areas than in rural areas and higher for those who are in the formal
sector than for those in the informal sector. The unemployed, as a group,
are not necessarily less educated than the employed, since unemployment
is concentrated among young people who have typically had more educa-
tion than their parents; there are, in fact, a sizable number of educated
youth, including university graduates, looking for suitable jobs. That be-
ing said, observers of the Zambian education system agree that the quality
of education provided, never satisfactory, deteriorated considerably during
the 1990s.
The Vocational Education and Training System
Vocational education and training in Zambia is provided by a diverse group
of government ministries. The private sector is also slowly becoming a player
in this sector.
General Education
Primary school in Zambia begins at age seven and lasts seven years. There-
after, selected pupils may go on to secondary school, comprising a two-
year junior secondary cycle (intended eventually to form part of basic
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education) and a three-year senior secondary cycle. Further education and
training is available after Grade 12, at the university level or in institutions
forming part of the country's technical education and vocational training
system.
It is evident from enrollment data that Zambia has made remarkable
efforts since independence to provide all its children with primary educa-
tion. Enrollments steadily increased from around 380,000 in 1964 to 1.5
mnillion in 1995. Over the same period, secondary school enrollments in-
creased from around 14,000 to 228,000 (table 14-2). Enrollment rates,
particularly for primary education, compare favorably with those of other
Sub-Saharan African countries. In 1994 net enrollment rates for primary
school (excluding overage pupils) were 86 percent for boys and 80 percent
for girls; net enrollment rates for secondary school were 19 and 14 percent,
respectively.2 This relatively positive picture conceals the fact that, in recent
years, primary level enrollment rates have been gradually declining and
drop-out rates have been increasing. After "catching up" until the mid-
:[980s, with enrollment growth exceeding population growth, primary
school enrollments increased, on average, by 1.6 percent per year between
1985 and 1990, and by only 1.1 percent per year between 1990 and 1995,
compared with a population growth rate of close to 3 percent per year over
the past two decades.
Upon completing primary school, only one in three pupils (62,000 out
of 183,000) entered secondary school in 1994; progression to senior sec-
ondary, after Grade 9, was a mere 18 percent in 1994. Of students who left
secondary school upon completing Grade 12 ("Ordinary" levels), at best
20 percent is believed to have pursued some form of further education or
f-ormal training. It should be noted that formal, pre-employment training
opportunities are available only for those who complete Grade 12 (because
there are far fewer training places than applicants). In other words, formal
TABLE 14-2
Primary and Secondary School Enrollments, Selected Years, 1964-95
(thousands of pupils)
School evel 1964 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Primary 378 695 872 1,042 1,343 1,451 1,534
Secondary 14 52 73 95 132 182 228
Source: Ministry of Education data.
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vocational education and training in Zambia is all at the tertiary level,
regardless of whether, in the context of that country, a completed second-
ary education is essential (for example, for tailors or masons).
The University of Zambia in Lusaka and the Copperbelt University,
which was established in the early 1990s, had a combined enrollment in
1995 of 6,000 students, considerably more than the 4,000 students en-
rolled in the 1980s. The focus of this chapter, however, is on VET other
than that provided by universities.
Vocational Education and Training
VET in Zambia is officially administered by the Department of Technical
Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT), established by an act of
Parliament in 1972. The act provides for the department to put in place
and operate a centralized, publicly supported training system. Its goal is to
produce specialists at the crafts, technician, and technologist level for em-
ployment in the formal sector of the economy. In addition, the act makes
DTEVT responsible for registering and monitoring private training pro-
viders and for training standards and certification throughout the country.
A 1996 national audit of training providers found 231 functioning institu-
tions with 19,181 students, 48 percent of them women; 39 percent of the
institutions were run under the auspices of different government minis-
tries, 21 percent by private-for-profit providers, 32 percent by church groups,
nongovernmental organizations, donor agencies, trusts or cooperatives, and
8 percent by industry.
The Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training, an
autonomous body under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Voca-
tional Training, is directly responsible for managing 17 public training
institutions-namely, the country's trades training institutes, the Evelyn
Hone College of Applied Arts and Commerce, the Northern Technical
College, the Luanshya Technical and Vocational Teachers College, the
Zambia Air Services Training Institute, and the Zambia Institute of Busi-
ness Studies and Industrial Practice, opened in 1993. Primarily to meet
their own manpower requirements, other government ministries operate
colleges offering formal, pre-employment training, notably for teachers,
health workers, and agricultural specialists. For example, the Natural Re-
sources Development College near Lusaka and the Zambia College of
Agriculture in Monze, with 430 and 240 students respectively, fall under
the Ministry of Agriculture.
ZAMBIA 395
The institutions under DTEVT management offer two-to-three-year,
full-time programs, resulting in diplomas or certificates. These programs
cover a broad spectrum of subjects, including applied arts, teacher train-
irLg, engineering, automotive repair, electrical training, construction, tai-
Iciring, paramedical studies, journalism, and clerical and business courses.
Each trades training institute typically offers a limited choice of sub-
jects. Therefore, students may come from far away places, and most of
them are boarders. Crafts-level students are expected, after two years in
their respective institutions, to spend a year in an industry job. It appears,
however, that a majority do not succeed in finding employers prepared to
take them on, thus greatly reducing the practical element in their program.
In an effort to diversify its programs and make them more responsive to
the labor market, DTEVT introduced on a limited basis skill training pro-
grams for those who do not qualify for regular pre-employment programs.
In addition, it offered a few competency-based modular training courses
and entrepreneurial training modules in all its programs. The department
did this "so that graduates of these programs do not necessarily have to
look for paid employment because nowadays formal employment is diffi-
cult to find" (DTEVT 1995, pp. 10-11).
Total enrollments in DTEVT institutions varied between more than
3,000 in 1971 and nearly 5,000 in 1994 (table 14-3), and annual outputs
usually did not exceed 1,600 graduates. In 1991, 3,619 students were en-
rolled, 54 percent of them at the crafts level. Twenty-eight percent of en-
rollees and 25 percent of graduates were women. Just over 30 percent of
graduates obtained a crafts certificate, 24 percent graduated in secretarial
and business studies, and another 14 percent as vocational teachers.
Training institutions under the DTEVT, some of them far away from
Lusaka, have very limited autonomy and depend on headquarters for
decisions on course offerings, curriculum and training modes, and staff-
ing and student places. Moreover, they depend for almost all of their
income on government subsidies, which the department administers.
Frequently, money allocated (for example, for salaries) arrives late, and
when it arrives it may have lost much of its value because of high levels of
inflation. Threatened with court action or food supply boycotts by credi-
tors, several training institutions have reportedly been unable to settle
their bills. Funds for necessary repairs and maintenance ran out a long
time ago in most institutions.
In 1996 the Zambian government allocated 3.4 billion kwacha (US$2.7
nmillion) to the department, or approximately 3.5 percent of total govern-
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TABLE 14-3
Full-Time Enrollments in Pre-Employment Programs Offered
by the DTEVT, Selected Years, 1971-94
Institution 1971 1981 1991 1994
Trades training institutes 1,226 2,182 1,714 2,456
Evelyn Hone College of Applied
Arts and Commerce 812 1,160 1,068 1,395
Northern Technical College 795 559 559 596
Technical and Vocational
Teachers College 88 390 278 264
Zambia Air Services Training
Institute 375 238 - 87
Zambia Institute of Business
Studies and Industrial Practice - - - 90
Total 3,296 4,529 3,619 4,888
- Not available.
Source: DTEVT (1995).
ment expenditure on education and training.3 In real terms the 1996 bud-
get was 27 percent lower than in 1990. In 1995 the DTEVT estimated the
actual cost of training a student at the crafts level at US$1,593 per year and
at US$2,007 per year at the technician level. In the same year crafts-level
students were expected to pay an annual fee of US$115 (US$83 for board-
ing and US$32 for tuition); students assigned to an industry had to pay an
additional US$85 per year. The basic fee for crafts students therefore cov-
ers approximately 7 percent of actual cost. During the 1990s, the public
training system also received significant support from donors. In 1994, 40
percent of all donor assistance for human resource development in Zambia
was channeled to VET. The value of this assistance rose from US$9 million
in 1990 to US$19 million in 1994. Donor funding is largely channeled to
capital investment and technical assistance.
There exists a variety of private-for-profit colleges, as well as training
institutions run by public or private enterprises. Little information, how-
ever, is available on these institutions. Private-for-profit colleges, registered
and, at least on paper, monitored by the DTEVT, concentrate on pre-
employment, secretarial and business, and computer courses; their fees vary
considerably, but in 1995 some were said to be charging up to K 300,000
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(US$240) per term. Training organized by enterprises is mostly technical
training for their own employees; firms such as the copper mines, the rail-
ways, or the national electricity company have developed well-function-
ing, in-house training centers. The National Institute for Public
Administration, which provides in-service training for civil servants, can
also be mentioned in this context. The majority of private training institu-
tions adhere to the DTEVT curricula in order for graduates to be certified
by the Examination Council of Zambia. The council also oversees a trade
testing scheme, administered by the DTEVT, to recognize competence ac-
quired outside the formal training system-that is, in nonformal training
centers or on the job (for example, as an apprentice).
Major Issues in Vocational Education and Training
Zambia's VET system is set in an exceedingly harsh socioeconomic envi-
ronment. It faces multiple constraints that may be categorized in terms of
purpose, clientele, management, and product quality.
The first issue deals with the relevance of training. Training efforts reach
less than 3 percent of the population entering the labor market. However
modest in size, the system has been targeting the wrong clientele for years.
Programs are essentially focused on providing a limited number of youth
with skills for wage-jobs in the formal sector, jobs that have all but van-
ished. Individuals entering the Zambian labor market have little choice but
to make a living as self-employed microentrepreneurs or as family helpers
in the informal sector or in subsistence farming, a situation for which they
are usually ill prepared. Part of the problem is the lack of a comprehensive
national training policy. Current training efforts are dispersed and mostly
uncoordinated. The capacity of government officials to collect and analyze
information necessary either for policy development or for administrative
purposes remains weak. The involvement of nongovernmental stakehold-
er s, such as private training providers and those who represent the world of
work, in directing the system is strictly limited, and the precise manage-
ment role of external donors is not always clear.
Not surprisingly, the quality of training is quite poor. Staff are untrained,
and there are plenty of vacancies. Funds earmarked for training are not
released or released only after long delays and with financial regulations
requiring numerous signatures to get a check ready. Curricula are outdated.
Equipment is broken down for lack of maintenance, buildings are dilapi-
dated, the library facilities are inadequate, and such essentials as writing
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paper, chairs, or light bulbs are often missing. Staff utilization is poor, with
an apparent student-staff ratio of about 6 to 1. Moreover, the ratio of non-
teaching staff to teaching staff is inordinately high (2 to I in 1997).
Reform Proposals
Following the election of a new government in 1991, concern about the
deplorable state of skills development in the country led to many policy
reviews and reform initiatives. Of these, VET reforms have perhaps been
the most innovative in terms of both procedure and proposals.
A New Policy Framework
The government's plans for the training sector are radical: a new training
authority has been established, the government has begun privatizing its
own training institutions under the supervision of autonomous manage-
ment boards, and there is a commitment to establishing a level playing
field for private providers. The reform process began in 1996 when the
government issued a policy document entitled "Technical Education, Vo-
cational and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) Policy." This document
identified the problems facing the economy and the training institutions
and formulated a broad national policy on technical education and voca-
tional training. In 1997 the government produced a strategy paper-"Strat-
egy Paper for Technical Education and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET)
in Zambia"-that spelled out strategies for implementing the new policy
and an action plan.
The government in 1998 signaled its commitment to a thorough re-
form of the sector by passing the Technical Education, Vocational and
Entrepreneurship Training Bill. A statutory instrument in late 1998 imple-
mented the legislation. The Board of the Technical Education, Vocational
and Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA) has now been con-
stituted, and terms of reference for the director general and senior manage-
ment of the authority have been developed. Individual public training
institutions are in the process of constituting their management boards.
The National Training Board
The main feature of the new structure of technical education and voca-
tional and entrepreneurship training in Zambia is the National Training
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Board, which endeavors to coordinate an efficient response to training de-
rmands and provides technical assistance to public and private training pro-
viders. The DTEVT was transformed into a support structure and integral
part of the National Training Board, with three directorates to deal with
training standards, training support services, and finance. A large measure
cif autonomy was granted to colleges and trades training institutions hith-
erto under the DTEVT. This enables them to tailor skill requirements more
closely to demand and to increase opportunities for entrepreneurship in
the informal sector.
Cost Sharing with Students and Employers
A greater portion of the cost burden of training will be shifted to beneficia-
ries, including those in the informal sector. More realistic fees will be charged,
and a loans and grants facility will assist disadvantaged groups. A payroll
levy scheme involving industry will be established to increase and diversify
sources of funding for public and private providers alike. Public training
institutions will be encouraged to augment their income by engaging in
commercial activities.
iVew Pathways for Formal Sector Training
Because there have been no opportunities for people to move from one
level of training to the next and programs have been highly biased in favor
of Grade 12 certificate holders, the new system allows for progression on
the basis of credits obtained from completed, lower training levels and
relevant experience. Based on competence acquired in institutions, on the
job, or as a result of distance learning, persons now can move from the
trades test level, via the crafts level and technician level, to the technologist
level. A reform of trades testing and of the examination system was pro-
posed to achieve this aim.
Training for Entrepreneurship and Work in the Informal Sector
The capacity of the country's education and training system to enhance
skills needed to succeed in self-employment will be strengthened. A series
of measures will be taken to introduce entrepreneurship development in
the formal curricula. Immediate attention will be given to the establish-
ment of community-based, multipurpose resource centers by reconverting
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existing facilities and providing them with trained staff and relevant train-
ing materials. Nonformal training will be strengthened by making it easier
and financially attractive for private training providers and microentre-
preneurs to train informal sector workers, by enhancing the quality of their
training by upgrading trainers, by assisting in training needs assessment,
and by promoting informal sector apprenticeship.
Notes
1. The data on the labor market are derived from a 1986 labor force survey;
Central Statistics Office (1991 1993); and World Bank (1995).
2. Gross enrollment rates (the total school population as a percentage of the 7-
to- 13 age cohort) were 103 percent for boys and 93 percent for girls at the primary
level; at the secondary level they were 25 percent for boys and 16 percent for girls.
3. Reconversions from kwacha to dollars indicate mere orders of magnitude.
High levels of inflation gave rise to considerable exchange rate variations within
short periods. Different sources may yield widely different dollar figures.
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15 Arab Republic of Egypt
INDERMIT S. GILL AND STEPHEN P HEYNEMAN
STATE-LED ECONOMIC growth in the Arab Republic of
Egypt, averaging 4.5 percent per year in the 1960s and 1970s, had slowed
to 0.5 percent per year by the mid-1980s. Regional conflict and declining
remittances because of the return of migrants provide some explanation,
but structural problems and other more problematic issues were also in-
volved. High growth had occurred uring an era of high petroleum prices
and protection for agricultural nd manufactured products and services.
A,fter 1985, however, public debt became burdensome, oil prices fell, and
workers' remittances dedined as labor in the Gulf was replaced. Egypt needed
to adjust to these problems, but unlike during earlier eras, a return to pre-
vious policies was infeasible. The Mediterranean world changed in the 1990s,
and the circumstances that predated the change were unlikely to return.
Part of the change was exogenous. Economies in Eastern and Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union were suddenly open to new trading
relationships with Western Europe. Western Europe was beginning to po-
sition itself or a more coordinated trading relationship both internally and
outside the region. No longer would bilateral tradition determine trading
relationships. Agricultural products could be found offshore with
outsourcing located in such places as Budapest or Alexandria. Choice would
be determined by a set of well-understood characteristics, including effi-
cient labor markets, low barriers to trade, and repatriation of profits.
Part of the change was internal. In reaction to exogenous pressures, in-
ternal policies in Egypt had to shift. Private enterprise was increasingly
accepted as a requirement for growth, along with an economy open to free
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trade. It was also accepted that a healthy economy would require a signifi-
cant increase in productivity, the attraction of private capital, and the abil-
ity to compete successfully with alternative trading partners in the European
Union.
What is the role of vocational and technical education in this overall
shift? Does competitiveness in Egypt require an increase in the current
form of vocational and technical education, or does it require something
new? If the latter, in what way should the education be different? Should
vocational and technical education employ the same structures as found in
Egypt today, or should different structures be used? If the structures need
to change, how would this affect the rest of the education system, includ-
ing general secondary education and criteria and mechanisms for entry
into higher education? How would labor markets, employment guaran-
tees, and restrictions on mobility and flexibility be affected?
This chapter suggests that the health of the Egyptian economy depends
on the extent to which it can continue to shift away from the past assump-
tions of central planning. This will require making changes in vocational
and technical education. However difficult institutionally and however
problematic in terms of recent tradition, these changes may not be any
harder for Egypt than for other countries whose economies are shifting
away from central planning.
We conclude with recommendations concerning compulsory educa-
tion; the definition of vocational and technical education; the audience
for such education; and mechanisms for financing, managing, and deliv-
ering it. While these suggestions are not simple or risk free, we believe
they are necessary. Moreover, we believe that the Egyptian educational
authorities could benefit from the general discussion of the economic
background that makes these changes in vocational and technical educa-
tion so necessary.
The Supply of Skilled Workers
The formal education system is an important supplier of skilled workers in
Egypt as in most other countries. In the late 1980s more than two-thirds of
unemployed males and almost all unemployed females were first-time job
seekers, so the only skills they possessed were those they acquired in school.
The education system is four-tiered: elementary school (five years), prepa-
ratory school (three years), secondary school (three years), and tertiary edu-
cation (two, four, or more years).
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The Formal Education System
Table 15-1 shows the growth in enrollments from 1990 to 1995. With an
enrollment of more than 12.4 million in primary and secondary schools
and roughly 750,000 in postsecondary institutes and universities, the for-
mal education system is the largest supplier of workers with pre-employ-
inent skills.
The enrollments in secondary and higher education are of special inter-
est, because a large share of these graduates is expected to look for work in
the private sector. Table 15-1 shows that about 500,000 graduates of uni-
versities, technical institutes, and secondary schools enter the labor force
each year. About 90 percent of general (nontechnical) secondary enroll-
ment is in government schools, although there are almost 300 private gen-
eral secondary schools. The Ministry of Education administers or regulates
both three- and five-year technical and vocational education programs and
two-year technical institutes. In 1994-95 enrollments in these programs
totaled about 1.75 million (table 15-2), more than twice the enrollment in
general secondary education. Seven hundred thousand of these students
are enrolled in 385 industrial schools, 754,000 in 524 commercial schools,
and 187,000 in 90 agricultural schools. In 1994 there were more than 250
private commercial schools, but only 4 industrial secondary schools and
no private agricultural schools. The Ministry of Education aims to have 70
percent of secondary school students enrolled in industrial, agricultural,
and commercial schools; however, the rationale is not to meet the economy's
TABLE 15-1
Enrollment, by Level and Type of Education, 1990-91 to 1994-95
(thousands of students)
Change
Type of education 1990-91 1994-95 (percent)
Primary 6,402.5 7,313.0 142
Secondary 1,648.9 2,788.2 66
General 576.4 894.4 47
Technical-vocational 1,026.2 1,893.8 85
Higher 215.8 224.5 5
Universities 74.3 148.4 200
Source: Ministry of Education (1995).
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TABLE 15-2
Enrollments in and Graduates of Vocational-Technical Schools, 1993-95
(thousands of students)
1993-94 1994-95 1993-94
Type of school students students graduates
Industrial
3-year schools 710.0 776.0 167.5
5-year schools 33.6 35.4 15.3
Vocational 14.0 27.9 3.6
Agricultural
3-year schools 183.2 197.2 40.1
5-year schools 1.4 1.3 3.2
Vocational 3.1 6.7 0.8
Commercial
3-year schools 734.0 674.6 153.0
5-year schools 20.3 22.7 1.4
Total 1,699.7 1,741.8 384.8
Source: Ministry of Education (1995).
demand for technical and vocational skills, but to ease the burden on higher
education.
Higher-level technical and managerial skills are taught in universities
and technical and commercial postsecondary institutes. Enrollment in higher
education is increasing rapidly: in 1990-91 the total enrollment in higher
education was 0.7 million students, up from about 0.5 million in 1988.
Egypt has 13 universities, and 12 of them have faculties of engineering.
About 10 percent of enrollment in higher education is in faculties of engi-
neering and about 20 percent in technical institutes. Technical institutes
offer two-year programs after general secondary schooling; universities of-
fer five-year engineering programs after general secondary education and
management and accounting courses (postsecondary, degree, and diploma
programs). Enrollment in technical institutes has risen by more than 10
percent per year in some years, but this is attributable to government at-
tempts to ease the pressure on universities rather than to meet private sec-
tor skill needs. Overexpansion has led to widespread deterioration in quality:
teachers are underpaid, and equipment is outdated or lacking entirely. Most
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faculty members teach in more than one institution and give private les-
sons that are estimated to provide up to 10 times their salaries. Thus while
private higher education is limited to the American University and insti-
tutes that provide short courses, cost sharing by students is considerable.
'The irony is that this parallel system of higher education is neither free nor
adequately funded (World Bank 1989).
Training in Ministries and Enterprises
'Training activities in ministries other than the Ministry of Education and
in enterprises proliferate. Vocational training in some ministries, such as
Industry and Housing, compete with the vocational education provided
by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Industry's Productivity and
Vocational Training Department (PVTD) administers programs for voca-
tional training, productivity improvement, and management development
in its 40 centers. In 1994 these centers had an annual enrollment of roughly
40,000 students in three-year programs and shorter "made-to-order" pro-
grams. The three-year programs use a dual system: all instruction, which is
80 percent practical and 20 percent theoretical, is in the centers during the
first two years, but in the third year more than 80 percent of training is on-
the-job instruction in participating enterprises. Roughly 25 to 30 percent
of participating employers are private firms. By all accounts, employers
prefer PVTD graduates to graduates from the Ministry of Education's in-
dustrial schools. In 1994, of the roughly 50 percent of PVTD graduates
who were not drafted into the military, more than half (or about 25 per-
cent of all graduates) found private sector jobs for which they were trained.
'The traditional clientele of these schools has been public enterprises, but
PVTDs now face the challenge of reorienting their training to meet private
sector needs.
Other training centers managed by ministries include the Training Or-
ganization of the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction (TOMOHAR).
More than 50 centers enroll about 70,000 students. These centers, which
cater to the demand of the public construction and housing sector, are
largely ineffective in supplying skills to an overwhelmingly informal pri-
vate sector (Assaad 1993).
The Ministry of Employment and Training (formerly the Ministry of
Manpower) provides short courses for the unemployed. These courses tar-
get the unemployed-largely the graduates of industrial, commercial, and
agricultural secondary schools according to preliminary statistics-but few
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studies exist to determine the courses' effectiveness. The ministry does esti-
mate, however, that less than 5 percent of the unemployed apply for these
programs. Another supplier of semiformal training intended to facilitate
employment is the Ministry of Social Affairs. It has 56 major training cen-
ters and more than 1,000 small units in its Productive Family Program.
Other ministries and parastatals also have their own training units.
Large and medium enterprises provide training (in-house or purchased
from outside providers) for their employees. For example, Xerox offers
courses on such subjects as "leadership through quality" for new and middle
managers. Like most other countries, Egypt has no systematic information
available on training in the private sector. Small firms dominate in some
private sector industries, such as construction. Training in these firms is
mainly through traditional apprenticeships rather than a formal program.
The Demand for Skilled Labor
Table 15-3 shows the number of labor force entrants. More than 400,000
individuals who have attended training institutes or a university entered
the labor force in 1989-90. Table 15-4 shows the sectoral distribution of
workers by education level. The government sector and public enterprises,
TABLE 15-3
Labor Force Entrants, by Sex and Level of Education, 1989-90
(number of graduates adjusted by labor force participation rates)
Level Males Females Total
University 67,000 36,000 103,000
Technical institutes 23,000 13,000 46,000
Commercial secondary 42,000 70,000 112,000
Industrial secondary 94,000 14,000 108,000
Agricultural secondary 24,000 5,000 29,000
Training colleges 8,000 12,000 20,000
Total, excluding general
secondary graduates 258,000 150,000 408,000
Dropouts reaching labor
force age - - 162,000
- Not available.
Source: Zytoun (1991).
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TABLE 15-4
Distribution of Workers, by Sector and Education
Below Inter- Total Annual
inter- mediate University employ- growth
mediate and above andabove ment 1976-
Sector (percent) (percent) (percent) (millions) 86
Government 31.6 40.7 27.7 2.943 3.7
Public enterprises 53.3 30.4 16.3 1.322 2.2
Private agriculture 96.5 3.0 0.4 7.973 -0.7
Private nonagriculture 80.5 12.6 6.9 4.925 3.3
Urban 73.3 16.5 10.2 2.957 -
Rural 91.3 6.9 1.8 1.968 -
Other (e.g., joint ventures) - - - 0.145
All sectors 76.9 14.6 8.5 17.367 1.5
-Not available.
Note: Percentages are for 1990, employment figures are for 1988.
Source: World Bank (1994).
with total employment of about 4.5 million workers, have the greatest de-
mand for educated workers. In the government sector the employment of
about 1.25 million workers with some secondary education and about 1.0
million workers with higher education is largely because of hiring policies,
which reflect social safety net functions rather than skill needs. In the pub-
lic enterprise sector the actual demand for skilled workers is also probably
less than the 0.6 million workers employed who have at least some second-
ary education. For the purpose at hand, the relevant figures are those for
the private nonagricultural sector. Less than 20 percent of the 5 million
workers in this sector have secondary or higher education.
Large Enterprises and Multinationals
Large enterprises have begun demanding managers with a mix of manage-
ment and technical skills ("technocrats"), supervisors, and maintenance
workers in greater numbers. Executives in large enterprises have expressed
concerns that the demand for maintenance workers has increased rapidly,
but they blame either training or "cultural norms" for the lack of an ad-
equate supply. The demand for accountants, technicians, and office work-
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ers appears to be largely met, although some employers have indicated the
existence of unsatisfied demand for financial or corporate accountants.
The demand for skilled workers varies by sector. In manufacturing the
demand for managers, administrators, and professionals is largely fulfilled,
and marketing managers are the only specialty for which demand has been
rising rapidly. Private entrepreneurs in manufacturing complain that as the
demand for both foremen and engineers has begun to rise, the "high indus-
trial" institutes have begun producing workers with neither engineering
nor supervisory skills. In trade and finance, which entail more frequent
contact with clients, specialists with good language skills are in great de-
mand according to private entrepreneurs. In services, especially in tourism,
demand for middle managers and workers with requisite language skills
rose sharply. Demand for workers in services has eased since 1992.
Small Enterprises and Microenterprises
Small firms and microenterprises (sometimes collectively referred to as the
informal sector) dominate the economy. In 1986 the share of the informal
sector in total employment was about 40 percent, but its share in private
sector employment was more than 80 percent. In sectors such as construc-
tion, virtually all private sector employment is informal (tables 15-5, 15-6).
Rizk (1991) cautions against assuming that the skill demands of small firms
are negligible, but skills are probably developed primarily through infor-
mal mechanisms, such as traditional apprenticeships and learning by do-
TABLE 15-5
Informal Sector Employment, by Nonfarm Activity, 1986
(percent)
Informal sector employment
As a share of As a share ofprivate As a share of
Activity total employment employment total informal
Industry 38.8 73.3 22.6
Construction 81.0 97.2 24.6
Services 30.0 79.7 46.4
All (nonfarm) 39.7 82.7 100
Source: Shaban, Assaad, and Al-Qudsi (1993).
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TABLE 15-6
Informal Sector Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment
and Private Sector Employment, 1974-88
Year Total Private
1974 44.9 91.9
1976 45.4 93.2
1978 42.8 91.0
1980 44.1 91.3
1982 46.3 92.1
1984 46.8 91.6
1986 42.9 90.8
1988 51.1 92.7
Source: Shaban, Assaad, and Al-Qudsi (1993).
ing. Employer federations representing small enterprises believe that the
demand for semiskilled workers and technicians is increasing rapidly, but
that trained technicians and otherwise competent workers are in short sup-
ply. In microenterprises the main constraints are credit availability and regu-
lation. In the mid-1990s skill demands were small and relatively easily met
(World Bank 1994b).
Demand-Supply Imbalances
Some skill shortages are inevitable in an economy where formal sector wages
are influenced through legislation and through public enterprise and civil
service wage structures, and restrictions on importing skilled labor are in
place. A World Bank (1994) survey of more than 200 enterprises high-
lights the importance of firm size as a correlate of skill shortages. Based on
these results, occupational wage data, and other findings, table 15-7 sum-
marizes the market for skills in the private sector.
Although there are exceptions to this simplified picture, the salient fea-
tures are as follows:
* Microenterprises do not face a shortage of skills. The demand is mainly
for semiskilled workers, and the Egyptian education and apprenticeship
systems provide an adequate supply.
TABLE 15-7
Salient Features of the Market for Skills in the Private Sector
Firm size
Skill level Micro Small Medium Large
Administrative Unimportant; Unimportant; Unimportant; Mismatch of
& managerial owner does almost owner/relatives/friends owner/relatives/friends demand and supply
everything do almost everything do almost everything of skills
Technical Unimportant; Acute scarcity of Entrants to work force Entrants to work force
little or no demand trained technicians hard to train hard to train
Vocational Unimportant; Scarcity of trained Adequate supply Adequate supply
little or no demand workers
Semiskilled Adequate supply Adequate supply Adequate supply Adequate supply
Note: Microenterprises, I to 4 employees; mall firms, 5 to 9 employees (as many as 50 employees in some sectors, such as construction); medium-size
firms, 10 to 100 employees; and large firms, more than 100 employees.
Source: Miller (1994); USAID (1994); World Bank (1994b).
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* Small firms face shortages of technical workers and of workers with
some vocational skills. Many of these firms rely on informal apprentice-
ship schemes and institution-based training to meet skill demands. Where
the demand for skills is high, firms may face acute constraints.
* Medium-size enterprises do not seem to face shortages of skills, but
because there are relatively few of these enterprises in Egypt, generaliza-
tions are difficult to make.
* Large enterprises can hire workers that are seemingly overqualified for
the posts they fill, because they can usually pay higher wages and benefits
than smaller firms. They encounter supply shortages for specialized mana-
gerial positions.
We describe next the main factors underlying these imbalances.
Problems in Vocational and Technical Education
About 0.5 million students leave the Ministry of Education's commercial,
industrial, and agricultural schools every year, either as graduates (0.4 mil-
lion) or dropouts. From all accounts, the quality of education in govern-
ment schools is poor. Some of the problems are the lack of teachers,
inadequate or outdated equipment, and poorly motivated students. Ac-
'cording to one estimate, only about 10 percent of these schools are well
equipped and managed (World Bank 1989). Teacher shortages are particu-
larly acute in theoretical subjects.
Although few studies evaluating the effectiveness of the Ministry of
Education's vocational and technical schools are available, graduates-es-
pecially those from three-year programs-are believed to be ill suited for
employment in the informal economy. Employers prefer the graduates of
five-year programs and PVTD schools, believing that three-year-program
graduates get neither a sound theoretical education nor a good practical
education. Ministry of Education estimates of the theoretical content of
curricula in three-year programs range from about 60 to 67 percent in the
first and second years and 56 to 69 percent in the third year (World Bank
1989). The humanistic-scientific (as opposed to technical-vocational) con-
tent of education ranges from about 37 percent for three-year programs to
about 52 percent for five-year programs. Because they demand workers
'with relatively general skills, employers may prefer graduates of five-year
programs, but good three-year programs would be a far less expensive way
of meeting this demand.
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Reported unemployment rates are highest for those with an intermedi-
ate certificate (Fergany 1994a). This suggests either that the quality of sec-
ondary education is a problem or that the supply of vocational and technical
skills is excessive relative to the demands of the economy. Assuming that
the demand for workers with secondary education in the private nonagri-
cultural sector doubles over the next 10 years because of growth and struc-
tural changes, fewer than 1 million additional workers would be in demand;
however, the education sector would supply this in about two years. Even
with no additional supply by the education sector, this demand could theo-
retically be met by drawing from the pool of unemployed workers with
secondary degrees (25 percent of total unemployment in 1993).
Imbalances in the Market for Engineers and First Technicians
The graduates of three-year industrial programs are called "technicians,"
and those of five-year programs are called "first technicians." The wide-
spread employment of engineers as technicians and first technicians indi-
cates an excess supply of engineers. In the past decade the educational quality
of five-year industrial and commercial schools and two-year technical in-
stitutes has declined. Their graduates may in fact be regarded as techni-
cians. Given the demand from a sluggish and largely informal economy,
the absolute number of engineers supplied is excessive. Employers com-
plain that while technical graduates usually have a reasonable theoretical
base, they lack experimental and problem-solving skills. Zaytoun (1991)
reports weekly private and public wages in skilled occupations; private sec-
tor salaries for mechanical engineers are about double those for engineers
in government employment, but the private-public wage ratio is close to
one for engineering technicians. Although there may be scattered shortages
of well-qualified engineers, the supply of first technicians appears to be
sufficient.
In the case of technicians and first technicians, the problem seems to
stem more from poor quality of technical practice than from a shortage of
instructors. Shortages of theoretical teachers were significantly greater than
shortages of practical teachers at many levels of technical education. Dur-
ing the early 1990s about 70 percent of the required number of practical
teachers were available; Ministry of Education schools and institutes oper-
ated with only 30 percent of required theory teachers (positions normally
filled by engineers). This suggests that teachers' salaries are not high enough
to attract unemployed engineers. In their review of vocational education
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and training projects, Middleton, Ziderman, and Adams (1993) found that
the inability to pay competitive salaries adversely affected training quality
in two-thirds of the countries studied.
Mismatch of Managerial Skills
Egypt's transition from a public-sector-led closed economy to an open
economy where the private sector is expected to take the lead has exposed
the weaknesses of nontechnical higher education. To determine if unmet
demand for management training existed, USAID (1994) sampled 60 pri-
vate sector and 16 public sector enterprises in Alexandria and 12 suppliers
of training nationwide. Its main findings were as follows:
* Private sector owners and top managers had little interest or financial
resources for management training: only 27 of the 60 firms provided man-
agement training during the previous financial year. These firms spent less
than LE 0.82 million-about LE 30,000 per firm or LE 8,300 per trainee.
(One firm accounted for more than a third of all spending.)
- In contrast, 14 of the 16 public sector firms spent money on manage-
ment training. It totaled about LE 4.09 million-that is, about LE 292,000
per company or LE 37,500 per trainee.
* Executives in the private sector were willing to send only close rela-
tives for long-term training (for instance, MBA programs). The general,
though limited, demand was for evening courses in quick-paying manage-
ment training.
* There was no correlation between the size of the firm and its propen-
sity to plan strategically and train its managers. Less than one-third of the
23 firms that had managers in training positions had strategic planning
processes.
* Marketing and sales, financial management and cost reduction, stra-
tegic planning, and production management were the four areas of mana-
gerial skills most demanded by executives who expressed an interest in
management training.
No more than one-third of the providers surveyed concentrated on any
of these four areas. Institutions tend to concentrate on courses for general
management, management systems (computers), total quality management,
human resources management, and time management. These are areas of
relatively low demand: only 25 percent or less of the 60 firms surveyed
expressed an interest in these courses. Private-public wage differentials sup-
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port these findings. In 1993 private-public wage ratios for financial and
enterprise managers were higher than 300 percent, the highest among all
occupations. While these results indicate a demand-supply mismatch in
the market for management skills, the mismatch is likely to be self-correct-
ing in a situation where such training is both privately demanded and
(largely) supplied.
Structural Problems
Some of the structural characteristics of Egyptian vocational and technical
education can be traced to the economic assumptions of the 1950s. Dur-
ing this era sectoral ministries were responsible for significant portions of
the economy: agriculture, manufacturing, services, and transport. As the
economy liberalized and the role of the state in determining employment
diminished, however, the role of sectoral ministries in determining train-
ing lessened. To be efficient, institutions require the latitude to shift their
focus across sectors and fields of training. Efficient curricula increasingly
are determined by local conditions. Agricultural institutions that used to
train only for production now may need to include courses on agricultural
services, credit, extension, health and safety, and nutrition. Permission to
introduce a new course of study or to cease providing an old one may not
need to be sought from central authorities, but depends on a budget con-
straint decided autonomously by the management of each institution. Seg-
mentation by sector and central control over content are two legacies from
the era of central planning that may require review; other problems are also
apparent.
One of the problems is the proportion of the student population as-
signed to vocational and technical education programs. This proportion is
established by an examination in upper secondary school. Students who do
well on the examination are allowed to compete for places in higher educa-
tion; students who do not are assigned to places in vocational and technical
institutions. Many Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries once assigned students in this fashion, but this
practice has changed in the past two decades. It would be useful for Egyp-
tian authorities to review the rationale for and results of these changes.
Modern economies now demand a wide variety of highly adaptable
workers whose occupations may change repeatedly during a typical career.
Training needs to be of a high quality and in a broad range of topics. Key-
boarding, once considered a vocational skill, now is a requirement for ev-
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eryone who completes compulsory education. Vocational students require
much higher levels of general preparation, and postcompulsory education
now includes training in a wide variety of vocational and technical profes-
sional skills. Distinctions between postcompulsory education and voca-
tional and technical education have become less sharp over time. The
opportunity to shift across subdisciplines in and out of vocational educa-
tion has become commonplace. However, if all postcompulsory education
requires selection, how is that selection made? Selection systems in Canada,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States differ, but
they include common elements. For example, they all give students in com-
pulsory education the opportunity to study a similarly broad spectrum of
subjects, and they no longer track students into different career paths prior
to selection for higher education.
The current problems of vocational and technical education in Egypt
may stem in part from the extremely high proportion of students assigned
to it after failing their examinations. Improvements to curricula, equip-
ment, teachers, and pedagogy may not prove effective if students, against
their better judgment, continue to be assigned to vocational institutions.
Because modern selection systems now allow for the efficient allocation of
large numbers of students simultaneously, and because of the blurring dis-
tinctions in content, it might be timely for the Egyptian authorities to
rethink their assumptions behind who should attend vocational and tech-
nical institutions.'
One influence on the quality of vocational education is the extent to
which it is used to ration higher education. Like all countries, Egypt faces
a difficult tradeoff. It can expand higher education opportunities and main-
tain the current assumptions of public financing and public delivery if it is
willing to make further sacrifices in quality. It can have higher quality and
maintain current assumptions of financing and delivery if it lowers access.
Or it can have higher access and higher quality if it is willing to diversify
the sources of higher education financing and delivery. A choice among the
three appears inevitable.
Changing the Demand-Supply Balance
Even during an era of import-substitution, with the formal sector domi-
nated by government, unpredictable input substitution by enterprises made
it difficult for planners to forecast manpower needs. The substantial
outmigration of skilled Egyptians in the 1970s and 1980s is ample testi-
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mony to labor market imbalances. However, falling output and employ-
ment growth rates in the public sector and slow growth in the formal pri-
vate sector ensured that the supply of skills far exceeded the demand.
The 1970s and 1980s
During the 1970s and 1980s, the main sources of supply of skills for pri-
vate sector enterprises were public enterprises, the apprenticeship system,
the education system, and returning migrants.
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES. For large and medium-size firms, the public sector
was a major source of supply. The ratio of public to private earnings in
Egypt fell from 1.5 in 1976 to about 0.9 in 1985. Because of these falling
wage differentials in the public and private sectors, technicians, supervi-
sors, and professionals trained abroad and with considerable work experi-
ence could be hired away from public enterprises. Over time, however, this
source dried up for two main reasons. First, the declining quality of the
formal education system has meant that the average quality of workers
recruited into public enterprises has fallen. Second, public employment
guarantees, combined with long waiting periods and deteriorating em-
ployment conditions in the public sector, have created an adverse selec-
tion problem: only the least qualified job seekers have been choosing to
work in the public sector.2
THE APPRENTICESHIP SYSTEM. In an economy dominated by small and
microenterprises, traditional apprenticeships have been the main supplier
of skills. In 1991 more than 80 percent of skilled workers in the construc-
tion sector, for example, had been trained as apprentices (box 15-1). No
concerted effort has been made to encourage skill acquisition through ap-
prenticeships. Although Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and German
chancellor Helmut Kohl took an initiative in 1994 to promote enterprise-
based training, it did not increase skill acquisition through apprenticeships.
THE EDUCATION SYSTEM. Until the 1970s, Egypt's formal education sys-
tem provided the private sector with workers of moderately high quality.
Since then, the quality of education seems to have declined. International
equivalency tests indicate that the typical high school graduate is less nu-
merate and literate than fifth graders in some other countries (Fergany
1994b). This problem has considerably diminished the trainability of work-
ers in both the formal and informal sectors.
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BOX 15-1
Demand-Supply Imbalances in Egypt's Construction Sector:
Formal Supply for a Largely Informal Sector
About 83 percent of craftspeople acquire skills through the traditional apprentice-
ship system in Egypt's construction sector This informal system dates back to the
guilds that existed until the late nineteenth century. In addition to being taught the
necessary skills, apprentices learn its values and behavioral patterns. Social net-
works are often important for entry into the system: in 1991 more than 37 percent
of craftspeople had relatives in construction when they entered the trade, while
only 19 percent of common laborers did. Age of entry is also important: most
craftspeople believe that it is extremely difficult o train a person older than 18.
The formal system consists of vocational training programs for construction
offered by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction; vocational secondary schools
run by the Ministry of Education; and schemes organized by public sector firms,
local governments, the armed forces, and private organizations. The most ambi-
tious is the Training Organization of the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction
(TOMOHAR). Between 1975 and 1991 it established 53 training centers, which
turn out about 18,000 graduates annually, or about 45 to 80 percent of the entrants
into the manual construction labor force. However, 1991 survey data indicate that
only 5 percent of workers in construction had formal training, implying a high rate
of attrition for TOMOHAR graduates. More than 50 percent of workers with
formal training work for the government, compared with only 16 percent of all work-
ers. Formally trained workers are thus more likely to end up in formal sector jobs,
and those who cannot find such jobs probably drop out of the sector altogether.
The demand-supply imbalance for construction-related skills has both quality
and quantiry dimensions. Since a large fraction of construction jobs is informal,
there is a mismatch between formal training and actual skill demands. Even more
disconcerting is the fact that the rate of training in TOMOHAR accelerated in
the early 1990s despite the severe recession in the industry. This suggests acute
demand insensitivity in the formal training system.
Source: Assaad (1993).
RETURNING MIGRANTS. Migration to the Gulf and other countries less-
ened the supply of skilled workers to both public and private sector enter-
prises in the 1970s and 1980s; most migrants were secondary school
graduates and college educated. After the Gulf War ended in 1991, about
0.7 million migrants returned to Egypt. Employers viewed them as a major
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source of skills. However, a large share of these workers chose to be self-
employed in the informal sector; at current wage levels their skills are largely
unavailable to firms (Shaban, Assaad, and Al-Qudsi 1993).
The 1990s and the Future
With structural adjustment, the market for skilled workers has begun to
change. Greater export orientation has already led to clearly identified de-
mand in some areas. For example, the growing demand for graduates from
Western universities and expatriates and the rapid rise in wages for trained
workers in tourism-related services reflect the relative scarcity of workers
fluent in English and endowed with attitudes of professional responsibil-
ity. While pockets of excess demand exist, the problem is mainly one of
isolated demand-supply imbalances rather than a skill shortages. The de-
mand for skills has been considerably overestimated in some areas, espe-
cially in the small-scale industrial sector.
Despite all these changes, informal small enterprises and microenterprises
will continue to dominate the private sector in the foreseeable future. The
skill needs of informal enterprises are best met informally; the best formal
way to equip workers for productive careers in microenterprises is to en-
sure that they get good academic schooling (Fluitman 1994). As these firms
formalize their operations, some will require workers with pre-employment
training. For small firms it is often difficult to formally train workers on
the job. The challenge in Egypt is to put in place institutions that will
supply technical and vocational skills cost effectively and on demand.
We now discuss several potential sources and likely obstacles to the pro-
vision of an adequate skill supply for the private sector.
LINE MINISTRIES AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES. During the period of transi-
tion from a formal economy led by public enterprises to one where the
private sector takes the lead, public enterprises could continue to supply
fledgling private firms with skills. Training institutions run by line minis-
tries should be helped to reorient their programs so that they view the
private sector as the primary client. Where this is not possible, the solution
may be to close the programs and use the money to fund enterprise-based
training in the private sector.
ENTERPRISE-BASED TRAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR Today the most
important barrier to enterprise-based training in Egypt is uncertainty about
the government's attitude toward private sector investment. Training is a
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long-term investment for both employers and workers, and the market for
long-term investments in either human or physical capital is thin. Large
private sector firms-which are most likely to train workers-also cite la-
bor legislation as a deterrent. Union behavior, minimum wage legislation,
and hiring and firing laws are the main reasons for hesitancy in hiring and
in investing in upgrading workers' skills. The removal of administrative
impediments to increased firm size will be accompanied by increases in the
amount of firm-based training. The predominance of microenterprises and
small enterprises, however, will continue to limit the amount of formal
enterprise-based training.
THE TRADITIONAL APPRENTICESHIP SYSTEM. In the short to medium term,
informal mechanisms will be the mainstay of postschool investments in
human capital, especially in sectors, such as construction and manufactur-
ing, where apprenticeship traditions are well entrenched. Although direct
incentives to the informal sector are difficult to administer, a stable macro-
economic environment and well-designed regulatory framework are likely
to rejuvenate traditional systems.
THE FORMAL EDUCATION SYSTEM. In any modernizing economy a robust
education system is the key to ensuring that the work force is literate and
trainable. In an economy dominated by microenterprises and small firms,
the most relevant vocational skills are those provided by a good general
education-especially arithmetic, language, and scientific skills-at the basic
and secondary levels. Training in job-specific skills is best left for enter-
prises to design and deliver.
INSTITUTION-BASED TRAINING. Because small firms tend not to invest in
formal training, institution-based vocational education and improved la-
bor mobility can help fill skill gaps. However, overestimating or underesti-
mating the skill demands of small firms is easy. A successful strategy for
providing small firms in the formal sector with skilled workers includes a
formal education system that equips students with general skills, and tech-
nical-vocational centers (run by the private sector or with its active partici-
pation) that specialize in relatively short courses that provide
occupation-specific skills.
The Cause of Demand-Supply Mismatches
Changing labor market demands, a supply-driven education system, and
institutional weaknesses (such as poor labor mobility) have exposed defi-
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ciencies in the market for skills. If left uncorrected, these deficiencies may
impede private sector development. The following paragraphs address the
most important problems.
The Declining Quality of Primary and General Secondary Education
While few systematic studies of the quality of basic and secondary educa-
tion in Egypt are available, all investigations point to a declining quality of
education (Heyneman 1997). Fergany (1994b) concluded that "measures
to raise the quality of output of primary education, in terms of acquisition
of basic literacy skills, with a major emphasis on mathematics, should be
given top priority." Well-designed legislation will result in increases in the
share of formal private employment over the long term, as the public sector
shrinks in importance. The share of informal sector employment may well
increase in the short term. The share of skilled labor in informal sector
employment is far from negligible (Rizk 1991), but the process by which
these skills are accumulated is generally informal. Improving educational
quality may be the best way to help these firms meet their skill needs.
Although basic literacy and numeracy skills are usually stressed as part of a
poverty reduction strategy, they are important labor market skills in an
economy dominated by self-employment and microenterprises. In Egypt's
push to become competitive in a world economy, a literate population
could provide not only a more stable socioeconomic environment but also
a more trainable work force, one that provides foreign capital with comple-
mentary inputs at relatively low wages.
The Misdirection of Vocational and Technical Education
Every year about 0.5 million persons graduate from or drop out of voca-
tional and technical schools in Egypt. They are often unemployable in the
jobs they are conditioned to expect. The problems seem to be fourfold.
First, there is an oversupply of technical and vocational skills to a slug-
gish economy. Even in technically demanding industries, such as machine
tools, technicians make up only 5 to 6 percent of the total production
work force (World Bank 1994). If it operated efficiently, the current sys-
tem in Egypt could supply five to seven times the required number of
skilled workers, according to conservative estimates.
Second, a fundamental mismatch exists between the needs of a largely
informal economy and an education system that is designed to meet rela-
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tively formal needs. The share of vocational enrollments in senior second-
ary education in Egypt is significantly higher than in countries that have
more formal economies.
Third, the quality of education in Egypt has deteriorated. Although the
graduates of three-year industrial programs are called technicians and those
of five-year programs are called first technicians, they are at best semiskilled
workers. The system conditions them to expect jobs that require technical
and practical skills they do not possess.
Fourth, technical and vocational education is used as a social safety net.
When Egypt's economy was centrally planned, it was assumed that the
lower 50 percent of the student population should be educated in voca-
tional and technical skills and the upper 50 percent should be eligible for
selection to higher education. When employment could be more easily
guaranteed, this assumption was unquestioned, but now that employment
cannot be guaranteed, the rationale for attending vocational and technical
training has shifted from educational reasons to social reasons-that is, to
lower the likelihood of criminal behavior and social hostility.3
Although forecasting the likely demand for vocational-technical gradu-
ates is difficult, a rough idea can be garnered by examining the skill distri-
bution of the work force and imputing the likely demand at alternative
employment growth rates. If employment in the private nonagricultural
sector were to grow at 10 percent from the level in the mid-1990s of 5
million workers-an optimistic scenario that assumes annual output growth
of about 20 percent-the employment of vocational-technical graduates
would grow by 60,000. If 1 in 30 workers were to retire every year, this
would imply a demand for 80,000 secondary school graduates. Even if all
of these positions were filled only from industrial and commercial schools
and technical institutes, this would imply a supply-to-demand ratio of more
than 400 percent. This does not take into account the roughly 2 million
secondary school graduates who are currently unemployed. At an annual
employment growth rate of 10 percent, simply absorbing existing job seek-
ers would take 15 to 20 years. These numbers indicate a serious demand-
supply imbalance in vocational and technical skills for the private sector.
Other Public Training Programs
Training institutions managed by sectoral ministries other than the Minis-
try of Education face an uncertain future because of the privatization or
the slow growth of public enterprises and the increased importance of the
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private sector as an employer. These training centers were often uncon-
cerned with placement, because this was traditionally guaranteed by client
enterprises and agencies.4 Some performed relatively well in ensuring that
training remained demand oriented: the Ministry of Industry's PVTD cen-
ters are a case in point. However, most public training programs became
supply driven and expanded capacity beyond expected demand. All these
programs require an increased emphasis on placement and greater cost shar-
ing with employers. In sectors that are dominated by informal enterprises,
formal training programs, such as TOMOHAR for construction (Assaad
1993), are often irrelevant, but these programs can be useful for large and
medium-size private enterprises that require relatively formalized technical
and learning skills. Smaller, more focused programs can be cost effective if
employers' participation is institutionalized.
The Imbalance in High-Level Skills
This chapter has noted that management and professional skills may be in
short supply. At least in management, there is little evidence of the need to
create institutional capacity: existing institutions are capable of meeting
the needs of small, medium, and large firms. In engineering, again there is
little evidence that more institutional capacity is needed. At the high levels
of specialization in professional skills, some mismatch between demand
and supply is inevitable during transition. The challenge is to ensure that
these gaps are closed quickly and cost effectively. While no additional insti-
tutional capacity to provide management training and engineering skills is
required, efforts to encourage industry-academic links may be worthwhile.
As the private sector replaces the public sector as the main employer, the
role of administration and financing could shift from government agencies
to business associations such as the Chamber of Commerce, the Alexan-
dria Businessmen's Association, and the Federation of Egyptian Industries.
In the meantime, public sector firms, which are likely to be overstaffed and
on soft budgets, could continue training managers. In this way trained
managers could be provided at relatively low (private) costs to small and
medium-size private sector enterprises.
Vocational Education and Training Reform
In this section we describe three aspects of the reform of Egypt's vocational
education and training system: providing a suitable environment for pri-
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vate training, reorienting education enrollments and expenditures, and re-
forming initiatives in enterprise-based training.
Providing a Suitable Environmentfor Private Training
Guaranteed public employment and narrow skill differentials in publicly
administered wage systems distort the incentives to invest in skills develop-
ment. For example, unskilled workers are paid higher than market wages in
public enterprises, leading to general disincentives to acquire skills (Zaytoun
1991). Moving toward a market-driven system of wage determination would
result in clearer signals of skill shortages. In the absence of broad regulatory
reform, compensatory interventions, such as partial public subsidies or tax
rebates for artificially high training costs, are sometimes advocated. How-
ever, such incentives need to be carefully monitored to prevent firms from
repackaging already established training just to gain tax credits or subsi-
dies: the current state of tax administration in Egypt may not be suitable
for introducing such schemes. The government can encourage private pro-
vision of training by reducing barriers to entry, such as requiring the use of
an official curriculum to obtain certification, and by allowing private and
public institutions to set tuition levels freely. Private sector investments in
skills can be encouraged by reducing distortions in incentives (for example,
by ending the public employment guarantee and initiating public enter-
prise and civil service pay reform).
Reorienting Education Enrollments and Expenditures
As noted earlier, accurately forecasting the demand for skills is impossible,
but a rough idea can be obtained by examining the current skill distribu-
tion of the work force and estimating the likely demand for skills at alter-
native employment growth rates. Even under unrealistically optimistic
scenarios, the numbers indicate a serious demand-supply imbalance in vo-
cational and technical skills for the private sector.
This section provides some analysis using the Third Five-Year Plan ex-
penditures on education (World Bank 1992) as the base. First, Egypt does
not spend less on education as a share of its gross national product than do
countries such as Chile and the Republic of Korea. However, the pattern of
its spending differs dramatically. While Korea spends less than 10 percent
of its education budget on higher education, Egypt spends about 45 per-
cent on higher education. The inequity and costs of this policy are appar-
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ent when one considers that only 0.7 million students are enrolled in uni-
versities (compared with an enrollment of 12.5 million students in pri-
mary and secondary schools). Although 66 percent of nonuniversity
spending goes to the more than 10 million students in basic education
(primary and preparatory), 33 percent goes to the 2.5 million enrolled in
secondary schools. Unit costs per student year are about LE 250 for general
secondary schools and LE 500 for technical secondary schools. Estimates
from Ministry of Education, PVTD, and private industrial schools in Cairo
indicate that between LE 2,000 and LE 2,500 are needed to provide tech-
nical education of moderate quality, while the unit costs for general sec-
ondary education of reasonable quality are about LE 400 to LE 500. In
other words, vocational-technical education is about five times costlier than
humanistic-scientific education.
At the current spending levels for each subsector, the following strate-
gies are feasible:
* Shift all secondary technical-vocational enrollment in schools run by
the Ministry of Education into general education. This would not entail
any additional expenses other than teacher training, but it would allow all
students to obtain a secondary education of moderate quality.
* Shift one-third of technical-vocational enrollment into general sec-
ondary schools and give each student an employment voucher on success-
ful completion of school that can be redeemed by employers on verification
of employment. This scheme has economic benefits, such as providing di-
rect incentives to private sector employment. It also has the obvious
sociopolitical attractiveness of a highly visible attempt to address the prob-
lem of unemployment among young people. This option also does not add
to costs.
* Combine the previous option with privatization of one-third of tech-
nical-vocational schools and use the freed-up resources to upgrade the quality
of the remaining schools.
Combinations of these options can also yield beneficial results in terms
of external and internal efficiency of secondary education. Ultimately, how-
ever, there are few ways to reform the education system without transfer-
ring resources from higher to primary education.
Introducing cost sharing in public higher education can significantly
increase the ease with which the secondary education sector can respond
to the demand for skills in the private sector. The potential for cost shar-
ing in Egyptian higher education remains largely untapped. In 1994 the
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cost recovery rate in Egyptian higher education was just 4 percent of
recurrent costs, compared with about 25 to 40 percent for Chile, Jordan,
and Korea.
Reform Initiatives in Enterprise-Based Training
In this section we discuss two initiatives that are particularly noteworthy:
the high-profile Mubarak-Kohl training initiative and the Employment
and Retraining Program of the Social Fund for Development.
THE MUBARAK-KoHL INITIATIVE. This initiative attempted to transform
a traditional apprenticeship system to meet a modern economy's demands.
Some policymakers believed that the German dual system could be adapted
to revive a well-developed tradition of apprenticeships that was stifled in a
command economy. However, the initiative encountered several obstacles.
The German dual system relies heavily on voluntary contributions from
the private sector. In 1992 German industry spent about 87 billion deut-
schemarks on dual system trainees (Gill and Dar 1996). The Egyptian pri-
vate sector seems less willing to make such investments, perhaps because of
quality problems.
Locally, the initiative was viewed as part of the broader task of improv-
ing the quality of technical and vocational education in schools and insti-
tutes. This may contradict one of the lessons learned in other countries-
namely, that a large share of instruction should be on the job.
Furthermore, on both the supply and the demand sides, expectations
were unreasonable. Experts familiar with the effort believe that the govern-
ment as well as the private sector grossly overestimated training needs, es-
pecially for technical workers. International experience suggests that
technicians represent less than 10 percent of the work force in most manu-
facturing industries; the ratio is believed to be more than twice that among
Egyptian government officials and businesspeople.
Vocational students are rigorously examined by employer associations
in Germany, and successful completion of dual programs is no easy matter.
In Egypt vocational education is reserved for those who cannot pass exami-
nations that allow them to compete for university entry. Thus the pool of
applicants has already been culled of the more gifted, and it is limited to
those who may very well consider themselves as having failed. Creating a
successful dual system in Egypt would be difficult unless the pool were
expanded to include a far wider array of applicants.
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The most important reason the private sector is hesitant to bear some of
the financial burden may be that it does not expect immediate benefits. In
Germany apprentices hired in the dual system can be paid wages lower
than those mandated or collectively determined for entry-level workers,
resulting in immediate benefits for employers as well as employees. In Egypt
entry-level wages in the private sector are often close to subsistence, so
apprenticeship schemes would result in no immediate benefit for employ-
ers in the form of lower wages.
THE SOCIAL FUND FOR DEVELOPMENT. The Employment and Retrain-
ing Program of the Social Fund for Development provides support for
projects to help displaced public sector workers and unemployed workers
who have more than a secondary education. The Employment and Re-
training Program funded only 18 projects in 1993 (Government of Egypt
1994), and it has remained small. This may be because of the reluctance of
public sector employees to enroll for training; they may fear that they will
be marked for layoff if they are retrained. The training effort for unem-
ployed graduates of universities and postsecondary institutes has also re-
mained small. The Employment and Retraining Program compiles an
inventory of institutions where training can be supplied. This is aimed at
helping private contractors find suitable training facilities. The Enterprise
Development Program also provides funds for training. Eight percent of
the loan amount can be spent on training, and the funds do not have to be
repaid.
The Employment and Retraining Program encourages training by the
private sector. Its funds can be used to develop private sector initiatives in
the provision of training and to help disadvantaged but educated job seek-
ers. Those retrenched can be offered cash incentives rather than retraining.
Funds for the training component of the Enterprise Development Pro-
gram, where leakages are suspected, could be reduced.
Conclusion
Reforms of the Egyptian economy should be accompanied by parallel re-
forms in vocational and technical education. The reforms that are needed,
however, are not unique to Egypt. They are shared by the many countries
shifting from a command to a market economy. Economic shifts require
structural and organizational changes in training systems. Western Euro-
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pean countries have had to review their assumptions about how training
should be organized, and they all have had to confront similar facts: the
rapid shift in career patterns, the blurring of distinctions between disci-
plines and professions, the open competition for comparative advantage,
and the ineffectiveness of vocational education as a social safety net. These
similarities have led many countries to institute similar reforms of training
institutions and policies.
Egypt may need to change (a) the proportion of students assigned to
vocational institutions; (b) the method by which it selects students for
postcompulsory education; and (c) the tradition of delivering vocational
and technical education through public institutions segmented by sectoral
iministries, with central control over curricula. High-quality training and
itechnical education can make an important contribution to growth. This
chapter suggests, however, that the content and delivery of that education
and the students who receive it will have to change for that contribution to
be realized.
.Notes
1. The OECD countries use several types of selection mechanisms. Italy selects
by attrition after entry to higher education, France has diversified the content of
the baccalaureate and has assigned ifferent weights to different subjects, and Ja-
pan and the United Kingdom have separated exit examinations from entry exami-
nations.
2. Public sector pay fell by 30 percent in real terms between 1976 and 1985,
and the waiting period was close to 10 years.
3. All OECD countries struggle with the same dilemma: what is to be done
with young people who may not be qualified to enter university and who may pose
a danger to the social order? And at one time or another all have attempted to use
the vocational training system to delay labor market entry. Consensus now exists,
however, that using the vocational system for this purpose is unwise. It lowers the
value of vocational training, it exacerbates the disaffection of the young people for
whom prospects of employment have not improved, and it wastes resources. More-
over, less expensive mechanisms are available to delay labor market entry that are
socially more constructive (for instance, community service programs, work-study
programs, and apprenticeships).
4. Vocational education institutions affiliated with state-owned enterprises pose
a significant dilemma for all economies in transition (Heyneman 1994, 1996).
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16 JordanZAFIRIS TZANNATOS AND VICTOR BILLEH
JORDAN HAS FEW natural resources and a small domestic
industrial basis. Its education and training system, however, is well devel-
oped. Workers have traditionally achieved high educational and skills lev-
els and have proven to be the economy's most successful "export." In turn,
less attractive jobs have been delegated to guest workers who are less quali-
fied than Jordanians. These workers are paid wages that are closer to subsis-
tence levels in their own countries and are typically lower than what
Jordanians would accept.
Low wages for the relatively unskilled have increased Jordanians' will-
ingness to get as much education as they can. These private considerations
are greatly assisted by the government's deliberate policy to support basic
education and training generously, while at the same time maintaining one
of the highest cost-recovery ratios in postbasic education. The public-pri-
vate interface has resulted in the commendable record of practically all
Jordanians going through basic education, broadly defined as from Grade
1 to Grade 10 (that is, until the age of 16) and an initial enrollment in
postsecondary education of 32 percent.
Past successes make future policies all the more challenging. When sys-
tems are well developed and have major fiscal implications, as is the case in
Jordan, misguided, albeit well-intentioned, policies can have significant
adverse ffects. A multifaceted approach to human resources development
is needed that will depart from the traditional view of the academic sys-
tem and on-the-job training-namely, that it is the less able who tend to
enter the vocational training stream. In addition, planners' reliance on
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projections of past trends is unreliable, because of the uncertainties sur-
rounding the future sources of industrial growth given globalization, changes
in trading partners, and the political instability in the region. 'While invest-
ment in training can facilitate economic growth, growth prospects need to
be enhanced by macroeconomic and trade polices before human capital
investments can be induced (in the form of incentives) or afforded (in the
form of increased public budgets, which are stretched thin).
Jordan has anticipated the need for change and has redesigned its edu-
cation and training system. Following an examination of the characteris-
tics and trends of Jordan's labor market and the institutional setting for
human resource development, this chapter reviews the proposed and on-
going reforms. The main conclusion is that the structure of the educa-
tion and training system is adequate, and what is required now is
consolidation and selective expansion, along with diversification and evalu-
ation of the reforms.
The Education and Training System
Jordan has an impressive record on education. Illiteracy rates were 68 per-
cent in 1961, but the adult literacy rate in 1997 was well over 80 percent.
Thus its education policies have paid off: today enrollment in primary
education is universal with no gender differences, and the number of pu-
pils, teachers, and schools has increased dramatically (table 16-1).
The Ministry of Education is responsible for providing public educa-
tion at all levels and for monitoring private education. General educa-
tion consists of 10 years of basic education (through age 16) and 2 years
o:F secondary education (Grades 11 and 12). Secondary education is di-
vided into comprehensive secondary education and vocational education.
In the 1994-95 school year the number of students enrolled in Egypt's
education system were as follows: preschool, 57,734; basic education,
1,058,611; comprehensive secondary education, 100,834; public and
private universities, 64,830 (undergraduates); and public universities,
5,225 (postgraduates).
Three different organizations deliver vocational education and training
(VET). First, the Ministry of Education provides VET in its comprehen-
sive, multipurpose, and specialized vocational schools. The ministry is the
main player in skills development at the secondary school level: 80 percent
ofall vocational students were enrolled in the vocational streams of Minis-
try of Education schools in 1994-95.
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TABLE 16-1
Number of Pupils, Teachers, and Schools (Grades 1 to 12),
Selected Years, 1960-61 to 1996-97
Year Pupils Teachers Schools
1960-61 278,496 7,947 1,200
1970-71 379,925 11,700 1,508
1980-81 720,759 27,151 2,593
1990-91 1,002,360 41,806 3,036
1996-97 1,251,023 60,219 3,517
Source: Calculated from data from the Ministry of Education and National Center for
Human Resources Development.
Second, the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC), an autonomous
entity governed by a board of directors and chaired by the minister of la-
bor, provides applied vocational training in its centers. In 1995-96 most of
the remaining 20 percent of vocational students were enrolled in its 35
public training centers that offered 215 programs. Ministry of Education
schools provide comprehensive vocational education, while the VTC cen-
ters provide applied secondary education.
Third, at the postsecondary level, 45 community colleges under the
Ministry of Education provided technical education and training. These
centers were once run by the Ministry of Higher Education, which has
since been abolished; its functions were passed on to the Ministry of Edu-
cation. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency provides skills devel-
opment at the two-year postsecondary level in two technical community
colleges.
An interesting characteristic of Jordan's education system is the signifi-
cant participation of the private sector. Table 16-2 shows enrollment by
level of education and indicates that the private sector in 1995 had 11
percent of students even at the basic and secondary level. This ratio was 49
percent for community colleges and 37 percent for universities. Cost re-
covery within the public sector was minimal at lower levels of education,
but reached 25 percent for postsecondary education. If one considers fees
paid to public institutions plus the estimated expenses of private students,
private expenditures accounted for some 11 percent of basic and secondary
education and 40 to 50 percent of postsecondary education. These figures
suggest that, on average, across the whole education system, the private
JORDAN 433
sector contributed one Jordanian dinar UD) for every four paid by the
government.
Planners know virtually nothing about the activities of many private
providers. This is one salient feature of Jordan's VET system. In 1995-96,
23,420 students were enrolled in 341 private "cultural" centers-an in-
crease from 16,300 students in 256 cultural centers in 1992-93. Of the 45
community colleges in 1995-96, 19 were private and accounted for 40
percent of enrollment. Planners also are frequently unaware of training
provided by employers. This lack of awareness of private training centers is
largely a failure of the system to register, license, accredit, and generally
monitor much of the national effort in this significant area of human capi-
tal development.
The Ministry of Education had the goal of increasing enrollment in
vocational programs to 50 percent for males and 35 percent for females by
2000 (compared with 41 percent for males and 21 percent for females in
:1996-97). This policy was inevitably associated with distortions. In addi-
tion, it had fiscal implications, since vocational education is usually more
expensive than general education. Moreover, investment in vocational edu-
cation, which produces narrow skills, is riskier than investment in general
education. Ministry estimates suggest that the annual cost per student in
vocational schools is JD 300 for business and commercial programs, JD
600 for agricultural training, and as much as JD 1,000 for training in hotel
skills. The annual unit costs were JD 168 for basic education, JD 224 for
secondary education, JD 337 for a community college education, and JD
1,020 for a university education (Ilon 1993; Ahlawat, Billeh, and Al-Dajeh
1995). Therefore, the decision to move to a 50-50 ratio of general to voca-
tional secondary education could be costly. Vocational education does not
have the income generating effect that general secondary education has,
and those with a vocational education are more likely to be unemployed
than are their counterparts who received a general secondary education
(World Bank 1994b).
Distortions are evident among those who continue into postsecondary
education. In 1995 the unemployment rate among women graduates of
the largely vocational community colleges was 60 percent. Had these women
pursued a general education, they might have entered nonvocational
postsecondary education. Private universities have been allowed to operate
only since 1990, but in 1995 they accounted for 40 percent of total univer-
sity enrollment. General secondary education and university education have
Ibeen constrained by government policies, the former because secondary
TABLE 16-2
Financing of the Education System and Cost Recovery, 1995
Private
Number of students enrolled Public recurrent expenditures (JD) expenditures
Public Private Budget Fees Cost recovery as percent
Education level (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)1(3 + 4) of total'
Basic & secondary 1 ,0 5 4,5 9 2b 130,191 190,947,419 3,021,345 2 11
Vocational 41,937 307 8,319,261 523,604 6 1
Community colleges 13,212 9,433 3,451,587 1,126,595 25 49
Universities 55,339 24,868 92,200,750 28,450,000 24 37
a. This is calculated as follows. First, obtain unit costs in public education by adding columns (3) and (4) and dividing the sum by column (1). Second,
multiply public unit costs by column (2) to obtain private expenditures (assuming that costs are the same in the two sectors). Third, add column (4) to
private expenditures and divide by total expenditures.
b. In 1995 the school system of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency had an enrollment of 147,039 students in the basic education cycle and
572 students in vocational education. These figures were added to the public category because these students do not pay fees. The total budget for the
agency's basic education system was JD 29,452,000, and the total budget for vocational education was JD 1,239,000.
Source: Data from National Center for Human Resources Development.
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school students are streamed into vocational education, and the latter be-
cause universities are restricted by legislation.'
The Ministry of Education has a good tradition of academic teaching
with broad-based education and tends to recruit more capable students
than in applied vocational training. It has a large network of institutions,
including comprehensive schools and multipurpose and specialized voca-
tional training schools. Its programs cover a wide array of specializations,
including 32 in the industrial field alone. The ministry's institutions ac-
count for about 80 percent of all enrollments in VET. The centralized sys-
tem of final examinations provides discipline for the studies and allows
some students to continue to higher education. Examination results pro-
vide a picture of the system's overall performance. Ministry institutions
have some credible vocational programs in selected areas, and many insti-
tutions benefit from committed staff and good buildings and equipment.
The Vocational Training Corporation's apprenticeship system and use
of modular training are unusual in the developing world. The VTC has a
solid organization dedicated to training with a 20-year tradition of indus-
trial training. The VTC maintains extensive contacts with employers and
the labor market through training officers and student supervision. Most
of its programs are closely linked to jobs, and consequently VTC graduates
enjoy high rates of employment. The modular system of instruction pro-
vides for continuous assessment of student performance, reinforcement,
and progression to new levels of expertise. Students are trained at school
for three days per week, which allows for some training at the workplace
and is cheaper than center-based training for five full days a week. The
\'TC has also developed flexible short-term and medium-term training
programs. It uses a system of training through production, which generates
some revenues and makes training more realistic. Follow-up (tracer) infor-
mation, albeit sporadic, is available on graduates. In addition, the VTC has
developed capacity for instructor training and industrial extension.
By offering some practical subjects in short (two-year) programs, the
community college system helps alleviate pressures for enrollment in longer
and more expensive university programs, thereby saving public funds. De-
mand for those who complete technical courses in community colleges is
reportedly strong. The colleges offer a broad range of practical and aca-
demic subjects in some 95 specializations. There is a tradition of accredita-
tion and comprehensive national examinations for graduates that can
enhance achievement of quality standards and provide information about
system performance. The existence of private community colleges offers
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advantages in terms of (a) the relatively close attention they pay to labor
market needs, the quality of training provided, and the incentives for effi-
cient use of resources; and (b) the reduced burden on public finances.
The foregoing suggests that the basic elements of high-quality training
are present. However, despite its strengths, the system does not appear to
be efficient in using available staff or physical resources. Although infor-
mal coordination exists, the system's functions tend to overlap. Formal co-
ordination, with the authority to direct the development of various parts of
the system, is absent. Management tends to be overly centralized, and in-
centives for managers of individual institutions are limited. The articula-
tion between the parts of the system is inadequate, and students lack
opportunities for vertical and horizontal mobility. Equally important, the
system lacks adequate information about employment demands, and part-
nerships with employers are lacking.
The Labor Market
From the mid- 1980s to the mid- 1990s, aggregate economic growth remained
robust, with GDP growth averaging 7 percent per year. However, this was
disproportionately affected by the 16 percent growth achieved in 1992 and
the continuing importance of construction activities. Because Jordan has a
small economic base and a rapidly growing population, even high rates of
growth may not be sufficient to absorb the continuing increase in the labor
force. Table 16-3 indicates the economy's difficulties in generating new
jobs. The number of applications for civil service positions illustrates that
labor supply is greater than demand. In the early 1980s Jordanians showed
little interest in public sector employment and the ratio of applicants to
recruits was practically 1: 1; in 1996 this ratio was almost 25:1 (table 16-4).
Determinants of Labor Market Outcomes
The key determinants of labor market outcomes include the macroeconomy,
fertility rates, and the public sector. Jordan is facing a crisis in terms of
both macroeconomic growth and population growth. With regard to pub-
lic sector employment, the labor market suffers from a "duality": in 1996
there were 165,000 civil servants and workers in parastatals in an employed
labor force of just over 800,000, of whom only 640,000 were employees.
This created fiscal implications at the macroeconomic level and a distorted
incentive structure at the microeconomic level. With respect to the latter,
TABLE 16-3
Employment, Unemployment, and the Labor Force, 1985-96
Number of Annual increase in employment
Total number Number of Jordanians Unemployment Number Percentage
Year of employed Jordanians employed rate (%) of workers of workers
1985 - 502,400 472,300 6.0 13,800 3.0
1986 - 535,400 492,500 8.0 20,200 4.3
1987 - 555,700 509,300 8.3 16,800 3.4
1988 - 572,166 521,815 8.8 12,515 2.5
1989 780,000 583,505 523,505 10.3 1,690 0.3
1990 794,000 630,070 524,197 16.8 692 0.1
1991 918,684 680,000 552,000 18.8 27,803 5.3
1992 932,000 839,000 691,700 17.6 139,700 25.3
1993 984,000 907,000 729,000 19.6 37,300 5.4
1994 1,038,000 963,000 811,000 15.8 82,000 11.2
1995 1,079,000 964,000 816,000 15.4 5,000 0.6
1996 1,070,000 950,000 826,000 13.1 10,000 1.2
-Not available.
Note: Figures for 1994 to 1996 are estimates.
Source. Data from Ministry of Labor and Department of Statistics.
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TABLE 16-4
Civil Service Applications and Appointments, Selected Years, 1981-96
(number)
Year Applications Appointments Ratio
1981 7,175 6,188 1.2
1985 23,854 5,771 4.1
1990 47,555 2,346 20.2
1996 136,823 5,491 24.9
Source: Civil Service Commission data.
public sector wage and employment policies act unavoidably as a pace-
maker for the entire labor market. On the labor demand side, private em-
ployers must compete with the large government sector on an uneven playing
field: they cannot offer wages to workers that are significantly below those
the public sector pays. Not only does pay in the private sector tend to be
inferior to that in the public sector, but workers are unwilling to work for
the private sector because it is deemed less prestigious, especially for women.
In 1960, 66 percent of the employed worked in the private sector, but
this share decreased to 56 percent in 1979 (Al-Akel 1985) and to 50 per-
cent by the mid-i 990s. The private sector is shrinking in part because of
past employment opportunities for Jordanians abroad: those who could
not work for the government tended to emigrate instead of working in the
private sector in Jordan. Government employment and emigration reduced
the available supply of Jordanian workers at home and at the same time
increased domestic wages. For a non-oil-producing country at the develop-
mental stage of Jordan, the small size of the private sector is compatible
with the claim that the sector has been repressed by high labor costs.
In addition to these domestic characteristics, regional aspects are im-
portant determinants of outcomes of the national labor market. Employ-
ment opportunities abroad have attracted many Jordanians. The number
of Jordanian workers abroad increased from 265,000 in 1975 to 315,500
in 1983. However, their outflow has been considerably reduced since the
mid-1980s. Before the Gulf War, the number of Jordanian workers in
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was 80,000 and 160,000, respectively (El-
Khasawneh 1992). The regional total may have reached 275,000 and the
world total 340,000. On the positive side, workers' remittances have con-
tributed to Jordan's welfare, reaching 20 percent of GDP in the late 1980s,
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compared with less than 5 percent in Egypt and only 1.3 percent in Alge-
ria. The volume of workers and the high salaries they have commanded
explain the high figure for Jordan; however, emigration and workers' re-
rnittances have resulted in higher wages and segmentation in the national
labor market. Emigration decreased the domestic labor supply while
wvorkers' remittances increased household incomes at home and pushed
up the reservation wage of prospective workers. This income effect made
domestic workers reluctant to accept work in certain jobs, sectors, or
geographical areas. This opened up opportunities for foreign labor in
jobs requiring fewer skills (El-Khasawneh 1992). In turn, behavioral rea-
sons preclude less-qualified Jordanians from undertaking employment
traditionally associated with immigrant laborers.
All these factors taken together have resulted in high labor costs. Labor
is already priced out because the public sector has driven up the average
wage and has increased the level of wages at which private employers can
recruit. While one could argue that the consumption wage enables Jorda-
nians to attain high living standards, the production wage in terms of labor
costs, particularly for Jordanians, is above its market clearing level as evi-
denced by the high unemployment rates.2
UJnemployment
Unemployment levels vary somewhat with level of educational attainment,
and the unemployment rates of the more educated have tended to decline
over time (table 16-5). Yet these differences are not pronounced, and they
seem to depend on the year of estimation. Unemployment has been, and
still is, particularly acute among first-time job seekers who are relatively
wvell educated (Lee 1989; World Bank 1994b).
Unemployment is a chronic condition in Jordan. The low growth of
domestic employment opportunities acceptable to Jordanians has resulted
in rising unemployment. In 1980 the unemployment rate was only 3.5
percent. Since then it has increased each year, passing the 10 percent level
in 1989 and reaching 19 percent in 1991. The underlying demographic
changes are important. During this period employment among Jordanians
increased by nearly 3 percent per year, but the labor force grew by 4.5
percent per year. The unemployed tend to be young. In 1991, 75 percent
of unemployed men were younger than 30. With respect to educational
attainment, 60 percent of unemployed women are qualified at the
postsecondary level, compared with 25 percent of men.
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TABLE 16-5
Unemployment Rates, by Education Level, 1987 and 1996
(percent)
Education level 1987 1996
Illiterate 1 1 5
Read and write 13 10
Primary 16 13
Preparatory 1 5 13
Secondary 16 13
Diploma (community college) 22 20
Bachelor's degree 14 12
Masters or doctorate 9 6
All (average) 8 13
Source: Department of Statistics (1987).
One additional reason for unemployment is that production is charac-
terized by capital bias. In the past two decades, while employment doubled,
the capital stock tripled. Productivity growth was low, and output growth
was achieved primarily through extensive growth-more inputs-rather
than intensive growth-higher efficiency (World Bank 1994a, chap. 2).
Cheap credit and low tariffs on capital goods favored the adoption of capi-
tal-intensive production techniques in the more modern sectors while keep-
ing wages for immigrant (guest) workers low in the traditional sectors.
Education and Training Issues
Although the total supply of human capital is relatively abundant and Jor-
dan "exports" workers to neighboring countries, each of the three main
actors in VET face serious problems that affect the overall system in terms
of relevance to market economy requirements, efficacy (the extent to which
objectives are met), management effectiveness, quality of training, and effi-
cient use of resources. The following paragraphs examine the role of each
agency and its performance from a systemwide perspective.
Ministry of Education
The Ministry of Education's VET schools tend not to be well linked to
business, industry, and labor market demand. Some inertia is evident in
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acljusting teaching content to practices in enterprises. There are numerous
examples. Computer courses teach programming, whereas the greatest de-
mand is for training in software applications and databases. Television re-
pair focuses on black and white televisions, whereas almost all of the sets
delivered for repair are in color. Typing is taught on manual typewriters,
whereas businesses are rapidly converting to word processing.
Moreover, schools provide students with little or no help with job coun-
seling and placement. In addition, they do little systematic follow-up on
graduates, and the lack of knowledge about what graduates do reduces the
effectiveness of the ministry's activities. The directorate responsible for VET
must report to a directorate general responsible for all academic matters.
Thus VET managers operate in an environment where they are unable to
irnpose trade training priorities in relation to the predominant position of
academic education. The low esteem in which VET is held is reinforced by
compelling about half of the students to enter vocational schooling, often
against their wishes.
In terms of quality, students in Ministry of Education programs tend to
receive little reinforcement of vocational content from academic programs.
For example, mathematics is taught as a diluted version of academic math-
ematics; it is not applied to the occupations being taught. The quality of
instruction in some industrial trades is poor, mainly because of instructors'
lack of practical training and industrial work experience. The inability to
maintain and replace equipment also affects the quality of instruction. Safety
standards, while existing in theory, tend not to be employed in practice,
resulting in hazardous working conditions in many workshops.
Finally, efficiency tends to be low. There are few incentives to coordinate
the use of Ministry of Education facilities with those of the VTC. This
results in duplication of facilities in some areas. Some of the costs could be
reduced through the production and sale of goods or services by the insti-
tutions. The lack of interest in or ability to sell production arises partly
because policies prevent the retention of earnings at the institution level.
T he high costs and lack of financing constrain the expansion of vocational
instruction in needed areas.
Wwocational Training Corporation
The VTC has employer councils for each institution, but these rarely func-
t.ion as regularly or as effectively as intended. Problems that affect relevance
are also apparent in several other areas. Students tend to specialize rela-
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tively quickly on entry into training centers. As a result, they lack broadly
based general training. This contributes to some lack of flexibility among
graduates. In addition, the VTC is constrained in increasing its intake of
students by several factors, namely (a) the number of enterprises willing to
accept apprentices (the small number is mainly because of the limited size
of Jordanian industry), (b) the VTC's lack of sufficient staff to develop
apprenticeship placement, and (c) parents' and students' low interest in
vocational training. The VTC suffers from a lack of capacity to provide
training for some target groups and in some areas of the country (for ex-
amples, for females and in the South).
Weak training standards in several industrial fields also affect the VTC's
effectiveness. A good training ethos and environment is lacking. Another
major factor is the instructors' lack of practical technical expertise. Unde-
manding, they are often satisfied with low levels of workmanship by stu-
dents. In addition, there are localized problems: missing equipment,
equipment that is inadequate for instructional purposes, or equipment in
disrepair. All of these problems reduce the quality of instruction. Supervi-
sion of trainees in apprenticeship programs is also reportedly inadequate.
The effectiveness of VTC programs could be compromised by a law on
certification of workers and enterprises, which could overburden VTC
management and staff resources.
Finally, efficiency is low as evidenced by the high dropout rates for ap-
prentices (20 percent in the first year), which is largely traceable to low
levels of student interest. This contributes to small class sizes and under-
utilization of staff and workshop facilities. In general, the available facili-
ties could handle many more trainees without incurring substantial
additional costs.
Community Colleges
Compared with the Ministry of Education and the VTC, community col-
leges, which tend not to have links with enterprises, suffer most from a lack
of relevance of the courses offered. As a consequence, program content is
sometimes not well related to employers' actual needs. Because of central
financing and control, the community colleges are not particularly respon-
sive to the needs and requirements of the communities in which they are
located. Another reflection of their lack of flexibility is the narrow special-
izations (95 different specialties) and the rigid length of training (two years).
Shorter programs would be more appropriate. The precipitous decline in
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enrollment suggests a shortage of jobs for graduates with this level of edu-
cation, idle capacity, and unemployment of graduates in general fields.
An overriding issue is the community colleges' lack of a clear purpose
and mandate, which has a definite impact on their effectiveness. Moreover,
the community colleges do not have a suitable governance system. Central
administrative control, particularly over private community colleges, tends
to be excessive.
Reform Priorities
Each part of the VET system (the Ministry of Education, the Vocational
'rraining Corporation, and the community colleges) operates independently
'with little direction from economic development priorities. A capacity needs
to be developed to analyze the human resource implications of overall eco-
nomic strategies and convert these implications into guidelines for VET
,development. A prudent approach would be to take the system as a whole
and examine the best way to improve it, starting with external efficiency
(links with the world of work), internal efficiency (especially flexibility),
and scope (coverage).
Links and Feedback
The links between training suppliers, particularly the Ministry of Educa-
tion, and employers are not well established and therefore the training pro-
grams are often unsuitable. The Ministry of Education vocational schools
and the community colleges lack adequate knowledge about the employ-
ment performance of their graduates. Sporadic and incomplete efforts at
tracer studies should be replaced with more efficient instruments and tech-
nical support.
A 1990 survey examined employers' views on factors affecting the pro-
ductivity and profitability of their operations, the sources and methods
of labor recruitment, the provision of on-the-job training, the use of out-
side skill development providers, and the VET system. Most firms (81
percent) indicated that they provided some sort of on-the-job training,
and just over 50 percent indicated that they had difficulties finding new
recruits with specific skills. Half of the respondents agreed with the fol-
lowing statement: "When hiring a new employee, I do not really want a
worker who is already trained. Just give me people who are motivated
and disciplined, and I will teach them what I want them to know." This
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reflects the fragmented nature of small Jordanian industries, which pos-
sess unstandardized equipment or production processes that require hands-
on practice with internal supervision. Only 40 percent of respondents
felt that the VTC could handle internal training, and only 6 percent of
firms reported sending their employees to the VTC for outside training.
Notwithstanding these responses, most firms seemed to be favorably dis-
posed toward vocational training programs and rated them "rather good,"
and 60 percent rated vocational graduates "much better" than their other
employees. Practically all firms (94 percent) agreed that the vocational
system needed to have more contacts with employers.
Flexibility
Rigidities appear in the supply response to labor market information. Pro-
grams almost invariably are of fixed length, and their content tends to be-
come and remain out of date. The procedures currently in place mean that
content updating is slow. Students sometimes specialize too early, thereby
reducing their chances for occupational mobility, and few alternatives exist
for continuing advanced skill training. In addition, students cannot move
easily from a vocational track to an academic path that leads to postsecondary
education.
Coverage
Plans for expanding vocational education and training may go too far and
waste resources. This includes the year 2000 goal of offering comprehen-
sive or applied VET to 50 percent of male and 35 percent of female general-
school graduates. Vocational training is expensive and should be limited to
areas that offer immediate employment prospects. The provision of private
VET needs to be encouraged.
Important areas of reform include improving the links between VET
and employers, increasing the flexibility of the system, and deciding when
and how to expand calls for better management practices to improve coor-
dination, which is currently lacking. The various training suppliers lack
incentives to adjust their offerings in relation to those of other suppliers.
This results in high costs, failure to realize economies of scale, and lack of
distinct mandates for the different parts of the system.
The lack of coordination reduces the scope for rationalization. One of
the most important issues is the need to rationalize the provision of VET
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and eliminate wasteful duplication. There is a need to re-examine the ratio-
nale for maintaining two separate VET administrations. The current sys-
tem fragments scarce management, staff, physical resources, and financial
resources. Community colleges also need rationalization. Their purposes,
functions, and mandate should be re-evaluated and made distinct from
vocational training (Association of Canadian Community College 1996).
.Instructors
Arguably the factor contributing the most to the low or mediocre quality
of instruction is workshop instructors' lack of work experience. Instructors
frequently have not mastered the crafts they teach, and they lack role mod-
els with high standards. Training tends to be monopolized by academic
teachers. Mechanisms to rectify the situation by means of instructor up-
grading and on-the-job training are lacking at present.
Materials and Equipment
Quality is also compromised by the lack of sufficient and updated materi-
als and equipment. Pedagogical materials are in short supply. Serious, of-
ten localized, problems relate to equipment provision: too many machines
are broken, have parts missing, or are inaccurate. This problem stems in
part from incapable instructors, inadequately trained in the proper use and
repair of equipment. The problem also is often attributable to overstretched
public funding.
The Training and Employment Support Fund
In 1998 the government, as part of its Social Productivity Program, intro-
duced the Training and Employment Support Fund. Its focus is on short-
term training for the unemployed. An addition to the system of vocational
schools, training centers, and community colleges, the fund has the follow-
ing objectives: to create an effective system of short-term training (training
that lasts for less than six months and is relevant to the specific needs of
employers) and to increase competition in the supply of skills (competi-
tion currently dominated by the public sector). The means to achieve these
goals is competitive funding for "contract-based or output-based" training.
Training is envisioned as a continuation of education. Given the com-
mendable educational attainment of Jordanians, training should play a
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complementary role. Since most workers are well educated, training can
provide them with the necessary specific skills that would make them em-
ployable. The training fund has the potential to be used as a guide for long-
run reforms.
The training fund is unlikely to provide a quick fix to the massive un-
employment problem and the problems of underemployment and hidden
unemployment. Neither will it address the main causes of unemployment:
Jordan's rapidly growing population and small economic base. It can, how-
ever, contribute positively by reducing the supply price of youth to em-
ployers and increasing productivity. These changes in the supply curve and
demand curve should increase employment.
Explicit estimates of the quantitative impact of a training fund on em-
ployment in the short run are lacking. (The impact may not be that much
given the current underutilization of existing employees.) If it succeeds,
the training fund could pave the way for the government to reduce the
direct provision of training and increase the use of competitive funds for
that purpose. At present, public providers of training have guaranteed allo-
cations from the budget and are expanding. They have few incentives to
adapt to the changing needs of employers despite the high unemployment
rates among their graduates. If funding for training is awarded on a con-
tract basis (that is, competitively and subject to achieving certain targets
prescribed by the government that reflect the labor market), the relevance
of publicly offered programs and courses will increase. If administration
costs are kept under control, budgetary savings could result.
The proposed fund will last for three years. It is expected that this would
be sufficient time to assess the desirability of such an intervention empiri-
cally through tracer surveys and impact evaluations. Although a training
fund should not be seen as a short-term solution to the continuing prob-
lem of unemployment, it can contribute to reduction in unemployment
among the groups it targets. Its greatest potential is to evolve into a com-
prehensive funding mechanism for training that can increase the effective-
ness and efficiency of public social spending in this area of human resource
development.
Conclusions
Although Jordan has an adequate education and training system, what is
now required is consolidation and selective expansion. The government's
role is important, as the commendable record of Jordan's human resources
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development has shown. However, its role need not be in the form of direct
provider. This chapter has emphasized publicly provided training because
little is known about what is happening in the private sector. The extent of
private sector involvement needs to be known not only to improve plan-
ning of public sector provision, but also to ensure that the private sector
provides what it is supposed to deliver. The recent growth of private uni-
versities has been criticized on the grounds that they offer little and make
money out of the ignorance of students and parents. To correct this, pri-
vate institutions should be transparently licensed and accredited on a level
playing field with public institutions. They also should not be crowded out
by the public sector but encouraged to expand by providing financial in-
centives through credit and scholarship programs.
Within the public training sector, more effective management of VET
should be sought through three principal means of policy coordination:
rationalization of VET programs at the secondary level, decentralization,
and improved resource management. In this respect, a VET policy council
should be established with sufficient analytical capacity and authority to
coordinate and direct the system toward priority areas and to avoid over-
lapping responsibilities. In addition, more authority and responsibility
should be delegated to managers of training institutions. Managers should
have the freedom to adjust training content to local requirements, and they
should be able to retain and use earnings from their own activities and
production.
Given the already high educational and skills attainment of Jordanians,
the importance of short training programs (including, for example, one-
year diploma programs in community colleges) cannot be understated. Such
additional courses and qualifications should enable graduates of secondary
education and second-level vocational training to enter postsecondary stud-
ies. VET system expansion should be guided by economic considerations
to minimize the amount of money spent to train people who will be unable
to find employment. The administrative streamlining of 1 6-year-olds into
general or vocational tracks should be abandoned. Individual students and
their families should be able to choose their course of study.
Self-employment in small business can play an important role in job
creation, and the concepts and basic requirements of entrepreneurship
should be introduced into VET programs. Programs on preparing business
plans should be offered to returning VET trainees who have acquired work
experience, and they should also have access to credit programs for busi-
ness start-ups.
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To adjust training supply to demand, it is helpful to know what hap-
pened to the graduates of VET institutions. The systematic collection of
information about graduates' performance in the labor market should be
a major responsibility of all training institutions, and the central authori-
ties should provide technical guidance and simplified instruments for
this purpose.
The quality of training instructors and their ability to teach modern
curricula should be addressed as well. It is always tempting to argue that
the government should spend more to bring these two aspects of training
in line with the requirements of a fast-moving economy. However, the ba-
sic issue is how to accomplish this. One suggestion is to change the regula-
tions to permit the hiring of part-time instructors from enterprises with
the work experience needed to improve the standards of practical teaching.
It also might be useful to reward public training institutions that achieve
commonly agreed objectives and to make the system of remuneration more
output based.
Notes
1. In support of this argument, we note that 40,000 Jordanians in 1995 studied
at universities abroad. Admission to public universities in Jordan is based only in
part on academic achievement, and admissions are greatly affected by various quotas.
2. Note that Jordan has a high dependency ratio, as the low participation rate
suggests. The average family of 7 members typically has no more than 1.5 workers.
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West Bank and
Gaza Strip
FRED FLUITMAN
THE WEST BANK, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza
Strip are Palestinian territories that have been occupied by Israel since the
Israeli-Arab War of 1967. Following the Middle East peace process in 1993,
limited self-rule by a Palestinian Authority in West Bank and Gaza was
agreed upon. The Palestinian Authority has, in accordance with what was
agreed, assumed responsibility in the autonomous areas of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, for labor and social welfare, health, education (includ-
ing training) and culture, tourism, agriculture, energy, statistics, and taxa-
tion. Things are far from settled, however, and the future is extremely
uncertain. Important spheres of jurisdiction have so far remained under
Israeli control, notably external security, foreign affairs, and exports and
imports. Opponents of the peace process have repeatedly succeeded in frus-
trating it by resorting to violence. As a result, punitive measures have been
taken, which, in turn, have worsened the situation on the ground.
The economy of the occupied territories is essentially underdeveloped
and fragile, vulnerable to unpredictable external shocks and subject to
massive constraints. Agriculture (mostly small-scale, low-tech, and family-
based) contributed between 25 and 35 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1995, and it remains the major productive sector. However, ag-
ricultural development is hampered by problems of access to land, water,
and markets. Manufacturing (around 8 percent of GDP) has remained
based in small-scale enterprises: 90 percent of enterprises have fewer than
10 workers and 72 percent have fewer than 5 workers. The domestic con-
struction sector (13 to 17 percent of GDP in 1995) depends largely on
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savings from income earned in Israel-most of it by construction workers.
However, there has been a "building boom" in parts of the territories since
the beginning of the peace process.
More than 85 percent of the territories' foreign trade is with Israel. A
structural deficit on the balance of goods and a surplus on account of ser-
vices, mostly wages earned in Israel, illustrate the dependence of the terri-
tories on the Israeli economy. Following a major drop in merchandise
imports from Israel in 1988, at the start of the intifada, the value of such
.imports increased rapidly to reach US$1,340 million in 1995, according
ito the Bank of Israel. Exports of goods to Israel, in contrast, never recov-
ered from their collapse in 1988-89; they were worth only US$205 mil-
lion in 1995. Since Palestinians of the territories are increasingly prevented
from working "across the green line," the ever-growing deficit on account
of goods is no longer largely made up for by wages earned in Israel. Annual
wage receipts by Palestinian workers in Israel plummeted from a record
US$930 million in 1992 to US$252 million in 1995.
Data provided by the Israeli Bureau of Statistics suggest that economic
growth in the territories has been low since 1987. Per capita gross national
product reached almost US$2,500 in the West Bank (21 percent from work
in Israel) and US$1,600 in Gaza (29 percent from work in Israel) in 1992.
However, average incomes have collapsed since then. By 1995 the territo-
ries' gross national product had decreased by close to 10 percent per capita
as a result of a 52 percent reduction in workers' remittances. Growth has
not picked up substantially since.
The Labor Market
'There are no reliable census data about the population of the occupied
rerritories. According to estimates made by the Palestinian Central Bureau
of Statistics, the territories had a Palestinian population of almost 2.5 mil-
lion by the end of 1995, 53 percent of them 15 years of age or older. By
1992 there were, in addition to those in the territories, around 1 million
Palestinian refugees in Jordan and around 300,000 each in Syria and Leba-
non. In total, an estimated 3.5 million Palestinians lived outside the West
Bank and Gaza in 1995.
The first labor force survey undertaken by the Palestinian Central Bu-
reau of Statistics suggests a 1995 labor force participation rate of 39 per-
cent for the territories as a whole (PCBS 1996). With an estimated 1.3
million Palestinians 15 years of age and older, the size of the labor force was
452 LOW-GROWTH ECONOMIES
TABLE 17-1
Labor Force Participation, by Gender, 1995
(percentage of the population age 15 and older)
Location Male Female Total
West Bank 68.6 12.8 40.6
Gaza Strip 62.8 7.6 35.4
Both territories 66.9 11.2 39.0
Source: PCBS (1996).
around half a million. Labor force participation was found to be higher in
the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip and significantly lower for women,
particularly so in Gaza (table 17-1). Participation rates were particularly
low (14 percent) for those without education and relatively high (63 per-
cent) for those who had completed more than 12 years in school.
With a labor force growing at an annual rate of between 3 and 4 per-
cent, 20,000 new job seekers (net) enter the market every year. If the gov-
ernment were to decide to do something for the tens of thousands of
unemployed persons, it would have to identify, if not create, 30,000 or
perhaps 40,000 new jobs year after year for years to come-a daunting
challenge.
Employment in the Occupied Territories and Israel
Less than half of the labor force are wage employees; the others are mostly
self-employed in agriculture or in small shops. There are also sizable num-
bers of unpaid family workers and unemployed people. Many of the people
who work for wages depend on jobs in Israel. While job growth within the
territories has been remarkable in recent years, it could not entirely make
up for a massive decline in employment of Palestinians in Israel.
The growth of employment within the territories after 1992 has cer-
tainly been significant, but it is unlikely to continue at current rates. Most
of the new jobs were associated with the establishment of a Palestinian
public service and with a building boom. In view of budget constraints
facing the Palestinian Authority, doubts are justified about any further in-
crease in the number of public servants, estimated in 1994 at around 65,000.
Moreover, the construction sector is not expected to contribute to further
large-scale job growth. New and lasting jobs created as a result of massive
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external investments (for example, in the much talked about industrial parks)
have yet to materialize and may not unless a fundamental climate change
occurs. Employment growth within the territories is most severely com-
promised by repeated and prolonged closures and other punitive measures
restricting or preventing, at great expense, the movement of people and
produce across and inside the green line. Imports of essential inputs, in-
cluding flour and fuel, are frequently halted, and exports are prevented
from leaving. As production falters, so does consumption, and incomes
and jobs evaporate.
For more than 25 years, tens of thousands of Palestinians (at times more
than 40 percent of the labor force, mainly construction workers and farm
hands) have been working in Israel because there were no jobs for them
within the occupied territories. In 1992, on normal days, almost 120,000
registered workers and-in spite of strict controls-an estimated 30,000
to 40,000 unregistered workers crossed the green line to earn a living. These
days are over, or so it appears. For a long time there had been periods
during which the borders were closed for all or some, usually but not al-
ways in the wake of terrorist activities. But closure became the rule rather
than the exception in March 1993. Since that time the maximum numbers
allowed back in have decreased. Consider the case in Gaza. Although an
average of 43,000 daily workers came to work in Israel in 1992, this num-
ber had declined to below 12,000 by 1996. In order to make up for the
many Palestinian workers prevented from coming to their jobs, Israeli em-
ployers have been steadily replacing them with foreigners. By the end of
1995, more than 70,000 foreign contract workers were legally employed in
Israel, most of them construction workers from Rumania, Thailand, Tur-
key, and China.
Unemployment in the Occupied Territories
Unemployment and underemployment have become serious problems. In
1993-94 unemployment varied between 17 and 33 percent in Gaza and
between 11 and 30 percent in the West Bank, depending on whether work-
ers had access to jobs in Israel (ILO 1995, p. 15). According to a Septem-
ber-October 1995 survey by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,
18 percent of the labor force of the occupied territories was unemployed-
that is, 14 percent in the West Bank and 29 percent in the Gaza Strip
(PCBS 1996). Results of the second round of the Labor Force Survey (April/
May 1996) suggest a dramatic surge in unemployment to 29 percent (24
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percent in the West Bank and a record 39 percent in the Gaza Strip). These
estimates imply that unemployment is now likely to affect more than
140,000 Palestinian workers and their families.
The Education and Training System
In the West Bank compulsory basic schooling lasts ten years; after that
students can opt for two years of secondary education, either general (with
a scientific track and a literary track) or vocational. In Gaza compulsory
education consists of six years of elementary schooling plus three years of
preparatory schooling; secondary schools (general only) last three years.
Since the Palestinian Authority assumed control of the education sector in
1994, steps have been taken to unify the system. The first secondary school
examination (Tawjihi) under Palestinian supervision took place at the end
of the 1994-95 school year. Well over half a million Palestinian children,
48 percent of them girls, received basic education in the territories in 1994-
95 (table 17-2). There were 45,359 pupils (45 percent female) in second-
ary schools, including a small proportion in vocational secondary schools.
Almost all of secondary education is provided by the authority.
Enrollments in vocational education are small compared with general
education enrollments. The Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher
Education reports that there were 18 vocational schools in the West Bank
and Gaza in 1995. These included vocational (or industrial) secondary
schools following the Jordanian curriculum, all of them in the West Bank,
as well as certain commercial, agricultural, and nursing schools. Ten of
TABLE 17-2
Enrollments in Basic and Secondary Education, 1994-95
Level of education West Bank Gaza Strip Total
Basic education 355,269 217,260 572,529
Government 280,145 97,435 377,580
UN Refugee Welfare Association 43,969 117,363 161,332
Private 31,155 2,462 33,617
Secondary education 27,678 17,661 45,339
Government 24,091 17,026 41,117
Private 3,587 635 4,222
Source: PCBS (1995).
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TABLE 17-3
Vocational Secondary School Enrollments, by Gender, 1995
School type and specialization Male Female Total
Vocational secondary schools 1,233 235 1,468
Commercial 15 220 235
Agricultural 35 - 35
Industrial 1,162 - 1,162
Nursing 21 15 36
-Not available.
Source: PCBS (1995).
these schools were said to be governmental; the others included schools
run by the Arab Development Society, the Salesian Brothers, and the
Lutheran Church. According to the Education Statistics Yearbook (PCBS
1995), fewer than 1,300 students, mostly men, were enrolled in vocational
secondary schools in 1995 (table 17-3); only 77 of these students went to
such schools in Gaza. Upon completing the two-year program, about half
of which is devoted to practical work, graduates may seek employment or
pursue their education at the tertiary level in one of 17 community colleges
that offer two-year technician-level courses. Graduates of general second-
ary schools may also enter these colleges.
Four of these community (or technical) colleges were administered by
the Ministry of Education, 3 of them were with the United Nations Refu-
gee Welfare Association, and 10 were private institutions. Together they
enrolled 4,110 students, more than half women, and two out of three in
the 19-to-21-year-old age bracket. Graduates of community colleges could,
in principle, continue their education at a university.
In 1995 there were eight universities in the occupied territories: six in
the West Bank (including an open university) and two in Gaza. Between
1992 and 1995, enrollments almost doubled to reach about 30,000 stu-
dents; almost 45 percent of these students were women. A large share of the
university students (27 percent) had opted to study education; other ap-
parently attractive specializations were arts and letters (17 percent), science
and technology (16 percent), economics and business (16 percent), and
religious studies (12 percent).
In 1994, 21 vocational training centers (with an enrollment of 4,000)
trained school leavers to become semiskilled or skilled workers. Since 1995
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TABLE 17-4
Enrollments in the Training Centers of the Ministry of Labor,
by Gender, 1994
Trade category Male Female Total
Construction trades 646 19 665
Automotive repair 438 - 438
Metal trades 339 - 339
Woodwork 127 - 127
Electrical/refrigeration/radio/television 208 - 208
Tailoring 43 592 635
Hairdressing - 222 222
Bookkeeping/word processing 2 227 227
Total 1,801 1,060 2,861
- Not available.
Source: Ministry of Labor (1996).
the Palestinian Ministry of Labor has been responsible for 13 of these cen-
ters (namely, the ones set up and previously administered by Israeli au-
thorities, primarily to prepare Palestinian workers for jobs available in Israel).
These centers continue to offer short-term courses (5 to 12 months) in 24
occupations; around 75 percent of the time is devoted to practical work
and 25 percent to theoretical training. Trainees must be at least 16 years of
age and, depending on the course, have completed 6 to 10 years of basic
education. In fact, many of the trainees are school dropouts. Fewer than
3,000 students were enrolled in the centers under the Ministry of Labor in
1994 (table 17-4).
Most of the women were enrolled in sewing classes; the remainder were
in hairdressing or secretarial courses. Most of the men took courses related
to either motor vehicle repair or the construction sector. The Ministry of
Labor has taken steps to develop an "efficient, effective, and relevant na-
tional vocational training system" (Ministry of Labor 1996), including a
review of these institutions. Its evaluation report alludes to a range of weak-
nesses with regard to coverage, curriculum, training methods, the qualifi-
cations of trainers, the state of facilities and equipment, and links with the
world of work. The report points out that 63 percent of operating expenses
in running these training centers was spent on salaries and 19 percent on
trainee stipends. Thus less than 20 percent of operating expenses got spent
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on teaching and learning materials. Costs per course varied between US$500
and US$1,300 per student per year. Extra-budgetary resources, notably
funds granted by external donor agencies, paid for special projects, includ-
ing the "expert team on vocational training" that assists the directorate in
formulating policy, in developing curricula, and in training staff.
In addition to the Ministry of Labor, the United Nations Refugee Wel-
fare Association is providing vocational training in two large centers-one
in Kalandia, just North of Jerusalem, and one in Gaza. In the mid-1990s
the combined enrollment in both schools was about 1,100 students. The
United Nations Refugee Welfare Association courses last two years; Stu-
dents begin them after completion of basic education. Additional voca-
tional training is provided in six private centers with an estimated enrollment
of around 500 trainees. Private centers are operated by the Al Bir Society,
the Young Men's Christian Association, and the Near East Council of
Churches; most of their courses last three years. Details concerning their
operations and costs are unknown by the Ministry of Labor.
A fairly extensive informal network of nongovernmental organizations
in the occupied territories offers additional opportunities for adults to ac-
quire or improve certain skills. Such nonformal education and training
was provided in 1994 to 13,898 students enrolled in 426 courses offered in
108 "cultural centers" (PCBS 1995). Two-thirds of the students were 19
years of age or older; almost half of the students were women. One-third of
all courses were computer courses. Little information is known about the
costs of training in these institutions.
The Palestinian training system is small. Presumably, most workers who
need specific skills acquire them on the job-that is, by copying others or
by trial and error-rather than as a result of structured learning. However,
there is little data concerning organized training or skill upgrading by Pal-
estinian employers for their employees. It may be assumed that private
sector establishments in the territories do not provide much training ei-
ther, given the nature and size distribution of enterprises and the fact, well-
established elsewhere, that small enterprises do not usually train their
workers.
Reform of Vocational Education and Training
Soon after being established in the mid- 1990s, the Ministry of Labor took
an active interest in vocational training. The ministry explicitly recognized
the weaknesses of the system it had inherited and "the importance of sup-
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porting and developing the system of vocational preparation . . . in par-
ticular the importance of defining clear objectives and establishing the nec-
essary bodies." It stressed the urgent need for a "common vision of the
priorities for developing the vocational training system" (Ministry of La-
bor 1996). It proposed (a) enhancing coordination among vocational edu-
cation and training providers, (b) involving industry in the design of training
policies, in the assessment of training needs, and in the provision of train-
ing, and (c) creating what is referred to as a "catalyst." This would be a
body equipped to ensure the continuous adjustment and development of
the training system by being aware of the labor market and of new training
methods, and by training trainers and training managers.
To achieve its overall objective of developing an "efficient, effective, rel-
evant, and sustainable" training system, the ministry decided to attach an
expert team to its General Directorate for Vocational Training. It also set
up the Advisory Council on Vocational Training, which has representatives
of the ministries of Labor and Education and of the United Nations Refu-
gee Welfare Association. There are additional seats for other ministries, for
representatives of private training providers, for representatives of employ-
ers' and workers' organizations, and for the head of the expert team. The
council advises the Ministry of Labor on training policies and on legisla-
tion or other forms of regulation. It coordinates all those involved in voca-
tional training, and it directs and reviews the work of the expert team.
The technical arm of the Advisory Council, the expert team is a semiau-
tonomous body based in the Ministry of Labor and financially supported
by an external donor. Its objectives are to foster a flexible, demand-driven,
and sustainable Palestinian training system, to become a platform for a
continuous exchange of information and experience, and to develop the
human and material resources for the new training system. The team is
involved in data collection and policy analysis, curriculum development,
and the training of trainers and training system managers.
In its efforts to develop a training policy framework, the team addressed
numerous issues, such as the Palestinian economy and labor market, alter-
native modes of skill development, the division of training responsibilities,
and the financing of training. A Palestinian training system, according to
the team's recommendations, should
* Handle (in several years) up to 30 percent of the relevant age group
* Focus on the training needs of the local market
* Be as flexible as possible and modular in form
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* Serve adults as well as youngsters
* Provide basic training as well as skills upgrading and retraining
opportunities
* Lead to an occupational certificate and regained access to the general
education system
* Ask those who can afford to pay for their training to do so.
At this stage the government should provide training in all fields, but
particularly in strategic areas, and its role should move gradually toward
policy formulation, curriculum development, training of trainers, and the
setting of standards and certification. With regard to vocational training
and vocational education, there is simply no one right system. It would be
wrong to phase out completely any of the existing systems at this time.
Establishing multipurpose training schools or centers might be an excel-
lent way of experimenting with methods to find a harmonious combina-
tion (Ministry of Labor 1996).
The Ministry of Labor and its expert team have begun to implement a
comprehensive plan of action to ensure the transition to a new Palestinian
training system. The plan presents a series of distinct but related donor-
funded projects covering the expansion of the system, administration, staff
development, curriculum development, financial planning, the upgrading
of certain facilities, and the improvement of links with industry.
Constraints to Reform
Reforming training policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, because of
their unique circumstances, is particularly difficult. Having decided that
such constraints are no excuse for inaction, Palestinian authorities have
embarked upon reforms that promise to be gradual but substantive and
innovative. Success is likely to depend on the ability to obtain adequate
information and to reach goals that are clearly stated and shared.
In 1995 no more than 5 percent of the relevant age group had ever been
enrolled in formal VET programs. As stated above, the Ministry of Labor
is striving for 30 percent. Whether the system will be able to attract signifi-
cantly more students is another matter, especially given its current internal
and external efficiency. Concerns about dilapidated facilities, outdated cur-
ricula, obsolete or unavailable equipment, and unqualified trainers are wide-
spread. The Young Men's Christian Association conducted a tracer study of
about 25 percent of the 1992 graduates of all West Bank VET institutions.
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This study suggested that half of them found work in their field of study, 7
percent in related fields, 22 percent in unrelated occupations; 20 percent
were unemployed. In Palestinian society more young people are enrolled in
Palestinian universities than in VET programs. There is a clear preference
for an academic education. Finally, and probably most importantly, the
issue of financing a significant increase in VET enrollments has to be care-
fully studied. This will prove to be a daunting task particularly because of
the lack of information on unit costs of training.
However small, the Palestinian training system is a "patchwork of for-
mats and sponsors" (de Moura Castro 1994). Although the Advisory Council
is intended to coordinate vocational education and training activities, nu-
merous actors, including foreign donors, have entered the scene, each with
its own view of what is to be done and how. There may be certain benefits
in diversity, but it will be important for the Advisory Council to manage
these often conflicting priorities.
A final issue to be considered concerns training providers' resistance to
change in the occupied territories. Most of these providers have been doing
an admirable job for years in difficult circumstances; now that the circum-
stances are supposed to get better, they should not be expected to unques-
tioningly abide by the directives of a new and largely inexperienced training
authority. In other words, the willingness of certain key actors to play their
part may be compromised either by their particular terms of reference or
by their divergent views on the nature of change.
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PARTJ V Two Special Studies
DURING THE PAST TWO decades Australia and Germany
have strengthened their roles as international advocates of reform of voca-
tional education and training (VET). Part IV examines how their experi-
ences can provide useful lessons for low- and middle-income countries.
VET policies in Australia and Germany have increased the links be-
tween education and employment, a challenge preoccupying policymakers
in all countries. In countries with rapidly growing economies, this preoc-
cupation stems from the concern that demand for skilled workers will out-
strip supply. In countries where economic growth is slow, the concern may
arise because of growing unemployment among youth. In both cases the
result may be the same: efforts by policymakers to vocationalize the cur-
riculum, or involve employers in schooling decisions, or increase pre-em-
ployment training, or create incentives for employers to participate in
apprenticeship training. These actions have been the hallmark of Australia's
reforms and Germany's dual system in the past two decades.
Few countries have pursued reform of vocational education and train-
:ing as persistently as Australia. After a decade of significant expansion of
VET, Australian policymakers realized that expansion by itself was not a
solution: the country needed to confront institutional issues that were in-
hibiting progress. Typically, countries seeking to reform vocational educa-
Ltion and training have a VET tradition that is focused strongly on the
public sector. Australia's experience shows that a public sector system, by
iitself, will eventually prove inadequate.
It is reasonable to ask what relevance the experience of a rich country
like Australia can have for developing countries or countries in transition
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to a market economy. The answer is that the issues Australia faced were not
unique, and its experience confirms that these problems are not easily re-
solved. The Australian experience highlights the importance of basing re-
form on sound institutions.
With the establishment of the Australian National Training Authority,
the government sought to engage employers and the unions, not as advi-
sors, but as integral parts of the management of the VET system. Coun-
tries that have depended on the public sector will find it difficult to adopt
such an approach, but it is necessary if they are to get full value for their
VET investments. Australia's experience also demonstrates how difficult it
is to forge relevant links between the VET system and the labor market.
The solution in Australia was the establishment of a single national minis-
try encompassing employment, education, and training. By joining all the
players in one institution, Australia was able to resolve competing priori-
ties more effectively.
For market forces to work, however, countries must do more than cre-
ate an institutional framework that involves industry. Financial mecha-
nisms that support the central role of employers must be put in place as
well. The chapter on Germany provides more evidence in favor of this
argument. In Germany the organization and control of vocational educa-
tion and training are left to the body that pays for the instruction: state and
local governments pay for and control relatively general skills that are ac-
quired in school, and employers pay for and determine job-specific train-
ing acquired in the workplace. This is the so-called dual system.
It is unrealistic to expect a system that has matured in a highly industri-
alized country with strong workers' and employers' unions and well-devel-
oped regulatory and administrative mechanisms to be readily adaptable to
countries lacking these attributes. However, such countries can learn gen-
eral lessons from Germany's apprenticeship experience. The chapter on
Germany summarizes the main features of the VET system, analyzes its
institutional and financial prerequisites, and explains which aspects are
applicable in low- and middle-income countries and which are likely to be
prohibitively costly. Differences in the sectoral and size distribution of firms
and high costs may pose insurmountable obstacles to developing countries
eager to import the dual system, but its fundamental attributes are relevant
across a broad socioeconomic spectrum.
Efforts by developing countries to adopt Germany's system are often
characterized by governments, not employers, taking the lead in organizing
and financing vocational training. Germany introduced the vocational edu-
TWO SPECIAL STUDIES 463
cation component of its VET system many years after the vocational train-
ing part had been formalized, a sequence that is often reversed in develop-
ing countries. Participation in the German dual system is voluntary; coercive
measures, such as mandated minimum training requirements or levies, are
inconsistent with the German model. Finally, the dual system is not cheap
in any setting. It is likely that the dual system will be an expensive way to
divert students in developing countries from pursuing higher education.

I , Australia
J ALAN ABRAHART AND ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS
FEW COUNTRIES HAVE PURSUED the reform of vocational
education and training (VET) as persistently as Australia. Change has been
a constant theme for more than 20 years. A decade of significant expansion
of VET did not yield the desired results. The country then confronted
deep-rooted institutional issues that were inhibiting progress toward im-
proved outcomes. As Australia's experience shows, no quick fixes are avail-
able. Reform must adapt as a country's economic, industrial, political, and
social circumstances change. Understanding the institutional framework
in which VET is set is vitally important. Institutional impediments need to
be confronted no matter how difficult they are to overcome, if progress is
to be made.
Labor Market
By any measure Australia is wealthy. Earlier this century that wealth was
based on agricultural products, especially the wool industry. The country
has always had a reasonably significant manufacturing sector, which it built
up during the 1950s and 1960s, largely behind tariff walls. Following the
oil crisis in the mid-1970s, growth in the gross domestic product fell, and
unemployment, which had rarely surpassed 2 percent, rose to more than 6
percent. This problem persisted. Unemployment rates in 1997 reached more
than 8 percent.
Table 18-1 shows the growth of employment in industry between 1976
and 1994, and the Australian government's assessment in 1995 of its pros-
465
466 TWO SPECIAL STUDIES
TABLE 18-1
Average Annual Growth of Industrial Employment,
Selected Years, 1976-2005
(percent)
Actual Projected
Industry 1976-86 1987-94 1995-2005
Agriculture 0.8 -0.4 2.5
Mining 2.1 -1.1 0.0
Manufacturing -1.2 0.2 0.1
Electricity, gas, and water 3.1 -4.8 -2.3
Construction 0.3 2.0 2.4
Wholesale and retail 2.0 n.a. n.a.
Wholesale n.a. 1.7 4.0
Retail n.a. 2.4 3.2
Transport and storage 2.2 -0.5 -0.4
Communication 2.4 -1.5 3.3
Financial and business services 4.5 n.a. n.a.
Finance n.a. 0.4 3.7
Property n.a. 5.4 1.2
Public administration 1.7 1.1 2.7
Community services 3.7 n.a. n.a.
Education n.a. 2.1 2.6
Health n.a. 3.1 2.7
Recreation, personal, and other services 2.2 n.a. n.a.
Recreation n.a. 4.6 0.6
Personal services n.a. 3.2 2.9
Accommodation and restaurants n.a. 5.3 4.0
Total employment 1.6 1.7 2.2
n.a. Not available.
Source: Actual: ABS (various issues); projections: Government of Australia (1995).
pects in the immediate future. Employment in agriculture, utilities (gas,
electricity, water), transport, and storage declined, and this decline may
well continue. Manufacturing employment remained more or less stable in
absolute numbers, although its share declined given the overall increase in
the level of employment. The changes have been associated with the de-
cline in traditional job opportunities for male, blue-collar, full-time work-
ers. New jobs have been created largely in the services sector.
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The projected growth rate of the labor force suggests average growth of
only 1.6 percent per year, compared with the previous rate of 2 percent
(Government of Australia 1995). The decline will be the result of expected
reductions in the rate of natural increase of the population, in the level of
immigration, and in changes to the population's age structure. As has been
the case for many years, newly created jobs will be more suitable for new
entrants to the labor force (not only young people but mature women in
particular) than for those who have been working for some time. Women
are expected to increase their share in the labor force, increasing the trend
toward part-time work and other flexible arrangements, with significant
consequences for the composition of the labor force. Table 18-2 shows
changes to the gender composition of the labor force and the incidence of
f'ull-time and part-time work. Note that an additional factor contributing
to flexibility is the growth in self-employment. Between 1978 and 1995
the number of self-employed persons rose from 550,000 to 820,000, an
increase of 50 percent
TABLE 18-2
Structure of the Labor Force, by Gender, Selected Years, 1978-2005
(percent)
Gender of employee Actual Projected
and duration ofjob 1978 1986 1994 2005
WVomen
Full-time 24 25 25 27
l'arr-time 12 15 17 19
Total 36 40 42 46
Men
Full-time 60 56 52 47
Part-time 3 4 6 7
Total 64 60 58 54
Employee of either gender
Full-time 84 81 76 74
rPart-time 16 19 24 26
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: Figures subject to rounding.
Source: Actual: ABS (various issues); projections: Government of Australia (1995).
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Changes in the demand for goods and services are also expected to affect
future employment and future training needs. Growth is expected to be
strongest in service sector industries such as finance, health, personal ser-
vices, retail, and tourism. Employment in manufacturing is unlikely to
grow much, or may even decline as the industry attempts to improve its
international competitiveness through productivity gains and the resultant
cutbacks in jobs. Other industrial sectors, such as electricity, gas, and wa-
ter, will also attempt to increase their efficiency through reforms that will
result in further adjustments in employment levels.
Whether Australia will be able to reduce the high level of unemploy-
ment that has persisted for over two decades depends on many factors.
Perhaps the most important will be the economy's ability to make the nec-
essary investment, trade, and financial links that would better integrate
domestic opportunities of a relatively small economy with international
economic conditions. The response of the VET system is also a critical
factor. In the following sections we review this system and derive the main
lessons of Australia's experience with reforms.
The Institutional Context of VET
The VET system is firmly embedded in two institutional frameworks-
the government framework and the industrial relations framework. Each
had a profound effect on the way the system was established and devel-
oped, and each gives rise to issues that have dominated the reform process.
The Government Framework
Australia is a federation of states. The constitutional responsibility for edu-
cation and training is vested in state governments. The central element of
VET has long been an apprenticeship system: state governments provide
formal training in technical institutes, and employers provide on-the-job
training. This arrangement typifies what has become widely known as a dual
system, and it has been confined to traditional crafts (journeyman occupa-
tions) in sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, and construction.
Despite its limited constitutional role, the federal government has man-
aged to play a strong role in education and training for many years, par-
ticularly in higher education. This stemmed partly from its responsibility
for providing income support (such as education allowances) and social
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security (pensions and benefits) for the general population, and partly from
its responsibility as the collector of income taxes and the main collector of
corporate taxes. As revenue collector, the federal government has always
sought to influence state policies and programs, usually through income-
sharing arrangements and through providing ad hoc funds to the states for
what the government perceived to be national priorities. In the early 1970s,
the federal government, in an expansionary frame of mind and with the
agreement of the states, took over complete responsibility for financing
and directly administering higher education. In doing so it abolished fees
fir higher education.
Until the mid-I 970s, the federal government's influence in other educa-
tion sectors had been limited. With little involvement by the federal gov-
ernment, states had managed both the school system and the vocational
education system. When the federal government, in the same expansionary
frame of mind, sought to influence the direction of VET, it encountered
problems. The shift in federal and state responsibilities did not to prove to
be as straightforward as it had been for higher education.
The Industrial Relations Framework
The second dominating institutional factor that has shaped the history of
VET is the industrial relations framework. While Australia's federal system
cif government may not be not unique, its industrial relations framework
is. That framework is legalistic and adversarial. The federal government
and all state governments maintain industrial courts intended to manage
the complex, and often contentious, relationship between employers and
trade unions. For example, the courts formalize industrial agreements be-
tween the parties through so-called industrial awards, setting wages and
conditions for employment. The courts must ratify changes to awards, a
process that, in the event of a dispute, frequently involves conciliation or
arbitration.
The apprenticeship system was built into this legal framework from the
outset. Education planners perceived it as a way to train young people, and
adult apprenticeships were not permitted. Wage levels for apprentices were
(lefined in awards just as they were for any other occupational group or
level. Training standards were formalized in the same way. Proposed changes
in training standards or age restrictions thus gave rise to changes in awards,
something that then required ratification by the industrial courts, or con-
ciliation or arbitration if the change was disputed.
470 TWO SPECIAL STUDIES
Despite their interest in establishing adult apprenticeships, employers
for decades were unable to influence the trade unions in this regard. Work-
ers who developed their skills on the job, thereby effectively reaching skilled
occupation status, were unable to convert this ability into a formal qualifi-
cation, which might have considerably enhanced their marketability. Skill
shortages were endemic in Australia for almost 30 years prior to the 1970s.
Obtaining agreements about the duration of training, typically four years,
proved difficult, even as technological advances changed the occupations
covered by the apprenticeship system, and thereby the kind of training
required.
As this chapter shows, some VET reforms introduced in the 1980s, par-
ticularly the traineeship system, have had to be accommodated within the
same framework. This has affected both the speed and shape of reforms.
Compulsory and Postcompulsory Vocational Education
Australia currently has no vocational schools. Until the 1960s, students
interested in apprenticeships or less skilled occupations were usually di-
rected toward what could be described as technical schools. The selection
of students for various secondary school streams was based on academic
achievement, with higher achievers being directed toward general second-
ary schools or, in some states, to more select government schools. During
the 1960s, however, state education authorities abolished streaming and
the distinctions between various secondary schools. Since then they have
maintained a single system. School certificates are now obtained at the end
of year 10, with higher school certificates awarded at the end of year 12.
With the continuing rise in unemployment among young people after
1974, many became concerned about school leavers' lack of work readi-
ness. To overcome this problem, the federal and state governments imple-
mented work experience schemes, introduced curriculum changes, and
allowed some students to attend school and simultaneously participate in
the postcompulsory vocational system. In each case the intent was to re-
spond to industry criticisms of the basic lack of skills among many young
people, especially among those who left school as soon as they were al-
lowed to do so.
At the same time, however, the number of students who left school early
began to decline dramatically. Between 1967 and 1982, retention of stu-
dents to year 12 increased from about 25 percent to about 33 percent,
which was low compared with other countries of the Organization for Eco-
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nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Three effects then com-
bined to bring about substantial increases. First, the federal government
embarked on a series of income-support reforms for young people still in
school and older than 15. Eligibility for these benefits depended on par-
ents' incomes. This reform reduced the cost of education for many young
people who otherwise would have probably dropped out of school. Sec-
ond, public awareness of the returns to education increased sharply. The
public became aware that unemployment among young people was con-
centrated in early school leavers. Third, employers were able to lift their
selection criteria for entry-level occupations, not only for apprenticeships,
but for occupations (for instance, in the retail industry) that had become
major sources of employment for school leavers. Increasingly, those with
education beyond the school certificate took up apprenticeships.
The end result was a steady increase in school retention rates. By 1986
retention rates had risen to 50 percent, and by 1992 they were over 75
percent, more than doubling in less than a decade. This rise had a far greater
impact on reducing the absolute levels of teenage unemployment than had
concurrent labor market interventions on their behalf.
Technical and Further Education Colleges
The major vehicle for postcompulsory vocational education is the system
of technical and further education (TAFE) colleges. They rapidly expanded
between 1975 and 1984 (table 18-3). The TAFE system has not been con-
fined to training apprentices. It has provided training in technician-level
occupations and paraprofessional fields; English language training for im-
migrants; and remedial education for secondary school dropouts, allowing
them to obtain senior secondary school qualifications through the estab-
lished examination system. TAFE colleges also offer adults numerous classes
ranging from remedial courses to hobby courses. Note in table 18-3 the
strong growth in the "other skilled" category, which reflects the increasing
use of these colleges as a means of retraining the unemployed. TAFE col-
leges have always maintained a close association with industry, which in
turn has meant an attachment to the industrial relations system. This at-
tachment has also been forged through the strong unionization of the teach-
ing profession, including in TAFE colleges.
With the dramatic economic changes of the mid- 1970s, the federal gov-
ernment came to believe that industrial change was required and that it
should take the initiative. TAPE became one of its starting points. As the
TABLE 18-3
Enrollments in Technical and Further Education Colleges, 1975-84
(thousands)
Category 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Professional 3.5 4.8 5.7 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.2
Paraprofessional 149.5 156.0 160.4 165.3 176.6 192.6 191.3 195.7 214.7 221.8
Trade 133.0 131.4 142.3 145.0 152.1 159.5 160.4 162.4 164.9 158.8
Other skilled 117.5 140.0 150.2 166.5 173.4 207.8 212.9 208.5 230.2 239.4
Preparatory 96.5 102.1 108.3 117.5 123.8 127.7 151.8 139.7 164.9 174.7
Total 500.0 534.3 566.8 596.7 628.4 690.5 719.2 709.2 777.8 797.9
Source: Government of Australia (1995).
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public sector component of the VET system, it was clearly amenable to
dLirect action by the government. In 1974 the government instituted a re-
view that concluded that TAFE was something of a poor cousin within the
education system. The government chose to begin providing federal funds
dLirectly to the system for capital investment. The funding, however, re-
rnained the lesser part of all of the funding for TAFE, especially when
recurrent costs are taken into account. Most funding continued to come
from state governments.
Labor Market Programs
As unemployment rose after the mid-1970s, particularly among the young,
federal and state governments began spending on ad hoc programs to
provide training courses for the young unemployed. This added yet more
impetus to the expansion of TAFE. Many courses were short and in rela-
tively new fields for TAFE, requiring a flexibility and responsiveness on
the part of TAFE colleges. Their other activities did not ease, and they
found themselves with growing responsibilities as well as growing bud-
gets. The growth in the "other skilled" category in table 18-3 reflects growth
in school-to-work transition programs as well as in retraining programs
for the unemployed.
TAFE colleges were not the only institutions heavily involved in labor
rnarket programs. The federal government began financing other training
providers, including ad hoc community groups, some local governments,
and some voluntary organizations. The number of providers offering
unaccredited, usually short-term, training for unemployed young people
began to increase rapidly.
7Traineeships
The government's review of labor market programs had noted substantial
spending on short-term programs for the unemployed, such as wage subsi-
clies and public works schemes. The government then decided the empha-
sis should be shifted to training. Traineeships did not replace apprenticeships.
Rather, they expanded the concept of a dual system of training into areas
riot covered by apprenticeships. The level of prerequisites and the degree of
skill development for apprenticeships and for traineeships were not the
same. Moreover, the duration of traineeships was much shorter than the
four-year apprenticeships.
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Traineeships were an extremely important initiative, and the reasons for
the federal government's enthusiasm were clear. Many saw traineeships as a
way to break down the inflexibility of the apprenticeship system. The in-
dustrial partners began to talk of training people according to the compe-
tencies required, not simply according to a time schedule. Large occupational
and industrial groupings came within the purview of the system. In main-
taining its historical roots, the apprenticeship system had largely failed to
move into new fields, especially in the services sector, where employment
growth for young people was concentrated. In 1985 the government com-
mitted itself to rapid and significant development of traineeships.
Enterprise Training
Australian employers, in their own right, have always been heavily involved
in training. Apprentices, for example, are trained mostly on the job. They
typically are released by employers for formal training in technical and
further education colleges for only one day a week, though under alterna-
tive arrangements they may be released for a few weeks at a time. Major
employers are accredited to provide much of their own off-the-job as well
as on-the-job training. Indeed, many employers train more than the num-
ber of crafts workers they actually need. Major companies did not cease
this practice unless they began restructuring, a process that usually entailed
substantial reductions in their overall staffing levels.
Employers who accept apprentices take on significant financial and le-
gal commitments. Apprentices are usually indentured to employers for four
years. Although apprenticeships impose obligations on both parties, they
are probably stronger on employers, who are unable to break indentures
without applying for a cancellation through a state-governed apprentice-
ship board. Because of the costs to employers, apprenticeship training is
affected by economic cycles. During the 1982-83 recession, for example,
the number of apprenticeship commencements declined by 27 percent,
and the number of indentures canceled increased by 7 percent.
Employers are also involved in on-the-job-training and skill develop-
ment in general. Studies around 1976 showed that employers sufficiently
trained significant numbers of staff to undertake work in craft occupa-
tions. Nonetheless, these employees lacked credentials and hence were not
formally qualified. This became most apparent in companies that began to
retrench workers, including informally trained skilled crafts workers. State
governments and the industrial partners agreed that ways would need to be
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found to provide qualifications for these workers and accredit this sort of
training in the future.
Employers train in areas not covered by apprenticeships. For example,
they train in entry-level occupations in the service industries. Industries
such as banking and tourism have built up considerable expertise of their
own. They are leaders in determining industry training requirements, and
they push to meet those requirements, either on their own or through co-
operation with training providers.
Financing VET
Employers have traditionally borne most of the costs of training. For ex-
ample, employers pay their apprentices full-time wages, including for peri-
ods of release to TAFE colleges, and they bear many other direct costs. As
already noted, this direct cost to employers made training susceptible to
employers' responses to economic cycles. The federal government's approach
during the period of expansion of TAFE was to provide direct funding for
apprentices. It gave employers wage subsidies and bounties for apprentice
commencements, and it fostered group apprenticeship schemes. In addi-
tion, a large part of the administrative costs was picked up by the federal
government. The government's objectives were to address two concerns:
maintaining training at a reasonable level even during economic down-
turns, and dealing with the intransigent levels of unemployment among
young people.
Many large employers undertook a great deal of training, but the gov-
ernment was concerned that many others were failing to make even mini-
mum provisions for training their employees. It moved to correct this by
introducing what it termed the training guarantee. With the exception of
those small employers already exempt from payroll taxes, other employers
were obliged, through their annual tax returns, to pay a levy equivalent to
their shortfall in achieving a set minimum target for spending on training.
I'he minimum was defined as equivalent to 2 percent of an employer's
payroll (a figure based largely on OECD analyses of enterprise training).
Employers who met the minimum paid no levy. The revenue collected was
to be returned to employers (not to public sector training providers) in the
firm of training activities. Tripartite committees empowered to assess ap-
plications for funds would determine the training activities.
The guarantee was introduced in the early 1 990s over a three-year pe-
riod. It rose from an initial 1 percent in the first year to the full 2 percent in
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the third year. The guidelines for the scheme were debatable. For instance,
employers could include administrative and accounting costs as eligible
expenditures. Nevertheless, employers were able to demonstrate that they
were bearing costs for training. Indeed, many of them were bearing consid-
erable costs. In the three years of the scheme, the federal government col-
lected virtually nothing, and thus set the minimum at zero in the third
year. Although it did not abolish the scheme as such, it effectively reversed
its earlier policy.
Major VET Issues
Despite the expansion of the VET system until the mid-1 980s, it remained
subject to criticism. Critics charged that the system was too inflexible to
respond quickly to skill shortages or to adjust to new demands in the labor
market. VET procedures and standards, they said, were out of date and no
longer cost effective. The period of expansion of government provision of
vocational education and training led to a reconsideration of institutional
issues and financial issues. Those VET reforms continued after 1985.
Institutional Issues
The federal government addressed institutional issues relating to govern-
ment structures, industrial relations, and accreditation.
REFORMS TO GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES. From 1975 to 1985 the federal
government increasingly intervened in the labor market. In particular, it
introduced major changes in the relationship between the ministries of
Employment and Education. The different approaches of these two minis-
tries can be observed in many countries, and Australia is no exception.
Focused increasingly on economic objectives, the government gave the
Ministry of Employment growing responsibilities. To develop traineeships,
the ministry became involved in negotiations with employers and unions
to assess needs and determine the type of training required. It also imple-
mented programs for the unemployed, which led to a significant increase
in the number of non-TAFE training providers, both profit and nonprofit
based. Nevertheless, TAFE, which formed part of state education minis-
tries, remained the country's major vehicle for the VET system's formal
training component. The engagement between employment and educa-
tion portfolios at the state and federal levels reached new heights.
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At the federal level the government found itself unwilling to tolerate
the division between the Education and Employment ministries and com-
bined them. Since its role in education was mainly as a financier rather
than as an administrator, the federal government was able to take major
initiatives in setting policy. It decided to do this to bring about an even
closer relationship between the vocational education system and the la-
bor market. Its approach was not confined to TAFE but spilled over into
the higher education system, where increasing costs had led the govern-
rrment to conclude that higher education institutions had to be more effi-
cient. In particular, they needed to carry greater teaching loads and relate
their courses to the needs of the economy. Eventually, some states fol-
lowed the federal government and brought their labor and education
portfolios under one umbrella.
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL TRAINING AUTHORITY. The second major
reform was the establishment of the Australian National Training Author-
ity (ANTA) by the federal and state governments. ANTA was required to
w ork on behalf of all the governments acting in unity. This was particularly
irnportant since the constitutional responsibilities of the two layers of gov-
ernment remained unchanged. ANTA was established as a company; the
federal and state governments were equal shareholders. The authority was
set up in one of the state capitals supported by its own secretariat.
All governments recognized that their role in developing vocational edu-
cation and training could not be paramount to the role of employers and
trade unions. Even though the formal structures of industrial courts had
changed somewhat and industrial legislation had been amended, the in-
dustrial roots of the VET system were intact. All developments in voca-
tional training still depended on industrial agreements being reached. As a
result, employers and unions were incorporated into ANTA, thereby mak-
ing it a tripartite authority.
Through ANTA, governments and the industrial partners embarked on
an ambitious plan to develop new accreditation procedures, to encourage
new training providers, and to develop a nationwide system of assessment
and certification. The most important task, however, was to develop new
competency standards on an industry-by-industry basis. The approach to
this task was based on the understanding that the major responsibilities
should not be vested in government bureaucracies. The central intent was
to pass control from the suppliers of a skilled work force, hitherto mainly
government organizations, to those who gave rise to the demand in the
first place, that is, industry.
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ACCREDITATION. Accreditation procedures across the states were incon-
sistent. One state did not necessarily recognize courses of study and diplo-
mas offered in another state, skills learned on the job were not readily
recognized, and no formal method was available to distinguish between
the courses offered by public and private institutions. The development of
competency-based training and the subsequent adoption of a set of na-
tional competency standards helped to overcome some of these problems.
The move to achieve competency-based training is largely industry driven.
The skills in demand in the economy and the standards to be achieved in
those skills are being set by industry. The public VET system, essentially
TAFE, is being required to adhere to those standards and to issue certifi-
cates that attest to that fact. So too are major enterprises, such as those in
the motor vehicle industry. They have long conducted both on-the-job and
off-the-job training, the latter in formal classroom settings that are as well
established as any public institution. Such industry courses are being ac-
credited through the same process as the TAFE courses.
The burgeoning private sector training providers may subscribe to the
same accreditation processes if they choose to do so. Long-established pri-
vate providers have well-earned reputations that suggest that there is no
great need or urgency for them to subscribe. Indeed, they are likely to be
more instrumental in setting the standards than in following them.
One major advantage of training standards is that they allow partici-
pants maximum flexibility in moving between education systems-from
secondary school to VET and from VET to higher education. As impor-
tant as anything else in the system is the notion that development paths,
especially for the young, should not be closed off. Figure 18-1 is a sche-
matic representation of the system. Level I Certificates from the VET sys-
tem are regarded as educationally equivalent to Senior Certificates from
secondary schools. Diplomas and advanced diplomas may be issued by the
VET system or by higher education institutes. Depending on the courses
of study, credits may be allowed as participants choose to move between
the three sectors. Note that some VET certificates may be issued to persons
with little or no formal training (for example, to enterprise workers who
have obtained their skills over a number of years on the job).
Financing
While some people might think that the financing of VET is not as big an
issue in a country like Australia as it is in developing countries, it clearly is.
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FIGURE 18-1
The Scope of VET in Australia
Secondary school VETsector Higher education
Senior certificate Certificate I
Certificate II
Certificate III
Certificate IV
Diploma Diploma
Advanced diploma Advanced diploma
Bachelor's degree
Graduate certificate
Graduate diploma
Master's degree
Doctorate
Employers, of necessity, are concerned with containing their own costs
and continue to look critically at the cost of training. States, as the major
financiers for TAFE, have always wanted to make sure their money was
being spent effectively and efficiently. The federal government, as the
rnain agent for policy initiatives, has also grown increasingly interested
in a more cost-effective system. Trainees and students, however, have prob-
ably been less concerned about costs. When the reforms began, they bore
few direct costs for any of the training they received. As we will explain in
the following sections, the federal and state governments acted in a num-
ber of different ways to bring about a new distribution of costs between
themselves and users.
STUDENT CHARGES. By the mid-1980s the federal government, with its
sole management responsibilities for higher education, was finding that
the decision it had taken a decade earlier to abolish higher education fees
was difficult to sustain. Consequently, it introduced the higher education
contribution, which initially covered roughly 20 percent of the actual cost
of higher education. Students were given the option of paying the charge
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up front at a discount, or of paying from their subsequent earnings through
income tax. Charges accumulated over the duration of a course were accu-
mulated as a future taxation debt. Naturally, charges could not be recouped
through income tax during those times when former students had no in-
come, either because they were unemployed or out of the labor force.
However, the federal government took no action concerning student
charges or fees for TAFE. This was left to the states, given their continuing
administrative and financial responsibilities for TAFE. In their turn, the
states did not consider the wholesale introduction of student charges, since
the states viewed most TAFE courses as alternatives to senior secondary
schooling. However, they scrutinized such courses as hobby courses, adult
courses, and repeat courses, and in most cases subjected them to substan-
tial, or even full, cost recovery. In addition, the states restricted their provi-
sion of funds to TAFE to what they regarded as core activities.
TRAINEE WAGES. Traineeships had opened up the question of trainee
wages. The wages paid to young people generally had been a contentious
issue for at least a decade before the review. In the early 1970s, before the
economic shocks, unions pushed for reducing the age at which adult wages
were paid to 18 years. For instance, the wage for a first-year apprentice
fitter was increased from 33 percent of a qualified fitter's wage to 42 per-
cent. Traineeships offered an opportunity to reconsider the wages paid to
young people.
It was not until 1996 that the government announced new measures
designed to realign the cost sharing of training for apprentices and other
trainees by introducing a training wage. It proposed that the training wage
be calculated to recompense trainees for their productive work, but not for
the time they spent on training, which was unproductive from an employer's
point of view. Calculating the balance between training and productive
work will be the responsibility of an agency established for that purpose.
Trainees will be asked to bear a far greater share of the cost of training.
However, in anticipation of the possibility that the training wage might fall
below an acceptable standard, the government proposed topping up the
wage to bring it to an agreed minimum.
The proposal to introduce trainee wages represents the most important
development in VET so far. It shifts a large part of the cost away from
employers-in the main to trainees but to some extent to the government.
How the balance of cost sharing will evolve through this new system re-
mains to be seen.
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ADOPTION OF A MARKET SYSTEM. The federal government and state gov-
ernments have both wanted to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the TAFE system. The states have negotiated new employment conditions
affecting teachers' workloads (for example, with regard to teaching hours
and the structure of the teaching year). These reforms were not easy to
achieve. The most important moves for the long-term future of vocational
education and training have come about through the governments' intro-
duction of market elements in an attempt to shift the VET system from a
supplier's to a buyer's market.
The federal Ministry of Employment received funds for retraining the
unemployed, for restructuring industry, for setting up group training
schemes, and for promoting industry involvement in training. The minis-
try introduced competitive bidding among training providers. Training
courses were put out for bids, and although TAFE colleges maintained
their position as the major supplier, others began entering the field. The
community-based training network that the ministry was financing sepa-
rately was allowed to submit bids, as were private providers. The number
of small providers increased greatly as a result of this initiative.
The governments also debated the question of who should be receiving
the direct financial support: the suppliers or the buyers. They concluded
that employers should be allowed to use nongovernment training provid-
ers, including for apprenticeship training, even though in many cases such
providers did not yet exist. Employers would be supported to buy training
from whatever supplier seemed to them to be the most appropriate, rather
than having funds go automatically to TAFE or other government-funded
providers.
In 1996 the federal and state governments moved to implement their
conclusions, a process completed by 1998. Employers are now able to ne-
gotiate with training providers of their own choosing. Many choose to
remain with TAFE colleges, however. Training must be in accordance with
standards agreed to by the industrial partners. The governments will pro-
vide the financing for the negotiated agreements up to a given maximum;
beyond that employers must bear the cost themselves.
Lessons Learned
Are the experiences of a country like Australia applicable to developing
countries or to countries in transition to market economies? This is a rel-
evant question to ask. After all, Australia is developed-not only economi-
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cally but also institutionally. It is in the area of institutional change that the
Australian experience offers the most pointers for others.
Countries seeking to reform vocational education and training usually
have a tradition that is focused strongly, if not entirely, on the public sector.
Countries in transition, for example, have virtually no private sector tradi-
tion at all, either among business enterprises or within the VET sector.
Developing countries also tend to be driven by the public sector, if only
because of the strong role that governments and their agencies usually play
in guiding national affairs. As far as VET is concerned, Australia shows
that a public sector system, by itself, will eventually prove inadequate to
handle the entire task.
Expanding VET without Institutional Change Rarely Works
Often the first object of reform in developing countries, and perhaps even
more so in transitional economies, is to expand public sector VET by in-
vesting in new or substantially upgraded facilities, equipment, and training
materials. Investments also frequently provide for curriculum development
and teacher training or for improved employment conditions for those
already in the system. All this is usually done in anticipation of a growing
demand for skills even when the projected growth may be quite distant in
time or extremely uncertain. Countries assume that once they have made
the investments, good returns will follow. However, case studies have dem-
onstrated that such investments should not be made without greater cer-
tainty about future labor market demand.
Australias experience reflects the same reality, but it also underscores the
importance of basing reform on sound institutions. Indeed, without this
investments are likely to be counterproductive and turn bad systems into
expensive bad systems. One particular problem concerns the relationships
among the industrial partners, employers, and unions and between each of
them and the VET system. In this respect, a great deal depends on the
broader relationship between the industrial partners and the government.
Australia can regard itself as fortunate in having strong industrial partners,
but this is not enough. With the establishment of ANTA, the government
sought to engage the employers and unions, not as advisors, but as integral
parts of the executive management of the VET system.
Such an approach is extremely difficult to adopt in countries that have
depended on the public sector for their development. Countries encour-
aged to follow the same approach often come to regard it as too difficult
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and end up making little or no effort to bring about change. In the end,
however, employers must become involved in VET for countries to realize
i:he full value of their investments.
Links with the Labor Market Must Be Predominant
Australia's experience demonstrates the difficulty of keeping the link be-
tween the VET system and the labor market secure and relevant. A great
deal of work is required to maintain this link. If the connection with the
labor market is weak, the system will fail. Part of the answer lies in forging
effective ties with industry as partners in the executive management of VET.
The government also should look closely at its own internal structures and
operations.
In many countries a tension exists between achieving educational objec-
tives and achieving labor market objectives. Resolving these tensions is not
easy, even in industrial countries, and solutions change as the relative
strengths of different government organizations ebb and flow. Countries
with well-entrenched public sectors where interagency discussions are of-
ten weak have an even more difficult task. The solution in Australia was to
amalgamate the players into a single entity-the Australian National Training
Authority. With the establishment of a single national ministry encom-
passing employment, education, and training, competing priorities were
resolved closer to the operating level and had far less chance to create con-
flict among trainers and confusion among students.
VETFinancing Should Support Market Forces
Allowing market forces to work does not depend only on an institutional
framework that involves industry in determining its own training needs.
With the establishment of ANTA, Australia has gone farther than most in
doing this. Financial mechanisms that will support market directions also
are needed. This can be achieved to some extent by ensuring that costs are
shared. Too often, however, training levies are seen as a way to expand and
strengthen the public sector system. Unfortunately, extracting training lev-
ies without any regard to the labor market is too easy.
Costs are best apportioned in a way that enables the buyer to exercise
judgment. Competition among suppliers is essential. This again implies a
shift in control and management away from the public sector toward em-
ployers and VET participants. Industry, in particular, should become the
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main force behind the development of training standards, assessment pro-
cedures, and accreditation. However, in the end, industry needs must be
determined pragmatically. Accreditation, for example, is important to most
employers only in so far as it genuinely provides them with information
they would not otherwise have about the type and quality of training being
offered. It should not be used as a means of enforcing de facto licensing on
training providers, a move that protects public sector providers more than
consumers. In short, VET should benefit buyers more than suppliers.
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19 GermanyINDERMIT S. GILL AND AMIT DAR
GERMANY'S APPROACH tO vocational education and train-
ing (VET)-the so-called ual system introduced in 1969-strengthens
the links between education and employment. The system is "dual" be-
cause vocational education and occupational training are provided simul-
taneously (that is, during asingle program of work and study) to participants
by schools and employers espectively. The system is believed to be an ef-
Fective strategy for keeping youth unemployment low and ensuring an ad-
equate supply of skilled workers.
For these reasons the dual system is an alluring alternative for other
,countries, some of which have sought German technical ssistance in trans-
Forming their VET systems to resemble Germany's. Concerned that its sup-
ply of technicians was not keeping pace with the demands of a rapidly
expanding economy, the Republic of Korea experimented with cooperative
training and a master technician training college in the 1980s; German
training experts actively assisted in this effort. In the early 1 990s President
Hosni Mubarak, faced with high unemployment among Egyptian youth,
asked German chancellor Helmut Kohl for his country's assistance in re-
:forming Egypt's VET system. More recently, Indonesia, in dealing with
youth unemployment and perceived skills shortages, attempted-with
German help-to introduce the dual system.'
Imbalances between the demand and supply of skilled workers have been
experienced at various times by all countries, and they have been addressed
in different ways depending upon the countries' education-related and la-
bor-related institutions. Japan, for example, has eschewed vocational edu-
cation in favor of formal, lifelong in-service training. The United States has
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resisted vocationalizing secondary education. Instead, it has relied largely
on a process of matching jobs with job-seekers through job changes and
subsequent informal on-the-job training of workers with relatively high
education levels. Like Germany, Japan and the United States have main-
tained relatively low unemployment rates among youth and have ensured a
steady supply of skilled workers. Germany, with well-defined relations be-
tween central and state governments and a labor market with powerful
unions, has taken a different approach.
This chapter reviews the main features of vocational education and train-
ing in Germany and analyzes the institutional and financial prerequisites
for an effective dual system. Some aspects of the dual system are applicable
in low- and middle-income countries, and others are likely to be prohibi-
tively costly. Before we examine the dual system in more depth, we will
briefly discuss how other industrialized countries have tried to ensure strong
linkages between the education system and the workplace.
Country Comparisons
France, Japan, and the United States have adopted quite different approaches
to VET under varying institutional and labor market conditions (table 19-
1). The comparisons made in this section between these countries and
Germany may help to underscore the conditions under which the dual
system operates.
Education
As the table shows, the education levels of workers in 1990 were higher in
the United States than in Germany and Japan. Almost 37 percent of the
U.S. population had more than a secondary education in the United States.
Japanese workers-one-fifth of whom had more than secondary school-
ing-fell in the middle between the United States and Germany. In most
low-income countries, educational levels are considerably lower. Educa-
tion levels in middle-income countries and countries making a transition
to a market economy may be closer to West European levels.
Labor Force
Labor force growth between 1965 and 1995 was highest in the United
States (1.7 percent) and lowest in Germany (0.5 percent). The labor force
TABLE 19-1
Skill Formation Mechanisms, Selected Countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(percent)
Characteristic Germany United States Japan France
Education level in 1990
Percentage of population with more than
a secondary school education 7.2 36.9 19.5
Enrollment ratio in 1990
Upper secondary school 88.6 90.2 -
Tertiary-level school 28.7 65.9 -
Labor force growth
Annual average (1965-95) 0.52 1.70 0.83 0.95
Unemployment
Average rate (1982-94) 7.9 7.0 2.5 9.9
Youth rate divided by average rate (1973-89) 1.25 2.75 - 3.25
Vocational education
What level? Secondary Postsecondary None Secondary
Where? School (theoretical Community None Vocational
education); firm colleges schools
(practical education)
Who pays? Government Government - Government
and firm and worker
(Table continues on the following page.)
TABLE 19-1 (continued)
Characteristic Germany United States Japan France
On-the-job training
Structure Formal Informal Mainly formal Mainly informal
Formal for new hires 71.5 10.2 67.1 23.6
Who pays? Firm Worker and firm Firm Firm
Training institutes
Technical/commercial Commercial Both Commercial Both
Public/private Both Private Private Public
Skill certification
Central body Tripartite None None Government
Local bodies Employers and unions None Firm-level Government
Labor contracts
Union influence Strong Weak Weak Strong
Turnover Low High Low Low
Average tenure (years) 10.4 6.7 10.9 10.1
-Not available
Source: Federal Ministry of Education (1995); OECD (1993).
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grew by less than 1 percent annually in Japan and France. It is worth keep-
ing in mind that annual labor force growth in low-income countries ex-
ceeds 2 percent, while it is closer to 1 percent in most transitional economies
and other middle-income countries.
Unemployment
Unemployment rates averaged about 7 percent in Germany and the United
States during the 1 980s and early 1990s, lower than the 10 percent average
for France but considerably higher than unemployment rates in Japan. In
the mid-1990s unemployment rates in Germany and France were much
higher (about 12 and 15 percent respectively) than those in the United
States and Japan (about 6 and 3 percent respectively). Germany's unem-
ployment rates have remained below the average levels in Europe.
It is difficult to compare unemployment rates in countries in the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development with rates in devel-
oping countries, which generally do not have formal unemployment
compensation systems. In transition countries, where such systems do ex-
ist, open unemployment rates resemble those in Western Europe. Youth
unemployment rates, relative to average rates, are strikingly low in Ger-
many: youth are likely to experience higher unemployment rates than oth-
ers, but this differential is far higher in the United States and France.
Labor Relations
Labor unions in Germany and France help ensure that the turnover of
workers is low. In Japan, which had implicit lifetime contracts in large
firms until recently, the same result was obtained even though unions are
relatively weak. The United States' labor market is characterized by lower
average tenure on the job. Tenure is about 30 percent shorter in the United
States than in Japan, Germany, and France.
School-to-Work Transitions
When tenure statistics are adjusted for the high turnover that characterizes
the U.S. labor market for new entrants, the intercountry differences be-
come much smaller (Hall 1978). Japan, Germany, and the United States
take different approaches to matching the skills of labor force entrants to
jobs. In Japan more than two-thirds of new hires-who have reasonably
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high levels of general education-are formally trained by employers. In the
United States informal on-the-job training is relied upon to impart job-
specific skills to new hires, a large number of whom have some postsecondary
education. In Germany, until recendy, relatively few labor force entrants
had received a postsecondary education. But nearly three-fourths of all
new hires in Germany get formal training, mainly through firm-sponsored
apprenticeships in conjunction with vocational education provided by the
state. This approach has strong intuitive appeal. Employers provide occu-
pation-specific skills to workers, sharing those costs with them through
lower wages during the apprenticeship period, and taxpayers finance more
general-but still work-relevant-vocational education. It is hardly sur-
prising that many developing nations want such a system.
Experiments in Korea, Indonesia, and Egypt
During the past decade or so, countries at varying levels of development
have sought to import the dual system. German training experts can be
found in countries as diverse as China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Eritrea,
the former Soviet Union, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Leba-
non, Malaysia, Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza. We do not attempt
an evaluation of efforts to adapt the dual system to the special circum-
stances in developing and transition countries. But in Korea, Egypt, and
Indonesia information on German-assisted experiments with the dual sys-
tem is available, and we have found their experiences useful.
Korea's Cooperative Training and Industrial Master's College
Since the early 1 970s, Germany has provided financial and consulting aid
for establishing public vocational training institutes in South Korea. Jeong
(1995) has informally evaluated two initiatives to introduce the German
dual system in Korea: the cooperative training program and the Changwon
Industrial Master's College. The aim of the comparative training program
was to provide industrial workers with adaptable skills. Public vocational
training institutes provide theoretical and basic practical training, while
firms provide applied and specialized training. The Changwon Industrial
Master's College was set up to improve the skills, earnings, and social status
of persons in the intermediate managerial category (similar to the German
"meister" class). Between 1982 and 1991 the college had more than 3,000
graduates, including about 600 master craftsmen.
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The operative training program failed to generate the multiple and highly
adaptable skills envisioned. No training was conducted within firms: the
apprentices were instead used as low-wage workers. Managers of machine
tool firms stated that there were no significant differences between the skills
of graduates of comparative training and the skills of graduates of other
training institutions. Interviews with personnel managers at machine tool
firms confirm that "master craftsman" is just a nominal title; graduates of
the Changwon Industrial Master's College do not perform the functions of
workers in an intermediate managerial category. The prestige envisioned
for Changwon Industrial Master's College graduates did not materialize
because of a strong societal preference for higher education (eong 1995).
Indonesia's "System Ganda"
Indonesia's "System Ganda" is a pilot program begun in 1994 that targets
the "best" 250 government vocational and technical schools. About 6,000
small and medium companies were expected to participate. Apprentices
attend school and are placed in jobs for three or four years. The length of
programs is chosen to keep approximate parity with senior secondary edu-
cation. The government bears the cost of in-school vocational education;
in-firm training expenses are borne by the companies. The annual unit cost
of System Ganda is about US$2,000, which is almost four times the cost of
senior secondary education and about three times the per capita gross na-
tional product (GNP).
A 1995 survey found that participation in the system was negligible
despite active encouragement by the government. Other surveys point to
the usual reasons apprenticeship programs in low-income countries falter:
students prefer general education to vocational streams, and companies are
not keen to offer apprenticeships because they consider them to be unprof-
itable. Moreover, a vibrant private training sector in Indonesia has been
effective in providing school leavers with skills required for quick place-
ment in jobs (World Bank 1995).
Egypt's Mubarak-Kohl Initiative
This high-profile effort sought to use German experience to revive the tra-
dition of apprenticeships in Egypt that had been stifled in a command
economy. Egyptian policymakers believed that the German dual system
could be adapted in a way that would transform the apprenticeship system
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into one that would meet the needs of a modern economy. They planned
six high-level training centers like those in Germany. The centers would be
fully funded by the Germans. Practical training would be with local manu-
facturing firms. Two centers near Cairo were inaugurated in 1995 (Minis-
try of Education 1995).
The German dual system is unlikely to be implemented on a wide scale
in Egypt because of the predominance there of small and microenterprises.
Such firms often do not participate in the dual system in Germany. Small
Egyptian firms may be hesitant to bear the costs because they do not expect
immediate benefits from participating in formalized apprenticeship pro-
grams. In Germany apprentices hired in the dual system are paid wages
lower than those mandated or collectively determined for entry-level work-
ers, resulting in immediate benefits for small employers. And a system that
is planned and supervised largely by the Ministry of Education is unlikely
to elicit the enthusiasm of large employers. The Egyptian government and
private sector representatives may overestimate training demands, especially
for technical workers. Although international experience suggests that tech-
nicians are less than 10 percent of the work force in most manufacturing
firms, Egyptian officials are aiming for twice this ratio.
Germany's Dual System
It may seem unrealistic to expect a system that has matured in Germany-
a rich country that is highly industrialized, has strong workers' and em-
ployers' unions, and well-developed local, state and federal government
regulatory and administrative mechanisms-to be readily adapted to low-
and middle-income countries that do not share any of these attributes, but
it is our belief that these countries can learn from the German appren-
ticeship experience. Although the dual system cannot be transplanted as
a whole or even in parts, all countries can learn valuable lessons by care-
fully examining the principles on which the system is based (table 19-2
and box 19-1).
Organization and Institutional Framework
The German apprenticeship is a joint undertaking between the public and
private sectors. Theoretical aspects of training are provided in publicly run
and financed vocational secondary schools, and practical aspects in firms
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TABLE 19-2
Organization, Regulation, and Financing of Germany's Dual System
Feature Vocational education Training
Venue School Firm
Duration One year full time or Two years, full time or
1 to 2 days a week for 3 to 4 days per week for
3 or 3.5 years or more 3 or 3.5 years
Curriculum General education; Occupation-specific training
job-related theory
Legal framework State school laws Federal training laws;
industry rules and regulations
Teacher Theory teacher (university Vocational trainers (master
degree plus practical craftsman or equivalent)
training); practical teacher
(secondary degree, master
craftsman title or technical
diploma, plus work ex-
perience)
Costs Staff, material, and plant Trainee compensation;
staff, material, and plant
Funding State and municipal tax Employers
revenues
Responsibility State ministries of edu- Employers, with federal regu-
cation and culture lations and union monitoring
Source: Adapted from Dicke, Glismann, and Siemben (1994).
that provide and finance apprenticeships. The program usually lasts about
three years for commercial trades-longer for technical occupations. Ap-
prentices spend one or two days each week in vocational schools, and the
remainder in the firm. In small firms, apprentices acquire skills through
learning by doing; in large firms training is often in specialized centers
(,Bosch 1993). In the early 1990s about 600,000 firms, 700 interfirm train-
ing centers (organized by firms that cannot provide in-plant training), and
1,800 schools participated in the dual system (Soskice 1994).
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BOX 19-1
Salient Features of Germany's Dual System of Training
* The dual system in Germany has evolved from the medieval tradition of
guild training. Employers, unions, government, and research institutions all
play important roles.
* Students over the age of 15 are prepared for higher education in gymnasia, or
the dual system prepares them for work. Many of those who complete du-
cation in gymnasia lso go through dual system programs.
* Most of the recognized training companies are small enterprises, but many
small firms do not provide training. All large companies provide training
places.
* Berufsschulen-postsecondary technical and vocational colleges-work with
companies to administer three-year programs of vocational education and
training.
* Public and private investment in VET is high. The cost of dual system train-
ing is high (because of training allowances, the costs of professional trainers,
the administrative costs of examinations, and the costs of enforcing stan-
dards). The Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) estimates the
gross costs to be about DM30,000 per student per year.
* The costs net of trainee productivity are estimated at DM 18,000. Nonethe-
less, it is believed that "overall the employment of trainees brings a positive
balance to the employer."
Source: Adapted from Schmidt and Alex (1995).
The Role of the Federal Government
After the end of World War II, the Inder-state governments-were given
responsibility for vocational education and training. The Vocational Train-
ing Act of 1969 formalized this control. But the Vocational Training Law
(Berufsbildungsgesetz) governs only enterprise-based training and not school-
based education, the other component of the dual system of VET. A for-
mal agreement between the federal government and the state ministries of
education and cultural affairs lays out the procedures for coordinating edu-
cation and training. The Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB)
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can establish or reform training regulations. It draws up the rules to imple-
ment changes in training laws, standards, or curricula after they have been
deliberated upon by the employers' associations, unions, and the state gov-
ernments. It also monitors training costs and effectiveness through peri-
odic nationwide surveys, and it finances federal government initiatives to
increase vocational training.2
The Role of State and Local Governments
Vocational schooling can be either full-time or cooperative; both types of
schooling are run by state ministries of education and culture. The state
ministries of education develop draft curricula for vocational schools. The
curricula are supposed to reflect the opinions of employers, but in practice
curriculum development in vocational schools is done without the active
participation of employers. Vocational schools are financed by municipali-
ties or district governments, which provide equipment and material costs,
and the states, which provide personnel costs. The state minister of eco-
nomics and other "competent" ministers (such as agriculture, justice, and
industry) play a more important role than the minister of education in
regulating in-firm vocational training. These ministers have some influ-
ence in selecting members of the "competent body," which oversees in-firm
training in each state.
The Role of Employers'Associations and Labor Unions
After World War II a pluralist system ensured nongovernment forces a
strong influence in important areas of government policy, including VET.
Control of vocational training is decentralized among 480 regional cham-
bers. Responsibility for supervision lies with these chambers (employers'
associations). Within them vocational training committees are formed. These
bodies are passively regulated by the relevant state ministers. Vocational
training committees include labor union representatives and vocational
education teachers (who only have an advisory role). These committees
determine the suitability of firms to provide training, monitor (through
training counselors) the quality of training provided by member firms, and
take punitive action if necessary (nullify or refuse training contracts). The
main conflict in vocational training committees is over training quality.
Labor union representatives generally demand more training and, since
training counselors are paid by employers, they try to ensure that counse-
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lors are even-handed in assessing training activities.3 Chambers also set up
exam committees-consisting of employers, employees, and instructors-
for each occupation.
Reform and Change
Since the early 1960s, debate about the organization and legal framework
of VET has become less important, and structural reform and new subject
matter have become the dominant concerns due to rapid technological
change. The establishment or reform of training regulations can be initi-
ated by labor unions, employers' associations, or by BIBB. The state or
local government representative acts only as a notary during the discussion
of these reforms. After successful talks, the state minister issues an order to
the BIBB to draw up the rules to govern the implementation of these
changes, especially regarding the coordination between the federal and state
governments. The state ministry develops curricula for vocational schools.
BIBB develops a "draft training regulation" for workplace training in co-
operation with experts from employers' associations and unions. Employ-
ers' associations aim largely to keep workplace training standards reasonable.
Unions aim to ensure that wage growth reflects occupational upgrading.
Often the only role of the federal government lies in helping forge a com-
promise, since unanimous consent is required for changes to become law.
Syllabi for vocational schools are slow to change; for some subjects, it can
take two decades to change the curriculum (The Economist 1994). Schools
are sluggish in responding to changing technology, but companies-which
are half responsible for drafting the curriculum-are also accused of being
indifferent to the content of vocational school instruction.
Profile of Dual System Participants
The ages and education of participants in the dual system vary. The average
age of beginners is 18 years. The number of participants in the dual system
decreased from 1985 to 1990 and then increased markedly (table 19-3).
Germany's demographic trends indicate a sharp fall between 1983 and 1990
in the cohort ages 15 to 19, the age group of most of the participants.
The ratio of participants to the size of this cohort has risen steadily from
less than 30 percent in 1975 to more than 40 percent in 1990. It should be
kept in mind, though, that youth ages 20 to 24 are increasingly participat-
ing in the dual system.
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TABLE 19-3
Participation in the Dual System, Selected Years, 1975-92
(millions)
Participants as
a percentage
Number of Population of the 15-19
Year participants 15-19years population
1975 1.33 4.45 29.8
1977 1.40 4.81 29.1
1979 1.64 5.12 32.1
1981 1.68 5.23 32.0
1983 1.72 5.19 33.2
1985 1.83 4.94 37.1
1987 1.74 4.39 39.6
1988 1.66 4.12 40.4
1989 1.55 3.84 40.4
1990 1.48 3.57 41.3
1991 - - -
1992 3.33
- Not available.
Source: Bosch (1993); Federal Ministry of Education (1995); ILO (various issues).
In 1970, 80 percent of participants came directly from lower secondary
schools (hauptschule) and the remainder mostly from short-term vocational
secondary schools (realschule). By 1989, 34 percent each came from
hauptschule and realschule, while 16 percent each came after finishing gen-
eral secondary school (abitur) and university diploma programs or
fachhochschulreife (Maurice 1993). Thus the average education level of en-
trants to the dual system increased by about 15 percent-from 10 years of
schooling in 1970 to 11.5 years in 1989. Since then the average education
level is believed to have increased even more. In the past two decades, there-
fore, the average education level (and the age) of participants in the dual
system have increased by about two years.
Apprentices in the handwerk sector-comprised largely of small arti-
sans-are less well educated than those chosen by industrie-defined as
large-scale manufacturing and services. Although about 60 percent of
handwerk apprentices had no more than a lower secondary education in
1989, this ratio was less than 30 percent in the industrie sector (table 19-4).
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TABLE 19-4
Education Levels of Participants in the Dual System, by Sector, 1989
Handwerk Industrie
Level sector sector
No school-leaving certificate 5.4 0.8
Hauptschule certificate 55.0 27.9
Realschule c rtificate 18.6 35.3
Abitur 5.3 19.2
Higher education n.a. n.a.
n.a. Not applicable.
Source: Soskice (1994).
The increase in the average education level of dual system trainees may be
attributed in part to the growing importance of large-scale services.
In 1989 the most common apprenticeships for men were in these fields:
auto mechanic, electrician, joiner, clerical worker in trade, and banking.
Together they accounted for about a quarter of all male apprenticeships.
The most common apprenticeships for women were as hairdressers, cleri-
cal workers, and medical assistants. These occupations accounted for a third
of all female apprentices. It should be noted that in 1989 there were more
than 300 occupational categories for dual system trainees.
Size Distribution of Participating Firms
Large firms predominate among corporate training institutions. Only about
a third of all dual system trainees are in the handwerk sector, which is
comprised of small firms. Large companies form the mainstay of the dual
system. Soskice (1994) illustrates this well: while almost all firms with more
than 500 employees offer apprenticeships, this ratio is close to one-third
for firms with fewer than 10 employees (table 19-5). Postapprenticeship
retention rates are higher for large firms, which can be rationalized either
by differences in the company-specificity of training or because handwerk
firms may be more likely to view apprentices as cheap temporary labor
than potential long-term employees.4
Sectoral Distribution of Participating Firms
It has been difficult to obtain the distribution of dual system participants
by sector, as defined according to international norms. German data report
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TABLE 19-5
Employer Participation and Trainee Retention, by Size of Firm, 1985
(percent)
Firms with Post-training
Number of workers infirm apprentices retention rate
5-9 35.0 56
10-49 59.0 64
50-99 78.0 69
100-499 91.0 73
500-1,000 99.5 82
More than 1,000 99.6 87
Source. Soskice (1994).
distributions by categories that are a composite of occupation, company
size, and sector. For example, Steedman (1993) reports that in 1990 the
shares were as follows: 46 percent in industrie, 40 percent in handwerk, 3
percent in the public sector, 7 percent in professions, and 3 percent in
other sectors. "Craft" training (for example, for garage mechanics, bakers,
painters, plumbers, hairdressers) is done in small, handwerk firms. Such
training is apt to be at a lower level and cost than training in industrie,
which is generally professional or technical in nature (for example, for bank
clerks, machine operators, and nurses).5
Costs
Detailed cost information is available (although usually in German docu-
ments) for company-based training of dual system participants. The BIBB
conducted three extensive surveys in 1972, 1980, and 1991, and employer
organizations also periodically gather this information. The costs of voca-
tional education have proved much harder to come by, and we report only
the most rudimentary statistics here.
COSTS OF COMPANY-BASED INSTRUCTION. Gross costs of company-based
instruction include staff, materials, and investment costs (65 percent), and
compensation for trainees (35 percent), according toTimmermann (1993).
Gross annual costs per apprentice for firms with more than 500 workers
were about 30 percent higher than those for firms with fewer than 10 em-
ployees in 1991. It is likely that this is because of sectoral-occupational
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TABLE 19-6
Costs per Apprentice of Workplace Training in the Dual System,
by Company Size, 1991
(1990 U.S. dollars)
Net cost as
Apprentice a percentage
Number ofworkers Gross productivity Net ofgross cost
1-9 16,392 7,292 9,100 56
10-49 16,811 6,841 9,971 59
50-499 18,105 7,219 10,886 60
More than 500 21,296 6,152 15,144 71
All firms 17,645 6,987 10,657 60
Source: Harhoff and Kane (1996).
differences in training type rather than company size differences per se.
BIBB has also estimated costs net of trainee productivity: net per appren-
tice costs for firms with more than 500 workers were about 66 percent
higher than those for firms with fewer than 10 employees in 1991. Note,
however, that absolute apprentice productivity levels do not differ signifi-
cantly by company size (table 19-6).
Harhoff and Kane (1996), using BIBB data, report that the costs of
workplace training are highest in public service, but this accounts for less
than 5 percent of trainees. Among the more important groups, gross train-
ing costs in industrie (industry and commerce) are about 35 percent higher
than those for the handwerk sector (crafts). Sectoral-occupational differ-
ences in net costs are much more pronounced: in 1980 net costs of training
in public service were more than six times the net cost of agricultural ap-
prenticeships. For the two main categories, net costs of training in industrie
were 57 percent higher than those for the handwerk sector. Interestingly,
gross and net costs of workplace training more than doubled in real terms
between 1972 and 1991, but average net costs remained about 60 percent
of gross costs (table 19-7).
COSTS OF SCHOOL-BASED INSTRUCTION. In 1991 the costs of school-
based instruction amounted to almost DM8 billion. With almost 2 mil-
lion apprentices, the treasury costs per student were DM4,000 per year,
implying a full-time equivalent of about DM13,000, or about US$8,000:
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TABLE 19-7
Costs per Apprentice of Workplace Training in the Dual System,
by Sector, 1972, 1980, 1991
(1990 U.S. dollars)
1972 1980 1991
Sector Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net
Industry and commerce 9,971 6,123 14,654 9,381 18,988 12,237
Crafts 6,233 3,071 10,939 5,991 14,850 7,370
Consultancy 7,869 1,890 13,199 8,499 - -
Public service - - 17,855 17,041
Agriculture 6,360 453 10,420 2,746 -
Health 6,299 102 - - -
All sectors 7,774 4,255 12,845 7,755 17,645 10657
- Not available.
Source: Harhoff and Kane (1996).
1.6 times the cost of public university education. Information for school-
based instruction is difficult to find, since it is not a federal responsibility.
NET COSTS OF DUAL SYSTEM INSTRUCTION. For every dollar spent by the
government, firms spend two dollars as gross costs and about US$1.25 as
net costs. If government finances both school-based instruction and work-
place instruction for participants in the dual system, the total (gross and
net) costs are considerably higher.
Factors Influencing Applicability in Developing Countries
From the preceding analysis we have identified five of the most striking
features of Germany's dual system of training. First, firms pay for and con-
trol the content and delivery of vocational training, and the government
(taxpayer) pays for and controls the content and delivery of vocational
education. Second, small firms tend not to participate in dual system voca-
tional training. Third, the unit costs of school-based vocational education
are high, even when compared with university education. The state and
local governments meet all of the costs of school-based instruction. Fourth,
workplace training is not cheap either, and its costs have risen steeply over
the past two decades. Finally, the federal and state governments and Ger-
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man firms appear to respect each other's domains. Federal and state gov-
ernments set only broad guidelines for the content and delivery standards
of workplace training, which firms provide and fund. Firms appear to ac-
cept the content and delivery of school-based vocational education, which
is provided by the government at taxpayers' expense.
From the perspective of low- and middle-income countries, these fea-
tures are critical for determining the suitability of the German dual system
as an instrument for improving the relevance and efficiency of VET sys-
tems. These features suggest three questions that policymakers should con-
sider before attempting to adopt the German dual system in its entirety or
any of its components. First, will firms willingly organize and pay for work-
place training of apprentices? Second, if they are willing, is the government
prepared to relinquish control of vocational training beyond providing
oversight and broad guidance? Third, if they are not willing, can the gov-
ernment finance both training and vocational education components? We
will examine these questions in turn, contrasting-for illustrative purposes-
conditions in Egypt, Indonesia, and Korea with those in Germany.
Will Firms Organize and Pay for the Training Component?
In this section we explore the implications of structural differences be-
tween Germany and other countries interested in importing the system.
DIFFERENCES IN SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION. The dual system is not a small
scheme for training labor force entrants. It is "the single biggest (appren-
ticeship) scheme of all" (The Economist 1996). It is pertinent, therefore, to
ask whether the employment structure of countries that are seeking to im-
port the system is similar to Germany's. The sectors in which most appren-
tices are trained-manufacturing and services-have almost 90 percent of
employment in Germany compared with 45 percent, 48 percent, and 75
percent respectively in Indonesia, Egypt, and Korea (table 19-8). Only Korea
would probably "qualify' for large-scale implementation of the dual sys-
tem using this criterion. In Egypt and Indonesia a significant share of em-
ployment is in subsistence and small-scale agriculture, and the likelihood
that an ambitious apprenticeship program would succeed is little.
DIFFERENCES IN SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS. Even in the relatively mod-
ern manufacturing and services sector in Egypt, Indonesia, and Korea, em-
ployment is concentrated in microenterprises and small-scale enterprises
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TABLE 19-8
Sectoral Composition of Employment in Germany and Selected
Developing Countries, Selected Years, 1986-90
(percent)
Share of employment
Germany Rep. of Korea Indonesia Egypt
Sector 1990 1991 1990 1986
Agriculture 3.6 16.7 49.9 32.7
Mining 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.4
Manufacturing 31.6 26.6 11.4 11.2
Construction 6.6 8.3 4.1 6.2
Services 57.4 48.0 33.7 37.1
Transport 5.7 5.3 3.7 4.9
Other 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: ILO (various years).
(table 19-9). The German experience with the dual system since 1969 clearly
shows that very small firms (fewer than 10 employees) usually do not pro-
vide apprenticeships, and when they do, they usually do not retain trainees
upon completion of the program (Soskice 1994). In Germany employers'
associations that oversee vocational training often do not burden their small-
est members with the responsibility of accommodating apprentices. In de-
veloping countries where even the regulated, formal private sector is
dominated by small firms, following this principle would imply marginal
participation in the dual system. Even for large firms the threat that if they
do not accept apprentices, the government will train job-seekers with funds
gathered from taxes on employers may be less credible in settings where tax
collection mechanisms are weak.
DIFFERENCES IN REGULATION AND UNION COVERAGE. Firms in develop-
ing countries are more likely than German firms to be unregulated and to
have weak union representation. (Even in transitional countries, the pri-
vate sector may be both nascent and largely informal.) Thus it may be dif-
ficult for the government or unions to ensure that employers conduct
apprenticeships in conformity with established standards and regulations.
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TABLE 19-9
Size Distribution of Firms, Selected Countries and Years
Percentage in
Country small firms Explanation Year
Germany 10.9 Share of employment in firms with fewer 1996
than 10 workers out of all firms registered
with the Hanover Chamber of Commerce
and Industry.
Indonesia 67.3 Share of manufacturing employment 1986
in firms that are classified as home
industries and small and medium firms.
Egypt 78.0 Share of construction employment in 1984
firms that have fewer than 10 workers
59.4 Share of manufacturing employment 1984
in private small-scale nterprises
Source: Germany: personal communications; Indonesia: Nachrowi, Dwiantini, and
Dwiswati (1995); Egypt: Assad (1991), Handoussa and Potter (1991).
In the German handwerk sector, where conditions most resemble those in
manufacturing and services in developing countries, many German firms
use trainees as cheap and flexible labor (Abraham and Houseman 1993).
This helps explain the moderate retention rates of trainees among the small
firms (table 19-5). In most developing countries, however, minimum wage
legislation is either nonexistent or not enforced, which reduces the incen-
tive for firms to take advantage of apprenticeship wage laws to avoid hiring
untested workers at high entry wages.
In Germany dismissal of workers is difficult or costly, so participation
in a large-scale apprenticeship program may be viewed as a blessing. This
may not be the case for small firms in developing countries, where dis-
missal regulations and mandated severance benefits are not enforced strictly
(for instance, in Egypt), or not strictly enough (for example, in Indonesia
or Korea).6 Even where such regulations are strict and binding, the absence
of strong unions for workers may result in training of poor quality. This
training can be monitored mainly at the place of delivery. Employers have
been coerced (or artificially induced through incentives) into providing it.
Apprentice training in Germany conforms most with regulations in those
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sectors or occupations where powerful nationwide labor unions represent
workers (Bosch 1993; Harhoff and Kane 1996).
Are Governments Ready to Let Industry Take Control of Training?
Unlike the federal and state governments in Germany, governments in most
low- and middle-income countries are reluctant to give up control of voca-
tional training. In Bahrain, Indonesia, Tanzania, and Tunisia, public train-
ing institutes are funded at least in part by special levies on employers. The
,case of Korea perhaps best illustrates how difficult it is for policymakers to
relinquish control of vocational training to firms or private sector provid-
ers. Korea has had a "training promotion levy" for two decades. Its goal has
been to induce employers to provide in-service training of specified type
and duration to stipulated numbers of employees. The levy was introduced
because of the government's belief that the private sector, left to itself, would
not invest adequately in training. Even when it became apparent that the
government's efforts had not succeeded in increasing training, or had done
so at unsustainably high costs, the levy was not repealed. This is partly
lbecause public training institutions rely upon the levy for financing. The
Korean government, known for hard-nosed evaluation of its own policies,
decided to phase out the levy after more than 25 years of experimentation.
It may prove difficult for other countries to do the same.
Can Governments Finance both Vocational Education
and Vocational Training?
'[f the government is not ready to give up control of vocational training,
employers may be reluctant to provide and pay for it. This has been the
experience of countries such as Egypt and Korea. Under these circumstances,
the government will have to bear the costs of both components of the dual
system: vocational education and vocational training.
METHODOLOGY. To determine the costs of both parts of the dual system
in low- and middle-income countries, we adopt the following four-step
methodology. First, we determine the (gross) cost of each component in
Germany. In 1993 the unit costs of vocational training were US$17,700,
and those of vocational education were US$3,300. Second, we calculate
the ratio of these costs to the costs of (a) public secondary education and
(b) public university education in Germany. For example, the ratio of sec-
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ondary education costs to apprenticeship costs was about 1:7. Third, using
these ratios and the actual costs of, alternatively, secondary and university
education in selected low- and middle-income countries, we impute two
sets of costs of the vocational training and education components. For
example, we find that, using secondary education costs as the numeraire,
the unit costs of vocational training in Korea in 1993 were US$15,300,
and those of vocational education were US$2,900. The corresponding
numbers for Indonesia were US$1,400 and US$300 respectively. Finally,
we calculate the average of costs using secondary and university costs as the
numeraire, and we impute the total costs for the dual system. In Egypt the
total imputed cost for putting one trainee through a year of the dual system
was about US$2,800.
COSTS OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING COMPONENT. Calculated using this
methodology, the imputed costs of the vocational training component-
which is borne by employers in Germany-is between US$13,700 and
$US 15,300 in Korea, between US$1,400 and US$2,400 in Indonesia, and
between US$1,200 and US$3,500 in Egypt (table 19-10). Note that we
have used gross costs of vocational training in Germany to impute the cost
of this component in other countries. We do so to show the costs that
governments must bear if employers are unwilling to shoulder the costs of
apprenticeships, and because we are skeptical whether the methodology
used by BIBB to value the net productivity of apprentices is reliable (or
even feasible).
COSTS OF THE VOCATIONAL EDUCATION COMPONENT. The imputed cost
of the vocational education component-which is borne by the state gov-
ernments in Germany-falls between US$2,500 and US$2,900 in Korea,
between US$300 and US$400 in Indonesia, and between US$200 and
US$600 in Egypt. Since these costs are based on unit costs of vocational
education in the German dual system where trainees usually attend school
for one day each week, they are not full-time equivalent costs (which would
be more than three times higher).
TOTAL COSTS OF THE DUAL SYSTEM. Averages of the vocational training
and vocational education costs (estimates using secondary and university
costs as numeraires) are summed to get the imputed unit cost of imple-
menting the dual system in each of these countries. The averages are
US$17,200 in Korea, US$2,300 in Indonesia, and US$2,800 in Egypt.
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TABLE 19-10
Annual Unit Costs of Dual System Components, 1990-91
(thousands of U.S. dollars)
Public cost of
Training cost Vocational Public Public
I II education cOst secondary university Dual GNP/
Country costs (1993) I II education education system capita
Germany 17.7 17.7 3.3 3.3 2.26 6.00 21.0 23.56
](orea' 15.3 13.7 2.9 2.5 1.96 4.57 17.2 7.66
Indonesiaa 1.4 2.4 0.3 0.4 0.18 0.80 2.3 0.74
Egypta 1.2 3.5 0.2 0.6 0.15 1.15 2.8 0.66
a. Costs are imputed using German estimates of ratios of training and vocational educa-
tion component costs to, alternatively: (I) secondary education costs, (II) public university
costs.
b. Dual system unit costs are computed by adding up the average (of methods I and II)
costs of training and vocational education.
Source: Egypt and Indonesia: World Bank data; Korea: KEDI (1994); Germany: Dicke,
Glismann, and Siemben (1994), Harhoff and Kane (1996).
Assuming that the average dual program lasts a little more than three years,
we impute the cost of putting an Indonesian trainee through the dual sys-
tem at about US$7,000, which is identical to the cost of System Ganda
reported in independent surveys (World Bank 1995). The annual unit cost
of the dual system in Germany is roughly the same as Germanys per capita
GNP, but this ratio is greater than two in Korea, three in Indonesia, and
four in Egypt. The poorer the country, the greater will be the real burden of
implementing a German-style dual system.
It is unlikely that the dual system can be imported by low- and middle-
income countries, even with some adaptation and on a much less ambi-
tious scale than in Germany, where two-thirds of labor force entrants come
through the dual system. A critical look at the dual system, however, does
reveal lessons that these countries can learn from Germany.
lIessons for Other Countries
Developing countries often attribute Germany's low unemployment of youth
and adequate supply of skilled workers to its dual system and are eager to
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replicate it. These countries frequently have a public vocational education
system that is expensive, or irrelevant, or both. To improve the relevance of
their vocational education, or to reduce public expenditures on it, they try
to increase employers' involvement in the planning, financing, and deliv-
ery of vocational training. Adding a vocational training component based
on the workplace while reducing the school-based vocational education
segment is viewed as the obvious solution. Observing (correctly) that Ger-
many has a system that combines vocational education with workplace
training for almost two-thirds of its secondary school students, develop-
ing-country governments ask for German assistance in reforming their train-
ing systems to resemble the dual system. But it will be unsustainably
expensive for these governments to transplant the dual system wholesale.
The main reason is that their industrial structures and governmental atti-
tudes are far different than Germany's.
In their preoccupation with importing the dual system, many develop-
ing countries may overlook its relevance to any system of vocational train-
ing. Two of the German dual system's fundamental attributes deserve special
mention. First, government-financed, school-based instruction is not the
centerpiece of the German dual system. In fact, it is a relatively recent
addition to Germany's formal training mechanisms. Second, employer-fi-
nanced training based in the workplace, nurtured but not dictated by gov-
ernment, is the mainstay of the German dual system. This is the product of
both a longstanding tradition in the German handwerk sector and of cur-
rent industrial labor relations.
School-Based Vocational Education Is Important,
hut Not the Central Component
The foundations of the dual system lie not in school-based education but
in apprenticeships that evolved over several centuries. School-based instruc-
tion is a relatively recent addition to the dual system: the growing sophisti-
cation in production technology required work-relevant but general skills.
Initially, school-based instruction was informal, sometimes the extension
of Sunday school. It was formalized by the Vocational Training Act of 1969,
only a generation ago. In-school instruction remains the less important
part of the dual system. It accounts for only about 25 percent of instruc-
tion time and expenses.
The Vocational Training Act recognized that because the aim was to
provide general skills to future workers, vocational education should be
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financed by the taxpayer and not by individual employers. Although an
elaborate set of rules stipulates that employers participate in reforming the
subject matter of vocational school instruction, employers, in practice, are
often indifferent to curriculum issues. This should not be surprising since
the subject matter, although relevant to work, is in fact quite general.
The organization and control of vocational education are best left to
the body that pays for the instruction. This is one of the most important
lessons from Germany's experience. In the case of relatively general skills
that are acquired in school, the paying entity would be the state and local
governments. Another lesson relates to the sequence in which dual sys-
tem components are introduced. In Germany the formal vocational edu-
cation component came many years after the vocational training part
had been formalized. Many countries trying to adopt the dual system
reverse this sequence. For example, in Egypt, a formal apprenticeship sys-
tem is being tacked on to a public vocational education program through
the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative. Such efforts may yet bear fruit, but it would
be naive to think that German trainers have any more expertise than
others in successfully adding workplace training to a school-based voca-
tional education system.
Employers Control the Central Component:
V'ocational Training in the Workplace
The mainstay of the dual system is workplace training, and it is controlled
by employers. This component has matured over a long period in Ger-
many, and it continues to change as the industrial structure changes. Its
importance may have lessened somewhat since the "dualization" of the
German training system in the 1 960s, but it still accounts for 75 percent of
instruction time and resources. Today adaptability rather than mastery of
specific skills is increasingly valued in workers. Despite the pressure this
change has brought to bear on vocational training, it remains the critical
component of the dual system.
Although the government provides a broad regulatory framework within
which dual system trainees and employers interact, individual employers
pay for and decide which skills are taught, and employers' associations
(regional chambers) decide how skills are tested and certified. The legal
system gives labor unions a voice in training matters, and the government
provides some advice, but employers decide the details, and whether to
offer apprenticeships in the first place. In Germany 10 percent of all firms
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in the industry and commerce sector and 45 percent in the trade and crafts
sector do not offer apprenticeship opportunities at all. Neither these firms
nor the ones that do offer apprenticeships are coerced into offering train-
ing. When firms and students voluntarily decide to sign an apprenticeship
agreement, training advisors paid by the regional chamber of business
(industrie or handwerk) of which the firm is a member-not the govern-
ment-determine whether the firm is capable of delivering training of a
sufficiently high standard. Again, the government does not determine ap-
prenticeship wages, which are occupation specific.
Perhaps the most important lesson is that job-specific training is financed
and organized by employers who have a vested interest in ensuring that
relevant skills are taught and taught cost effectively. This training is usually
provided in the workplace, either in formal training sessions or on the job.
If a firm chooses to offer an apprenticeship, it is examined to determine if
it has the facilities needed to train the apprentice effectively. This examina-
tion, however, is by employers' associations and not by the government. In
their efforts to adopt the German dual system, developing countries have
violated this principle. Governments, not employers, appear to take the
lead in organizing and financing vocational training. Another important
feature in Germany is the complete absence of coercion. Participation in
the system is voluntary. Even some firms that are "qualified" to offer ap-
prenticeships do not do so. And employers are under no obligation to re-
tain trainees upon completion of the dual program. In fact, fewer than half
do. Developing-country governments that are trying to adopt the dual sys-
tem on the one hand and using coercive measures (such as minimum train-
ing requirements or levies) on the other should be warned that this is
inconsistent with the German dual system.
Vocational tracking is no less expensive than higher education, and it is
not used by governments to divert students from higher education. The
annual unit cost of dual system training is roughly equal to Germany's per
capita GNP (close to US$25,000). Our simulations indicate that while the
absolute unit cost would be lower than this in developing countries, it
would be higher as a proportion of per capita GNP. For a middle-income
country such as Korea, this ratio could be higher than two. For a low-
income country such as Egypt, it may be as high as four. Another yardstick
is the share of GNP spent on the dual system: the total cost of the dual
system was over DM67 billion in 1993, or more than 2 percent of GNP. In
developing countries the entire education budget is generally 4 percent
of GNP. It is also noteworthy that costs of in-firm training increased
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much faster than education costs in Germany between 1972 and 1993,
and this may in part be the reason for the system coming under stress in
recent years.
The dual system is not an instrument to keep students out of higher
education, which is almost entirely at taxpayers' expense. While a large
share of dual system graduates enter the labor force, many go on for higher
education either immediately or after working a few years. A growing num-
ber of junior secondary school graduates choose the academic track and
head for college. In the 1950s, only 5 percent of a graduating high school
class obtained the necessary academic diploma (Abitur); the predicted per-
centage for 2000 was 40 percent. Recent reforms have made it even easier
f'or graduates of the dual system to go on to university. Conversely, higher
education does not rule out subsequent participation in dual system train-
ing. In 1995 more than 5 percent of dual system participants had a univer-
sity diploma.
Not cheap in any setting, the dual system is likely to be the most expen-
sive in the poorest countries. The social costs of effective dual system train-
ing are higher than for university education. Vocational tracking could be
effective in keeping high school graduates from pursuing costly higher edu-
cation, but this is certainly not the case in Germany, where there is no
significant difference in costs. Participation in the dual system does not
preclude a person from going on for higher studies, and as the economy
has become more complex and technological change has escalated, the gen-
eral education level of dual system entrants has risen significantly. Germany's
experience clearly shows that when the mix between general education and
job-specific training is determined by employers and workers (who pre-
sumably care the most about the costs and returns to these investments),
the importance of general education increases.
Notes
1. Countries as diverse as Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Tanzania, and the United States
have seriously considered adopting this system. See chapters 5 and 13 in this vol-
ume and Lynch (1994).
2. The Federal Labor Office-through its state and local bureaus-provides
information on training and job opportunities, helps mediate training demand
and supply, provides financial support for training special groups (such as girls,
f'oreigners, and dropouts), and carries out research. It also finances special efforts
such as the "Qualifications Offensive," which was launched in 1986 in response to
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increased unemployment of youth. The Federal Labor Office exhorted employers
to offer more training.
3. Works counselors and shop stewards supervise vocational training at the firm
level. In 1990 about 75 percent ofworks counselors were members of unions affili-
ated with the German Federation of Trade Unions. This supervision is usually
limited to large firms. There is no such coordination at the company level in small
enterprises.
4. For this reason, the attractiveness of the dual system was probably weakened
by the reform of the labor laws in 1986. The reform allowed firms to hire workers
on fixed-term contracts for up to 18 months and to fire them during this period
without the usual (high) dismissal costs (Harhoff and Kane 1996).
5. Soskice (1994) reports that the annual net costs in the handwerk sector are
about DM7,250 per trainee, about half the cost of training in industrie sector firms
with more than 1,000 employees.
6. Dicke, Glismann, and Siemben (1994) attribute the equilibrium of the Ger-
man dual system largely to the highly regulated labor markets. Regulations and
collectively bargained work contracts help explain wage differentials between un-
skilled and skilled labor and the uniform relative changes of these wages over time.
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(Governiments have expected vocational education .an t rainini,g (VET) svstems3
to perform feats that thIey wVould not reasonably expect fromii other public sys-
reims. Policv makier-s have perceived an increased demand for training at aminost
everv turin. ['he list of deniands is disconcertingly long. VFF is viewed as a solu-
tion if there is rapid growvth in the supply of labor, or if there is rapid employ-
menit growth, or if ther is a sharp increase in unemiplovmeitr. VET', svstemi.s
have been called upOnl to help unemployed vouth and older -workers get jobs,
to reduCe the burden on higher education, to attract foreign investment, to
enSilre rapid growth oe carning and employmenit, and to reduce inequality of
earnings between the rich and the poor.
lhese high expectatio:ns have often ledi governments to involve tlemiisel-es heav-
iiv in thils area. BLt tihe record has not been encouraging, and botlh exagg',erated 0
expectationis and overly involved governments may be responisible for the dis-
appointments that have plaguied VET. In some couintries, a rethinking of thel
role of governmient in vocational educationi and training is tiidertva. This joint
WVorld Bank-International Labour Office stu.dv traces the expericnce of 19
couLtries in reforming4 tlheir VE.T policies and summarizes the lessoIns learined.
The book idenltifies obstacles to implementing adjustments in response to
changing labor markets and innovative approaches to overcoming tlhese conI-
straints. Tlhe findinsgs of rite stuli have beeni packaged to best facilitate the
exchange of information ar all policy-making leveis and armong researchers in
itldustrializcd. transition. and developing counltries.
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